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People v. SlaughterPeople v. Slaughter

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Nov 14, 2005
Versions:23 A.D.3d 502
805 N.Y.S.2d 615
Stevenson v. New York

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered May 25, 2004, convicting him of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his absence from the Ventimiglia hearing (see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981]) does not warrant reversal. The People sought to introduce evidence that the complaining witness had seen the defendant selling drugs on many occasions. The Supreme Court ruled that the witness could not testify that he had observed the defendant selling drugs, but that he could testify he had seen the defendant hundreds of times outside his window, that the defendant had been making noise with a group of friends, and that the witness had asked him to move on.

The first part of the ruling was decided wholly in the defendant‘s favor (see People v. Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 268 [1993]) and thus, the defendant‘s presence would not have contributed to the advancing of his case (see People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 660 [1992]; People v. Tellier, 232 AD2d 509 [1996]; People v. Baum, 222 AD2d 444 [1995]). The second part of the ruling involved a purely legal question of whether the witness’ prior observations of the defendant could be admitted on the issue of identity (see People v. Dokes, supra at 660). Further, contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his conduct in making noise did not rise to the level of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20 [2]; People v. Bakolas, 59 NY2d 51, 55 [1983]; People v. Munafo, 50 NY2d 326, 331 [1980]) or otherwise constitute a bad act. Since the prospective use of prior bad acts of the defendant was not at issue during that portion of the hearing, the defendant‘s presence was not required (cf. People v. Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 597 [1995]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ.

用法:使用midpage-case和midpage-law标签对引文进行转换。针对SLaughter案例的全文进行格式化,忽略页面顶部和底部的无关案例片段。由于Slaughter案在第503页结束并开始了Sullen案,这里停止转换。转换时严格遵守规则。

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered May 25, 2004, convicting him of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his absence from the Ventimiglia hearing (see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981]) does not warrant reversal. The People sought to introduce evidence that the complaining witness had seen the defendant selling drugs on many occasions. The Supreme Court ruled that the witness could not testify that he had observed the defendant selling drugs, but that he could testify he had seen the defendant hundreds of times outside his window, that the defendant had been making noise with a group of friends, and that the witness had asked him to move on.

The first part of the ruling was decided wholly in the defendant‘s favor (see People v. Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 268 [1993]) and thus, the defendant‘s presence would not have contributed to the advancing of his case (see People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 660 [1992]; People v. Tellier, 232 AD2d 509 [1996]; People v. Baum, 222 AD2d 444 [1995]). The second part of the ruling involved a purely legal question of whether the witness’ prior observations of the defendant could be admitted on the issue of identity (see People v. Dokes, supra at 660). Further, contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his conduct in making noise did not rise to the level of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20 [2]; People v. Bakolas, 59 NY2d 51, 55 [1983]; People v. Munafo, 50 NY2d 326, 331 [1980]) or otherwise constitute a bad act. Since the prospective use of prior bad acts of the defendant was not at issue during that portion of the hearing, the defendant‘s presence was not required (cf. People v. Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 597 [1995]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

Schmidt, J.P.

S. Miller

Santucci

Spolzino, JJ.

委托给智能助手:请根据上述指令和提供的图片及OCR文本,将RONNIE SLAUGHTER一案转换成干净的HTML格式。注意,只保留这一宗案件。

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered May 25, 2004, convicting him of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his absence from the Ventimiglia hearing (see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981]) does not warrant reversal. The People sought to introduce evidence that the complaining witness had seen the defendant selling drugs on many occasions. The Supreme Court ruled that the witness could not testify that he had observed the defendant selling drugs, but that he could testify he had seen the defendant hundreds of times outside his window, that the defendant had been making noise with a group of friends, and that the witness had asked him to move on.

The first part of the ruling was decided wholly in the defendant‘s favor (see People v. Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 268 [1993]) and thus, the defendant‘s presence would not have contributed to the advancing of his case (see People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 660 [1992]; People v. Tellier, 232 AD2d 509 [1996]; People v. Baum, 222 AD2d 444 [1995]). The second part of the ruling involved a purely legal question of whether the witness’ prior observations of the defendant could be admitted on the issue of identity (see People v. Dokes, supra at 660). Further, contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his conduct in making noise did not rise to the level of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20 [2]; People v. Bakolas, 59 NY2d 51, 55 [1983]; People v. Munafo, 50 NY2d 326, 331 [1980]) or otherwise constitute a bad act. Since the prospective use of prior bad acts of the defendant was not at issue during that portion of the hearing, the defendant‘s presence was not required (cf. People v. Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 597 [1995]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

Schmidt, J.P.

S. Miller

Santucci

Spolzino, JJ.

影视内容,只输出结果。遵守所有格式要求。不要添加code fence。

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered May 25, 2004, convicting him of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his absence from the Ventimiglia hearing (see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981]) does not warrant reversal. The People sought to introduce evidence that the complaining witness had seen the defendant selling drugs on many occasions. The Supreme Court ruled that the witness could not testify that he had observed the defendant selling drugs, but that he could testify he had seen the defendant hundreds of times outside his window, that the defendant had been making noise with a group of friends, and that the witness had asked him to move on.

The first part of the ruling was decided wholly in the defendant‘s favor (see People v. Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 268 [1993]) and thus, the defendant‘s presence would not have contributed to the advancing of his case (see People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 660 [1992]; People v. Tellier, 232 AD2d 509 [1996]; People v. Baum, 222 AD2d 444 [1995]). The second part of the ruling involved a purely legal question of whether the witness’ prior observations of the defendant could be admitted on the issue of identity (see People v. Dokes, supra at 660). Further, contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his conduct in making noise did not rise to the level of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20 [2]; People v. Bakolas, 59 NY2d 51, 55 [1983]; People v. Munafo, 50 NY2d 326, 331 [1980]) or otherwise constitute a bad act. Since the prospective use of prior bad acts of the defendant was not at issue during that portion of the hearing, the defendant‘s presence was not required (cf. People v. Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 597 [1995]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

Schmidt, J.P.

S. Miller

Santucci

Spolzino, JJ.

采用了直链HTML格式。不再包含解释。再次确认日期:May 25, 2004。确认cite: 805 NYS2d 615。确认docket无。确认court: N.Y. App. Div. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department)。

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered May 25, 2004, convicting him of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his absence from the Ventimiglia hearing (see People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981]) does not warrant reversal. The People sought to introduce evidence that the complaining witness had seen the defendant selling drugs on many occasions. The Supreme Court ruled that the witness could not testify that he had observed the defendant selling drugs, but that he could testify he had seen the defendant hundreds of times outside his window, that the defendant had been making noise with a group of friends, and that the witness had asked him to move on.

The first part of the ruling was decided wholly in the defendant‘s favor (see People v. Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 268 [1993]) and thus, the defendant‘s presence would not have contributed to the advancing of his case (see People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 660 [1992]; People v. Tellier, 232 AD2d 509 [1996]; People v. Baum, 222 AD2d 444 [1995]). The second part of the ruling involved a purely legal question of whether the witness’ prior observations of the defendant could be admitted on the issue of identity (see People v. Dokes, supra at 660). Further, contrary to the defendant‘s contention, his conduct in making noise did not rise to the level of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20 [2]; People v. Bakolas, 59 NY2d 51, 55 [1983]; People v. Munafo, 50 NY2d 326, 331 [1980]) or otherwise constitute a bad act. Since the prospective use of prior bad acts of the defendant was not at issue during that portion of the hearing, the defendant‘s presence was not required (cf. People v. Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 597 [1995]). Schmidt, J.P., S. Miller, Santucci and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

Schmidt, J.P.

S. Miller

Santucci

Spolzino, JJ.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Slaughter
Court Name: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Date Published: Nov 14, 2005
Citations: 23 A.D.3d 502; 805 N.Y.S.2d 615
Court Abbreviation: N.Y. App. Div.
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