People v. SpencerPeople v. Spencer
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Kevin M. Fee Jr. and Alexis Picard, of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., of Chicago, for amicus curiae ACLU of Illinois.
¶ 1 The State charged defendant, Eugene Spencer, with first degree murder (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The facts of this case have been set forth in the appellate court decision (2023 IL App (1st) 200646-U), and we, therefore, summarize only the facts relevant to our disposition. Spencer was arrested on December 23, 2013. On January 29, 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Spencer with multiple offenses including first degree murder, attempted murder, and home invasion.
A. Jury Trial
¶ 5 A jury trial was held from February 26 to March 5, 2019. The evidence at trial showed that on September 9, 2012, Spencer, along with Qawmane Wilson and Lorina Johnson planned and executed (1) a murder for hire of Wilson’s mother, Yolanda Holmes, and (2) a home invasion. In addition, Spencer shot at and choked Curtis Wyatt, Holmes’s boyfriend, who was also present during the home invasion. Spencer admitted to detectives that Wilson had offered him money to commit the murder. Spencer entered the apartment building alone because Wilson had given him the code to the building. Wilson also called Holmes and asked her to unlock the apartment door, explaining that he planned to come over. Spencer maintained phone contact with Wilson as he made his way to Holmes’s apartment, and he listened to Wilson’s instructions through Spencer’s earbuds. Spencer admitted еntering the apartment and shooting and then stabbing Holmes in the bedroom. Spencer also admitted fighting with Wyatt. At the
¶ 6 On April 8, 2019, Spencer filed a motion for a new trial, and on June 6, 2019, he filed a supplemental motion for a new trial. On August 15, 2019, the circuit court denied Spencer’s motions.
B. Spencer’s Sentencing Hearing
¶ 8 In August 2019, in anticipation of Spencer’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the circuit court to review two appellate court decisions—People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, and People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B—that concerned changes in sentencing law for young offenders.1 The circuit court stated that it was familiar with the cases and directed the parties to address them at the sentencing hearing.
¶ 9 On January 31, 2020, the sentencing hearing was held. Spencer was 28 years old. Prior to the hearing, the circuit court received a presentence investigation report (PSI), Holmes’s sister’s and Wyatt’s victim impact statements, and testimony regarding Spencer’s disciplinary history during pretrial custody.
¶ 10 The PSI provided information regarding Spencer’s background, reflecting—inter alia—that Spencer’s mother raised him and his nine siblings after his father left when Spencer was a child. Spencer described his childhood as “fair” but unstable. Before age 11, he lived with 15 other people in his grandmother’s apartment in a public housing complex. His family struggled financially, and his basic needs were not always met. When the housing complex was torn down, Spencer moved with his mother and siblings to better living conditions but continued to experience financial difficulties. From about age 12 to 16, Spencer suffered physical abuse by his mother’s boyfriend. Spencer reported that he had a good relationship with his siblings until his mother died in the year between his crimes and arrest; his father died sometime in 2012. Spencer attended multiple schools during his childhood and left school during the eleventh grade because his home life was unstable and he was struggling to eat and survive. While in school he attended a special education program for learning issues. Spenсer described himself as a “C” and “D” student who did not get along with his teachers because he did not understand the work. He was suspended once for fighting. And from age 16 to 24, Spencer was “affiliated” with the Gangster Disciples.
¶ 11 In 2012, the year preceding his arrest, Spencer worked at a moving company earning about $1,200 per month. He lived with a friend’s mother and paid $75 per month in rent. Spencer related that he was in good physical health but suffered from high blood pressure and had a torn ligament in his knee and nerve damage in his neck. Hе began abusing marijuana at age 13, alcohol at age 18, and cocaine at age 21. Spencer experienced negative consequences as a result of his substance abuse, but he never received treatment. While in pretrial custody, Spencer twice attempted suicide and was prescribed medication for depression and anxiety. Spencer had no prior criminal history.
C. The Circuit Court
¶ 14 The circuit court recognized that it needed to determine Spencer’s sentеnces in accordance with the seriousness of his crimes and after considering the goal of restoring him to useful citizenship. Accordingly, before sentencing Spencer, the court reviewed the PSI “two or three times” and considered the aggravating and mitigating factors and evidence. The court found Spencer’s youth and lack of a prior criminal record to be mitigating. However, the court attached great significance to the seriousness of his offenses, emphasizing that Spencer agreed to kill for $4,000, shot and then stabbed the victim to make sure she was dead, and tried to kill Wyatt. The court found Spencer’s actions to be “cold-hearted,” noted his problems with authority while in pretrial custody, and could not provide “one good reason he should be back on the street again.”
¶ 15 Spencer’s crimes subjected him to consecutive prison terms of 20 to 60 years for first degree murder (
¶ 16 The court found that the statutorily authorized sentences for Spencer’s crimes were appropriate. The court sentenced Spencer to consecutive prison terms of 50 years for first degree murder, 25 years for attempted murder, аnd 25 years for home invasion, under a misguided assumption that the minimum sentence for the latter two crimes was 21 years.3 On February 26, 2020, Spencer filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. On March 4, 2020, the circuit court denied Spencer’s motion. Spencer filed a timely notice of appeal on March 4, 2020.
D. The Appellate Court
¶ 18 Relevant here, on appeal, Spencer claimed that his sentence was unconstitutional. The appellate court, in a split decision, found that Spencer could not establish that his 100-year sentence of imprisonment violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (
¶ 19 The appellate court majority observed that section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Code of Corrections (
¶ 20 Justice Hyman concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. ¶ 150 (Hyman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Hyman concurred with the majority that Spencer could not bring his emerging adult claim in a direct appeal (id. ¶ 152) but maintained that Spencer must raise his claim in postconviction proceedings as directed by People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 (2023 IL App (1st) 200646-U, ¶ 157). Justice Hyman further faulted the majority for not apрlying the cruel or degrading standard that governs proportionate penalties claims to Spencer’s case and noted only that eligibility for parole did not control that analysis. Id. ¶¶ 164-67.
¶ 21 We allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Spencer’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Spencer argues that, as applied to him, his de facto life sentence violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause and Illinois’s youth parole statute (
A. Standard of Review
¶ 25 An as-applied constitutional challenge is a legal question that we review de novo. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 18; People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22.
1. Miller v. Alabama Does Not Apply to Emerging Adults
¶ 28 Spencer argues that, based on Miller, his sentence is an unconstitutional de facto life sentence that violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. We disagree.
¶ 29 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment (
¶ 30 In Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 54, this court found that ”Miller did not prohibit life sentences for juveniles but, instead, held that the eighth amendment required sentencing courts to have discretion in sentencing juveniles after considering the juvenile’s youth and the attendant characteristics of youth.”
¶ 31 Furthermore, in People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61, quoting People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74), this court observed that “‘”Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.“’” This court clarified that, as Miller directly applies only to juveniles and does not apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶¶ 38, 42. Furthermore, this court found that Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences imposed on young adult offenders, i.e., 18- to 20-year-olds. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 44; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 (“[T]he Supreme Court has clearly and consistently drawn the line between juveniles and аdults for the purpose of sentencing at the age of 18.“).
¶ 32 Additionally, we observe that claims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older have been repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 2017) (declining to expand the holding of Miller to offenders who are “‘just over age 18’” at the time of their offenses); United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013) (determining considerations of efficiency and certainty require a bright line separating adults from juveniles, and for purposes of the eighth amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday marks that bright line); People v. Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting argument to extend Miller to an offender who was over 18 years old at the time of his offense); People v. Abundio, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 190 (Ct. App. 2013) (same); see also Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61. We agree with those decisions and continue to hold that Miller only applies to juveniles and does not apply to emerging adults.
¶ 34 While Miller does not directly apply to Spencer, this court recognized the science that helped form the basis for the Miller decision may assist emerging adult defendants in supporting an as-applied, proportionate penalties clause challenge. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46. Thus, emerging adult defendants, like Spencer in this case, often assert their sentence is a de facto life sentence based on this court’s Miller cases.
¶ 35 The statutory scheme under which Spencer wаs sentenced required an aggregate sentence of 72 years in prison—a minimum of 20 years for first degree murder (
¶ 36 The General Assembly, in response to case law regarding youthful offenders under the age of 21, enacted the parole review statute, which provides in relevant part:
“(b) *** A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of first degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 100-1182) shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner Review Board after serving 20 years or more of his or her sentence оr sentences, except for those subject to a term of natural life imprisonment under Section 5-8-1 of this Code or any person subject to sentencing under subsection (c) of Section 5-4.5-105 of this Code.
* * *
(j) ***
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In considering the factors affecting the release determination under 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1610.50(b), the Prisoner Review Board panel shall consider the diminished culpability of youthful offenders, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender during incarceration.
* * *
(m) *** [A] person denied parole under subsection (j) of this Section, who is serving a sentence or sentences for first degree murder or aggravated criminal sexual assault shall be eligible for a second and final parole review by the Prisoner Review Board 10 years after the written decision under subsection (k) of this Section.”
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b), (j), (m) (West 2020).
¶ 37 In Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 62, this court, referencing the day-for-day credit available to the defendant, found that “[w]e are simply setting forth the sentencing scheme that applies to defendant’s sentence. And we believe it undeniable that the ability of defendant to earn day-for-day credit under that scheme presents a ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release from prison short of a de facto life sentence.” This court found that a judicially imposed sentence that is
¶ 38 As observed by the appellate court in People v. Doe, 2024 IL App (1st) 220811-U, ¶ 22:
“the Dorsey decision concerned the availability of day-for-day, good-conduct, and did not specifically address the situation presented here where a defendant is sentenced to more than 40-years in prison but is nevertheless eligible for parole under section 5-4.5-115 of the Code. However, in reaching its decision, the Dorsey court specifically analogized day-for-day, good-conduct to the possibility of parole. [Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 53-54] (‘The statutory scheme here, which allows for the opportunity of release shоrt of a de facto life sentence, is at least on par with discretionary parole for a life sentence[.]’).”
¶ 39 Based on this court’s analogy, numerous appellate court decisions held that considering Dorsey and its recognition of the relationship between day-for-day, good-conduct, and the possibility of parole, the availability of parole under section 5-4.5-115 of the Code of Corrections (
¶ 40 We find that the statutory provision invoked to review parole petitions for emerging adults convicted of first degree murder provides that the opportunity for release requires consideration of “the diminished culpability of youthful offenders, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender during incarceration.” See
C. Spencer Is Not Foreclosed From Bringing His as-Applied Challenge to His Sentence Pursuant to the Illinois Proportionate Penalties Clause
¶ 42 Notwithstanding the fact that Spencer is not serving a de facto life sentence, he is not foreclosed from bringing an as-applied challenge to his sentence pursuant to the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. Thus, the appellate court erred by finding that, because Spencer did not receive a de facto life sentence, he cannot establish that his sentence violated the proportionаte penalties clause. See 2023 IL App (1st) 200646-U, ¶ 143. Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution, titled “Limitation of Penalties After Conviction,” states: “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
¶ 43 A defendant may challenge a sentence of any length. See People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 (1999) (as-applied challenge to Class B misdemeanor punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment). Further, the Illinois Constitutiоn does not limit a proportionate penalties challenge to just juveniles or individuals with life sentences. People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 29. In addition, this court has not barred young adult defendants from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science regarding juvenile maturity and brain development. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (19-year-old defendant sentenced to a term of natural life in prison)).
¶ 44 “All as-applied constitutional challenges are, by definition, reliant on the appliсation of the law to the specific facts and circumstances alleged by the challenger. ‘Therefore, it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.’” (Emphasis omitted.) People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 2018 IL 121636, ¶ 31 (quoting Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37); see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 41 (18-year-old defendant sentenced to a mandatory minimum aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment; this court stated that the record needed to be sufficiently developed in the circuit court through an evidentiary hearing and findings оf fact to review the defendant’s constitutional claim); House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 5, 31 (19-year-old defendant sentenced to a mandatory natural life term for murder; this court determined that the appellate court erred in holding that his natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the issue).
¶ 46 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 In sum, we continue to hold that Miller only applies to juveniles and not to emerging adults. We find that, while Spencer is not serving a de facto life sentence, the appellate court erred by concluding that fact prohibited him from establishing his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. Lastly, we hold that Spencer is not forеclosed from bringing his proportionate penalties claim in a postconviction petition. The judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court of Cook County are affirmed.
¶ 49 Judgments affirmed.