PEOPLE v SEARS
Docket No. 78-1313
88 Mich App 1
January 3, 1979
88 Mich App 1
Submitted November 14, 1978, at Lansing.
This procedure of jury selection improperly restricted thе defendant’s ability to conduct a voir dire of the jurors and engage in the reasonable exercise оf challenges.
Reversed and remanded.
Cynar, P.J., dissented. He would hold that questions put to the jurors by the trial judge prior to trial sufficiently protected the defendant’s right to a fair trial in this case, although he does not favor the procedure used. Hе would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Jury — Voir Dire — Challenges.
To have a fair trial a litigant must be given a reasonable opportunity to ascertain on the voir dire whether any of the jurors summoned are subject to being challenged for cause or even pеremptorily.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury § 195.
[2] 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury §§ 198, 200.
[3] 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury § 267.
The scope of examination of jurors on voir dire is, in a large measure, within the discretion of the trial judge, but it must not be so limited as to exclude a showing of facts that would constitute ground for challenging for cause or the reasonable exercise of peremptory challenges; so to limit the examination is an abuse of discretion.
Dissent by Cynar, P.J.
3. Jury — Selection of Jury — Voir Dire — Right to Fair Triаl.
The selection of a jury for a defendant’s trial, three weeks prior to trial, in a procedure by which the entire jury panel was assembled on one day and all defendants who had trials scheduled that month were rеquired with their attorneys to choose a jury for their trial, and various members of the jury heard unspecified types of criminal trials in the interval between the date the jury was selected and the defendant’s trial did not deprivе the defendant of his right to a fair trial, even though the defendant was not given an opportunity to conduct a voir dire of the jury to ascertain whether any members of the jury had formed opinions prejudicial to the dеfendant while sitting on these other trials, where, prior to the start of the defendant’s trial, the trial judge asked the jurors if they had heard anything further about the defendant’s case, whether they had formed an opinion regarding the innocence or guilt of defendant, and whether anything had occurred that would cause them in any way to change their minds about anything and received negative responses to the questions.
Kraus & Ferris, P.C., for defendant on appeal.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and R. B. Burns and M. B. Breighnеr,* JJ.
R. B. Burns, J. Defendant was convicted by a jury of larceny in a building, contrary to
The jury that sat at defendant’s trial was selected three weeks prior to trial in a procedure by which the entire jury panel was assembled on оne
In Fedorinchik v Stewart, 289 Mich 436, 438-439; 286 NW 673, 674 (1939), the Supreme Court wrote:
“It is indispensable to a fair trial that a litigant be given a reasonable opportunity to ascertain on the voir dire whеther any of the jurors summoned are subject to being challenged for cause or even peremptorily. In a large measure the scope of examination of jurors on voir dire is within the discretion of the trial judge; but it must not be so limited as to exclude a showing of facts that would constitute ground for challenging for cause or the rеasonable exercise of peremptory challenges. So to limit the examination is an abuse оf discretion.”
The procedure of jury selection in this case improperly restricted defendant’s ability tо conduct a voir dire of the jurors and engage in the reasonable exercise of challenges.
Reversed and remanded.
M. B. Breighner, J., concurred.
Cynar, P.J. (dissenting). I would affirm. No fur-