Lead Opinion
Rosie Smith escaped from a Michigan Department of Corrections facility. She was apprehended on a larceny charge, convicted, sentenced, and returned to a Michigan Department of Corrections facility to serve the sentence.
Smith was subsequently arraigned on a charge of prison escape, and pleaded guilty after her motion to quash the charge for violation of the 180-day rule
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed,
The people contend that Smith’s unconditional guilty plea waived any claim she might otherwise assert that the 180-day rule barred prosecution on the charge of prison escape.
A predicate of Smith’s claim is this Court’s per curiam decision in People v Woodruff,
The purpose of the statute is clear. It was intended to give the inmate, who had pending offenses not yet tried, an opportunity to have the sentences run concurrently consistent with the principle of law disfavoring accumulations of sentences. This purpose, however, does not apply in the instance of a new offense committed after imprisonment, nor where the statute, as in the case of an escape or attempted escape, sets up a mandatory consecutive sentence. The legislature was not concerning itself with the need for dispatch in the handling of a charge brought against an inmate for offenses committed while in prison. [Emphasis in original.]
The Court of Appeals agreed with the prosecutor that Smith’s unconditional plea of guilty waived any claim she might otherwise assert that her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
The Court of Appeals is reversed and the conviction is reinstated.
Notes
MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). The 180-day rule as amended by
(1) Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time or disciplinary credits earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, andany decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement shall be delivered by certified mail.
(2) This section does not apply to a warrant, indictment, information, or complaint arising from either of the following:
(a) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility while incarcerated in the correctional facility.
(b) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility after the inmate has escaped from the correctional facility and before he or she has been returned to the custody of the department of corrections.
MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3). See n 1.
Similarly see People v Ewing,
Cf. People v Patterson,
The warrant charging Smith with prison escape was issued in February, 1987. She pleaded guilty on March 7, 1988.
See n 1. MCL 780.132; MSA 28.969(2) provides that the Department of Corrections shall notify each prisoner of any request forwarded under § 1. MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) provides that in the event that the time limitation set forth in § 1 is violated, "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction,” and “the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.”
People v Smith,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in the result). I agree with Justice Brickley’s analysis and conclusion that an unconditional guilty plea waives a claim of violation of the federal and Michigan constitutional right to a speedy trial, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
I also concur in Justice Levin’s conclusion that People v Woodruff,
Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of theinmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. [MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).]
MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) requires dismissal with prejudice where an action is not commenced within the 180-day time limit set forth in the act:
In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
When the statute is applicable as a threshold matter, an unconditional guilty plea waives the right to assert a violation of the 180-day rule;
It is generally stated that a guilty plea "waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.” People v Alvin Johnson,
"Neither Tollett v Henderson,411 US 258 (1973), nor our earlier cases on which it relied, e.g., Brady v United States,397 US 742 [90 S Ct 1463 ;25 L Ed 2d 747 ] (1970), and McMann v Richardson,397 US 759 [90 S Ct 1441 ;25 L Ed 2d 763 ] (1970), stand for the proposition that counseled guiltypleas inevitably 'waive’ all antecedent constitutional violations. If they did so hold, the New York Court of Appeals might be correct. However, in Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases, 411 US 266 . The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State’s imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.” [New, supra, pp 487-488.]
The Court in New held that a defendant could raise only such rights and defenses as "would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant.” Id. at 491. The New Court reasoned:
Such rights and defenses "reach beyond the factual determination of defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial . . . .” [People v] White, 411 Mich [366] 398 [308 NW2d 128 (1981)] (Moody, J„ concurring in part and dissenting in part). In such cases, the state has no legitimate interest in securing a conviction. On the other hand, where the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove defendant’s factual guilt, it is subsumed by defendant’s guilty plea. [Id. at 491.]
Thus, the shorthand question whether violation of the 180-day rule is a "jurisdictional defect” which cannot be waived, may be rephrased as whether the statutory 180-day rule implicates the
This requires examination of the object of the statute and the harm it is designed to remedy. The title of the act indicates that its purpose is "to dispose of untried warrants, indictments, informations or complaints against inmates of penal institutions of this state.” We stated in People v Hill,
Because the interests implicated in the 180-day rule do not relate to the very authority of the state to prosecute, the relevant question becomes whether the statutory remedy of dismissal with prejudice may be relinquished by a valid and unconditional plea of guilty. This is nothing more than a question of statutory interpretation: Did the Legislature in MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) intend to remove the state’s authority to prosecute the defendant?
Justice Brickley opines that the language of the statute is so clear that "[t]he traditional personal versus subject-matter jurisdiction distinction is not pertinent . . . .” Post, p 741. I disagree. The statute does indeed decree that when an action is not timely commenced as required by the statutory 180-day rule, "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3). Obviously, the statute contemplates a remedy of dismissal with prejudice and termination of "jurisdiction.” But that observation does not go far in
Given the distinct meanings of the word "jurisdiction,” the term, as employed in MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3), cannot be said to unambiguously refer to the power of the court to entertain a class of cases, i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction. Rather, the statute represents a limitation on the power to prosecute in specified circumstances, viz., where an existing warrant, information or charge against a prisoner is not disposed of in a timely manner as provided in MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). The interpretation of the word "jurisdiction” as used in MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) to mean subject-matter jurisdiction reads too much into the statute. The statute does not dictate the class or kind of cases a court can hear; it does not refer to subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the statute decrees that a court loses its power over a particular matter in specified circumstances. Violation of the statute is therefore a "nonjurisdictional” defect, and a claim of error based on noncompliance with the statute does not survive an unconditional guilty plea. Alvin Johnson, supra at 440.
A review of the law in other jurisdictions further reinforces the conclusion that a claim of error based upon violation of the 180-day rule is subsumed by an unconditional guilty plea. It is the general rule throughout the various states that a guilty plea waives a violation of a statutory speedy
Of particular interest is a Connecticut case, Craig v Bronson,
The Connecticut Supreme Court found no clear answer in the statutory language to the question whether the statute decreed a loss of subject matter rather than personal jurisdiction. Thus, the court sought other indications of legislative intent. The court analogized the provisions of its own intrastate detainer act to those of the interstate agreement on detainers (iad), which provides a sanction of dismissal with prejudice when trial is not brought within the time limits set by statute. Similar to both the Connecticut and our own intrastate detainer acts, the iad provides:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment . . ., such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice[4 ] [Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957, p 83.]
The court in Craig noted that its own intrastate detainer act was modeled after a proposal of the Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation in its 1957 program. Id. at 104. The committee report noted that the purpose of the proposed intrastate provision was the same as that intended by the iad, of which the committee also advocated adoption. Council of State Governments,
As the court in Craig observed, a guilty plea is held to waive violation of the time limits set forth in the iad. Kowalak v United States, 645 F2d 534 (CA 6, 1981).
While the legislative history of MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. does not positively reveal that our intrastate detainer act was modeled after the 1957 proposed legislation, I find the analysis contained in Craig persuasive.
In conclusion, it is my view that where the statutory 180-day rule is applicable, a defendant waives any error based on violation of the rule by unconditionally pleading guilty. To state otherwise is to ascribe to the Legislature an intent to preclude a counseled defendant from voluntarily relinquishing the protection of the statute, and would separate Michigan from the great weight of authority holding that an unconditional guilty plea waives noncompliance with statutory provisions for speedy trial. I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Report of the Council for State Governments on 1957 Suggested State Legislation contains intrastate detainer provisions substantially similar to those contained in MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. According to the report, the legislation was intended to address concerns relating to rehabilitation as well as sentencing:
The prison administrator is thwarted in his efforts toward rehabilitation [by the existence of a warrant against a person already in custody]. The inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a training program. He often must be kept in close custody, which bars him from treatment such as trustyships, moderations of custody and opportunity for transfer to farms and work camps. . . .
The sentencing judge is likewise often thwarted by the de-tainer system. . . . The judge is at a loss when faced with detainers already filed, and with the possibility of other detain-ers. A rather long sentence may be indicated, but the judge hesitates to give such a sentence if the offender is going to serve subsequent sentences, or if he stands to lose the privilege of parole because of a detainer. The incidental first offender may, and sometimes does, serve years in prison because he has violated the law in several jurisdictions, although only a short sentence or probation would accomplish the necessary rehabilitation. [Id. at 74.]
See Kennedy v State,
The federal rule of waiver by guilty plea is codified in 18 USC 3162(a)(2), which provides that "[failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal Federal case law establishes further that even where a motion for dismissal is made, a subsequent plea waives a claim of error premised on violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Lebowitz, supra.
The iad was enacted into Michigan law and appears at MCL 780.601 et seq.; MSA 4.147(1) et seq.
The concerns sought to be addressed by the proposed intrastate detainer act related to rehabilitation of prisoners and sentencing. See n 1. The committee stated that "[t]he [Interstate] Agreement on Detainers applies the same principles embodied in the intrastate act to the interstate field.” Council of State Governments, supra at 78.
See also United States v Palmer, 574 F2d 164 (CA 3, 1978), cert den
Our Court of Appeals in People v Office,
MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) is virtually identical to the suggested legislation, reproduced below:
In the event that the action is not brought to trial within the period of time as herein provided, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried [indictment, information or complaint] be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [Council of State Governments, supra at 78.]
In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3).]
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Although our grant of leave to appeal in this case did not specify issues for consideration, the appellant framed the issues as whether the defendant’s Michigan and federal constitutional rights to speedy trial and her statu
I. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 780.131 ET SEQ.; MSA 28.969(1) ET SEQ.
In Woodruff, supra at 137, this Court held that the 180-day rule applied to any untried charge against an inmate even if the offense was committed in prison or carried a mandatory consecutive sentence. The Court applied a statutory rule of construction that requires penal statutes to be strictly construed, People v Goulding,
The majority’s use of the subsequent statutory amendment of the 180-day rule to overrule Wood-ruff can be attacked on a number of grounds. One rule of statutory construction requires that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, an amendment that materially changes the statute is presumed to indicate a change in existing legal rights. 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 22.30, p 265. The author of the lead opinion has also previously applied this rule. See Sam v Balardo,
The majority also, by applying the language of the new statute, in eifect applies this penal statute retroactively when the Legislature has not deemed it necessary to do so. Not only does this contravene the rule that amendments to statutes are generally inapplicable when transactions and events are completed prior to their enactment, 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, § 22.36, pp 300-301, but it also attempts to apply a statute retroactively without undertaking an analysis of whether that statute should be so applied. See People v Hampton,
The doctrine of stare decisis also requires this Court to uphold Woodruff This doctrine exists to promote uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law, Parker v Port Huron Hosp,
Finally, neither the parties nor any of the lower courts discussed, argued, or questioned whether MCL 780.131-780.133; MSA 28.969(l)-28.969(3) applied to the defendant. This issue is simply not properly before the Court. MCR 7.302(F)(4)(a).
For these reasons, I would adhere to the decision in People v Woodruff, and hold that it applies to this defendant because the amendments of the 180-day rule were not effective until after her plea to the underlying charges. Because I find that the statute still applies, a determination must also be made regarding whether the defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights were waived by her unconditional guilty plea.
II. WAIVER OF RIGHTS BY UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA
A majority of the Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s unconditional guilty plea did not waive her rights under the 180-day rule statute, but that she did waive her constitutional speedy trial claims.
A. WAIVER BY GUILTY PLEA
In People v New,
"[o]nly those rights and defenses which reach beyond the factual determination of defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial are preserved. . . . When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives his right to a trial. Therefore, he necessarily gives up all the rights and challenges associated with thattrial. Thus, important safeguards relating to the capacity of the state to prove defendant’s factual guilt, and those regulating the prosecution’s conduct at trial are among those defendant waives when he pleads guilty. These rights, which essentially relate to the gathering and presentation of evidence, are lost even if a successful challenge would provide a 'complete defense’ by in effect rendering the state unable to continue with the prosecution.” [ 427 Mich 492 -493. Citations omitted, first and second emphasis in original, third emphasis added.]
As this decision indicates, only those rights that prevent the state from initially bringing the defendant to trial are preserved in the face of an unconditional guilty plea. As noted by Justice Levin in People v Reid,
B. APPLICATION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Although the defendant has only argued that her right to a speedy trial under the Michigan Constitution is not waived, the result would be the same whether the defendant had alleged rights under either the Michigan Constitution or the federal constitution. The Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 20, states:
In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .[ 3 ]
The federal constitution, US Const, Am VI, also states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ....
We have always interpreted these two constitutional rights in a similar manner. See People v Hill,
We previously determined that one purpose of the constitutional right to speedy trial is to try the accused within a reasonable period of time. People v Den Uyl,
I find that two federal cases help analyze whether the constitutional right to speedy trial is waived by the defendant’s unconditional guilty plea. Although many of the federal circuit courts have found that the constitutional right to speedy trial is waived by a guilty plea, see, e.g., United States v LoFranco, 818 F2d 276 (CA 2, 1987); Tiemens v United States, 724 F2d 928 (CA 11, 1984); United States v Saldana, 505 F2d 628 (CA 5, 1974); Pate v United States, 297 F2d 166 (CA 8, 1962), only one has stated the reasons why such a finding is appropriate. United States v O’Donnell, 539 F2d 1233 (CA 9, 1976).
The existence of [Sixth Amendment] violations is consistent with guilt as a matter of fact. If guilt can be validly established such violations are not logically inconsistent therewith. While such violations preclude the establishment of guilt by trial, that is the extent of their reach. The establishment of guilt by a proper plea is not condemned by these protections. The Constitution protects the accused from conviction by trial but not a conviction by way of a plea of guilty. [Id. at 1237.]
As this analysis indicates, the constitutional right to speedy trial is concerned with establishing guilt as a matter of fact. Once guilt is established by a proper unconditional guilty plea, the constitutional right is no longer applicable.
I also find the reasoning in United States v MacDonald,
Even if the degree of prejudice could be accurately measured before trial, a speedy trial claim nonetheless would not be sufficiently independent of the outcome of the trial to warrant pretrial appellate review. ... [A] central interest served by the Speedy Trial Clause is the protection of the factfínding process at trial. The essence of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his abilityto establish his innocence of the crime charged. Normally, it is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed. ... It is the delay before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. . . . Furthermore, in most cases, as noted above, it is difficult to make the careful examination of the constituent elements of the speedy trial claim before trial. [Id. at 859-861. Emphasis added.]
I agree with this analysis and would find that the constitutional right to speedy trial, whether under the Michigan or federal constitution, relates to determining the factual guilt of the defendant. The right to speedy trial is concerned with the prejudice to the defendant in defending himself against the charges brought by the state, with the memory of witnesses, and the availability of those witnesses. It is not concerned with the ability of the state to bring the charges against a defendant in court. Therefore, I would hold that the constitutional right to speedy trial is waived by a defendant’s unconditional guilty plea. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue.
C. APPLICATION TO THE STATUTORY 180-DAY RULE
MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) limits the ability of a court to decide a matter that violates the 180-day rule:
In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and thecourt shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [Emphasis added.][ 5 ]
One panel of the Court of Appeals, in addition to the dissent in this case, has stated that the reference to jurisdiction in this section refers to personal jurisdiction and that the bar to the court’s jurisdiction is waived by a defendant’s unconditional guilty plea. See People v Eaton, supra.
As noted by the Court of Appeals majority in this case, the question is whether the statute refers to the authority of the state to bring an action in court or to the factual guilt of the defendant. The only issue under the statute relates to the expiration of the pertinent 180-day period, not the ability to determine guilt or innocence, New, supra at 492-493, and no trial is needed to determine whether the 180-day rule has been complied with. As we noted in People v Harrison, supra, if the prosecution does not comply with the statute, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the "matter.” Harrison,
The language of the statute indicates that, in addition to divesting the court of all jurisdiction over the defendant, the court must dismiss the charges before it with prejudice. The statute also indicates that the untried warrant, indictment,
I agree with the analysis by the Court of Appeals in People v Parker,
The clear import of [§ 3] is to deny jurisdiction to the courts where the provisions of § 1 are not met. . . . [T]he Court stated, with regard to the fact that the prosecutor therein had previously consented to the motion: "This Court has never held that jurisdiction of the subject-matter can beconferred by consent or waiver. . . . '[JJurisdiction comes solely from the law, in no degree from consent of litigants. So that neither consent nor anything else can authorize a court to act in a cause outside the sphere which the law has ordained for it.’ ” [Id. at 404-405 (citing Nichols v Houghton Circuit Judge, 185 Mich 654 ;152 NW 482 [1915]).]
Defendant was incapable of conferring on the trial court the jurisdiction which had been removed by statute. The trial court was without jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea and the untried complaint, upon which the case was based, was void at the time of the plea. The plea was, therefore, without effect and cannot act as an estoppel. By the terms of the statute the only proper action for the trial court was to enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice. [Parker, supra at 405-406. Emphasis added.]
This decision correctly analyzed the statute currently before this Court and correctly found that the 180-day rule is a defense that is similar to a jurisdictional matter.
Even assuming arguendo that the statutory language was unclear or ambiguous, the purpose of the 180-day rule also supports a conclusion that the defendant did not waive her rights by an unconditional guilty plea. In contrast to the constitutional right to speedy trial, the purpose of the statute is not to deter prejudice to the defendant, although that is one of the effects. As noted in Woodruff, supra at 137, the purpose of the statute is to clear away untried accusations against prison inmates. It also is consistent with legislatively prescribed concurrent sentencing. Id. While, as noted by Woodruff, one of the effects is to prevent prejudice incurred by the defendant due to a delayed trial, Hill, supra at 280, the object and
I conclude, as did the majority in the Court of Appeals panel in this case, that the constitutional right to speedy trial was waived by the defendant, but that the statutory right is not waived. Therefore, I would also affirm the Court of Appeals decision on this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Some may argue that it is inconsistent to find that a defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial is waived while a statute that also protects the right to speedy trial is not waived. However, as I have previously noted, the statutory right protects purposes and objects that are not included in a defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial. Therefore, such an interpretation is not inconsistent. I would affirm the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeals in this case and find that the defendant’s conviction is reversed and vacated.
The majority seems to imply that because Woodruff was a per curiam opinion, it should be easier to overturn. However, a per curiam opinion is as persuasive as an authored opinion and shows that the Court was united in its reasoning. Dowling v Salliotte,
The report on the amendments by the Senate Analysis Section, although not controlling on legislative intent, indicates that the Legislature’s two main concerns included the time constraints imposed on prosecutors and judges when attempting to comply with the 180-day rule and miscalculations of the 180-day period that would lead to a dismissal of charges against a prisoner. Senate Analysis Section, SB 344, October 13, 1987.
This constitutional right to speedy trial has also been enacted into statute. MCL 768.1; MSA 28.1024.
Although United States v Gaertner, 583 F2d 308 (CA 7, 1988), also analyzed this issue, that court simply reiterated the reasoning in O’Donnell.
This language was in the statute as it existed at the time of the defendant’s plea and conviction. Unlike §§ 1, 2, this portion of the statute was not changed by the 1988 amendments.
Justice Boyle suggests that MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) may be ambiguous and, by analogy, should be interpreted similarly to federal opinions on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (iad). MCL 780.601-780.608; MSA 4.147(1)-4.147(8). However, not only does the iad fail to include the important language of MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) that "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof,” but the iad also states that one of its specific purposes is to abate the "difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions.” Therefore, not only is the iad dissimilar on its face, but also in its purpose. See infra, p 743.
While the Court of Appeals also discusses when a defendant should be considered in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, that issue was not presented to this Court. During oral arguments, the prosecutor, when asked about this issue, admitted that it had been abandoned on appeal. Therefore, under MCR 7.302(F)(4)(a), I do not discuss that matter.