OPINION OF THE COURT
Defendant appeals from an order of the Appellate Term
Defendant contends that the statute violates the United States and New York State Constitutions because it prohibits constitutionally protected speech, and because it violates his constitutional right to due process. Defendant also maintains that the information charging him with commission of the crime lacked sufficient specificity because it failed to set forth the dates and times of his alleged criminal conduct. Finally, defendant complains that he was deprived of a fair trial because the complaining witness was permitted to testify in violation of the psychologist/patient privilege set forth in CPLR 4507. We hold that the statute is not unconstitutional and find no merit in defendant’s remaining contentions. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Term should be affirmed.
I
Defendant Julian Shack suffers from mental illness, a fact which he concedes and which was the centerpiece of his defense at his trial. Complainant Diane Buffalin, defendant’s first cousin, is a psychologist who lives and practices in Michigan. In June of 1990, defendant placed a telephone call to Buffalin at her home seeking information regarding his illness and medications and posing questions that arose from his treatment with a psychiatrist in New York. Buffalin, who had had no contact with defendant during the 12 years preceding this phone call, triеd to answer his questions. Defendant apparently obtained some benefit from speaking with her, and upon his request she agreed to a continued telephone relationship with him, so long as he remained in treatment with his psychiatrist and continued taking his medication. From June through October, they spoke on the telephone approximately twice each week, and, during a visit to New York that summer, Buffalin "connected” defendant with an anxiety clinic at a New York City hospital.
Toward the end of October of 1990, defendant informed Buffalin that he was "doing better” and that he had stopped
At the end of November, Buffalin informed defendant that she would be undergoing major surgery and told him not to call her during her two-week period of recuperation. On the day of her surgery, defendant called Buffalin three times, and he continued to place calls to her home repeatedly and regularly thereafter. From December 12 through the end of that month, he placed 88 phone calls to her home, sometimes calling as many as seven times a day. Defendant left messages on Buffalin’s answering machine, asserting that if she refused to take his calls, he would begin to place repeated calls to her adult daughter, her mother-in-law and her father. In December, Buffalin wrote defendant a letter in which she tried to make it clear to him that his calls were unwanted, and she advised defendant that she would file a criminal complaint against him if he did not stop calling her.
Defendant continued to telephone Buffalin and records for his residence in Queens County indicate 185 calls to her residence between December 12, 1990 and May 20, 1991. Defendant left messages in which he stated that if she refused to speak with him, he would sell her telephone number tо a "pervert” who would delight in calling and upsetting her, that he would place dozens of phone calls to other family members and that he would call the Michigan licensing board to have her psychologist’s license revoked. Buffalin telephoned defendant once in January to implore him to stop calling, and on several occasions she called him and replayed the taped messages of his calls so thаt he would know that evidence against him was being gathered. Nevertheless, defendant continued to place calls to Buffalin’s home until May of 1991, when Buffalin came to New York and filed a criminal complaint against him. Defendant was arrested, prosecuted and convicted on one count of aggravated harassment in the second degree and sentenced to three years of probation.
Defendant challеnges the constitutionality of the statute on several grounds. 1
A
Defendant’s first claim is that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringes the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution. Even if not facially unconstitutional, defendant maintains that it is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Penal Law § 240.30 (2) does not prohibit speech or exрression — on its face, its proscription is limited to conduct (making a telephone call without any legitimate purpose of communication). The limiting clause which expressly excludes constitutionally protected speech from its reach plainly distinguishes this statute from those which impose criminal liability for "pure speech”
(see, e.g., People v Dietze,
Moreover, even if Penal Law § 240.30 (2) is construed to proscribe speech, a declaration of fаcial overbreadth does not automatically follow. Constitutional free speech protections "have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses”; a person’s right to free expression may be curtailed "upon a showing that substantial privacy interеsts are being invaded
The
Rowan
analysis may be extended to Penal Law § 240.30 (2). Manifestly, an individual has a substantial privacy interest in his or her telephone; in the context of a telephone harassment statute, the device is easily conceptualized as the functional equivalent of the mailbox. Thus, to the extent Penal Law § 240.30 (2) limits a caller’s right to free speech, it permissibly subordinates that right to the recipient’s right to be free of unwanted telephone calls. The statute is narrowly drafted and furthers the State’s compelling interest in protecting its citizens from "persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives”
(United States v Lampley,
573 F2d 783, 787;
see also, Gormley v Director, Conn. State Dept. of Probation,
632 F2d 938, 941,
cert denied
Nor is the statute unconstitutional as applied to defendant, because it did not subject him to criminal liability for engaging in protected speech; his liability arose from his harassing conduct, not from any expression entitled to constitutional protection. Although defendant claims that he had a legitimate purpose becаuse he placed his calls seeking help for his illness, that argument addresses only those telephone calls placed before Buffalin told him to stop calling her. The manner and substance of defendant’s calls changed dramatically in December, and the information charged him with criminal conduct only after that time. Indeed, defendant does not now deny that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the
Defendant further asserts that Penal Law § 240.30 (2) is overbroad because it may impair or chill others’ lawful exercise of free speech rights; it may reasonably be interpreted to prohibit expression which is constitutionally protected
(Grayned v City of Rockford,
Defendant does not assert any circumstances in which the language of Penal Law § 240.30 (2) would impermissibly restrain protected speech, only suggesting generally that it would permit criminal prosecution of "any patient who has an argument over the phone with a psychologist, or a provider of any good or service”
(compare, People v Hollman, supra).
His argument overlooks the statutory requirement that the telephone call be made "with no purpose of legitimate communication,” a provision which plainly excludes the vast majority of such calls. It is this limitation which distinguishes Penal Law § 240.30 (2) from other telephone harassment statutes that have been declared constitutionally overbroad
(see, People v Klick,
66 111 2d 269,
Defendant further claims the statute is unconstitutionally vague, i.e., that it violates the constitutional right to due process because it fails to give a citizen adequate notiсe of the nature of proscribed conduct, and permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
(see, People v Bright,
Defendant claims that the statute does not adequately apprise ordinary citizens that phone calls made to "vent anger” or to "inform someone that an attempt would be made to revoke a professional license” would fall within its proscription. As one whose conduct clearly fell within the ambit of the statute, defendant may not assert a due process challenge on the grounds that the statute may be vague when applied to the potential conduct of others
(see, Broadrick v Oklahoma,
Whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is measured by whether it provides notice to "a person of ordinary intelligence * * * that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute”
(United States v Harriss,
Moreover, insofar as defendant contends that Penal Law § 240.30 (2) fails tо put citizens on notice of what they may not
Further, we find no possibility of arbitrary enforcement. The combination of the described standards and the clear and understandable elements of the criminal conduct adequately dеfines the criminal conduct for the police officers, Judges and juries who will enforce the statute. Notably, because of the very nature of the conduct proscribed by Penal Law § 240.30 (2), enforcement of the statute is unlikely to occur in the absence of a victim’s complaint to authorities. Given the opportunity to consider the veracity of the complainant and to engage in preliminary investigation, this statute vests no more discretion in the police than any other statute which proscribes malevolence or misconduct toward another person
(compare, People v Bright, supra
[statute required loiterer to give police officer a "satisfactory explanation of his presence”]). We conclude that the statute adequately describes an element of the proscribed conduct, and provides sufficient notice to potentiаl offenders and sufficient guidelines to those who would enforce the statute and that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to legislative enactments
(see, People v Bright,
Ill
Defendant claims that the accusatory instrument was defective for lack of specificity because it did not identify the
Each count in a charging instrument must state "that the offense charged therein was committed on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time” (CPL 200.50 [6]). This requirement, along with others set forth in CPL 200.50, serves thrеe purposes: to provide the accused with fair notice of the nature of the charge against him so that he may prepare his answer and defense to the charge; to ensure that the crime for which defendant is tried before the petit jury is in fact the crime with which he was charged; and, to identify the criminal conduct with sufficient specificity so that defendant, if convicted, may raise a double jeopardy clаim as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same conduct
(People v Sanchez,
A continuing crime is one "that by its nature may be committed either by one act or by multiple acts and readily permits characterization as a continuing offense over a period of time”
(People v Keindl, supra,
at 421). Whether multiple аcts may be charged as a continuing crime is resolved by
By its terms, Penal Law § 240.30 (2) imposes criminal liability for making а single telephone call, if placed with the requisite intent and lack of legitimate purpose. While a defendant may annoy, harass, or, more likely, threaten or alarm another person with a single telephone call, the statute does not
necessarily
contemplate a single act. The use of the terms “harass” and "annoy” are easily susceptible of describing multiple acts occurring over a period of time. Indеed, Penal Law § 240.30 (2) derives from, and was intended to be broader than, former Penal Law § 1423 (6) which was directed to tieing up business telephone lines by repeated calling. In revising the statute, the Legislature intended to proscribe repeated telephone calls to a residence that might "driv[e] a person to distraction”
(see,
Staff Notes of Commn on Revision of Penal Law, reprinted in CLS NY Statutes, vol 23B, Penal Law § 240.30, at 261). Thus, despite the statutоry reference to a single phone call, the provision and its history readily permit characterization as a continuing offense over time
(compare, People v Sanchez,
Finally, defеndant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the introduction of evidence of defendant’s mental illness through the testimony of Buffalin because her testimony violated the psychologist/patient privilege which attended their relationship
(see,
CPLR 4507). Asserting the existence of a psychologist/patient relationship, defense counsel successfully obtained a pretrial ruling that Buffalin could not testify about defendant’s condition or medication unless
IV
In sum, we conclude that Penal Law § 240.30 (2) does not violate the constitutional right to free speech, and it does not suffer from vagueness. The statute is amenable to characterization as a continuing crime, and in this case, the charging instrument adequately advised defendant of the time period during which he was alleged to have harassed his victim.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Term should be affirmed.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.
Order affirmed.
Notes
. Defendant does not contend that the Free Speech or Due Process Clauses of the New York State Constitution afford greater protection than those of the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, our analysis assumes the requirements of both documents are the same.
. This statute has once before withstood a constitutional challenge in an intermediate appellate court
(see, People v Smith,