THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NEVA B. SNYDER, Defendant and Appellant.
Crim. No. 22293
Supreme Court of California
Oct. 18, 1982.
32 Cal. 3d 590
Harry D. Roth, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Harvey R. Zall, Deputy State Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, Assistant Attorney General, Robert D. Marshall, Gary A. Binkerd and Christine M. Diemer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHARDSON, J.—Defendant Neva Snyder appeals from a judgment convicting her of possеssion of a concealable firearm by a convicted felon (
At trial, defendant offered to prove the follоwing facts supporting her theory of mistake: The marijuana possession charge resulted from a plea bargain not involving a jail or prison sentence. At the time the bargain was struck, defendant‘s attorney advised her that she was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor. Believing that she was not a felon, defendant thereafter had registered to vote, and had voted. On one prior occasion, police officers found a gun in her home but, after determining that it was registered to her husband, the officers filed no charges against defendant.
The trial cоurt refused to admit any evidence of defendant‘s mistaken belief that her prior conviction was a misdemeanor and that she was not a felon. The court also rejected proposed instructions requiring proof of defendant‘s prior knowledge of her felony conviction as an element of the offense charged.
The elements of the offense proscribed by
Does
In the present case, defendant was presumed to know that it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a concealable firearm. (
Thus, regardless of what she reasonably believed, or what her attorney may have told her, defendant was deemed to know under the law that she was a convicted felon forbidden to possess concealable firearms. Her asserted mistake regarding her correct legal status was a mistake of law, not fact. It does not constitute a defense to
None of the California cases relied on by defendant is apposite here. People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092], and People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337], each involved mistakes of fact, not law. In Hernandez, the mistake concerned the age of the alleged victim of a statutory rape. In Mayberry, dеfendant erred in assuming that the adult victim of forcible rape consented to his acts. People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798 [299 P.2d 850], involved the good faith belief of a defendant charged with bigamy that he is free to remarry. We were careful to explain that defendant‘s mistake was a factual one: “We have concluded that defendant is not guilty of bigamy, if he had a bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left him free to remarry.” (Id., at p. 801; italics
Our conclusion is confirmed by federal cases interpreting a similar federal statute forbidding possession of a firearm by one convicted of a felony. (
Defendant relies primarily upon People v. Bray, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at p. 494, but that case is distinguishable. There defendant pleaded guilty in Kansas to being an accessory before the fact and was placed on two years’ summary probation, which he successfully completed. When he subsequently sought to register to vote, he filled out an explanatory form referring to a Kansas offense, and indicating that he was uncertain whether he had been convicted of a felony. He was permitted to vote. Seeking employment as a security guard, he stated that he had not been convicted of a felony but described the circumstances of his arrest and probation. The Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services registered him as a guard. On several other jоb applications he indicated his uncertainty as to his status while fully setting forth the circumstances of his arrest and probation.
In Bray, the court concluded that under these unusual circumstances the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on mistake or ignorance of fact and knowledge of the facts which make the act unlawful. (52 Cal.App.3d, at p. 499.) The court cautioned, however, that its decision “should not be interpreted to mean instructions on mistake or ignorance of fact and knowledge of the facts are required every time a defendant claims he did not know he wаs a felon .... It is only in very unusual circumstances such as these that the giving of these instructions is necessary.” (Ibid.)
In the present case, unlike Bray, defendant made no attempt to inform government officials of the circumstances of her conviction or to seek their advice regarding her correct legal status. (Some authorities have suggested that reliance upon the erroneous advice of governmental authorities might constitute an exception to the general rule that a mistake of law is no defense. See Perkins on Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969) p. 938; A.L.I. Model Pen. Code (Proposеd Official Draft 1962) § 2.04(3)(b).)
We conclude that the trial court properly excluded evidence of defendant‘s asserted mistake regarding her status as a convicted felon.
The judgment is affirmed.
Bird, C. J., Mosk, J. and Kaus, J. concurred.
BROUSSARD, J.—I dissent.
The two elements of a violation of
The majority have adopted a special strict liability rule as to
During a lawful search of defendant and her husband‘s home in 1979, officers found one loaded handgun and two other handguns which were partially disassembled. In 1973 she had been convicted upon a guilty plea of sale of marijuana, a felony. (Former
The trial court refused to admit the evidence of defendant‘s mistaken belief that the prior conviction was a misdemeanor and that she was not a felon. The court also rejected offered instructions to require knowledge of a prior felony conviction as an element of the offense, and to define “knowingly,” to explain the effect of ignorance or mistake of fact disproving criminal intent. (CALJIC Nos. 1.21, 4.35, 3.31.5 [paraphrased].)1 The instructions, if given, would have required the jury to find that defendant knew she was a felon as an element of the crime.
We recently recognized our duty to reconcile the provisions of
In the instant case we are similarly called upon to reconcile
“The word ‘intent’ in
At common law an honest and reasonable belief in circumstances which, if true, would make the defendant‘s conduct innocent was held to be a good defense. (People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092].) The concept of mens rea, the guilty mind, expresses the principle that it is not conduct alone but conduct accompanied by certain mental states which concerns, or should concern the law. While in some cases, culpability had been сompletely eliminated as a necessary element of criminal conduct, the court has moved away from imposition of criminal liability in the absence of culpability where the governing statute, by implication or otherwise, expresses no legislative intent or policy to be served by strict liability. (Id., at pp. 532-533.)
The elements of the offense proscribed by
There does not appear to be any provision in
To hold otherwise is contrary to the settled California rule that a mens rea requirement is an “invariable” element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d 143, 154; People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, 801.) Having established the rule, we must assume the Legislature is aware of it and acting in accordance with it, and the absence of any provision to establish strict liability must be read as reflecting legislative intent to require wrongful intent.
The majority rely upon federal cases interpreting a federal statute forbidding possession of a firearm by one convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors. (
None of the federal cases cite or discuss statutes comparable to
In determining whether a defendant‘s mistaken belief disproves criminal intent pursuant to
While mistake as to whether the conduct is violative of a statute is not a defense, a mistaken impression as to the legal effect of a collateral matter
This court has also held that criminal intent may be negated by defendant‘s reasonable and bona fide but erroneous belief as to his status. In People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, 801 et seq., the defendant was prosecuted for bigamy, and it was held that the defendant‘s bona fide and reasonable belief that his first wife had divorced him and remarried would be a good defense. The court reasoned in part that it would not be reasonable to hold “that a person is guilty of bigamy who remarries in good faith in reliance on a judgment of divorce or annulment that is subsequently found not to be the ‘judgment of a competent court’ (
People v. Flumerfelt (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 495, 497-498 [96 P.2d 190], also illustrates the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. In that case, the defendant was charged with selling corporate securities without a permit. The defendant claimed that before she sold the securities, her attorney told her that a permit to sell had been obtained, and it was held that her honest but mistaken belief that a permit to sell had been
The O‘Brien, Hernandez, Atchison, Mayberry, Vogel and Flumerfelt cases, read together, make clear that a mistake of law is one premised on ignorance of the terms of the statute which the defendant is charged with violating. However, when the defendant reasonably and honestly believes that the statute is not applicable to him or that he has complied with it, there is a mistakе of fact. There is a mistake of fact even though the matter as to which the defendant is mistaken is a question of law. The questions of age in Hernandez and Atchison were matters resolved as a matter of law as was marital status in Vogel and the nonissuance of a permit in Flumerfelt.
The Court of Appeal has held that a mistaken belief that a conviction was not a felony conviction could negate criminal intent in a prosecution for violation of
In Bray, it was concluded that in the circumstances the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on mistake or ignorance of faсt and knowledge of the facts which make the act unlawful. (52 Cal.App.3d, at p. 499.)
The Court of Appeal stated that its decision should not be interpreted to mean instructions on mistake or ignorance of fact or knowledge of the facts are required every time a defendant claims he did not know he was a felon.
Had the trial court in the instant case admitted the offered evidence and given the requested instruction, the jury could properly have concluded that defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that her conviction was not a felony conviction. She was granted probation without jail or prison sentence. Her attorney had advised her that the offense was a misdemeanor,3 and there were additional circumstances reflecting a good faith belief.
The errors in excluding the offered evidence and refusing the offered instructions denied defendant the right to have the jury determine substantial issues material to her guilt and require reversal of the conviction. (People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 27 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000]; People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d 143, 157-158.)
I would reverse the judgment.
Newman, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.