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merit since are they predicated upon statutory which is far authority more restrictive than the statutory in our authority State.
An examination of the record and applicable law compels a find- ing in the instant case that the decision of the circuit court was proper when it concluded that the decision of the defendant Depart- ment of denying parcel Revenue status tax-exempt against was the manifest weight of the evidence.
For the reasons set forth the judgment circuit court of Bu- reau is affirmed. County
Affirmed. STOUDER, JJ.,
HEIPLE and concur. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, THE THE PEOPLE OF STATEOF SIMS, Defendant-Appellant. STEVEN D. No. 3 — 86—0768
Third District 6, 1988. January Opinion filed *2 HEIPLE, J., concurring part dissenting part. Fitzsimmons,
Catherine E. Churm and Catherine Appel- both of State Office, Ottawa, late appellant. Defender’s of II,
Raymond Kimbell State’s Attorney, Galesburg (Terry Mertel, of A. Attorneys Office, State’s Appellate counsel), Prosecutor’s People. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion the court: After trial by jury the circuit court of Knox County, defend- ant, Sims, Steven D. was found guilty the crimes of home invasion and attempted armed robbery. Judgment was entered on the of- only fense of home invasion and the defendant was to a sentenced 12-year term of imprisonment.
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing hear defendant’s motion to suppress post-arrest statements and that further error was committed by trial court’s overruling objections defendant’s to testimony about the statements.
In addressing the defendant’s argument, the following scenario of events should be noted.
The trial court 23, 1986, order of July stated that all mo- tions were to be filed and by September heard 1986. A second or- 10, 1986, der dated September required that all motions heard by be October the first day the trial scheduled for the defendant. On October the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements, and on the he following day supporting affidavit which, alia, alleged inter that his statements were be- involuntary convictions, cause he had no young, was that he had physi- been officer, threatened enforcement that he misin- cally by law had been and, further, formed the officer as to vital information that he exhausted, (defendant) was scared signed confused and when he statement.
On October defendant’s attorney by motion requested continuance of one day problems because of medical of one of his chil- dren. This motion was denied and co-counsel for the defendant con- ducted voir dire examination of prospective jurors on October 1986. It was also on this date that co-counsel for defendant filed no- tice that the motion to would heard the suppress following day, wit
On the State argued that the motion due to the trial court’s order that all motions were to timely have filed and 1986. The State by September sug- gested that even if the statements were found to be voluntary, present during by presenting defendant could evidence evidence of the circumstances under which the statements were taken.
The defense statements should not be argued involuntary to a presented necessary. that a was defense jury maintained that the motion to was because it was timely made required by 11(a) section of our Criminal Code of which provides: *3 to confession suppress “Sec. 114 — 11. Motion move (a) any may Prior to the trial criminal case a defendant given confession him on the suppress any to as evidence 1985, 38, not Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. ground voluntary.” that was 11(a). par. 114 —
The trial court found that the motion to timely that all mo- pretrial required that its order of September 6, tions trial on October 1986. The court should be resolved to order directed counsel to with rules comply further stated that the hearing that notice as to provide the Ninth Judicial Circuit. The rules on to the date of See Gen- given eight days prior a motion be Rules, eral Ninth Judicial Circuit Court R. G—1. fails to basis foregoing yield any
An of the events analyzation for to a on the motion to deny hearing sup the trial court’s decision 1986, 10, order set The trial court’s reliance on its press. view of the ting hearing placed a cutoff motions is not well date supplement discovery fact the State to permitted that the court had the State motions filed until the eve of the trial and further heard a short time before after 12 which were heard within trial.
207 trial court’s reliance are that opinion We likewise of to the court’s support court rule too tenuous a reason upon a circuit is not question denial on the motion to We hearing suppress. of a however, must rules; to such rules adopt of the circuit court authority Rule of our Court (See Supreme be consistent with the statutes State. abrogate, modify 21 2d R. rules limit or (107 21).) may Ill. Local 133, 429 (1981), App. See v. 102 Ill. 3d existing People law. Schroeder 573; Ill. 484 (1985), App. N.E.2d v. Williams 3d People N.E.2d 947. of a
A full and on the the voluntariness fair issue of (1964), confession is a Denno 378 U.S. right. (Jackson constitutional Ed. 2d Ct. of a 1774.) L. 84 S. The constitutional status on to of a right against a motion militates the use circuit rule to 11(a), limit the force and effect section 114 — which gives hearing, a defendant on a motion to confession volun suppress a on that the confession was not grounds tary. argues that his counsel filed the motion sup-
press knowledge as soon he had of the a mo- factual basis for such tion. aware We are of the short time of the gap filing between date; however, motion and the trial the better and necessary practice is to arrange or, hearing on motion if necessary, before it should presence outside the of a A defendant should jury. not be compelled, case, as was the defendant in instant try suppress a confession a jury after it has admitted.
The defendant further argues his sentence is excessive in record, view of his youth, convictions, lack of prior educational work record. The defendant was convicted of Class X offense of invasion, home which has a mandatory sentence of imprisonment not less than 6 years and not more years. (Ill. than 30 Stat. Rev. ch, par. 8—1(a)(3).)The defendant received a sentence of 12 which is within the years, well parameters sentencing statute. The defendant four other men into an broke individual’s home for the purpose stealing drugs. The defendant and other one guns, individual were armed procured by which had been During defendant. people physi invasion three home were cally assaulted and was shot the neck and now a injured —one *4 the paraplegic. disagree We with defendant that the trial court abused its by discretion a sentence of 12 imposing years’ imprisonment.
For the foregoing reasons this case is remanded to the circuit court of Knox for the of County purpose conducting suppression the hearing, with instruction that if motion the allowed and the defendant grant court shall the conviction judgment vacate of remand, the suppression hearing judg- a new trial. to the on Subject ment of the trial and sentence therein is affirmed. court
Affirmed, with but remanded instructions.
WOMBACHER,J., concurs. HEIPLE, part dissenting part:
JUSTICE concurring opinion I that of which affirms agree portion majority the the of I dissent from that judgment and sentence the trial but the portion conducting sentencing which remands for of purpose hearing. order the trial court stated all motions
By July dated 12, A second order by were be filed and heard 1986. of September order re- extended the deadline the first set, prior all and resolved to the date set quiring motions be noticed trial, 6, The also counsel for 1986. second order directed Rule with the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court G—1. comply procedure notice motion provides hearing given Rule G—-1 that as to the on a be date of the hearing. Additionally, to the the second eight days 1986, order stated motions at or after” would “presented finding not heard the court new “except upon express be matter, parties, not available to the has been discovered previously motion, upon also necessitating filing presentation of said the purposes motion is filed for the de- finding being that said lay.”
On October filed a motion to his on October statements and motion would indicated notice as The action violated Rule G—1 because defendant’s given eight on the motion was not advance hearing days new matter unless defendant could establish hearing. Additionally, date necessitating the late set had been discovered suppress, motion to defendant’s action violated the. court; if the to be heard on date order of the motion was not be
set for the motion could resolved is obvious date set trial. not be on October present
The defendant’s counsel could on the motion for October co-counsel filed a notice so notice Again, the second 1986, and to choose a proceeded jury. given eight days it was not ad- Rule G—1 since hearing violated had the motion itself problem vance of *5 Now, following it to heard until the day worsened. first set for trial. day no reason finding justifying
On the trial judge, motion, suppres- to hold a lengthy late of the refused presentation defendant is entitled to a sion The now holds the majority It states: suppression hearing. its order September
“The trial court’s reliance on a cutoff date for motions is not well setting placed sup view of the fact that the court had the State to permitted until the eve of the trial and further heard plement discovery motions filed the State after 12 and which were 3d at App. heard within a short time trial.” 165 Ill. Whether the State was until the supplement discovery allowed eve of trial is irrelevant the defendant’s late regard presentation of his motion to suppress. The does not contend the majority supple- mental somehow the late discovery presentation necessitated Further, motion. I fail to see that the how fact State motions which were resolved to trial prior excuses defendant’s actions. The State acted to the pursuant order of set- ting, noticing and its resolving motions to trial. The defendant did not.
The majority’s second reason for is entitled holding defendant to a suppression hearing is that “the trial court’s reliance on a circuit court rule is too tenuous a reason to the circuit court’s denial support of a on the motion to It further states circuit suppress.” 11(a) rule limits the force and effect of section of our 114 — (Ill. Criminal Stat. 11(a).) Code. Rev. ch. I dis par. 114 — agree on points. both
Circuit courts have the power regulat enact and enforce rules ing their calendars and long dockets as as the rules do not conflict court rules or supreme law. Valid circuit court rules of statutory practice have the binding effect of a statute and are to be obeyed. (Martin Brothers Implement Co. Diepholz (1982), 109 Ill. 3d App. 283.) Section states in a criminal 11(a) case move to may voluntary. confession circuit 114— abrogate, modify court’s order did not limit or section rather, it was in accordance the section. The court allowed 11(a); a total of 74 from the issuance of its first order on days July until trial on setting, noticing resolving of motions. This was amount of time for the certainly reasonable defendant to resolve his motion to Trials cannot suppress. proceed fashion orderly when motions which can be filed and heard before
trial, and which are ordered to be filed and heard before are not so filed and heard. Failure to comply with reasonable local rulings directions as to procedural deadlines the trial judge serves to ob- trjal stated, struct the timely justice. administration of As the judge the time to have a is lengthy suppression hearing morning not the the jury did, trial. The trial had inherent he judge power to rule as rulings law, reasonable, were consistent with statutory were should be upheld.
Finally, majority opinion stresses that a hearing on volun- tariness of a right. confession is a constitutional So it is. Like all con- rights, however, stitutional subject re- *6 procedural reasonable Otherwise, quirements. there is nothing prevent the defendant from raising such motions for the first time at the conference on jury instructions or even at the sentencing hearing. Throughout the entire law, fabric of the a thread of reasonableness interlaced. Without reasonableness, the fabric unravels. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
THE THE OF PEOPLE OF STATE CLARK, Defendant-Appellant. CLAYSCOTT Third District No. 3—87—0271 Opinion January