People v. SpencerPeople v. Spencer
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It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, two counts of assault in the second degree (
Contrary to defendant‘s contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request to poll the jurors to determine whether they had knowledge of a story published during the trial about the case (see People v Rivera, 31 AD3d 790, 790-791 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 904 [2006]; see generally People v Shulman, 6 NY3d 1, 32 [2005], cert denied 547 US 1043 [2006]; People v Williams, 78 AD3d 160, 167 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 838 [2011]). The court properly noted that conducting such an inquiry “could have the effect of focusing the jurors’ attention on something that there was no indication any of them had seen” (Williams, 78 AD3d at 167). The court also properly denied defendant‘s motion for a Frye hearing inasmuch as the testimony of the People‘s expert “did not involve any novel procedures or innovative scientific theory” (People v Garrow, 75 AD3d 849, 852 [2010]; see generally People v Wernick, 89 NY2d 111, 115-116 [1996]). Instead, the expert‘s conclusions regarding intoxication by dextromethorphan, an ingredient in cough syrup, were based on basic principles of toxicology, which is a “well-established and accepted methodol-og[y]” (Nonnon v City of New York, 88 AD3d 384, 394 [2011]; see Marso v Novak, 42 AD3d 377, 378 [2007], lv denied 12 NY3d 704 [2009], rearg denied 12 NY3d 881 [2009]).
Finally, defendant contends that he “was unconstitutionally punished for exercising his right to a trial by a judge who should have recused himself.” To the extent that defendant contends that the court should have granted his recusal motion, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion by the court (see People v Shultis, 61 AD3d 1116, 1117 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 929 [2009]; People v Brown, 270 AD2d 917, 917-918 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 851 [2000]; see generally People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the sentence was vindictive (see People v Hurley, 75 NY2d 887, 888 [1990]; People v Irrizarry, 37 AD3d 1082, 1083 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 946 [2007]) and, in any event, that contention is also without merit (see Irrizarry, 37 AD3d at 1083). It is well settled that “[t]he mere fact that a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that offered in connection with plea negotiations is not proof that defendant was punished for asserting his right to trial” (id.). The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Centra, J.P., Fahey, Carni and Sconiers, JJ.