*1 Pеople v Smith PEOPLE SMITH 1989, 13, Docket No. 110110. at Submitted December Detroit. Decided 7, 1990. May appeal applied to Leave for. custody Department Rosie Smith was in the Corrections facility half-way City at a located in of Detroit when she 9, facility required February failed to the to return when on 20, 1987, February 1987. On the 36th District Court issued a prison charge escape. warrant for Smith’s arrest on On 18, April 1987, County Smith was arrested in Genesee on an lodged charge County jail unrelated and was in the Genesee 19, 1987, charge. await trial on that On November Smith was and, 8, 1987, charge convicted of the unrelated December Facility. Valley was sentenced' to the Huron Women’s On 29, 1987, 20, arraigned February December Smith was on the 1987, 20, prison escape 1988, January warrant. On an informa- against tion was filed Smith in Detroit Recorder’s Court. On 1988, 12, February quash defendant moved to the information bring and dismiss the case for failure to her to trial within 180 days of the issuance of the warrant her incarceration on charge. 7, 1988, quash On unrelated March the motion to denied, pled guilty prison and dismiss was Smith to the escape charge. years She was sentenced to months to five six prison completion to be served after the sentence she was serving Evans, escape, at the time her L. J. Robert She was given prior sentencing no for credit incarceration to the date. appealed. Smith Appeals The Court of held: purposes rule, 180-day 1. For defendant was in the custody Department from of the of Corrections the time of her 18, 1987, and, April Department arrest on since the Correc- complainant escape prison charge, tions was the on the department or knew should have that a known warrant was outstanding against defendant date of from the its issuance on 1987, 20, February triggering running thus arrest, April from the date of defendant’s 1987. _period References 2d, 854, 855, 858, 863, Am Jur Law 866. Criminal §§ Waiver or loss of accused’s trial. ALR2d 302. [May- Opinion of the Court days brought of her within 180 Defendant was just arrest, any prosecution cause has not shown and the delay. her reversed to have conviction Defendant entitled *2 and vacated. 180-day rule is not waived 2. issue a violation of the 180-day jurisdictional plea by guilty statute is since rule a jurisdictional guilty plea issues. аnd does not waive a and is reversed Defendant’s conviction vacated. Griffin, P.J., violation of He would hold that a dissented. personal jurisdiction 180-day over rule a court of divests matter, defendant, subject-matter jurisdiction and over relinquishes the defendant’s unconditional jurisdiction could personal which the defendant all defects guarantees claim, statutory to including the and constitutional conviction and He would affirm defendant’s а trial. sentence. 180-Day Speedy — — — Inmates Rule. 1. Criminal Law Trial being county jail escaped prisoner an in a on An who held custody charge of the to be within the unrelated is considered 180-day Department purposes rule of the of Corrections for (MCL780.131; 28.969[1]). MSA 180-Day Guilty — Speedy — — Pleas Rule. 2. Criminal Law Trial appellate review of a consti- An unconditional waives claim but does not waive issue tutional 180-day 180-day rule involves violation of the rulе since the authority prosecute to the defendant and a defen- of the state prose- challenge the of the state to dant’s by plea guilty. cute are him never waived Kelley, D. John Frank J. General, Attorney Baugh- Timothy O’Hair, A. Prosecuting Attorney, man, Research, and Training Appeals, Chief Puleo, P. John for Prosecuting Attorney, Assistant people. Cal, R. Wanda appeal. on Sawyer, Griffin, P.J., and Gillis Before: JJ.
Sawyer, prison es- pled guilty J. Defendant 750.193; was sen- MCL MSA 28.390. She cape. Opinion years fenced to serve a term of six months to five prison, consecutively run to the sentence she serving escape. was at the time of her She now appeals and we reverse and vacate the conviction. argues
Defendant that the court lost prosecutor over this matter because the failed to good-faith bring exercise a effort to her to trial days within 180 after the issuance of the arrest warrant and her incarceration in the Genesee County jail charge, on an unrelated in violation of the so-called rule. 780.131; MCL MSA 28.969(1). agree. custody We Defendant was in the Department half-way of Corrections at a facility City located in the of Detroit when she "escaped” failing facility to return to the when required February February 1987. On 1987, the 36th District Court issued a warrant for prison escape chargе. defendant’s arrest on the On *3 April 18, 1987, defendant was arrested in Genesee County charge lodged on an unrelated and in was County jail the Genesee to await trial on that charge. People England, App Court,
This in 279, 284; 441 95 NW2d held that an es caped prisoner being county jail who is held in a awaiting charge trial on an unrelated is considered custody Department to be within the of the of purposes 180-day Corrections for Thus, of the rule. Deрartment defendant was in the of Corrections’ custody Furthermore, from the time of her arrest.1 1 that, people argue accept The also if we do defendant’s incarcera- County jail being tion in Department running Department custody the Genesee as within the of the Corrections, do, of which we we should commence the period 180-day only from the date on which the placed defendant, of Corrections a hold on which the people represent 29, being First, as December 1987. we are not period calculating 180-day convinced run from Department only that the for the rule should placed formally the date a hold was on defendant the pointed England, of Corrections. As the Court out in supra 284, escaped prison at the defendant "was an inmate detained [May op Opinion the Court Department was the of Corrections as inasmuсh escape charge, prison complainant the on the the department known that a knew or should have against outstanding from defendant warrant was the triggering February 20, on thus its issuance date of period running 180-day the from the of subsequent arrest.2 Accord- date defendant’s the prison.” jail awaiting that defendant return to We conclude in certain jail awaiting County an eventual return detained in the Genesee was to Geneseе ment’s lodged prison in the moment by was arrested and from the she and, thus, depart- in County jail was the local officials purposes custody the rule. for Furthermore, nothing in establishes that the the record before us place Department until not a hold on defendant of Corrections did 29, only in the lower court 1987. The "hold” reflected December matter, 29,1987, any that was a on or other date for record December placed uрon in the defendant in the instant action Recorder’s hold Court. on December arraigned Moreover, County’s custody in defendant not even Genesee was day the was as that was she inasmuch fact, the offense. In District on instant in 36th County on on the Genesee matter defendant had been sentenced December time or to clear, and, although entirely not that record is was at the custody Department either the to the Corrections returned Wayne County. custody Moreover, although a does not reflect when hold was record custody, upon County’s placed hearing at the while in Genesee exchange quash cryptic be- on the motion somewhat placed a hold court and defendant indicates that was tween point during upon see County, in her the Gene- defendant at some incarceration custody County Specifically, discussing jail. in Genesee while her inquired court of defendant whether there was the trial Corrections, Department or which hold defendant tions escape.” no reason lien from replied that "the Correc- in affirmative indicated privilege Department gave days came me loss event, relevant, any In even "hold” there if the date were placed was not on from the record a hold to believe and, County more her Geneseе defendant soon after incarceration point, placed people’s representation not that a hold was to the defendant until December 29 is not are in the supported by few what facts there surrounding this issue. record charged argument prosecutor people’s should be *4 knowledge until December with of defendant’s incarceration First, Department of merit. the is both irrelevant and without since warrant, outstanding knowledge charged Corrections is that with the England, begin running 180-day rule. is of the sufficient Furthermore, escape supra as warrant was at 283. inasmuch lein, been as officials would have aware entered soon Genesee outstanding they as defendant of arrested identified charge appropriate escape that it would be warrant and we believe Opinion of the Court ingly, period 180-day we conclude that under began running upon the statute defendant’s arrest County. Thus, Genesee defendant was not brought days to trial within 180 of that arrest. people any Furthermore, since the have not shown just delay, cause for the we conclude that requirements of the statute were violated in this and, therefore, case defendant is entitled to have her conviction reversed and vacated.
Finally, briefly people’s we wish to address the argument guilty plea ap- that defendant’s waived pellate prosecutor review of this issue. The is guilty plea correct appellate that an unconditional waives review of a constitutional Rivera, claim. (1987). Thus, NW2d 569 to the extent that defen- argue dant does also a violation of her constitu- appellate trial, tional review of argument that has been waived her uncondi- guilty plea. argued, However, tional decided, we this matter on thе basis of a violation 180-day of the rule statute and this statute jurisdictional. Accordingly, the issue of a violation 180-day guilty plea rule is not waived guilty plea jurisdictional since a issues. does not waive supra. Rivera,
As for the view of the dissent that
the issue of
180-day
the violation of the
rule is waived
it
since
personal,
subject-matter,
juris-
affects
rather
than
disagree.
assuming
diction, we must
Even
that our
colleague in dissent
is correct that
this issue in-
question
рersonal jurisdiction,
volves a
a conclu-
upon
opinion,
sion
which we offer no
we do not
analysis.
Supreme
believe it affects the
knowledge
Wayne County prosecutor
,the
purposes
to the
rule,
satisfying
requirement
thus
the alternate
prosecutor knows or should have
known
the defendant’s incarcera-
tion. Id.
*5
[May
by Griffin, P.J.
Dissent
explained
482, 495-496;
New, 427 Mich
in
v
(1986),
by a
are waived
Reid, NW2d 655 condi 420 Mich situation, may criminal defendant plea tional appeal a plea plea or guilty from an unconditional appeal only nolo where the claim contendere bring to very authority of the state implicates the trial, is, to the defendant where government prosecute to the defendant is chal the lenged. guilty plea rights by a are never waived Such sought the claim or nolo contendere. Where only capacity appealed to be involves guilt, it is prove factual state to defendant’s or nolo contendere. by a waived dissenting question not, Thus, col- is as our league hold, could waive Rather, would defendant whether post, pp 543-544, 548. the issue. See goes question to the whether the issue state’s is ability authority prosecute to or to the state’s guilt. prove rule the former involves Accordingly, issue, latter. it not waivеd not the put, guilty plea. Simply the issue is not issue, have waived the whether defendant could bar, it. In the case whether she did waive at not. defendant did reasons, we that defen-
For the above conclude reversed, and since dant’s conviction should be try defendant, deci- court lacks charges reinstating prejudice is with sion against thus, and, must the conviction vacated well. be as is reversed and vacated.
Defendant’s convictiоn Gillis, J., concurred. present (dissenting). time, At the
Griffin, P.J.
People v Smith
by Griffin,
split
there is a substantial
within the
Appeals
Court of
on the issue whether a defendant
who enters an unconditional
relin-
quishes
statutory
his or her constitutional
to a
trial. Panels of this Court in
Parshay,
App 411;
304 NW2d
(1981), People
lv den
Panels in
v
606
123 Mich
(1983), People
558-559;
Farmer,
332
NW2d
v
App
(1983), People
472;
127 Mich
NW2d
v
(1986),
App
Wolak,
60;
153 Mich
Jurisdiction involves the two different subject-matter jurisdiction personal jurisdic- of tion.
Subject-matter jurisdiction encompasses those App [May by Griffin, power upon the court has to act. matters which jurisdiction deals with the Personal Subject- parties bind action. the court to may jurisdiction waivable nor it be matter is never by parties. jurisdiction, stipulated to Personal always may however, is waivable and defects be stipulation. corrected Supreme Phillips, 383
The 464, 469-470; 175 exam- Mich ined the distinction between NW2d subject-matter and personal jurisdiction and held that a criminal may personal jurisdiction defen- waive ses: jurisdiction subject of the court over the questioned.
matter only that court is not here We are concerned whereby validity procedure with the sought to exercise its over person of the accused. course, matter, subject Jurisdiction over waiver, not be conferred consent or could appears why no reason an accused could not sub- personal himself jеct jurisdiction. the court’s *7 procedural spelling safeguards The whereby out the method per- court obtains over the designed protec- son of an accused are all for his If he elects himself tion. not to avail of the estab- procedural rights appears lished there to be none complain. be who should heard People New, Later, 482, 487-488; 427 (1986), Michigan Supreme 398 358 the NW2d precedent looked federal determine rights relinquished by scope of constitutional plea guilty. analyzing After Brady trilogy States, 742; 90 S United 397 US McMann v (1970), 1463; 25 L Ed 747 Rich- 2d Ct ardson, 1441; L 763 759; 397 US 90 S Ct 25 Ed 2d (1970), Carolina, 790; Parker v North 397 US (1970), 1458; 25 L 2d 785 and the later 90 S Ct Ed 545 by Griffin, Henderson, 258; cases of Tollett v 411 93 S US Ct 1602; (1973), 36 L 235 Ed 2d and Menna v New York, 241; 423 US 96 46 L 195 S Ct Ed 2d (1975), Michigan Supreme Court cited with Menna, approval following passage from 62- pp 63, n 2: Henderson, (1973), Neither Tollett v US 258 relied, e.g., nor our earlier it Brady cases on which States, (1970), v United 397 US US and McMann v
Richardson, prop- stand for the osition that guilty pleas counseled inevitably "waive” all antecedent constitutional violations. If hold, they did so Appeals New York Court of might However, empha- be correct. in Tollett we ingredient sized that waiver was not the basic cases, this line of cases is that a point US 266. The of these counseled is an guilt that, admission of factual so reliable where voluntary the issue of factual intelligent, quite validly it removes guilt from the case. In most casеs, guilt factual is a sufficient basis imposition punishment. plea, State’s A guilty therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitu- tional logically violations not inconsistent with the guilt valid establishment of factual and which do conviction, way not stand in is guilt if factual Here, validly however, established. the claim is may petitioner the State not convict no mat- validly guilt ter how guilty plea, his factual is established. The therefore, does not bar the claim. [Emрhasis added.] The Federal of Appeal Courts have employed the Menna analysis to hold that speedy rights trial do not survive a guilty plea since the purpose guarantee is to factual guilt established. validly As Seventh Circuit Appeals Court of stated in United States v Gaert- (CA ner, 7, 1978), 583 F2d cert den 440 *8 (1979): 918; US 99 S Ct 59 L Ed 2d [May by Griffin, P.J. claim, speedy trial We believe Gaertner’s the upon the Sixth Amendment or whether based Amendment, is Clause of the Fifth Due Process not open pleas guilty. review after The for our purpose prompt guarantee trial that the of a is to right substantially to a fair trial is not accused’s or, put prejudiced pre-trial delay, way, another by guilt validly that is to lend factual assurance preclude Speedy trial the established. establishment violations trial, guilt by finding guilt by option. a viable proper remains guilt logically Simply, establishment of is the violations, inconsistent not and does with trial prevent government invoking from the long process, criminal so as there is no trial. [Emphasis added.] Appeals
The Ninth Circuit Court of in United (CA O’Donnell, 1236-1237 States F2d 1976), has ruled in also accord: therefore, plea, simply
"A irrele- renders logically violations not vant inconsistent with those constitutional fac- valid establishment of guilt in the way tual and which do not stand conviction, guilt validly if factual is established.” [Menna, supra.] argues appellant The in the case instant rights guaranteed by Due Process Clause to a Fifth Amendment and
speedy trial of the Sixth Amendment are analo- Jeop- gous rights protected by the Double Fifth He ardy Clause of the Amendment. therefore his not waive these contends that did disagree. violations. We protections afforded the Fifth and Sixth purpose is to are different. Their Amendments guilt validly is established. insure that factual is, guarantee purpose That their substantially fair is not right tо a accused’s post-accusation pro or prejudiced by either [sic]- *9 People 547 by Griffin, Dissent delays. The existence of such violations is consis- guilt guilt tent with validly as a matter of If fact. can be logically established such violations are not pre- inconsistent therewith. While such violations trial, guilt by clude the establishment of the extent of their guilt by reach. The establishment proper plea by
a
is not condemned
these
protеctions.
protects
The Constitution
the accused
by
by
from conviction
way
trial
not a
conviction
plea
guilty.
Brady
of a
Tollett and the
trilogy
inapplicable.
control here. Menna is
[Em-
phasis added.]
(SD, 1988),
Anderson,
In State v
417
403
NW2d
Supreme
the South Dakota
Court addressed the
argument
statutory right
defendant’s
speedy
that his
to a
relinquished by
plea
trial was not
his
guilty.
rejecting
challenge,
In
the defendant’s
Supreme
agreed
South Dakota
with the
weight
jurisdictions
from other
which
rights
statutory
speedy
holds that
to a
trial are
relinquished
plea
guilty:
waived or
a
Anderson has asserted no violation of his consti-
argues
tutional
to a
trial.
solely
He
noncompliance
rule,
technical
the 180-day
with
requirement
now codified
created
Supreme
prejudice.
Court rule. He claims no
It is settled law that a voluntary
intelligent
right
waives a
appeal
defendant’s
nonjurisdictional
all
ings.
prior proceed-
defects
Schulz,
(SD, 1987);
State v
In considerations advanced Supreme Court in v New are better by holding served that an unconditional guilty relinquishes personal jurisdiction all defects including guaran- statutory the constitutional and anomaly tees to a addition, trial. In relinquishment statutory of constitutional but not rights is avoided.
Accordingly,
respectfully
I
dissent and would
affirm.1
arguing
reversed,
In
that her conviction should be
defendant relies
upon People Hill,
England,
App 279;
(1989).
Supreme