Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Grover Smith, Sr., was convicted of violating section 6 — 303(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 303(d)) and sentenced to 23 months’ imprisonment after trial by jury in the circuit court of Jackson County.
Section 6 — 303(d) provides that any person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of section 6 — 303 (driving while license revoked) shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the original revocation was for a violation of section 11 — 401 (leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries) or section 11 — 501 (driving under the influence) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, pars. 11 — 401, 11 — 501), or a violation of section 9 — 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, relating to the offense of reckless homicide (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3). Smith had a previous conviction for driving while his liсense was revoked and that revocation was for driving under the influence of alcohol.
On appeal, defendant argues that a previous conviction of driving under the influence is an element of the offense specified in section 6 — 303(d) and that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the previous conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, defendant argues section 6 — 303(d) is merely a sentencing provision and that the previous convictions were not essential elements of the offense. Therefore, defendant maintains, he was denied a fair trial because the trial court improperly submitted evidence of the other convictions to the jury. Defendant also argues that the $1,000 fine assessed against him should bе vacated because the defendant is financially unable to pay that amount. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County.
On February 3, 1986, Grover Smith, Sr., was stoрped in Murphysboro, Illinois, by a Jackson County deputy sheriff after his car was seen driving erratically and with only one headlight. When asked to produce his driver’s license, defendant stated that he did not hаve one. It was subsequently discovered that Mr. Smith had a previous conviction for driving while his license was revoked and that the revocation was for driving under the influence of alcohol.
At trial, the Stаte introduced as evidence three separate orders of revocation, certified by the Secretary of State, all of which were for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and all of which were in effect on February 3, 1986. The State also introduced an order for probation for Mr. Smith, dated April 15, 1986, for driving while his license was revoked. Based upon this evidence, Mr. Smith was found guilty.
On appeal, defendant contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because it failed to introduce sufficient evidence of his prior DUI convictions. Thе only evidence of these prior convictions was the certified copies of the orders of revocation, which stated that the reason for revocation was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Citing People v. Slaughter (1980),
While Slaughter states the traditional rule, we believe the Motor Vehicle Code provides an exception. Section 2 — 108 of the Code states, “The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to prepare under the seal of the Secretary of State certified copies of any records оf his office and every such certified copy shall be admissible in any proceeding in any court in like manner as the original thereof.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 2 — 108.) Certified copies of orders of rеvocation are admissible. (Cf. People v. Younge (1980),
“The Secretary of State shall maintain appropriate records of all licenses and permits refused, cancelled, revоked or suspended and of the revocation and suspension of driving privileges of persons not licensed under this Chapter, and such records shall note the reasons for such action.” (Emphаsis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 117(b).
Reading these two statutes together, we conclude that a certified copy of an order of revocation which states that the reason for such revocation was driving under the influence of alcohol is sufficient evidence to prove the previous DUI conviction for purposes of section 6 — -303(d).
As an alternative argument, defendant maintains that section 6 — 303(d) of the Vehicle Code is merely a sentencing provision and that prior convictions are not elements of the offense which the State must prove, but are only factors used by the sentencing judge in determining whether the crime should be enhanced to a felony. The introduction of his previous convictions, defendant argues, prejudiced the jury and denied him a fair trial.
We considered a similar argument in People v. Hicks (1986),
“a prior conviction for theft is an essential element of the crime of felony theft when the offense has been enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony due to the prior conviction, and that the prior conviction must be provеd before the trier of fact prior to finding guilt or innocence.” People v. Hicks (1986),150 Ill. App. 3d 242 , 246,501 N.E.2d 1027 , 1030.
We see no reason to distinguish between Hicks and the present case. While defendant cites People v. Davis (1985),
Defendant also argues that his $1,000 fine should be vacated because he is financially unable to pay that amount. As this argument was not advanced in defendant’s post-trial motion for a new trial, it is waived for purposes of appeal.
For the aforementioned reasons, the deсision of the circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and WELCH, JJ., concur.
Lead Opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
delivered the opinion of the court:
Grover Smith, Sr., was convicted of violating section 6 — 303(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 303(d)) after a trial by jury in the circuit court of Jaсkson County. He was sentenced to 23 months’ imprisonment and fined $1,000. On appeal, Mr. Smith argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State did not introducе certified copies of the records of his prior convictions. In the alternative, he argued that the introduction of certified copies of his previous orders of revocatiоn unfairly prejudiced the jury because such prior convictions were not elements of the offense which the State had to prove, but only factors to be used by the sentencing judge in determining whеther the offense should be enhanced to a felony. We held that a certified copy of an order of revocation which states that the reason for such revocation was driving under the influence of alcohol was sufficient evidence to prove the previous DUI convictions for purposes of section 6 — 303(d). We further held that such previous convictions were elements of the enhanced offense which had to be proved to the trier of fact.
Mr. Smith also appealed the imposition of the $1,000 fine, arguing that he was financially unable to pay it. We stated in our opinion that because he did not advance this argument in his post-trial motion for a new trial, it was waived for purposes of appeal. In his petition for rehearing, Mr. Smith maintains that because sentencing does not necessarily occur within 30 days of the verdict, the time limit within which a motion for new trial must be filed, a defendant would be prevented from appealing a sentence imposed more than 30 days after the return of the verdict. In Mr. Smith’s case, he filed a motion for a new trial on November 26, 1986, 30 days after the return of the verdict. Sentencing occurred later that day. Mr. Smith could not have included a request for relief from the sentence in his motion for a new trial because it had not yet been imposed. We hold, therefore, that review of the severity of a sentence is not waived by failing to include it in a post-trial motion for a new trial.
Considering Mr. Smith’s argument on the merits, however, we conclude that the imposition of the $1,000 fine was not an abuse of thе trial court’s discretion and should not be vacated on appeal. Mr. Smith was given one year from the date of his release to pay the fine and the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mr. Smith was financially able to pay the fine.
The judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed.
HARRISON, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.