People v Shamim

Jul 15, 2026
2022-02955
Versions:

Langone & Associates, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Richard M. Langone of counsel), for appellant.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Patricia E. Stewart, and William Branigan of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Ushir Pandit-Durant, J.), rendered April 6, 2022, convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant‘s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was sufficient to establish the element of forcible compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law §§ 130.35[1]; 130.00[8]; People v Shelton, 307 AD2d 370, 371, affd 1 NY3d 614; People v Williams, 289 AD2d 600, 601). Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, any discrepancies in the complainant‘s testimony did not render such testimony incredible as a matter of law and merely raised issues for resolution by the jury (see People v Green, 107 AD3d 915, 915; People v Wilson, 50 AD3d 711, 711; People v Shelton, 307 AD2d at 371). Further, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury‘s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict convicting the defendant of rape in the first degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643).

The defendant‘s contention that an expanded jury charge on intent should have been provided as part of the Supreme Court‘s definition of forcible compulsion is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Somers, 78 NY2d 1058; People v James, 35 AD3d 762). In any event, the contention is without merit, as the court‘s charge, when viewed in its entirety, adequately conveyed to the jury that the defendant acted with the necessary mens rea (see People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 316-317; People v Contrera, 242 AD3d 1016, 1018).

The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the Supreme Court erred in not issuing a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of text messages sent by and between the defendant and the complainant for the purposes of impeachment (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Tomlinson, 174 AD3d 929; People v Farmer, 54 AD3d 871, 872). In any event, the court‘s instructions with regard to the text messages, which were marked only for identification but not received in evidence, are presumed to have been followed by the jury (see People v Baker, 14 NY3d 266, 274).

The defendant‘s contention that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (see People v John, 27 NY3d 294) were violated by the admission of the testimony of a criminalist is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Sirleaf, 231 AD3d 969, 971). We decline to review the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see People v Hairston, 213 AD3d 694, 695; People v Gough, 203 AD3d 747, 751).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court