Defendant was charged with breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house with intent to commit larceny. MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.305). Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime as charged. Defendant was sentenced to a term of four years to ten years in prison. Subsequently a nunc pro tunc order was entered by the trial court to correct the maximum sentence to 15 years as provided for by the statute.
The questions on appeal are:
I. Did the defendant plead guilty to the crime of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house with the intent to commit larceny?
II. Was the trial court’s examination of the defendant sufficient for the acceptance of a guilty plea?
III. Did the trial court accept the defendant’s guilty plea without first establishing that defendant understood and was aware of the consequences of the plea?
IV. Did the trial court err when it accepted the defendant’s guilty plea without a specific waiver of a jury trial by the defendant?
*351 V. "Was it proper for the trial court to correct the maximum sentence without the presence of the defendant before the court and by entry of a mmc pro tunc order?
A fair review of the record shows that defendant pled guilty to the crime as charged.
The trial court’s examination of the defendant established that a crime had been committed and that the defendant participated in it. The examination also ascertained that the plea was honest and truthful. Thus, the requirements of
People
v.
Barrows
(1959),
The record further reveals that defendant understood and was aware of the consequences of his plea. In addition defendant was represented by counsel during the guilty plea proceedings.
Michigan does not require a specific waiver of the right of trial by jury.
People
v.
Taylor
(1970),
At sentencing the trial court imposed a lesser maximum sentence than provided for by the statute. By statute, MCLA § 769.8 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28-.1080), the trial court is required to fix the maximum sentence as provided for by statute. The Supreme Court has said that any sentence imposed which is not in accordance with the statutory maximum is a nullity.
In re O’Dell
(1962)
The entry of a
nunc pro tunc
order is a proper method to correct a maximum sentence.
In re Lemire
(1960),
The defendant did not need to be before the trial court when the correction was made. In re Pardee, supra.
We find no error in the proceedings below and hold that the trial court is hereby affirmed.
