People v. SpencePeople v. Spence
As is pertinent here, a jury convicted Francis Spence (Spence) of driving without a valid driver’s license. (
We granted transfer of this case to this court upon certification by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Riverside County to address the following question: May a defendant be convicted of driving with an invalid driver’s license in violation of
We conclude that he may, because
Facts
On January 30, 2001, Spence received a citation for a defective windshield or rear window. His driver’s license was suspended on June 10, 2001, for failure to appear as promised on a citation or for failure to appear after a court continuance.
2
Notice of the suspension was sent to him on May 9, 2001, by certified letter, but the letter was returned unclaimed. The Vehicle Code mandates that drivers’ addresses be updated within 14 days of their moving to a new address.
Discussion
1.
In 1913, the statutes provided that no one was to drive a motor vehicle after December 31 of that year, unless they had complied with the requirements of the act, which included section 23, providing for the obtaining of a driver’s license. (Stats. 1913, ch. 326, § 23, pp. 649-651.)
The first sign of the split that later became
For our purposes, the next substantive change to these provisions came in 1935 when the Vehicle Code was created. (Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 93.) Section 250, subdivision (a) made it a misdemeanor for
A 1937 amendment to section 332 expanded it to also cover those drivers who had been refused a license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department). (Stats. 1937, ch. 556, § 4, p 1591.)
A 1949 amendment to section 332 introduced the requirement that the driver know that his license or driving privilege had been suspended or revoked or that he had been refused a license by the Department. (Stats. 1949, ch. 273, § 5, p. 494.)
The People pointed out below, without contradiction by Spence, that legislative intent materials do not exist for any of the foregoing enactments.
In 1959, the existing Vehicle Code was repealed and reenacted. (Stats. 1959, ch. 3, p. 1523.) The existing section 250 became
The statutes of 1961 first introduced an increased punishment for a second violation of section 14601. (Stats. 1961, ch. 278, § 1, p. 1311.)
The 1963 statutes dropped from section 14601 the reference to drivers who have been refused a license. (Stats. 1963, ch. 155, § 1, p. 822.)
In 1968, section 14601 was revoked and a new version was enacted prohibiting driving while one’s “driving privilege is suspended or revoked” for a list of driving offenses. (Stats. 1968, ch. 1195, § 7, p. 2270.) It added the presumption that knowledge by the driver that his privilege has been suspended or revoked applies if the Department had so notified the driver. (Stats. 1968, ch. 1195, § 7, p. 2270.) It created section 14601.1, which applied to any drivers whose privilege is suspended or revoked for any reason not listed in section 14601, and it utilized the same presumption as that latter section. (Stats. 1968, ch. 1195, § 8, p. 2271.)
Legislation in 1993 reinstated the pre-1959 requirement of
The version of
As is evident from the foregoing, the two provisions
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have coexisted, in varying forms, since 1923. To summarize, the express requirement of
2. CALJIC No. 16.631
CALJIC No. 16.631, which was given to this jury, providеs: “It is not necessary for the People to introduce evidence that the defendant did not have a valid license to operate a motor vehicle. Whether the defendant was or was not properly licensed is a matter peculiarly within . . . his . . . own knowledge. The burden is on the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt as to . . . his . . . guilt of driving a motor vehicle upon a highway without being the holder of a valid driver’s license.”
This instruction was approved in
People
v.
Goscinsky
(1921)
More recently, in
In re Shawnn F.
(1995)
And, finally, the holding in
Shawnn F., supra,
3. CALJIC No. 16.641
CALJIC No. 16.641 applies to section 14601 et seq. and provides: “If the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that prior to the commission of the alleged offеnse herein, the defendant was given notice of the [suspension] [revocation] of [his] [her] driving privilege, either by personal delivery thereof to the defendant
or by the mailing of the notice, postage prepaid, addressed to the defendant at the address shown by the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles,
you may[
9
] infer that the defendant had
knowledge of the fact of the [suspension] [
4. In re Jorge M.
In
In re Jorge M.
(2000)
Considering the maximum punishment awaiting someone convicted of driving without a valid license, i.e., it is an infraction/misdemeanor “wobbler” with the maximum term being six months in jail (
The first is the legislative history and context of the statute. The
Jorge M.
court pointed out that while it appeared that the prohibition on certain assault weapons was motivated by a public safety concern, many individuals asserted during the legislative process that it might be too broad if it covered weapons that had legitimate applications, like hunting and target practice. In fact, the law in its final version explicitly stated that it was not applicable to weapons with legitimate uses. It was then left to the owner to determine whether the weapon he/she possessed was one or the other. The court further noted that the legislative history revealed no intent to either include or exclude a knowledge requirement. In examining the prohibition’s statutory context, the
Jorge M.
court pointed out that other courts had not uniformly required or rejected a knowledge requirement for other possessory offenses. The cases that did not require such knowledge, the court noted, involved weapons that, without exception, were used exclusively for nefarious purposes. The court concluded, “Nothing in the [statute in question] suggests the Legislature regarded the distinctions between [weapons with no legitimate use and those with] to be so patent and definite that innocent and unknowing possession of a restricted assault weapon would be particularly unlikely.”
(Jorge M., supra,
Unlike the prohibition in
Jorge M.,
Spence asserts that under the doctrine of preclusion, a more specific statute, which he asserts is section 14601 et seq., “governs” over a more general one, i.e.,
The second and third factors in
Jorge M.
concern a recognition that “at least whеre the penalties imposed are substantial, [the generally applicable rule that every offense contains either a mens rea or criminal negligence requirement] can fairly be said to establish a presumption against criminal liability without mental fault or negligence, rebuttable only by compelling evidence of legislative intent to dispense with mens rea entirely.”
(Jorge M., supra,
The next factor is the seriousness of harm to the public. As
Jorge M.
noted, “when a crime’s statutory definition does not expressly include any scienter element, the fact the Legislature intended the law to remedy a serious and
widespread public safety threat militates against the conclusion it also intended impliedly to include in the definition a scienter element especially burdensome to prove.”
(Jorge M., supra,
The next
Jorge M.
factor begins with the premise that the offense carries a substantial penalty.
(Jorge M., supra,
The next factor concerns the difficulty of proof for the prosecution of any knowledge requirement read into the statute.
(Jorge M., supra,
23 Cal.4th at pp, 884-886.) Applying this to
The last factor encompasses a consideration of the number of prosecutions anticipated under the law. In
Jorge M.,
the California Supreme Court said of this factor, “[0]ur construction should not impose a scienter requirement that would unduly impede the ability to prosecute substantial numbers of violators.”
(Jorge M., supra,
5. Due Process
Spence cites
People
v.
Garcia
(2001)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
McKinster, J., and Richli, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 13, 2005.
Notes
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Section 13365.
Section 14600 requires notification within 10 days, but the 14-dаy period was testified to by the prosecution’s witness.
Those statutes prohibit driving while one’s driving privilege is suspended or revoked.
Although Spence asserted in his opening brief that
We include in our discussion of section 14601 or 14601 et seq., sections 14601.1, 14601.2 and 14601.5.
In Kuhn, this court distinguished a statute making the willful failure to file a tax return with intent to evade a felony from another statute making the failure to file a return a misdemeanor, where the latter made no reference to willfulness and the failure was expressly with or without intent to evade. (Id. at pp. 699-700.) This court held both statutes to be valid. (Ibid)
Spence’s attempt to distinguish
Shawnn F.
and
Garcia
on the basis that the drivers there did not have drivers’ licenses, not that their licenses had been revoked or suspended, is meaningless, as
In
People v. Roder
(1983)
Thus, Spence’s suggеstion that the People carry the significant burden of proving that a license has been suspended or revoked in prosecutions under section 14601 et seq. is undermined by the existence of this instruction.
During oral argument, Spence ignored this court’s attempt to draw his attention to that portion of CALJIC No. 16.641, which, we believe, disproves his suggestion. Of course, as Spence asserted at oral argument, the People have the burden of proving knowledge on the part of the defendant of the suspension or revocation in section 14601 et. seq. prosecutions, because those provisions contain express knowledge requirements. However, the significance of CALJIC No. 16.641 is that the jury in such cases may infer, merely by virtue of the fact that the Department mails a notice, postage prepaid, to the address shown by their records to be the defendant’s, that the defendant had knowledge of the suspension or revocation.
If charged as an infraction, the maximum punishment is a fine of $250. (
Spence, for his part, waited until oral argument to present us with his own version of the “inquiry ender.” Specifically, he asserts that because section 13106 provides that a rebuttable presumption of knowledge of suspension or revocation is created when the Department mails notice to the driver’s аddress on file and
the notice has not been returned undeliverable or unclaimed,
the Legislature intended that actual knowledge be required as to any matters pertaining to suspension or revocation. We disagree. First, the same statute repeats the requirement of section 14600 that a driver notify the Department of any change of address. (Section 14600, as stated before, requires that this notification be done within 10 days.) What is clear from this provision is that the Legislature intended for Spence to notify the Department that he was no longer at the address to which his notice was sent, and for him to supply the Department with an address where he would have actually received such notification. Second, the existence of a rebuttable presumption in prosecutions where knowledge is clearly required cannot be construed as a message from the Legislature that knowledge is required in
all
prosecutions. The Legislature has had 88 years to amend
In their supplemental brief, the People point out that in some jurisdictions, driving without a valid license is considered a lesser included offense of driving while a license has been suspended or revoked. In others, the two are considered to have different elements.
We again refer to the language of section 14607.4, quoted in the text.
He also cites
Strandt
v.
Cannon
(1938)
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in
Jorge M.,
“all persons are obligated to learn of and comply with the law . . . .”
(Jorge M., supra,
Spence points out that
In re Murdock
(1968)
Spence’s assertion, in his reply brief, that a driver has no obligation to daily check with the Department to ensure that his license is still valid, and such an obligation would be too burdensome, is disingenuous. Drivers are aware that they commit or fail to perform certain acts and they are chargeable with knowledge that thеse acts or omissions may result in the suspension or revocation of their licenses. Thus, they have notice that their driving privileges are in jeopardy, even if they do not receive actual notice of revocation or suspension, without the “paranoid” need, as Spence puts it, to contact the Department daily.
At oral argument, Spence asserted that licensing provisions in other codes have no relevance whatsoever to
See footnote 7, ante.