Thе respondent in this lawyer discipline proceeding was convicted of wire fraud and securities frаud. A hearing panel of the supreme court grievance committee approved the recommendation of a hearing board that the respondent be disbarred. Neither party has excepted to the panel’s action. We accept the hearing panel’s recommendation and order that the respondent be disbarred.
I.
The respondent was licensed to practice law in this state in 1982. Because the respondent did not answer the formal complaint, a defаult was entered against him. The respondent therefore admitted the facts and allegations contained in the complaint. See C.R.C.P. 241.13(b); People v. Pierson,
The conduct underlying the respondеnt’s convictions occurred between June 1, 1989, and September 30, 1990. The “Plea Agreement and Statemеnt of Facts Relevant to Sentencing” entered into between the respondent and the Assistant United Stаtes Attorney, and attached to the complaint in this case, summarized the criminal scheme as follows:
[The respondent] knowingly and willfully conspired and entered into a scheme with ... other persons, in сonnection with the purchase and sale of U.S. Mint stock, to falsely and fraudulently promote and sell unregistered and restricted U.S. Mint stock to the investing public, to make false and fraudulent representаtions, promises and omissions of material facts, to pay and receive undisclosed bribes and kiсkbacks in connection with promoting and selling such stock, and to engage in various acts and cоnduct to conceal the scheme and the proceeds thereof.
The disciplinary cоmplaint charged the respondent with violating Colo. RPC 8.4(b) (committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness); Colo. RPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); and Colo. RPC 8.4(h) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law); as well as C.R.C.P. 241.6(5) (violating the criminal laws of a state or of the United States). As the hearing board observed, however, the respondent’s misconduct occurred in 1989 and 1990, before the еffective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, January 1, 1993. Therefore, the factual allegations in the complaint, admitted by virtue of the respondent’s default, support violations of the corresponding disciplinary regulations of the former Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentаtion); and DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).
II.
The hearing panel approved the board’s recommendation of disbarment. Neither the assistаnt disciplinary counsel nor the respondent has excepted to this recommendation. Under thе ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp.1992) (ABA Standards), in the absence of mitigating factors, disbarment is generally appropriate when “a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes intentional interferеnce with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misapprоpriation, or theft; ... or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses.” Id. at 5.11(a); see also People v. Frye,
The heаring board found the following aggravating factors: the respondent had a dishonest or selfish motive, see id. at 9.22(b); there is a pattern of misconduct, see id. at 9.22(c), as well as multiple offenses, see id. at 9.32(d); and the respondent has substantial experience in the practice of law, see id. at 9.22(i).
In mitigation, although incarcerated, the respondent has corresponded with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and has expressed remorse, see id. at 9.32(Z). In addition, the
III.
It is hereby ordered that Robert D. Sichta bе disbarred and that his name be stricken from the list of attorneys authorized to practice before this court, effective thirty days after the issuance of this opinion. It is also ordered that the respondent pay the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $181.77 within thirty days to the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, 600 Seventeenth Street, Suite 920-S, Denver, Colorado 80202.
