*1 S104487. Feb. [No. 2003.] PEOPLE,
THE Plаintiff Respondent, COMPANY, SENECA INSURANCE Defendant and Appellant. *2 Counsel Defendant and Appellant.
Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Klink, Dis- Brent and Fred Riggs Deputy District Cooley, Attorney, Steve trict for Plaintiff and Respondent. Attorneys, Perkes, and Lawrence A. Bales-Lange, Counsel County (Tulare)
Kathleen Counsel, of Counties as State Association California County Deputy of Plaintiff and Respondent. Amicus Curiae behalf Opinion
BROWN, case, J. In this we decide whether Penal Code1 section which release governs convicted defendant on bail pending sentencing, case of a conviction applies We conclude that by guilty plea. 1166 does not in this context. reverse the Accordingly, judgment the Court of Appeal. *3 Background and
Factual Procedural 30, A criminal 1999, filed on complaint July Noh charged Seung Hyun 496, with seven counts (Noh) of stolen subd. receiving (§ On property. (a).) 1999, Seneca Insurance September a bail bond Company (Seneca) posted to secure Noh’s release from The bond that Noh custody. provided would ... any to answer “appear any based [charge] accusatory pleading upon convicted, the acts filed him supporting complaint against . . . and if [would| appear pronouncement or ofjudgment grant if probation,” for оf $70,000 Noh failed to appear, Seneca would to the State of California. pay 23, 2000, On May Noh entered a five on of the seven plea charged 21, 2000, counts. court ordered Noh to on June for appear sentencing him to remain free bail. permitted on Noh failed to for sentenc- appear and the a court issued bench ing, warrant and ordered Seneca’s bail bond forfeited. 15, 2000,
On November Seneca moved to vacate forfeiture and exonerate that, bail. Seneca argued after entered Noh his the trial court guilty plea, should have in accordance with proceeded section 1166 before permitting Noh to free bail. remain Seneca further asserted that section 1166 the court to conduct an required and make of evidentiary hearing findings considerations, fact with to five including and the respect public safety of Noh’s probability failing Seneca appear judgment. argued court’s failure to with a comply jurisdictional was error words, exonerated bail of law. In other operation because court failed to follow the set forth in section procedures might 1166—procedures led the court to have commit Noh to custody his following plea—Seneca contended it should not be held for Noh’s failure responsible appear. claimed Seneca’s reliance on was opposition, People section 1166 because statute misplaced governs only bail “verdict” following contested trial and has no to bail application following guilty. 13, 2000,
On December hearing argument considering history the trial court denied Seneca’s motion statutory 1 Allfurther references to the Penal Code. that order (see Seneca from exonerate bail. appealed forfeiture and
vacate 53 Cal.2d v. Wilcox We granted reversed. Appeal 1174]), A.L.R.2d 1166 does apply conclude that section for review. We People’s petition based and therefore Seneca’s argument is by guilty conviction plea, where failure whether trial court’s fails. do not decide section 1166 We does would in a case where provision section 1166 with comply law, nor do we decide exonerating effect bail operation have the with evidentiary hearing an with section whether compliance of fact. findings formal
Discussion verdict is provides: general as amended Section “If she must verdict is he or or a special given, rendered against defendant, *4 to the remanded, or he or shall be committed if in if on bail she custody, be the the court upon of the to await the of county judgment officer proper verdict, unless, upon considering [1] the protection of the public, [2] the criminal of the and the previous seriousness offense charged proven, [3] record of the defendant, [4] the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court upon the verdict, and [5] public safety, the to to allow the defendant court concludes the evidence decision supports exonerated, if committed, on his or her bail is or remain out bail. When of it be refunded to the defendant or instead bail must money deposited or to have said deposited money found court person persons by amendment, said Prior (Italics added.) behalf of defendant.” that, verdict, an on-bail defend section 1166 stated after conviction by 1935, ch. (Stats. ant be committed to the officer of the proper county.” “may 657, 5, Thus, the former version of section 1166 italics added.) § commit an the trial court discretion as whether to on-bail gave unguided or him or her remain free. The 1999 amеnd custody defendant permit unless, ment, however, to custody the court to commit the defendant factors, a the evidence after five the court concludes considering supports decision to release defendant bail. by guilty plea, a is convicted either verdict or general, by person a a A criminal finding guilt
the term refers to verdict. “verdict” jury in a a . . . a finding case is made verdict of only “by jury, waived, italics aby guilty” (§ case where a has been jury plea prescribed a “shall be in form finding substantially and court’s added), a states (§ 1167). for verdict of Section general jury” verdict, not proceedings after a trial and section applies only proceedings to guilty no reference express a The section makes involving guilty plea. term, nor does use a pleas; “conviction,” broad such as that would more both clearly encompass Rather, and verdicts. guilty pleas statute refers only to “general In the “special (§ 1166.) same verdict[s]” verdict[s].” Code, of the Penal chapter the Legislature these terms: “The explains verdict, must general render a case, that in when except felony are in they doubt as to the effect legal facts proved, they may, exсept a trial upon libel, find verdict.” special italics (§ general “A verdict added.) upon is either or ‘not which ‘guilty’ guilty,’ imports conviction or acquittal of offense in the charged accusatory pleading.” (§ italics “A verdict is that added.) which the special jury find[s] the facts only, leaving to the Court.” judgment italics (§ added.) These specific descriptions general verdicts special do not simply rather, encompass refer to the guilty pleas; they of fact findings contested Moreover, trial. the organization of the Code Penal and the placement of section 1166 within that code strongly suggest 1166 does not in the case of a guilty plea.
Part 2 Code, of the Penal which at section begins relates to criminal procedure. The statutes in a proceed logical, consecutive fashion through case, of a stages criminal typical with indictment et starting (§ 940 seq.) and then et addressing (§ 948 pleadings 976 et seq.), arraignment (§ seq.), pretrial matters (§ et et plea (§ 1016 trial 1065 et seq.), seq.), (§ seq.), 1147 et (§ et seq.), sentencing (§ 1191 et seq.), judgment (§ seq.), and 1235 et (§ appeals seq.). governing Noh’s provisions *5 2, in 6, contrast, title which to appear part relates matters. In pretrial 2, section 1166 in title which relates to appears part matters that arise after the start of trial and before judgment. title 1 chapter Within governs 2 challenges itself, to the jury, governs the trial chapter governs chapter conduct them, after the cause jury is submitted to and chapter 4—which includes section 1166—governs jury’s verdict or findings. 4 first Chapter verdict, addresses the two of and types general special 1150 et and (§ what the seq.), explains trial court should do in the case of an ambiguous (§§ Then, or an in 1162) acquittal (§ 1165). section 4 describes what the chapter court should do when the jury returns a “verdict . . . against defendant.”
This context that clearly indicates section 1166 to refers proceedings a contested trial and verdict. following When drafters of Penal Code reached the in section chapter which were appears, they simply talking about were about verdicts—and pleas—they talking posttrial would need to distort the the Penal to logical structure of Code relate section Moreover, section 1166 works in tandem pleas. with section which in 2 of the same title. appears chapter Under section a trial court time “at any an defendant discretion,” custody commit on-bail in its “may, 1166, that Under section added.) (Italics for trial.” after his appearance against renders a verdict once the becomes discretion presumption unless then, custody, the defendant court, must commit defendant; sections 1129 Viewed together, test satisfied. the statute’s five-part finds an on-bail have do with they little to do with guilty pleas; 1166 have trial and before after the defendant custody appears defendant’s status judgment. verdict, context, relates to convictions clearly its
From Seneca, however, 1166 is ambiguous argues not guilty pleas. are resolved which criminal cases now because of with frequency that, resulting with cases many guilty pleas reasons so Seneca guilty plea. stage, cases the verdict reaching few comparatively following governing custody have enacted a reasonably provision could not custody governing enacted a comparable provision a verdict and not have following guilty plea. be because statutory may identifies in the scheme
The Seneca gap when were less common first enacted at time guilty pleas Penal Code was Nevertheless, 1930, the held early Appeal as Court of today. than they trial that, may cоurts the absence statute specific point, despite free defendant who remain their discretion allow an on-bail pleads Co. & Fidelity Deposit bail In sentencing judgment. pending this P. the court found discre (Fidelity), Cal.App. 59] bail form for statutory tion in section which sets forth implicit undertake, other among things, bonds. This form the surety convicted, of judgment the defendant “if will for pronouncement appear concluded, the text of from Fidelity grant probation.” (§ 1278.) form, that the must have contemplated possibility conviction, and that following free on bail remaining defendants sometimes by way guilty plea. this context include conviction might conviction noted other conclusion, the court also (Fidelity, support *6 a convicted section that including contemplate Penal Code provisions, at p. 164.) (Fidelity, free on bail remaining pending judgment. defendant not address expressly the Penal Code does is therefore that Seneca correct in Fidelity, light holding a but in following guilty plea, release on bail needed. that statute was have concluded no Legislature may specific that holding dissent Fidelity expressly Both Seneca and the interpret v. also cite They People of section 1166. scope fall within pleas guilty found in the court 755], which Cal.App.2d Scott at bench conviction a a by judge to case involving section 1166 a applicable trial. reason from these They cases that courts have historically understood convictions, now, section 1166 to all and that encompass the 1999 amendment limited trial court discretion under section are the People it a attempting give narrower dis. (See scope. opn., post, pp. 970-973.) agree We that 1999 amendment to section 1166 new gave significance here, to the issue but we do not think section presented 1166 has historically to guilty The court did not hold applied pleas. Fidelity fall guilty pleas within the of section and that have scope holding would made little sense in light of plain language of section 1166 and in the placement of the Penal governing Instead, Code chapter verdicts. Fidelity cited section 1166 as an of an in example analogous situation which a convicted defendant free bail remains and pending sentencing judgment. We think in Seneca the dissent err decision more reading Fidelity Scott, As for broadly. People we find no supra, Cal.App.2d in that suggestion section 1166 opinion to a сase applies involving no guilty plea, and have reason to decide here whether the court was correct to section 1166 to a case a bench trial involving instead trial.
The Court of found be Appeal ambiguous, warranting consideration of legislative because a history, guilty plea generally equiva- lent to a reasoned, verdict. The court guilty light in of this general equiva- lence, that “the absence any reference to guilty section 1166 pleas creates an We find no ambiguity.” when the context of the ambiguity statute is considered. The absence reference to any guilty section 1166 pleas merely reflects that section’s in the placement Penal Code chapter governing verdicts, course, Of a defendant pleas. can after a trial has plead guilty but begun, in the Penal for logical Code have place addressed release on bail is in the following guilty governing not in the section pleas, governing jury’s verdict at the close of trial. Hence, we see no in the inherent ambiguity Legislature’s failing discuss in section guilty pleas 1166.
Moreover, the equivalence verdicts relates to guilty pleas guilty their and our statements legal effect, them to be finding equivalent therefore contextual. (See, e.g., Valladoli Here, 918 P.2d more we are (Valladoli).) 999] concerned -with than effect, substantive procedure legal procedurally, from case guilty plea different verdict. of a quite crime, defendant plea, for his often in example, responsibility accepts or her his have hopes minimizing punishment. Legislature may that, circumstance, concluded where the defendant bemay cooperat- *7 authorities, at least to some extent with or she less ing he is prosecutorial this case as Though, to danger safety. risk or public to likely pose flight sentencing for fail to appear and then attests, defendants guilty some plead to have opted reasonably the Legislature might therefore and judgment—and who plead section 1166 to defendants set forth in extend procedures to resolve the a desire manifest guilty defendants who plead guilty—many have reasoned terms, may and the Legislature favorable matter on relatively favorable resolution not that would want to jeopardize that these defendants short, distinction In or failing appear. new crimes by committing is verdict not and convictions by guilty pleаs drew between 1166 must section baseless, and Seneca’s reject argument we completely in avoid absurd results. order to guilty pleas apply matter, who addition, persons treatment disparate In as a practical is as by verdict pro- as compared persons plead in section 1166 replicate, The factors listed suggests. nounced Seneca verbatim, (a), under section subdivision the factors that apply, almost fact, the bail, and in initially or sets magistrate when judge 1166 on section amendment have modeled appears (a), subdivision provides: subdivision (a). Specifically, bail, shall take into or magistrate “In or setting, denying judge reducing, consideration [1] protection of the public, [2] the seriousness of the offense charged, [3] previous criminal record of the defendant, [4] probability his her appearing at trial or hearing case. [5] Therefore, in the case of consideration.” shall be public safety primary defendants, guilty, all an on-bail defendant who including pleads on-bail at the time bail was listed in section 1166 considered already factors were favor of release. The new set, and were found to in initially they weigh itself, and the fact of the conviction factor after the defendant is pleads others, evaluate factor, that the court must it is that considered light freе on bail. But section whether the defendant should remain deciding when court to take the defendant’s does not in order for a have conviction into account when discretion. exercising asserts, v. Statum holding The dissent based our large part 572, 50 P.3d (Statum), Cal.4th 355] encompasses the term in statutes criminal governing procedure “verdict” 965-966.) convictions dis. by guilty plea. (See opn., post, pp. Statum, felony that a trial court’s order reducing concluded recently the verdict’ modifying pur conviction to a misdemeanor is an “order if the conviction even under section subdivision (a)(6), poses appeal trial, is at issue. not a and therefore no of a by way guilty plea, a guilty in this regard We reaffirmed italics (Statum, added.) Valladoli, verdict, citing supra, legal equivalent fn. 590. (Statum,
962 that,
We concede in contexts, many is not different guilty plea verdict, from a guilty and where distinctions between procedural guilty pleas guilty verdicts are not legally significant, Legislature use might the term “verdict” But, discussed, to include broadly guilty as can pleas. we think of several reasons plausible why treat a Legislature might from a verdict differently of purposes custody status pending Therefore, judgment. we must assume in that context that the сhose its words and intended a rule carefully special in case of apply a guilty trial, verdict after a contested because otherwise we would nullify the presumptively intentional distinction the drew.
Moreover, 1166, unlike section the statute that was issue Statum 1238, subd. (§ does not fall in a of (a)(6)) the Penal chapter Code that (1) specifically focuses the verdict or after a contested finding trial and no addresses other subjects; carefully delineates the (2) various of types verdict a render after jury might 1150, 1151, its completing deliberations (§§ 1152, 1153, 1154, 1158, 1158a, and then 1160); (3) describes what should follow in the case each 1155, 1156, 1157, 1161, verdict type jury (§§ 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1168), expressly distinguishing verdicts convicted, from other a defendant ways be might such findings by court. (§§ While the use of the term “verdict” in other places the Penal Code might a broad suggest that would interpretation reasonably include guilty pleas, use the context of title 4 part of that chapter code can only mean one reasonably at the thing: given conclusion of a contested trial. Court also relied on the that, Appeal rule because oft-repeated forfeitures,
law disfavors courts bail forfeiture interpret laws in favor of the surety. v. United (See, e.g., People Ins. Co. 5 Bonding (1971) Cal.3d 906 Cal.Rptr. 1385]; v. Ins. Co. People Ranger (1992) [98 1302, 1305 Cal.App.4th 343]; County Los Angeles [12 Co. Surety Ins. Cal.App.3d 263]; Co. Surety Ins. Here, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 385].) however, law; we are not a bail forfeiture we construing a rule construing of criminal procedure release on governing bail after verdict. Seneca contends that failure to with this rule of comply criminal has the procedure bail, effect of but do exonerating not decide that issue. The rule of on which the interpretation relied does Appeal simply here. conclusion, we find no in section 1166 in ambiguity light context
in which the To concede be provision appears. meaning must deter- mined from context does not indicate that provision Many ambiguous. *9 context eliminates but of possible meanings, have a wide range words is case here. Section clear. That meaning intended ambiguity, leaving verdict; govern guilty it does not a trial following 1166 governs proceedings e.g., history. (See, not consider we need Accordingly, pleas. 1036, Cal.4th 19 Inc. v. Superior Multimedia Systems, Diamond 828, P.2d 539].) be careful not we must justified, to legislative history But even were resort of conflicting number notoriously easy any It is support to misuse it. To be legislative history. persuasivе, quoting by selectively propositions than, as one critical more something compelling exercise must offer such an ” “ friends.’ out it, your a crowd and ‘looking picking describes over jurist in the History on the Use Legislative Observations Some (Wald, 195, a conversation Iowa L.Rev. quoting Court Term Supreme is the strategy But this Leventhal.) with Harold Judge pick-out-your-friends on which guilty obscure references to pleas best the dissent offers. The two occur on of two at 967-968) page the dissent relies dis. (see opn., post, pp. of the reports quoting identical committee a section nearly reports, Moreover, these two reports the bill’s author. background provided make no mention a collection of a dozen that otherwise nearly among on, two the dissent relies several of the including pleas, reports, 1166 as to defendants “convicted applying describe scope Assem. on Public e.g., a trial” or “found after trial.” Com. (See, 23, Mar. of Assem. Bill No. 476 Sess. Safety, Analysis (Reg. 1999-2000) 1; Public of Assem. Safety, Analysis Assem. Com. on Republican p. 1; Aug. Bill as amended Sen. p. No. 476 Sess. (Reg. 1999-2000) Bill Sess. Safety, (Reg. Com. on Public of Assem. No. 476 Analysis 2; Com., Off. of as Rules Sen. July amended Sen. 1999-2000) Bill (Reg. 1999-2000) Floor on Assem. No. 476 Sess. Analyses, Rep. Therefore, Aug. significance amended is is that it inconclusive. legislative history the statute as we do bad public
The dissent complains interpreting will of those defendants who plead guilty because the bail requests policy 1166. We are not not be to the of section subject requirements prepared that judicial opn., pp. 974-976), as the dissent does say, (dis. post, discretion in this context bad policy. defend- does not where the we conclude section 1166
Accordingly, 1166 does not apply, conviction is Because section by guilty ant’s plea. in accor- the trial court should have proceeded arguments—that Seneca’s so exonerated bail as with that section and that its failure to do dance constitutes a contract merit. bail bond matter of law—are without Seneca’s with the State California. (See Fidelity, supra, Cal.App. contract, Pursuant to that Seneca Noh’s expressly guaranteed appearance conviction, judgment and in the following event Noh failed to appear, $70,000. Seneca promised pay Nothing section 1166 abrogates Sen- eca’s contractual The trial court obligation. had discretion to allow Noh to remain free оn bail pending sentencing, and it acted accordance with that discretion.
Conclusion The Court of erred in Appeal finding where a applicable defendant’s conviction is based on guilty plea rather than a verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the of the Court of judgment and remand Appeal with instructions to affirm the trial court’s order Seneca’s motion denying vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail. J., Kennard, J., Baxter,
George, J., C. J., Moreno, J., Werdegar, concurred.
CHIN, J., In 1999,the Dissenting. Legislature amended Penal Code sec tion 11661 to increase public protection by requiring court commit a defendant to custody upon unless, conviction and before judgment considering factors, the court specified finds the evidence supports decision to release the defendant on bail. ch. The (Stats. 1.)§ holds the increased majority public protection the Legislature sought provide this amendment does not through to the apply great majority defendants who are convicted—those who Moreover, the plead guilty. ma jority’s rationale—that section use 1166’s of the term “verdict” refers only to jury verdicts—necessarily renders increased also protection inappli cable to defendants conviсted court findings after trials. nonjury analysis is flawed and majority’s its conclusion is to the contrary conclusion, intent. Legislature’s reaching does majority not main- tain that the statute’s us plain meaning requires to construe section 1166 so as to render its increased protection inapplicable great convicted defendants. On the concedes that the contrary, majority statu- tory is language and that term ambiguous “verdict” sometimes encom- Instead, passes guilty pleas. focusing single extrinsic aid—statutory context—the asserts that reasonable only construction of section 1166 excludes defendants who not convicted by my view, verdict. In jury other extrinsic aids that the are more majority virtually ignores far illumi- nating compel conclusion that the Legislature both understood and statutory 1A11further references are to the Penal Code. in all cases would increased protection that section 1166’s
intended verdict, convicted, finding, whether defendant where the policy construction best serves public This guilty plea. defeats construction the in section whereas declared has I therefore dissent. of cases. in the great majority policy public Apply Be Construed to Reasonably 1166 Can I. The Section Language Plea. Guilty to Convictions by task our fundamental statutory interpretation, any involving case “[I]n law’s effectuate the intent so Legislature’s ... is to determine the words, them giving the statute’s examining We begin by purpose. [Citation.] (People Murphy commonsense meaning. plain [Citation.]” 1129].) statutory Where Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.4th con it has one reasonable and unambiguous—i.e., clear language Board generally unnecessary. (Hughes construction is struction—judicial Architectural Examiners Cal.4th of 952 *11 638, 24 Cal.2d 642 P.2d v. People Moroney (1944) (Hughes); [150 641] than However, it has more P.2d where a statute is 888].) ambiguous—i.e., extrinsic evidence construction that is reasonable—we consider one possible at the intent the statute’s words. Legislature’s (Hughes, supra, of beyond 776.) p. construction, and is therefore 1166 has more than one reasonable
Section “verdict,” use the term ambiguous. Given statute’s of argu 1166—that verdicts—is only construction section applies cases, However, the term under a line of California ably long reasonable. In can be construed as reasonably guilty pleas. “verdict” also encompassing 572, 682, 50 685-686 Cal.Rptr.2d v. Statum People (2002) [122 1238, held that section subdivision (a)(6), we (Statum), recently 355] to a guilty where a defendant pleads felony authorizes People appeal later the conviction to a misdemeanor and trial court reduces charge that the 1238, subdivision (a)(6), provides sentence. Section imposes jail or finding order the verdict may modifying by from People appeal “[a]n or imposed modifying of the offense reducing degree punishment (Italics finding the offense to a lesser offense.” added.) that reduction of a defendant’s we concluded Statum applicable, “ . . . . . . is an ‘order the verdict modifying conviction guilty plea ” 688, at italics p. to a lesser offense.’ (Statum, supra, offense modifying is the plea based this conclusion on the added.) principle guilty We “[a] 688, Thus, fn. . . .” (Id. p. 2.) of a ‘verdict’ . ‘legal equivalent’ [citation] term statute’s use of the “verdict” held in Statum that a Penal Code not, as the by guilty plea, rendered the statute convictions applicable 966 concludes, here
majority Our Courts of inapplicable. Appeal have similarly 1962, construed term “verdict” in section 1238 since 45 before we years decided Statum. v. (People Eberhardt 186 (1986) Cal.App.3d 1119- 1124 387]; v. Cal.Rptr. Hames 172 1238 People (1985) Cal.App.3d [231 701]; v. Cal.Rptr. People Gaines (1980) Cal.App.3d [218 [169 Cal.Rptr. because is “tantamount to a applies guilty plea 381] [statute verdict”]; Thatcher v. 831-832 People (1967) Cal.App.2d [63 492]; Orrante fn. 1 Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.2d because is the applies plea guilty equivalent 480] [statute “[a] jury”].) section 1166 is language ambiguous because it has more than one reasonable construction.
Notably, majority concedes that the expressly language of Statum, After ambiguous. discussing states: con majority “We that, contexts, cede is not many different from . . .” ante, verdict. The also (Maj. opn., states term “verdict” in Code other Penal provisions may “reasonably” be con strued to “include guilty pleas.” also (Ibid) concedes implicitly the statute’s ambiguity by concluding that section 1166 has one reason only able construction when viewed in its statutory “context” (maj. opn., 958-959, 960, 963, i.e., its pp. within the Penal Code. 962), “placement” ante, at A (Maj. opn., statute’s “the within placement statutory scheme” is one of the “extrinsic aids” we look concluding the statute “is . .” ambiguous 776; . . (Hughes, 17 Cal.4th at see supra, also Levy Superior Cal.4th *12 896 P.2d the words are to than susceptible more one reason 171] [“[w]hen able we interpretation, aids, consider extrinsic variety including the statutory context”]; 86, 21 Cal.4th 94 [86 Jefferson 893, Cal.Rptr.2d is stаtutory language ambigu 441] [“[w]hen ous,” aids, courts consider a of extrinsic “the variety including context which the language its construction appears”].) by basing on Code, 1166’s within the Penal placement concedes majority implicitly that the statute’s is language ambiguous.
II. Extrinsic Aids Establish That Both Understood Intended That Section 1166 Would to Convictions Plea. Apply by Guilty Because statutory to “a language ambiguous, may look properly determine of extrinsic aids” to variety intent. Legislature’s (People 1002, 656, Woodhead Cal.3d (1987) 43 741 P.2d 154].) noted, As the statute’s within “the scheme” one of placement statutory factors, those aids. also (Ibid) We consider number other “including remedied, legislative be achieved, be the evils to to objects ostensible aids, we ‘select these extrinsic (Ibid.) “Using policy.” history, public [and] intent of most with closely apparent that comports construction the general than defeating to rather with a view Legislature, promoting lead to absurd that would statute, avoid an interpretation purpose 205, v. Sinohui (People consequences.’ [Citation.]” Here, the relevant extrinsic aids P.3d 629].) and intended that section understood that the both demonstrate to convictions by guilty plea. 1166 would apply Intеnt That Indicates Section Legislative History Legislative A. The Guilty. to Plead Be Who Applied Defendants trial gave As the before majority explains, out on bail after a defendant remain discretion unguided permit amendment The 1999 957.) conviction. (Maj. opn., p. “unless, considering” conviction upon court to commit a defendant after its decision allow factors, it “concludes the evidence supports specified legislative analyses remain on bail.” Several (§ 1166.) defendant to out because “individuals who the amendment was explained necessary prior convicted a much risk of if released pose greater flight [on bail] has an The intent is to assure a judge sentencing. [amendment] to release the record of a convicted individual prior examine opportunity on Com. on sentencing (Assem. if that individual is out bail.” pending Mar. Reg. on Bill No. 476 Safety, (1999-2000 Sess.) Public Assem. Rep. added; see also Com. Public Safety, Rep. italics Sen. Another July Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) to secure that the amendment is “intended explained analysis than them free on rather let bail immediately possibly parties Finance, Bill . of Assem. Analysis authorities . . .” escape (Cal. Dept. 17, 1999, No. Sess.) 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Apr. *13 in the
Nothing legislative history supрorts majority’s speculation by that” a defendant convicted guilty have concluded Legislature “may a or than danger safety” less risk a likely pose flight public “is ante, On at (Maj. pp. 960-961.) defendant verdict. by jury opn., the amend- that focused on two contrary, legislative analyses expressly risk defendants who cited the flight plead ment’s purpose specifically that a of this bill to assure Those intent analyses guilty. explained: “[T]he individual the record of a convicted has an to examine judge opportunity who is pending sentencing after conviction or It plea. should be conviction, obvious individuals who free on bail after but who have sentenced, not been pose risk than other on bail.” greater flight persons Com., Rules Off. (Sen. of Sen. Floor 3d Analyses, reading analysis of Bill 24, 4, Assem. No. (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Aug. italics p. added; Com. on Sen. Public of Assem. No. Safety, Analysis Bill 13, 1999, (1999-2000 Thus, Reg. Sess.) July italics added.) legis- lative history not, indicates that the did asserts, as majority intend to . . “distinction . between and convictions guilty pleas “dr[a]w” ante, verdict. . . Instead, .” at (Maj. opn., legislative history the conclusion that the supports Legislature viewed all defendants as posing risk greater flight conviction—whether plea—and intended increased рublic under the amended stat- protection ute to to all such defendants.2
The majority’s explanation virtually ignoring legislative history is both baseless and first unpersuasive. asserts that it “need not consider legislative history” because section 1166 is “in not ambiguous light ante, context.” However, at I (Maj. opn., have pp. 962-963.) [its] explained, a statute’s context is but one already of several extrinsic aids we look where a statute is ambiguous. held, As we have where a expressly statute is ambiguous, intent, discern legislative we must examine the “[t]o legislative context of the act history statutory scrutiny. under [Cita- (Sand Court 34 Cal.3d Superior (1983) tions.]” 668 P.2d 787].) majority’s questionable view of section 1166’s context neither nor justifies refusal to consider history.3 2It is therefore surprising say that the most the can defend its conclusion is plead guilty a distinction by jury between defendants who and those convicted verdict “is ante, (Maj. not completely opn., p. 961.) baseless.” at Systems, 3Diamond v. Superior Multimedia Inc. 19 Cal.4th 1036 [80 (Diamond), Cal.Rptr.2d 968 P.2d the majority (maj. opn., which relies 539] There, p. 963), actually my supports analysis. request this court the defendants’ “decline[d]” for consideration of “the context Corporate which the Law enacted” and Securities was legislative history,” “[o]nly “available explaining language when the of a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable appropriate construction is turn to extrinsic aids (Diamond, supra, . . p. 1055.) Notably, support position, . .” of this the court cited Islay Granberry Investments 970], 9 Cal.4th “ which, my aids, analysis, variety also consistent with stated that ‘we look to a of extrinsic including legislative history statutory . . ... . and the of which scheme the statute is a “ ” part,’ [statutory] language susceptible of more than one reasonable ‘[w]hen ” Diamond, supra, Moreover, interpretation.’ (See despite its state
ment, Diamond went (Id. on to consider the extrinsic materials cited. defendants *14 pp. 1055-1056.) legislative history’s express fallback position—that
The majority’s opn., are “obscure” (maj. by guilty to defendants convicted references The ob- majority baseless ante, unpersuasive. equally at p. 963)—is of the on the first do not page that references express appear serves these that the course, I must concede Of legislative (Ibid.) relevant reports. fact be utterly I find this However, unlike the majority, is correct. majority that, Instead, previously I fact significant what find insignificant. that ex- reports sections of noted, these references appear explicit intent, and justifica- the amendment’s purpose, on and pressly explain focus “in a that these references appear The also observes express tion. majority the bill’s author.” background provided reports quoting intent in However, statements of we have often relied similar (Ibid) 720, v. Kramer Cal.4th (2002) other statutes.4 construing (E.g., People 738]; 59 P.3d Price v. Superior Cal.Rptr.2d [128 618]; 25 P.3d v. Baker Delaney Cal.4th Cal.Rptr.2d 986].) Discounting 971 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d statements, the on selected other these instead focuses express majority best, that, Legis- inferentially suggest phrases only arguably opn., to exclude defendants convicted by guilty plea. (Maj. lature intended trial” and “found after “convicted after a [citing phrases no on these convincing relying offers justification trial”].) defendants convicted references to ambiguous ignoring express phrases It in the nothing history explicitly cites guilty plea. legislative to exclude I have cited or states an intent contradicts the references express defendants convicted Nor does how construction by guilty plea. explain theme his- throughout legislative fits within predominant expressed conviction, and that that the risk of increases tory: flight substantially releas- therefore be to consider certain factors before required courts should discloses not legislative history a defendant on bail after conviction. The ing of a convicted by guilty plea pose hint belief defendants slightest Thus, the “pick-out- of a risk than other convicted defendants. less flight ante, at opn., cautions your-friends strategy” against (maj. to the legislative history, describes the majority’s 963), precisely approach Indeed, describes the accurately mine. that characterization mine, case, which, focuses exclusively in this unlike overall analysis context—and all other extrinsic ignores extrinsic aid—section 1166’s single those other shown, As which is one of history, I have sources. Department in Cornette 4Ironically, construing a unanimous a statute for 332], the author of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 26 P.3d 72 [109 from the statute’s recently “a today’s majority opinion relied on letter Governor” “author,” finding explained” “purpose.” that it the statute’s “best *15 sources, extrinsic the conclusion that the in- strongly supports tended section be 1166 to to defendants applied by guilty plea.5 B. Prior Judicial Construction Indicates a That Intent Seсtion Legislative
1166 Be WhoPlead Applied Guilty. Defendants Judicial construction of section 1166 reinforces the strongly conclusion legislative history when the supports: Legislature amended section it understood and intended that the in amended statute’s creased would public protection to defendants convicted by guilty In plea. Fidelity & Co. P. Deposit (1930) 107 Cal.App. the court (Fidelity), section 1166 on facts similar applied to those very 59] There, now before us. the trial court ordered bail bond forfeited when the defendant, who was continued on bail after failed to pleading guilty, appear for on his hearing probation request. at (Fidelity, supra, Cal.App. p. order, 162.) Contesting forfeiture the surety that it was argued “released from on the bond when the liability court failed” to fulfill its “duty ... order into his custody at upon guilty.” (Id. pp. [the defendant] claim, 162-163.) rejecting Court that several Appeal responded Penal Code statutes established “that a defendant be admitted to bail not may convicted, until the time he is merely but until he for appears judgment, that such a bond as that now under consideration continues until defend ant, for whose it is release makes this at given, appearance.” 163.) (Id. p. Among statutеs the court relied was which then “If a general defendant, verdict is rendered or provided: against the a special remanded, verdict is he given, must be if in or if he on bail be custody, may committed ... to await the of the judgment the verdict. upon When committed his bail is . . Code, exonerated . .” (1872 261.) Pen. § this,” “The from plain implication “is Fidelity court that if explained, bail, defendant is out on the court has a discretion either or to commit him so, to do if committed, not he is not his bail is not exonerated.” Thus, (Fidelity, concluded, at the court supra, Cal.App. “the statutes,” “seem including authorize” a “so bond particularly conditioned as to make the surety responsible appearance defendant to the time for up pronouncing judgment.” (Fidelity, supra, Cal.App. p. 164.) surety Fidelity alternatively that there “argued be must some or showing before trial court can hearing exercise” “discretion” to continue defendant on bail “after conviction,” and that anything legislative history suggest 5Nor does in the that the viewed defendants nonjury posing flight convicted after trials as of a by jury less risk than defendants convicted However, the majority’s analysis necessarily inap verdict. protection renders section 1166’s trials, рlicable nonjury to defendants by convicted after because such occur convictions “finding,” by (§ 689.) stating “verdict.” person errs that “a convicted either verdict guilty plea.” (Maj. opn., (Id. turning 164-165.) Again “entitled to notice thereof.” pp. surety *16 surety that a the court replied surety’s argument, 1166 the reject section to as to custody, commit a defendant the court will no assume that has to “right 107 . . .” (Fidelity, supra, and 1166 . sections 1129 it do under may in on 1166 Thus, court relied Fidelity directly at Cal.App. p. 165.) bail with rights respect a court’s and surety’s determining power by guilty plea. status of a defendant convicted later, v. 792 Cal.App.2d in Scott years Thirty [7 court a conviction 755], involving by issue arose in a case a similar Cal.Rptr. court the trial findings,” in a trial. After findings “announc[ing] nonjury and after her conviction large the defendant to remain in Scott permitted (Id. did not return her to in three She days. ordered return forfeiture, the affirming bail was forfeited.” (Ibid.) ordered “[h]er at time of held defendant was free bail court that appellate “[s]ince to remain at conviction, liberty it with the court to her was optional permit court only authority on bail pending judgment (Ibid) [citations].” Thus, in a case Fidelity. cited for this was section 1166 and holding trial, the court findings nonjury applied conviction court after involving by is “a verdict general a court’s after powers which specifies which relied Fidelity, rendered ... or a special given,” section 1166 in a case conviction involving by guilty plea. reac- these Legislature’s
Like the decisions—and history, that the under- Legislature tion conclusion them—strongly support by it stood and intended that the increased was providing public protection both by section 1166 in 1999 would to defendants amending apply trials. the almost 70 During and court after findings nonjury pleas amendment, no expressed between and the 1999 case years Fidelity under view or even section 1166 does not suggested different in Moreover, these amended section 1166 Legislature circumstances. five after but did that time undermine years Fidelity, nothing by guilty plea. or reverse of the statute to conviction Fidelity’s application 657, 5, did do Legislature anything ch. Nor (Stats. § of section undermine or reverse Scott’s Fidelity—or application trials—when the Legislature findings nonjury convictions in this lack of action Legislature’s amended the statute 1999. The again Scott, that it because raises a endorsed regard Fidelity presumption “ those changing amends a statute without Legislature рortions ‘[w]hen courts, . have construed . . been previously in the previous judicial to have known of and have acquiesced presumed Atkins 89-90 construction.’ (People [Citations.]” 738, see 660]; P.3d also Malcolm Superior Cal.3d (1981) 495] [because was of’ “presumably aware statute’s “judicial prior interpreta- tion” the statute, when amended its retention of “parallel language revised statute” we “construe the ... present provision with the established conformity judicial interpretation”].) The majority discounts the incorrectly of these significance decisions. to the According majority, Fidelity “did hold that fall within pleas *17 1166,” the of section scope but “cited merely section 1166 as an of example an analogous situation in which a convicted defendant on remains free bail ante, pending sentencing judgment.” and at As (Maj. I opn., have already demonstrated, the incorrect; is majority substantively the Fidelity court directly relied on section in determining 1166 court’s and a power rights with surety’s to the bail status of a defendant respect convicted by event, the any plea. focuses on the response wrong Our not, task here question. is as the majority assume, to think appears up some new now way and it distinguish Fidelity render but is to inapposite, what determine understood and Legislature intended when it amended section 1166 in 1999. and Notwithstanding arcane distinction arguable now majority draw, when the amended section attempts Legislature 1999, it 1166 in no doubt understood section 1166 to a Fidelity applying defendant who pleads guilty. majority similarly focuses on wrong in its of question not, treatment Scott. The as the question whether “was suggests, Scott correct” to section 1166 to a defendant apply convicted after a finding nonjury ante, trial at (maj. opn., p. 960), whether, but in Scott, light Legislature understood and intended section 1166 to only to defendants verdict. Both by. jury decisions the conclusion that the support intended the Legislature statute to have a broader reach.
Also this conclusion supporting decisions I appellate have already discussed applied 1238 based their pleas legal Eberhardt, with equivalence verdicts. v. jury 186 (People supra, Cal.App.3d 1119-1124; at Hames, v. pp. supra, 1238; People Cal.App.3d v. People Gaines, 514; Thatcher, at v. supra, Cal.App.3d p. People supra, Orrante, 831-832; at Cal.App.2d pp. People supra, Cal.App.2d 557, in. Each of these decisions applied to convictions “verdict,” because its use of the guilty plea term and notwithstanding its lack of “express reference to term, its failure to “use a guilty pleas” broad ” such as ‘conviction.’ (Maj. opn., 957-958.) pp. Accordingly, they further conclusion that in support when enacted Legislature in form, section 1166 its current the Legislature understood and intended that verdicts, but not limit the statute to use the term “verdict” would its after nonjury court findings guilty pleas would render applicable that the our long-standing presumption trials. conclusion follows from This existence, already decisions judicial is “aware of statutes thereof. a statute in light and to have enacted or amended [Citation.]” 768 P.2d 48 Cal.3d v. Harrison (People earlier enact of an language a statute is framed in 1078].) “[w]here has been that enactment subject, ment the same or an analogous that con construed, to have adopted judicially presumed 329; see also Jones struction. (Harrison, supra, [Citation.]”6 753, 18 98, 109 674] [“[w]e Penal drafting provisions” that the Legislature, presume [certain] of’ the same Code, construction long-standing judicial “was aware of our used Penal Code statutes and intended incorporate “as in other language it”].) decisions, errs significance these
Again, discounting substantively Substantively, majority both and in analytical approach. *18 guilty guilty is that “the of asserting equivalence pleas incorrect have identified Appeal verdicts” that both this court and the Courts effect,” to not legal “procedure.” (Maj. “relates” their “substantive ante, Here, no more “concerned with we are opn., p. certainly that section 1238 than were the courts that determined procedure” (ibid.) Analytically, the guilty.7 authorizes after defendant People appeal pleads and the other the errs in for a Statum searching way distinguish cases, than determining Legislature reasonably section 1238 rather what nothing in the understood when amended section 1166 in 1999. Certainly, case that the had history suggests Legislature or the law section novel when the amended Legislature distinction mind 1166. Statum, 682, after amendment of People supra, we decided v. the 1999 6Because 1166,1 here. rely applying principle section do not on it in 999], 7In v. 13 P.2d which People (1996) Valladoli Cal.4th 590 918 [54 ante, p. 960), suggest not even support (maj. opn., cites to its we did assertion legal only to effect guilty pleas that the verdicts substantive equivalence of relates is, Rather, purposes, broadly guilty plea for most procedure. and not we stated “[a] guilty by (Valladoli, supra, 13 Cal.4th at legal jury.” of a reached equivalent verdict v. 601.) Similarly (E.g., People cases. Williams appear broad statements in numerous other equivalent to the verdict of plea P.2d is (1945) 27 Cal.2d 228 692] [“[a] [163 Cal.Rptr. (1977) 154 jury”]; Municipal Cal.App.3d v. 71 121] [“a Smith [139 court, jury”]; People v. accepted by equivalent of a verdict of a plea, once equivalent [guilty “is the Cal.App.2d 165 285 P.2d McDaniels 450] [331 [guilty plea P. jury”]; Kepford (1921) Cal.App. a verdict of a 64] “equivalent jury”].) to the of a
C. Public as Declared Policy by Section Supports Applying
1166 to WhoPlead Guilty. Defendants As previously explained, the 1999 amendment to passed section 1166—which a court to commit a defendant conviction after unless it concludes evidence its decision to allow the defendant supports bail—because, view, remain out on in the Legislature’s risk that a defendant will flee substantially increases after conviction. The Legislature wanted “to assure that a has judge an to examine the record of opportunity prior individual to release and if pending sentencing that indi- vidual is out on bail.” (Assem. Com. Public Rep. Assem. Bill Safety, No. 23, 1999, 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Mar. As Sess.) long ago “ ” recognized, ‘great majority’ convictions are obtained by guilty plea. West 3 Cal.3d (People
409].) we best serve the Legislature’s by purpose construing statute, if reasonably to all possible, convicted, defendants who are including those who I plead demonstrated, As have guilty. such a already construction is both reasonable and most likely Legislature’s reflective intent. contrast,
By the majority defeats the substantially Legislature’s purpose a construction that adopting renders to the great inapplicable majority of defendants who are convicted—those who More- guilty. plead over, not to decide although majority purports any question regarding convictions trials nonjury (maj. opn., 960), analysis further defeats necessarily the Legislature’s purpose by rendering circumstances, under these inapplicable because such convictions oc- cur “finding,” “verdict.” by jury (§ 689.)
The offers no majority public justification for its construction. It policy basis, speculates, without that the have concluded that” a Legislature “may defendant convicted “is less by guilty to risk or a plea likely pose flight to danger safety” than a defendant convicted verdict. public by jury (Maj. ante, opn., at As I have 960-961.) already in the pp. explained, nothing Moreover, this were history supports even the speculation. major- correct, ity the fails to the would majority why want to explain Legislature allow courts to release defendants convicted without by guilty first the going through section 1166 mandates to process public protect safety. ante, the can “think of’ a distinction although majority at (maj. opn., that, view, ante, in its is not baseless” p. 962) opn., “completely (maj. p. offers the 961), why no reason want to draw majority Legislature would short, this distinction. In from the policy perspective public declared, has unjustified construction is both and majority’s unjustifiable. to is not necessary protect that section 1166
Instead, the insists majority i.e., defendants, those of convicted majority from the public great as defendants to all to According majority, convicted by guilty plea. were, section bail, under specifies section 1166 admitted to factors set,” new “only and initially the time bail was considered at “already of the conviction itself.” is “the fact factor” after a defendant pleads ante, that courts “must acknowledging 961.) Although (Maj. p. opn., a defendant should remain this “new to determine whether evaluate” factor” in bail, “does not have states that section 1166 out on . . .” into account . the defendant’s conviction order for a court to take ante, at (Maj. opn., p. First and reasons, the majority’s reasoning unpersuasive.
For several and foremost, purpose it is with both the view Legislature’s inconsistent above, viewed “indi- section As explained 1166. amending guilty plea” are free on bail conviction” “or viduals who bail,” risk other therefore greater persons than “pos[ing] flight conviction courts to consider fact of require amended Com., bail. Rules before defendants to remain on allowing (Sen. Bill No. 476 Off. of Floor 3d Assem. Analyses, reading analysis Sen. added; Public Safety, italics Sen. Com. on (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) No. 476 Analysis Reg. Sess.) July of Assem. Bill (1999-2000 intent, this leaves it to the holding italics added.) Contrary majority’s determining trial the fact conviction in court’s discretion consider out bail. whether to defendants convicted remain permit guilty plea Moreover, the that section 1166 “does not have to observation a court (maj. opn., p. 961) to take factor into account apply” every is of no because the same factor consequence, true section 1166 was makе Legislature’s specifies. amending purpose mandatory, consideration of all of the factors specified discretionary. be- The second is that the differences flaw in majority’s reasoning terms a court of the factors must tween section 1166 and section 1275 are both than indicates. significant consider more greater courts to consider “the Whereas section subdivision (a), requires “the of the offense charged” seriousness probability defendant’s] [the *20 case,” to courts hearing at trial or appearing and and “the “the of the offense charged proven” consider seriousness the the court of the defendant to failing appear judgment probability of ,”8 . . a defendant at the Obviously, beginning . (Italics added.) of the state’s case and who who does not know the yet strength prosecution to emphasized that the 1999 reports 8SeveraI amendment “direct[s] consider,” factors, (Sen. Com. among a court other the defendant’s “crime conviction.” to trial, faces possibility of conviction on some and of charge, different—and, uncertain punishment, generally poses in the Legislature’s view, risk than a lesser—flight defendant who has been convicted of a offense, even specific if who faces by guilty certain who plea, punishment, knows the offense, statutory for the and punishment who awaits only judgment. several Accordingly, legislative analyses explained, Legis- lature amended section 1166 in an additional “grant[] safeguard convicted against felons fleeing jurisdiction requiring judge again look at the defendant’s risk” in whether flight deciding the now permit convicted defendant to remain out on bail. Com. on Public (Assem. Safety, Republican Analysis Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Mar. Reg. Sess.) 22, 1999, added; italics Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 added; Reg. Sess.) Apr. italics see also Assem. Com. on Public Safety, of Assem. Republican Analysis Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. an “grants [amendment additional safeguard against felons fleeing jurisdiction menacing trial community by to look at the requiring judge’s again [sic] defendant’s overall fitness for out on remaining Under the bail”].) majority’s analysis a court holding, in its discretion—but is may, not required to—consider the fact and seriousness of the conviction in making determination' as to defendants convicted Because the by guilty plea. great of convictions now occur majority by guilty construction plea, majority’s of section 1166 renders the increased public рrotection Legislature sought to provide to the inapplicable great defendants who are majority convicted.
Finally, rather than unfortunately, respond my argument, miscasts majority completely misrepresents in an my position apparent to arouse emotions it. attempt against The states view to be majority my discretion in this context is “judicial bad policy.” (Maj. opn., However, I make no on this judgment because it is not policy question, my to do so here. job My is that the has position Legislature declared public and, in this context as I have policy construction explained, majority’s defeats the public policy has declared. The fact remains that the majority offers no reason why would have wanted to the great of convicted defendants from a exempt mandatory process that the Legislature thought was necessary safety. protect public offers no valid actual response my position—that construction defeats as declared public policy Legislature. 2; Safety, Rep. (1999-2000 on Public Reg. Sess.) July Assem. Bill No. 476 Com., Analyses, reading Sen. Rules Off. of analysis Sen. Floor 3d of Assem. Bill No. 476 24, 1999, (1999-2000 Reg. Sess) Aug. *21 Construction. Does Not Justify Majority’s D. The Context Statutory solе the majority places consider the extrinsic aid on which Finally, I statutory According 1166’s within the scheme. reliance: section placement context, only in 1166 “can that the term “verdict” the majority, given of a contested given one a verdict at the conclusion mean reasonably thing: ante, 962.) trial.” at (Maj. opn., reasons, First, I have already incorrect. majority
For several extrinsic aids which many context is one of statutory only explained, Nothing majority’s an statute. construing ambiguous supports look Second, aid of all others. decision to focus on this extrinsic to the exclusion context. The statute’s vastly significance overstates majority in a Code section 1166’s inclusion title of Penal majority emphasizes after the start of trial and before judgment.” “matters arise addressing However, ante, any a defendant (Maj. opn., p. 958.) may plead notes, time, a trial begun.” as the “after has including, majority (Maj. opn., Moreover, the same that contains section 1166 also p. 960.) chapter findings nonjury (§§ addresses in a trial. disposition little, does if section 1166’s the Penal Code 1167.) within placement statute to indicate that the statute’s renders the anything, language applicable not, It does as the only by jury defendants convicted verdict. certainly asserts, is the statute’s reasonable that this “clearly indicate[]” ante, at interpretation. (Maj. opn., Finally, and most focus context exclusive importantly, majority’s “
defeats our aids: to ‘select the construc- very goal considering extrinsic tion that most with the Legislature, intent of comports closely apparent than defeating with view rather promoting general purpose statute, avoid would to absurd conse- an Sinohui, lead interpretation [to] As I have quences.’” (People supra, other, demonstrated, far and definitive extrinsic aids—the illuminating more construction, and legislative history, prior judicial public policy—support and, to safety, the conclusion that the understood enhance public be intended that section 1166 would to all convicted defendants. applied this an absurd conse- construction defeats majority’s produces purpose 1166’s to the rendering section increased quence by protection inapplicable demonstrated, who convicted. As I have great defendants this that we curious nothing—including adopt statute’s context—requires construction.
III. Conclusion holding that section does disagree I with Although case, I do not with necessarily disagree majori- ultimately, court’s to follow section result. I have serious doubt a trial failure ty’s *22 1166 in a convicted defendant to pennitting remain out on bail exoneration of a bond when the surety’s defendant fails to As appear. demonstrated, the statute to Legislature passed not protect public, However, sureties. have not raised or parties briefed this potentially issue; therefore, dispositive it is not before us and the majority correctly declines to it. discuss (Maj. opn., But the fact that pp. this issue is not now before us—and that Seneca Insurance is therefore Company entitled to return of its if money section 1166 applies—should drive our construction of a statute the Legislature to enhance passed public safety, because the effect of the will reach well holding beyond financial context strictly Indeed, case. Seneca Insurance Company correct in probably bail stating not involved” in this money “[w]ere case, “the would be on side of the likely argument, given [the other] protection is the public highest objective.” We should not construe a statute the restrictively to increase passed public coffers, in order safety to enrich state absent evidence of intent us to do so. requiring here, Because such evidence is absent I dissent.