THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMARI SHAW, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-23-2021B
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
January 22, 2024
2024 IL App (1st) 232021-U
SIXTH DIVISION
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
No. 234005288
Honorable David L. Kelly and Kristyna C. Ryan, Judges, presiding.
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.
Justice Tailor dissented.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We vacate the circuit court‘s October 17, 2023 order finding defendant‘s continued detention pending trial was necessary, and remand for a new proceeding, because the court did not base its finding on the specific articulable facts of the case.
BACKGROUND
¶ 3 ¶ 4 Shaw was arrested on October 10, 2023, and charged with one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm (
¶ 5 At the hearing, the State sought to detain both Shaw and a co-defendant (who is a not a party to this appeal) pending trial. The State‘s attorney proffered that on October 10, 2023, the victim was in a Dunkin Donuts parking lot in Cicero, Illinois, at around 8:49 p.m., with her two grandchildren (ages 9 and 3), her 13-year-old daughter, and two of the daughter‘s friends. The group was in the victim‘s vehicle when another vehicle pulled in front and blocked them in. An individual holding a firearm with an extended clip exited the second vehicle, approached the victim‘s vehicle, and instructed the victim to “get out.” Two other individuals exited the second vehicle holding firearms, one of whom pointed a firearm at the victim‘s daughter. Everyone exited the victim‘s vehicle, which the three individuals holding firearms then entered. Shortly thereafter,
¶ 6 Approximately eight minutes later (at 8:57 p.m.), officers located the victim‘s vehicle and began a pursuit after unsuccessfully attempting a traffic stop. The pursuit also involved a police helicopter, and continued to the 8300 block of Langley Avenue in Chicago, where the victim‘s vehicle stopped and four individuals exited and fled on foot. Officers “immediately” captured one of those individuals, a female, and pursued the other three individuals to a third-floor unit of a nearby apartment building. After forming a perimeter around the building and entering the unit, officers located five individuals inside, including Shaw and his co-defendant. The officers identified Shaw and his co-defendant as two of the individuals they pursued on foot. A search warrant was later executed in the apartment, where officers recovered ammunition, a loaded magazine, seven cell phones, and a handgun with an extended magazine.
¶ 7 Regarding Shaw‘s criminal record, the State proffered that he had an “informal station adjustment” for aggravated possession of a stolen vehicle from 2022, along with a pending case in Iowa for “participating in a riot.”
¶ 8 Counsel for Shaw‘s co-defendant pointed out that three individuals entered the victim‘s vehicle at Dunkin Donuts parking lot, but four exited following the vehicular pursuit. Shaw‘s counsel questioned the identification evidence, representing that one of the victim‘s stated the offenders wore masks during the incident. Counsel emphasized that the surveillance had a significant gap because it apparently did not capture when the fourth individual entered the victim‘s vehicle following the initial incident. Additionally, counsel contended there were “missing guns“—as officers recovered only one firearm from the apartment, and another from the female offender—and no recovery of the victim‘s keys. Regarding Shaw‘s history, his counsel
¶ 9 On questioning from Judge Kelly, the State affirmed it would not present a victim identification of either Shaw or his co-defendant. Instead, the State represented that the identification evidence consisted of “the initial surveillance video, them getting into the car, and them getting stopped at the end of their flight and identified.”
¶ 10 The circuit court granted the State‘s petition and ordered Shaw detained pending trial, finding that the State had established with clear and convincing evidence that Shaw was likely one of the offenders, based on the short time frame between incident, pursuit, and arrest. Regarding whether Shaw posed a real and present threat to the community, the court stated, “this Court can‘t imagine anything more dangerous *** [than] to have handguns with extended magazines pointed at [the victims] for a car,” and continued that the victims had to witness “handguns pointed both at their mother, their relatives, and their friends.” The court did not find that Shaw posed a willful flight risk. Finally, the court found there were no conditions that could mitigate the risk of Shaw‘s release because he allegedly committed “extremely violent acts” in a “commercial area,” and added that the vehicular pursuit also put the public in danger. The court continued, “Based on those violent actions, that flight, based on your criminal history *** this Court does not believe at this time that it can fashion any *** combination of conditions that would mitigate the risk” of release.
¶ 12 The matter was continued to October 17, 2023, before Judge Kristyna C. Ryan. Following a brief scheduling discussion, Shaw‘s attorney stated that the circuit court had “to make a finding that [Shaw‘s] continued detentions is necessary.” The court reviewed the allegations and Shaw‘s scores for the “new criminal activity” and “failure to appear” criteria, then stated, “Based on all of the prior documentation, the charges, the allegations, I will continue to find the detention is necessary.” In so finding, the court mistakenly represented that Judge Kelly had also based Shaw‘s detention on the risk of willful flight.
¶ 13 Defense counsel objected, arguing that the circuit court had to make a new factual finding before it could continue Shaw‘s detention, which would require the State to make a new proffer. The State disagreed, emphasizing that the pretrial detention hearing took place only 48 hours ago, and no “material change” had occurred in the interim. Defense counsel maintained Judge Ryan had to make independent findings, and could not only rely on Judge Kelly‘s findings. The State responded that a new factual finding was unnecessary. The court agreed, stating that if a defendant “has a court date every two or three days and nothing has changed *** I don‘t think that there‘s a need to then go back,” and then clarifying, “I‘m not making a factual finding. I based my decision on the petition and the findings of another judge.”
¶ 14 On October 27, 2023, Shaw filed his notice of appeal. In the notice of appeal form, Shaw checked a box indicating that he claimed he was denied an opportunity for a fair hearing, and
JURISDICTION
¶ 15 ¶ 16 Shaw appeals from the circuit court‘s order of October 17, 2023. He filed his notice of appeal on October 27, 2023, and thus the notice was timely, and this court has jurisdiction, per the Act. See
ANALYSIS
¶ 17 ¶ 18 On appeal, Shaw‘s primary argument is that Judge Ryan‘s continued detention finding was improper because she did not base her finding on the specific articulable facts of the case, as required by the Act. Shaw also argues Judge Ryan erred by finding that his continued detention was necessary based on the risk of his willful flight from prosecution, and the written order of October 17, 2023, did not meet statutory requirements.
¶ 19 Under the Act, a criminal defendant is presumed eligible for pretrial release, and cannot be detained pending trial unless the State files a petition for pretrial detention.
¶ 20 If, following the hearing, the court grants the State‘s petition, it must issue a detention order “summarizing the court‘s reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant‘s willful flight from prosecution.”
¶ 21 Regarding our standard of review, there has been disagreement amongst the Illinois Appellate Districts about whether all circuit court decisions regarding pretrial detention are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, or whether there is a two-tiered system, where the circuit court‘s factual findings are reviewed for manifest weight of the evidence, while the ultimate detention decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See People v. Herrera, 2023 IL App (1st) 231801, ¶¶ 22-24 (describing the differing approaches through examples from the Fourth and Fifth Districts). We need not resolve this issue because Shaw only challenges Judge Ryan‘s conclusion, and there is consensus amongst the Districts that this is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
¶ 22 Shaw first argues that Judge Ryan‘s finding that his continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and present threat constituted an abuse of discretion because the Act requires the circuit court to base this determination on the specific articulable facts of the case.
¶ 23 The record shows Judge Kelly conducted a pretrial detention hearing on October 15, 2023, at which the parties proffered evidence. Two days later, on October 17, Judge Ryan ordered Shaw‘s continued detention after a brief proceeding where neither side proffered evidence. Judge Ryan explained that she based her decision on, “all of the prior documentation, the charges, the allegations,” and further clarified she was “not making a factual finding” because she “based [her] decision on the petition and the findings of another judge.”
¶ 24 On this record, we agree with Shaw that Judge Ryan did not base her finding that continued detention was necessary due to Shaw posing a real and present threat on the specific articulable facts of the case, which constituted an abuse of discretion. See Long, 2023 IL App (5th) 230881, ¶¶ 18-19. The record shows Judge Ryan based this finding not on her own understanding of the specific articulable facts of the case, but on her acceptance of Judge Kelly‘s findings.
¶ 25 In so finding, we acknowledge that the pretrial detention hearing was only two days before Judge Ryan made her finding on October 17, 2023, and neither party contended that new information had arisen or a change in circumstances had occurred at that proceeding. Regardless of these circumstances, however, the Act requires that an independent finding based on the specific articulable facts of the case be made at every subsequent court appearance by a defendant.
¶ 26 We further acknowledge that our decision may well have been different had Judge Kelly presided over the October 17, 2023 proceeding, or if the record demonstrated that Judge Ryan independently reviewed the proffers made by the parties at that initial hearing (such as via review of a transcript). Here, however, the record contains no basis from which this court could conclude that Judge Ryan based her continued detention decision on the specific articulable facts. See People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 24 (finding the circuit court abused its discretion by not explaining its basis for finding no less restrictive conditions existed besides detention, and stating, “[w]hile the facts underlying the court‘s decision may well have been sufficient to deny pretrial release ***, we cannot supply the missing conclusion“).
¶ 27 Next, we also agree with Shaw that Judge Ryan abused her discretion by finding that continued detention was necessary based on flight risk, a point the State does not dispute. Judge Kelly did not find detention necessary on this basis, and the State offered nothing new regarding flight risk at the October 17, 2023 proceeding. It appears Judge Ryan‘s decision on this point resulted from a simple misreading of the October 15, 2023 order. Accordingly, we vacate the
¶ 28 The State argues that Judge Ryan‘s finding regarding continued detention based on Shaw posing a real and present threat was appropriate because the Act does not require a full pretrial detention hearing at each subsequent court appearance by a defendant, and Judge Ryan acted consistently with the Act to base her finding on Judge Kelly‘s conclusions. The State cites Long for support. There, the Fifth District affirmed a finding of continued detention over defendant‘s claim that the State did not meet its burden at a subsequent appearance. Long, 2023 IL App (5th) 230881, ¶¶ 13-19. In affirming, the Long court explained that the circuit court complied with the statutory requirements for subsequent hearings after it permitted additional proffers from those made at the original detention hearing, and then “determined that continued detention was necessary to avoid the specific real and present threat” Long posed “based on the specific, articulable facts of this case.” Id. ¶ 18.
¶ 29 We agree with the State that the Act, by its plain language, does not require a new, full pretrial detention hearing at each subsequent appearance of a defendant. Compare
¶ 31 The dissent claims that we found Judge Ryan abused her discretion because she “did not hold a separate, independent detention hearing.” This is a mischaracterization. As we state above, and reiterate in response to the dissent here, a full pretrial detention hearing is not required at each subsequent appearance. Instead, the Act requires a new determination that continued detention is necessary based on the specific articulable facts of the case.
¶ 32 The dissent also argues, echoing the State, that Judge Ryan‘s finding was, in fact, based on the specific articulable facts because Judge Ryan reviewed certain documents, specifically the State‘s petition for detention and Judge Kelly‘s order of October 15, 2023. This argument fails because the record shows those documents provided only brief summaries of the specific articulable facts, not the specific articulable facts themselves. The dissent details the contents of those documents and concludes they are sufficient to constitute the specific articulable facts of the case as if those documents existed in a vacuum, but they do not. The Act requires the State to
¶ 33 In sum, we vacate the circuit court‘s October 17, 2023 order continuing Shaw‘s detention, and remand for a new proceeding for the court to make a finding as to whether Shaw‘s detention should be continued based on the specific articulable facts of the case. In so finding, we retain jurisdiction, and order Shaw‘s continued detention pending the results of the new proceeding.
¶ 34 Finally, because reversal is necessary due to Judge Ryan not basing her continued detention decision on the specific articulable facts of the case, we do not reach Shaw‘s argument that the written order of October 17, 2023, did not comport with the statutory requirements.
CONCLUSION
¶ 37 Vacated and remanded with instructions.
¶ 38 JUSTICE TAILOR, dissenting:
¶ 39 The majority holds that Judge Ryan abused her discretion because she did not hold a separate, independent detention hearing when she ruled that Shaw would remain detained, and instead based her decision on the information presented to Judge Kelly, who only two days earlier ordered Shaw to be detained after a detention hearing. Although the majority says that it agrees section 5/110-6.1(i-5) “does not require a new, full pretrial detention hearing at each subsequent appearance of a defendant” (supra ¶ 29), it actually holds otherwise: “a circuit court at a subsequent appearance of a defendant cannot continue detention, without knowledge of the specific articulable facts, based only on acceptance of a previous judge‘s interpretation of specific articulable facts, and a review of documentation that does not contain the specific articulable facts.” Given the specific facts of this case, the majority‘s holding essentially prohibits continued detention without a full hearing at a subsequent court date whenever the defendant appears before a different judge. Nothing in section 5/110-6.1(i-5) places such a burden on the court or State. In any event, the record shows that Judge Ryan considered the specific articulable facts of this case before ordering Shaw‘s continued detention. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that Judge Ryan abused her discretion.
¶ 41 Here, the State filed a felony complaint and then a verified petition for pretrial detention. The facts of the case were proffered by the State and Shaw‘s eligibility for detention was addressed on the record on October 15, 2023, at his initial appearance hearing at the Leighton courthouse. Judge Kelly determined that Shaw should be detained. Shaw does not appeal from the court‘s October 15th detention order.
¶ 42 Two days later, on October 17th, Shaw appeared at the Maywood courthouse for a preliminary hearing. Shaw answered ready for a preliminary hearing. The State requested a continuance. Judge Ryan continued the case to November 8, 2023. Defense counsel then reminded the court that, “you also do have to make a finding that his continued detention is necessary.” Judge Ryan then did exactly what subsection (i-5) required of her and found “that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant‘s
¶ 43 We do not know from the record whether Judge Ryan had a transcript of the October 15, 2023, hearing. However, based on Judge Ryan‘s statements on October 17, 2023, it is apparent that she reviewed the State‘s felony complaint, verified petition for detention, and the order entered on October 15, 2023, each of which set forth the essential facts proffered by the State on October 15, 2023. The sworn felony complaint alleged that Shaw committed the offense of aggravated vehicular hijacking in that he “knowingly [took] a motor vehicle from the person and [Shaw] [was] otherwise armed with a firearm. To wit: [Shaw] pointed a firearm at the victim and her children and forced them out of their vehicle and took possession of the victim‘s vehicle.” The sworn “petition for pretrial detention hearing” alleged that Shaw committed a forcible felony and that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in that “Shaw and co-defendants pointed a gun at victim and her children forcing them from their blue Jeep Compass. The offender then took possession of the Jeep Compass and fled scene eventually being taken into custody after a pursuit.” The written order filed after the pretrial detention hearing indicates that
¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.