86 N.Y.S. 415 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1904
Lead Opinion
The defendant and one Van Aernam were sued for a penalty in burning á fallow in violation of section 229 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law (Laws of 1900, chap. 20). The record shows that the defendant Snyder had been indicted, tried and acquitted for the same acts which constituted the cause of action. Upon the presentation of the record of acquittal the complaint was dismissed as to him and the jury acquitted Van Aernam. The People appeal only from the judgment of dismissal, and the single question up for review is whether the judgment of acquittal is a bar to the action by the People to recover the penalty which the section provides.
Section 229, after prohibiting the burning of fallows, stumps, etc., during certain periods of the year, prescribes: “ Any person violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and iii addition thereto is liable to a penalty of three hundred dollars.”
Two distinct remedies áre allowable against' one violating the provisions of this section of the act. One to obtain the punishment of the offender for committing a misdemeanor, and the other a civil action to recover the penalty. This method of double punishment of offenders guilty of misdemeanors has long been much in vogue by various statutes in this State. For- instance, chapter 628 of the Laws of 1857 (Excise Law); section 2Í of chápter 534 of the Laws of 1879 (fishing out of season); section 19 of' chapter 183 of the Laws of 1885 (deception in sales of dairy products).
At the outset it will be noted that the. conviction or acquittal in the criminal action would hot be conclusive against one who has sustained damages by the acts which compose the criminal charge. From the early history of the State this has been made so by statute. (Newton v. Porter, 5 Lans. 416, 423.) The Code of Civil Procedure
The contention here, however, is founded largely upon the facts that the two remedies are prosecuted in the name of the People, and the suit for the penalty is quasi criminal in character. They are, however, entirely independent, and one is a criminal and the other a civil action. The rules governing the trials in the two cases, are dissimilar. In the criminal action the evidence must satisfy the jury of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The taking of the evidence of a non-resident witness by commission at the instance of the People is not permissible in a criminal prosecution. The manner of eliciting proof is more restricted and the district attorney in presenting the case to the jury must keep in a more narrow groove than the counsel in a civil action. (People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 547; People v. Milks, 55 App. Div. 372.) The jury without any departure from the strict letter of the law or from any misapprehension of the evidence might acquit in a criminal action and upon the same proof and with equal propriety render a verdict for the amount of the penalty.
The authorities in this State as far as our research has extended are uniform in holding that the two actions áre not at all dependent upon each other. In People v. Rohrs (49 Hun, 150) the action was to recover penalties pursuant to chapter 183 of the Laws of 1885, entitled “ An act to prevent deception in the sale of dairy products.” The act made the offender guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment and in addition thereto provided that he should forfeit and pay a penalty of $500. The " statute, it will be observed, is almost identical with the one under consideration. The defendants offered to prove that the defendant Rohrs had been tried and .acquitted for the offense set Out in the complaint, but the evidence was excluded. Upon appeal the court sustained this ruling saying (at p. 150) : “ The parties to the criminal proceeding were the People, the plaintiffs in this action, and Rohrs, one of the defendants-in this action. The question litigated in the criminal proceeding was whether or not Rohrs had violated the statute. It was judicially determined that he had not so done.
We are aware that the contrary principle has been maintained in Coffey v. United States (116 U. S. 436), but as the policy of the courts of our own State has been so consistent and uniform in the direction indicated we feel bound to follow them. The chief reason urged by the United States Supreme Court for the adoption of the doctrine that the two remedies cannot both be pursued is that the suit
In Stone v. United States (167 U. S. 178) the Coffey base was in a measure limited. The Stone case was an- action of conversion and the defendant Stone had been acquitted on an indictment in the United States District Court for the same offense which was made the basis of the civil action also prosecuted in the name of the United States. The defendant pleaded the judgment of acquittal in bar of the civil action, but the court of last resort held against him. After distinguishing the Coffey case, the court said (at p. 188): “ The rule established in Coffey's case can have no application in a civil case not involving any question of criminal intent or of forfeiture for prohibited acts, but turning wholly upon an issue as to the ownership of property. In the criminal case the government sought to punish a criminal offense while in the civil case it only seeks in its capacity as owner of property, illegally converted, to recover its value. In the criminal case his acquittal may have been due to the fact that the government failed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of some fact essential to establish the offense charged, while the same evidence in a civil action brought to recover the value of the property illegally converted might have been sufficient to entitle the government to a verdict. Not only was a greater degree of proof requisite to support the indictment than is sufficient to sustain a civil action ; but an essential fact had to be proved in the criminal .case, which was not necessary to be proved in the present suit. In order to convict the defendant upon the indictment for unlawfully, willfully and feloniously cutting and removing timber from lands of the United States, it was necessary to prove a criminal intent on his part, or at least that he knew the timber to be the property of the United States.”
The action for a penalty is a civil one, pure and simple, and the question of the defendant’s intent is not a necessary feature of the plaintiff’s case. (People v. Kibler, 106 N. Y. 321; People v. Laesser, 79 App. Div. 384.) The plaintiff made his prima facie case by proving that the defendant burned the fallow within the prohibited period. Whether done negligently, with malicious intent or in a spirit of sport is unimportant. If the maintenance of the
Whether the action for the penalty is to be sued for in the name of the People or of an informer or of an official, it is still a civil remedy by the statute. The test is not that the civil action is in form prosecuted in the name of the People which would make it objectionable. The criticism indulged is that the action is authorized if at all after the other remedy allowed by the statute has been resorted to. The doctrine upon which the cases in our State rest gives no room for this technical construction. They proceed upon the ground that the remedies are separate and were so intended by the lawmakers. Neither upon principle nor authority do we regard the one as a bar to thé maintenance of the concurrent or independent remedy.
Nor does the determination reached result in putting the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense within the proper meaning of that phrase. (Const, art. 1, § 6.) He had been once tried on an indictment where different inferences, a different mode of procedure,' a different rule as to the competency of witnesses prevail from.what are allowable iii the civil action.
It was not necessary to obtain the conviction of the defendant before resorting to the penalty. (People v. Waterbury, 44 Hun, 493.)
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
All concurred, except Williams, J., dissenting in an opinion in which Stover, J., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
The action was brought to recover' a penalty of $300 for burning logs, etc., in a fallow, at a time of year prohibited by section 229 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law (Laws of 1900, chap. 20). That section provides: “ Any person violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition thereto is liable to a penalty of three hundred dollars.” The defendant appellant was arrested for a misdemeanor under this statute, pleaded not
We do not think it necessary to enter upon any discussion of the question involved, inasmuch as there are at least two cases reported which involve practically the same question and which are directly in conflict with each other. (People v. Rohrs, 49 Hun, 150 ; Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436; approved in Stone v. United States, 167 id. 178.)
The Sohrs case was decided by the first department, General Term, in 1888. The Ooffey case was decided in 1886, and was approved in the Stone case in 1897. . The rule of law laid down in the Ooffey cáse was that adopted by the trial court in the present case, and seems to have been well considered and to be the settled law of the United States Supreme Court. The opinion in the Sohrs case was a per curiam one, and the attention of the General Term was not apparently called to the Ooffey case or the reasoning of the court upon which that case was determined. The General Term held 'the former acquittal was not a bar to the recovery of the penalty.
We think, under this condition of the decisions, that we should follow the.rule laid down in the United States Supreme Court, and that the judgment - and order should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
Stover, J., concurred. .
Judgment and order reversed and new'trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event.