The defendant was indicted for the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, and upon trial in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the City and County of New York was found guilty of the charge. There were two counts in the indictment; the first charging him with feloniously stealing, taking and carrying away on the 11th day of July, 1903, a number of articles of jewelry, the property of one Joseph Rosenthal; the second with feloniously receiving and having in his possession the property alleged in the first count tó have been feloniously stolen, taken and carried away. The prosecution abandoned the second count. Among the articles charged to have been stolen by the defendant was a pin of the value of $550. It was a bar diamond pin. There was another pin mentioned in the indictment — bearing the letters “ Y. P. C.” It was a badge of membership of a club called the “Young Potomac Cadets ” and was of trifling value. While the general drift of the evidence on the part of the prosecution tended to show that the defendant originally might have taken all the articles enumerated in the indictment, yet the case seems to have gone to the jury finally upon the question of the theft of the diamond pin only, the learned recorder stating in his charge that “ if the diamond pin in question belonged to the complaining witness and the defendant intending to deprive the complaining witness of its possession took it away, he stole it and is guilty of larceny.”
It seeins to be plain that during the trial and in the ultimate pre=sentation of the case to the jury, the guilt or innocence of the defendant was made to depend upon his felonious or innocent possession of this one selected, particular article, mentioned in the indictment, although it was charged to have been taken from a box in a safe in which all the abstracted articles were kept. The principal witness for the prosecution was Joseph Rosenthal, who testified that he was the owner of the jewelry mentioned in the indictment, all of it having been a gift from his mother; that it was kept in a box in a large safe" in the jewelry store of his father at No. 254 Bowery in-the city of New York; that the defendant was his intimate friend and very close social relations existed between them, as well ás between the families of which they were respectively members ; that the defendant frequently spent the night with the witness,
Two witnesses for the prosecution, namely,.Krauch and Firneisen, police officers, corroborated the story of Joseph Rosenthal relating to the discovery of the “ Y. P. 0.” pin in the pocket of the defendant’s coat. Krouch’s connection with the case began on the fifteenth of July. He testified that he was present when the small pin was discovered, and also that he had searched the place at which-the defendant stated he found the other jewelry. He made the arrest of the defendant, stating to him that.it was for stealing the jewelry at Rosenthal’s. He asked the defendant if he ever owned a silver badge with “ Y. P. C.” on it, and the defendant said, “ Ho.” The defendant asked if he could talk with Joseph Rosenthal and was told he could. This witness then states the conversation. He says that the defendant asked Rosenthal, “ what do you want from me ? ” and Rosenthal "replied that he wanted “that three-stone pin that you took.” The defendant said he did not take it. Rosenthal said, “Yes, yon did. * * * I am not doing this for your sake, but I am doing it for your family’s sake, and I want it.” The defendant said, “ The pin is all right.” Then this officer remarked, “What do you mean, all right?” The defendant said, “Well, * * * the pin is pawned,” and stated that he pawned it the day after the jewelry was found; that he kept the pin and pawned it in the name of “ Kahn,” and received $150. This witness also testified that he discovered at the pawnbroker’s that it had been pledged on the eleventh of July, which is the day on which the larceny was .committed as charged in the indictment. After the arrest this
In rebuttal the prosecution introduced evidence as to the club badge or pin and that young Rosenthal was a member of the club. It was sought to identify the pin as belonging to the latter by the mark of solder which had been used in repairing it. Two'witnesses, namely, Robert E, Rosenthal, the uncle, and Geneva Rosenthal, his wife, testified that the three-stone diamond' pin was in the possession of the .wife for several days in the early part of July; that she borrowed it and that it was returned before the eleventh day of that month. Prom whom it was borrowed, whether froth yotingRosenthal or from his father, does not appear. , It is a noticeable circumstance, that young Rosenthal in his testimony does not refer to the diamond pin ever having been out of his possession before the eleventh of July. On his direct examination he was asked specifically to state to whom, other than the- defendant, he had .showed that pin, and .he made no reference whatever to the very important factj if it be a fact, that his aunt had borrowed and used it at á time so near the day named in the indictment. ,
From this general statement of the evidence respecting the ownership of ; the society or badge pin found in the pocket of the defendant’s coat,' and the conflict concerning1 the way in which tile-defendant became possessed of the diamond pin, which he pledged, it is easily seen that the jury might have found either way- as to the guilt Or innocence of the defendant; and- if there were nothing further in the case to affect the verdict, we should not be inclined to disturb it.
There was introduced in the case, however^ an element which may. have had great influence with the jury and may have inclined
Tims, it will be seen that evidence as to those earrings was admitted ■ when given by one witness, and was rejected when another was interrogated concerning the same articles, But the-testimony of the'one witness as to the confession respecting-themreihained in the record, and'in the charge to the jury the court made no allusion to"the condition of the evidence on the subject. With that evidence in.the case, unless the jury were charged spe-' eifically .respecting it and were told they were not to consider it* it is not difficult to comprehend how potent or how prejudicial it would be as affecting their judgment in reaching a conclusion adverse to the defendant. It is not ■ permissible' to introduce evidence of an independent crime to establish the guilt of a person indicted -for a specific offense. As was. remarked by Church, Ch. J., in People v. Crapo (76 N. Y. 291), “an accused person is required to meet the specific charge made against him and is not called upon to defend himself against every act of his life.” " ' '
The. learned district attorney insists that the evidence- was admissible in that it showed a systematic scheme of larceny pursued- by the defendant. Evidence of such a systematic course is sometimes admissible, but it must be in pursuance of a single design, as was the case in People v. Zucker (20 App. Div. 363; affd., 154 N. Y. 770). In People v. Molineux (168 N. Y. 264, 305). speaking ■ of' exceptions tó the general rule which excludes proof of extraneous crimes* it is said': “ There must be evidence of system between the offense
On the record before us and in view of all that appears therein, we are convinced that this defendant should have a. new trial. As was remarked in People v. Loomis (supra) it cannot be said that the error in admitting this unexpunged evidence did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. It may be that he would, have been convicted without the evidence of his confession of an antecedent larceny, “but it is,enough to say that it may also have been sufficient to resolve against him any reasonable doubt that might previously have been entertained as to his guilt.”
The judgment of conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
O’Bibeb, P. J., Ibgbaham, Laughlib and Olabke, J J., concurred.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.