Opinion
Fred Scott appeals from an order extending his commitment as a sexually violent predator pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section *1062 6604 1 following a jury trial. On appeal, Scott argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the petition because only one expert testified for the People, (2) the court committed reversible error by admitting evidence regarding the details of his prior convictions, (3) the Sexually Violent Predators (SVP) Act violated his constitutional rights to equal protection, (4) the court’s failure to define the phrase “sexually violent criminal behavior” for the jury violated his constitutional rights to due process, (5) the SVP Act as applied to him violated constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, and (6) the SVP Act violates constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
We affirm.
I. The Number of People’s Experts Required at Trial
Scott argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law because only a single psychologist testified that he was a sexually violent predator within the meaning of section 6600. 2 He contends that two prosecution experts, psychiatrists or psychologists, must testify at trial before a trier of fact may find a petition for commitment true. He bases this contention on the SVP Act’s requirement that there be concurring opinions of two evaluators, who are either practicing psychiatrists or psychologists, before a request for filing a commitment petition may be forwarded by the Director of Mental Health to the appropriate county (§ 6601). He asserts that, a fortiori, evidence from two psychiatrists or psychologists is required to establish probable cause under section 6602, subdivision (a). Scott then reasons that “if the ‘probable cause’ standard in section 6602 requires the testimony of two psychiatrists] [or psychologists] who believe the defendant is a sexually violent predator, then the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard in *1063 section 6604 also includes this requirement” since proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a higher standard than probable cause. 3
Scott’s reasoning is flawed. The Legislature has imposed procedural safeguards to prevent meritless petitions from reaching trial. “[T]he requirement for evaluations is not one affecting disposition of the merits; rather, it is a collateral procedural condition plainly designed to ensure that SVP proceedings are initiated only when there is a substantial factual basis for doing so.”
(People v. Superior Court (Preciado)
(2001)
Although some Penal Code provisions do require the testimony of two witnesses or corroboration for conviction (cf., e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 37 [treason], 532 [false pretenses], 653f [soliciting commission of certain crimes]), nothing in the SVP Act expressly requires the testimony of two (or any particular number of) expert witnesses at trial to find that an individual is a sexually violent predator. (See § 6604.) In construing the SVP Act, our primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent by turning first to the statutory language and giving effect to the ordinary
*1064
meaning of the words employed.
(Burden
v.
Snowden
(1992)
Evidence Code section 411 specifically states: “Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” As a general rule, juries in criminal cases are instructed: “You must not decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of witnesses .... The final test is not in the number of witnesses, but in the convincing force of the evidence.” (CALJIC No. 2.22 (6th ed. 1996) p. 69.) Another CALJIC instruction provides in pertinent part: “Testimony by one witness which you believe concerning any fact whose testimony about that fact does not require corroboration is sufficient for the proof of that fact.” (CALJIC No. 2.27 (6th ed. 1996) p. 77.)
We conclude that, although there must be two concurring experts as a procedural prerequisite to commencement of the petition process (§ 6601, subds. (c), (d)), the SVP Act does not expressly require two experts to testify at trial on behalf of the People. Furthermore, the requirements at trial are not necessarily the same as the requirements at some other procedural stage. (Cf.
People
v.
Torres
(2001)
n.-vi. *
*1065 VIL Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Premo, Acting P. J., and Wunderlich, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 23, 2002.
Notes
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. Section 6604 provides for commitment where the trier of fact determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “the person is a sexually violent predator.” Section 6600, subdivision (a), states: “ ‘Sexually violent predator’ means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”
The trial court ruled in limine that witnesses could not mention the prior determination that Scott was a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the SVP Act, the specific parole violations underlying Scott’s 1995 parole revocation, and the consequence of a “not true” finding, namely that Scott would be released without parole supervision. Dr. Knowlton, one of Scott’s evaluators, told the court that it would be impossible for him to testify because he relied on all that excluded information to reach his opinion: “If I can’t testify to that information, how I employed that reasoning, I would not be able to provide truthful testimony before the Court.” He felt it would be unethical and unprofessional to give a partial explanation for his opinion. The People did not call Dr. Knowlton.
Section 6601, subdivision (h), requires that copies of the evaluation reports and other supporting documents be made available to the attorney who may file the petition for commitment. Section 6602 does not expressly require the People to call the two concurring evaluators as witnesses or to introduce their evaluation reports at the probable cause hearing under that.section. However, in
In re Parker
(1998)
See footnote, ante, page 1060.
