*1 Dec. S186707. 2012.] [No. PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
THE SCHMITZ, Defendant Appellant. GEORGE DOUGLAS *4 Counsel Farber, Court,
William D. under for Defendant appointment by Supreme and Appellant. Brown, Jr., Harris, General,
Edmund G. and Kamala D. Dane R. Attorneys Gillette, General, Schons, Chief Assistant W. Assistant Attorney Attorney Gary General, Dutton, James D. Steven T. R. Hanks and Theodore M. Getting, Emily General, for Plaintiff and Cropley, Deputy Attorneys Respondent.
Opinion
CORRIGAN, This case involves constitutional limits of a vehicle J. Here, officer, search based on a status. aware that the passenger’s parole front seat *5 passenger on searched the backseat of defendant’s car parole, and recovered and and a drugs drug bag from paraphernalia chips pair Defendant, driver, shoes. sought evidence. We conclude suppress that the search Amendment was reasonable under the Fourth to the United States Constitution. We hold that the Constitution a search of those permits areas of the where the officer reasonably compartment expects could have stowed or discarded items when parolee belongings personal aware of the officer police activity. Additionally, personal prop located in those areas if the officer erty believes reasonably owns those items or has the to exert control over them. ability
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24, 2006, in the Early of November Sheriff Mihaela Mihai evening Deputy saw defendant’s car turn into a dead-end lined with the alley garages U-tum, condominium When defendant then made a Mihai complex. stopped no, his car and he alongside asked whether he was lost. Defendant said the street. Mihai got to avoid a U-turn on alley making had driven into for his driver’s license. As defendant of her car and asked defendant out abscesses, covered with which Mihai observed that his arms were complied, use. Asked if defendant was on probation parole, she associated with drug said, to search the car. “No.” Mihai then asked him for defendant permission did not Defendant respond. seat, the front and a woman and had three a man in
Defendant passengers: he on Mihai in the baсk. The male said parole. her small child In the backseat that basis after removing occupants. searched the car on area, two in a syringes chips in a woman’s purse,1 she found syringe cap in a of shoes. pair some bag, methamphetamine but moved resulting charges, hearing
Defendant waived preliminary took in a misdemeanor hearing the evidence.2 The place suppress suppression not The judge approved courtroom. Most of the were proceedings reported. The testimony. of the officer’s of the unreported portion settled statement items searched or their reflect the condition of the precise record does not of the shoes. had no memory style location in the backseat. The officer denied, he to four guilty motion was pleaded After defendant’s suppression of sentence The trial court imposition misdemeanor counts.3 suspended three on condition he serve years defendant on informal probation placed of his from the denial Defendant jail. appealed days county motion. suppression reversed, not be justified that the search could holding
The Court Appeal It articulated status. of the front seat passenger’s parole on the basis driver, Schmitz, defendant Douglas George broad rule that extremely box, console, his in his glove of privacy had reasonable “clearly expectation seat, his car every the backseat—indeed part door his own his pockets, . . . Nothing was sitting. seat where the front passenger except over his as ceding authority have been viewed reasonably did could Schmitz stating that no justify purse, the search of the attempt Attorney General does Attorney against As the charges defendant. was used to sustain *6 evidence derived therefrom contraband, identify the notes, did not and defendant’s trial motion syringe cap a is General sought suppress. he to syringe cap in his list of evidence 1538.5. Penal Code section 23152, Code, (a)), (Veh. with a subd. drug § alcohol Driving the influence of a or under Code, 11550, (Health & Saf. § of a controlled substance prior; being under the influence 4140, Code, (Bus. repealed & Prof. former (a)); syringe § possession of subd. unauthorized 273a, Code, (b)). charge 2011, 738, (Pen. subd. A 2); endangerment § and child by ch. § Stats. Code, 11350, (a)) dismissed (Health subd. & Saf. § a controlled substance possession of hearing. prior suppression to food, eat
backseat to the The had no right packages, open or even read he found in the backseat.”4 magazines
We reverse the of the Court of judgment clarify Appeal permissible aof vehicle search based on a status. passenger’s parole 4 In the Court of Appeal, defendant also contended the evidence should have been suppressed product illegal by as the of an rejected detention the officer. The court this contention, and defendant does not renew it here. Writing separately, Werdegar urge challenge Justices and Liu that defendant failed to court, permissible scope of the search in the trial adequate and thus did not create an J., (Cone. 934-935; litigate record to that appeal. opn. Werdegar, post, issue on & dis. at pp. Liu, J., 935.) cone. opn. post, colleagues & dis. Appeal Our would reverse the Court of ground They urge defendant forfeited the claim now before us. that it is unnecessary to granted reach the merits of the Fourth question Amendment on which we J., (Cone. review. opn. Werdegar, post, & dis. opn. & fn. cone. & dis. Liu, 1, 935, post, at pp. argument We respectfully unpersuasive. find this It the People’s justify (Vale (1970) is burden to a warrantless search. v. Louisiana 30, 1969]; (2006) People v. Johnson 38 Cal.4th 723 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d (Johnson)-, People 133 P.3d v. Williams 1044] Cal.4th 127 [83 (Williams).) Cal.Rptr.2d 973 P.2d The defendant does have the burden to file a motion and, asserting the absence of a prosecution justification warrant if the offers for the seizure, warrantless search present arguments why justification as to inadequate. (Williams, Here, p.at suppression challenged defendant’s written motion both his detention and argued the search of vehicle. generally his He that the officer’s conduct was not warrant, consent, supported by a “particularized suspicion,” or lawful and that it was the People’s justify burden to the warrantless search and According seizure. to the settled statement, the officer testified at the suppression hearing that she searched the defendant’s car Thereafter, passenger’s based on the parole status. reported portion hearing, of the both parties argument focused their brief oral on the detention issue. The trial court denied entirety. defendant’s motion in its In Williams we held orally argue that the defendant’s failure point he had in his raised pleading written did not forfeit the gap issue or otherwise excuse the in the prosecution’s (Williams, evidence 137-138.) on the facts of that case. Cal.4th at pp. Whether this challenge defendant forfeited his colleagues search is not as clear cut as our suggest, particularly transcript absent a verbatim portion suppression substantial of the hearing. What Attorney is clear is that the General nowhere raised the forfeiture issue in here, Appeal, Court of petition briefing her for review or in her before this court. The Court Appeal legality addressed the of the parole briefing by parties. search after full Attorney General’s petition conducting for review asked: “When search authorized condition, passenger’s parole automobile can the search those areas of the compartment reasonably appear subject to the parolee’s justices access?” All seven voted grant significant review on this recurring legal question. Both parties have briefed the and, below, explained merits issue in this court adequate we find the record to resolve Accordingly (See it. we exercise our discretion to do so. v. Brendlin 45 Cal.4th 262, 267, fn. 1 195 P.3d To do otherwise would be unfair to defendant, parties, particularly briefing who was not asked to address forfeiture issue in Code, (See argument. at oral Gov. § *7 916
II. DISCUSSION
by
of evidence obtained
admissibility
Challenges
(Cal.
under federal constitutional standards.
and seizure аre reviewed
530, 564,
Lomax
Const.,
I,
24;
fn. 11
(2010)
Cal.4th
People
art.
49
[112
§
668,
v. Woods
96,
377];
(1999)
Cal.4th
674
People
21
234 P.3d
[88
Cal.Rptr.3d
(Woods).)
88,
search is unreason
P.2d
A warrantless
981
Cal.Rptr.2d
1019]
one of
it
conducted
Amendment unless
pursuant
able under
Fourth
to the constitutional
requirement
drawn
narrowly
exceptions
few
332,
Const.,
Amend.;
v. Gant
(2009) 556 U.S.
338
(U.S.
4th
warrant.
Arizona
Woods,
(Gant);
supra, 21
485,
Cal.4th at
L.Ed.2d
1710]
[173
282,
600,
v. Bravo
(1987)
Cal.Rptr.
43 Cal.3d
People
[238
of those
clause is one
exceptions.
P.2d
California’s
parole
250,
843, 846,
(Samson
850-857
v. California
(2006) 547
(Samson).)
Under California statutory or other a . . . officer peace “is to search or seizure by parole subject warrant or with or without night, officer at time of the any day release, Code, (b)(3).) subd. (Pen. Upon with or without cause.” § under residence and your any property that “[y]ou is notified agent time by any without a warrant control be searched your law enforcement or any of Corrections the Department Rehabilitation] [and 15, 2511, tit. (b)4; Regs., see Cal. Code tit. subd. (Cal. officer.” Code Regs., § notify prisoner staff department 2356 [requiring § to. release].) There is no dispute conditions of before Attorney clause. The to the standard search and subject on that basis. defends the search solely General to warrantless suspicion- constitutional challenges
When considering condition, courts weigh on a search searches based less parole and detecting interest against society’s preventing interests of the parolee Court have concluded States Supreme we and the United recidivism. Both reasonable, is known to status so long parolee’s searches are that such (See harassing. arbitrary, is not capricious, the officer and the search 850-856; Samson, v. Sanders People U.S. at (Sanders)-, 73 P.3d Cal.Rptr.3d 496] Cal.4th 332-334 [2 P.2d 743, Cal.4th Reyes by of privacy diminished severely expectations . . . have (Reyes).) “[P]arolees 852.) “As (Samson, status alone.” virtue of their Corrections, a has Department convicted felon still his monitoring purpose freedom—granted specific conditional at p. (Reyes, supra, Cal.4th citizen.” inmate to free transition from ’ ' contrast, supervising interest” state, “overwhelming “has
917 because ... are more to commit future parolees ‘parolees likely criminal offenses.’ Pennsylvania Bd. Probation and Parole Scott (1998) 524 U.S. [v. 357, 344, 365 L.Ed.2d 118 that the interest in (explaining [141 2014]] combating recidivism ‘is the behind the very of close premise system parole (Samson, supra, 547 supervision’).” “The state has a not p. duty assess the efficacy its rehabilitative efforts but protect . . . .” (Reyes, supra, Cal.4th at public a Accordingly, does not have a legitimate that would expectation privacy prevent properly (Samson, conducted search. supra, parole Reyes, supra, Cal.4th at p.
Different
however,
considerations
when a
search affects
present,
search,
interests of third
privacy
the context of a
parties.
residential
we
“
have
no doubt that
expressed
‘those who reside with
to a
person subject
[a
enjoy measurably greater
in the
privacy expectations
eyes
condition]
”
of society’
(Sanders,
than those
supra,
enjoyed by
We have encountered similar
questions
context of a residential
Woods,
search. In
21 Cal.4th
officers searched a house
based on the probation status of one of the residents. We held that evidence
found in the house’s only bedroom was admissible against
two other resi-
(Id.
dents who were
not
probationers.
681-682.) We
pp.
observed that
California, probationers
“[i]n
may validly consent
advance to warrantless
searches in
for the
exchange
to avoid
opportunity
service of a state prison
(Id. term.
674.)5
on the “common
Relying
[Citations.]”
authority” theory
consent,
that,
we concluded
if others live with a
the shared
probationer,
areas of their residence
be
may
consent,
searched based on the probationer’s
given
advance
to a
by agreeing
674-676,
search condition.
at pp.
citing Schneckloth Bustamonte
would not “legitimize unreasonable searches with respect nonprobationers who share cases, residences with probationers. In all a search to a pursuant 5 As will be (post, 9), discussed below & fn. we have never relied on a consent rationale to uphold a search condition. 6 This court further held that an officer’s reliance the probation status of one of the residents as a pretext against to secure evidence the other residents did not render the search of (Woods, the common area 671-672.) unconstitutional. Cal.4th at clause search clause exceed the may probation particular harassing relied Nor such search be undertaken in upon. [Citation.] Moreover, unreasonable officers may only manner. generally [Citations.] those of the residence believe the portions they reasonably probationer (Woods, over. Cal.4th at joint has control complete [Citation.]” *9 681-682.) Robles, that, we if lives with supra, In 23 Cal.4th reaffirmed someone areas residence be searched a “common or shared of their probationer, (Id. aware citing officers of an search condition.” at by p. applicable Woods, and Russi v. Court supra, Superior Cal.4th observed that We further Cal.Rptr. nonprobation Cal.App.3d addition, their ers “maintain normal of over In persons. expectations privacy their retain valid in residential areas to subject they privacy expectations control, or basis to access so as there is no for officers long exclusive (Robles, has over those believe the areas.” reasonably authority probationer the 798.) at the search as to supra, We found unreasonable p. nonprobationer, Robles, on because the were unaware that the other resident was officers a clause A fortuitоus of search subsequent discovery probation probation. (Robles, 798-800.) at not be relied the search. justify could upon Sanders, supra, a Fourth Amendment In 31 Cal.4th we considered of two “one by to warrantless search home challenge occupied people, to a condition of the whom was on which parole subject police (Sanders, 322.) at the Addressing unaware at time of the search.” p. were search, we “had to the observed nonparolee’s challenge nonparolee with because was living reduced she expectation privacy concluded, however, that she 330.) . We to a search condition . . .” p. “ that officers with no knowledge ‘need not anticipate probationer’s absence invade their residence in the may freely existence or condition ” Robles, supra, (Ibid., of a warrant or circumstances.’ exigent quoting of Robles that officers extending holding require Cal.4th p. search, we before conducting of a resident’s search condition know parole this searches between distinguish probation declined to is the “the of cohabitants purpose, concluding expectation or condition is a condition probation parole.” whether same (Sanders, supra, Cal.4th the Car Was Reasonable
A. Search Backseat Officer’s of a vehicle search has addressed permissible scope This court We uncontested status. with begin premise, on a based passenger’s entering by Mihai in a search engaged physically either party, Deputy related to the car to for contraband and property defendant’s look 106, 111, New York v. Class (See 960].)7 The burden on the warrantless search the People justify 34; Johnson, Louisiana, (Vale as reasonable. U.S. at 723; Williams, Cal.4th 20 Cal.4th at The Court relied “common authority” consent-based Appeal in Woods to conclude that the standard of the employed permissible scope and the search was confined seat he narrowly parolee’s person “ superior ‘common It reasоned that with author- occupied. persons ” search, over an area can authorize a and that “that means the ity’ rule search those may ‘only reasonably believe portions [property] they ” complete joint control over.’ that “there has It observed probationer Schmitz, no evidence ride merely by allowing car, all, in his to that ceded over the car let alone the parolee any authority ” *10 ‘in his own to right.’ authority of the vehicle’s interior permit inspections vehicle, concluded Accordingly, it that mere in a who claims passenger “[a] therein, neither a nor interest lacks the ‘common author- possessory over the vehicle which him ity’ would allow either to consent or to object its search.” reliance on Woods led it
The Court of We Appeal’s astray. conclude the Woods, rationale advance consent search based employed justifying aby cohabitant “with common or authority over area probationer superior (Woods, to be searched” supra, 675), 21 Cal.4th at unworkable is when to this who mere applied was a in defendant’s automo- parolee, bile.8 There are significant distinctions between the residential probation Woods, search in and the search of defendant’s car on his based passenger’s status. Homes and cars are afforded different levels of Fourth Amendment protec- tion. of the home is the chief ‘physical entry against evil which the “[T]he ” of (Payton New York wording the Fourth Amendment directed.’ v. (1980) is 573, 639, 445 U.S. 1371].) 585 L.Ed.2d 100 S.Ct. is good There reason to [63 warrantless, limit a residential search to areas where an officer suspicionless believes the reasonably or exercises “common authority.” probationer (Woods, Matlock, 674—676; United 21 Cal.4th at supra, States supra, 171, fn. “The which authority justifies third-party 7 testify incriminating Mihai did that she plain saw evidence in view from where she 128, (See Horton v. (1990) stood outside of defendant’s vehicle. 496 U.S. 136-137 California 112, 730, 2301]; Texas Brown (1983) L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 110 [110 460 U.S. L.Ed.2d [75 502, J.).) (plur. opn. 103 S.Ct. of Rehnquist, 1535] 8 There be circumstances that demonstrate a parolee exercising could is lease, authority through joint physical possession, common over vehicle ownership, or example. present Such are not opinion facts here. We offer no permissible such a search. . ... use generally consent . . rests on mutual of the property by persons access or control for most so that it is reasonable to having joint purposes, co-inhabitants has the recognize right inspection permit that one their in his own and that the others have assumed risk right (United number the common area to be searched.” States v. might permit Matlock, 171, U.S. fn. the home demands sanctity “retain with valid recognition persons living probationer areas exclusive residential their access privacy expectations control, there believe the so is no basis for officers long reasonably (Robles, 23 Cal.4th at authority has over those areas.” probationer Sanders, accord, 329-330.) 31 Cal.4th at contrast, “the to one’s automo with By privacy respect expectation (South less to one’s home or office.” significantly bile than relating 1000, Dakota v. 428 U.S. L.Ed.2d 96 S.Ct. Opperman [49 omitted; accord, 3092], U.S. fn. v. Edmond Indianapolis have a L.Ed.2d Both drivers and passengers of a car and its contents reduced interior expectation “ Lewis, 417 because Cardwell v. thoroughfares,’ cars public ‘trave[l] as . . the (1974), ‘seldom . serv[e] ibid., effects,’ and exami subjected police stop repository personal everyday nation to enforce controls occur governmental ‘pervasive’ ‘[a]s rence,’ , and, . . . Dakota v. South Opperman, [supra,] *11 to accidents that render all their contents finally, may traffic exposed open 295, (1999) v. 526 U.S. 303 to public scrutiny.” (Wyoming Houghton 408, “warrantless Accordingly, L.Ed.2d 119 S.Ct. (Houghton).) 1297] [143 in which a automobiles have been in circumstances examinations of upheld (South Dakota v. at supra, search of a home or office would not.” Opperman, 367.) p. Woods, unlike this also failed to consider that
The Court Appeal case, a Our cases have drawn clear a search. involved probаtion previous A with to consent. regard proba distinction between probation parole often in for an exchange to on agrees being tioner explicitly placed probation, Likewise, a probationer avoid incarceration in state prison. to opportunity to that condition. clause has consented who is explicitly Bravo, 674; 600, (Woods, v. 43 Cal.3d 21 Cal.4th at People supra, supra, p. 302, 759, 605-607; (1971) Cal.Rptr. 5 Cal.3d 764 v. Mason People [97 (1975) Lent 15 630], People another in v. P.2d disapproved ground 488 contrast, 481, 486, 905, 545].) P.2d in By 1 541 Cal.3d fn. Cal.Rptr. [124 naturally not on the principle applies we have relied consent cases parole the Determinate Sentencing that “under Reyes In we explained probation. Prison 1976, The Board of Terms a matter choice. Act of (Reyes,supra, must it.” 19 accept prisoner must provide period parole;
921 749, Code, Cal.4th at Pen. 3000 et citing Finding consent p. seq.)9 § of the analysis we circumstances test inapt, adopted totality balancing evaluate the reasonableness of a warrantless and search. suspicionless 753-754; accord, Samson, 547 at (Reyes, U.S. supra, supra, p. This unlike the consent to the warrant approach, exception requirement, the state’s interest to and to recognizes ensure compelling supervise parolees with the terms of their release. It recognizes also “parolees compliance have fewer than because is more expectations probationers, (Samson, akin to than is to imprisonment probation imprisonment.” “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment .” is reasonableness . . . (United 112, 497, (2001) States Knights 534 U.S. L.Ed.2d [151 122 S.Ct. diminished (Knights).) “When faced with . . . expectations intrusions, like, privacy, minimal or the found Court has that certain individual, general, or circumstances render a warrantless search (Illinois 326, seizure reasonable.” (2001) v. McArthur 531 U.S. 838, accord, 946]; L.Ed.2d v. Robinson [148 1104, 727, Cal.4th 55].) 224 P.3d Whether a search is reasonable within the meaning the Fourth “ ” Amendment ‘totality (Samson, circumstances.’ depends 848; 33, U.S. see Ohio Robinette 347, This test includes assessment of the interests, degree to which legitimate promotes governmental bal anced against the degree which it intrudes an individual’s upon privacy. (Samson, Houghton, supra, Both we and the United States Court have traditional Supreme standards of employed reasonableness to evaluate the of warrantless vehicle constitutionality 1996, Legislature enacted Code section Penal 3067. At time of defendant’s that, parole, provided release on the statute January for crimes committed on or after mandatory (Pen. the inmate had agree writing to a parole. clause as a condition of id., Code, (a); (c); 4656-4657.) § subd. subd. both added Stats. § ch. *12 agree, If the inmate did he required imprisoned or she was to remain and serve Code, 3067, (See (b); remainder of the sentence without worktime credits. Pen. former subd. § Code, see also former [providing authority Pen. 3060.5 that “the shall parole § revoke the parole any agreement any of who prisoner sign parole setting general refuses to a forth the and special applicable prisoner conditions . . . and to shall order returned prison”].) The were amended requirement parolee statutes in June 2012 to omit the clause, expressly agree writing parolee’s agreement in to the search and to omit the lack of aas 2012, 43, denying revoking (Stats. parole. change, basis for ch. Before this one § appellate parolee’s acceptance court had that a indicated of a search condition under Penal Code 3067, (a) (See (2005) section v. Middleton former subdivision constituted consent. 131 732, General, however, 813].) Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.3d Attorney expressly 739-740 [31 any theory a justify disavows reliance on of advance consent to the search in this case. regard Because we search to an assess reasonableness of the without advance-consent Samson, 852, supra, theory, (Cf. we question. p. need not resolve this at 547 U.S. fn. 922 11 we consider whether Accordingly,
searches10 and
searches.
reasonable,
was
with a “salient circumstance” being
officer’s search here
(Knights, supra,
to a search condition.
534 U.S.
subject
presence
Sanders,
Samson,
supra,
118;
848;
supra,
accord,
We
at the outset
the Court of Appeal’s suggestion
reject
of
of
car was not
to
modicum
search based
subject
interior
defendant’s
to
status
a search condition.12
subject
passenger’s
there
“no
that defendant was not on
and
was
Emphasizing
parole,
knew his
the Court of
evidence
parolee,”
Appeal
[defendant]
nor of
none of his own
“gave
expectation
privacy,
found
defendant
up
“
However,
search of the vehicle.”
authority
his
officer’s
prevent
‘[o]ur
in
defendants
expectations
particular
is not what
privacy
[inquiry]
in
of the
be ...
. Our
terms
may
principles
situations
particular
[inquiry],
576,
States
United
U.S.
Katz[
(1967)
v.
389
347
L.Ed.2d
announced in
[19
507]],
what
constitutionally “justifi
88 S.Ct.
expectations
____’” (Hudson
517, 525, fn. 7
v. Palmer
L.Ed.2d
(1984)
468 U.S.
able”
[82
745,
United States v. White
393,
3194],
(1971) 401 U.S.
104 S.Ct.
quoting
White,
Here,
453,
J.).)
S.Ct.
opn.
751-752
L.Ed.2d
91
(plur.
[28
1122]
car,
thereby
to ride
his
opening
defendant
allowed
knowingly
passengers
and
of its contents.
and
them see
access some
allowing
its interior
them
(Cf. United
v. Jacobsen
States
U.S.
117
L.Ed.2d
466
Maryland
Smith
1652];
(1979) 442 U.S.
743-744
of the passenger’s
Once an officer learns
99
Robles,
Sanders,
supra,
supra,
23
31 Cal.4th
(see
status
it, the
cannot
799),13
reasonably
the driver of
driver
informs
Cal.4th
completely
search aimed at
the car
from any
to shield the interior of
expect
Houghton,
(officer
cause
supra,
probable
with
to search
pages
923 However, the criminal the driver can reason uncovering activity by parolee. “ of the search tied to and ably ‘strictly will be expect scope justified ” Ohio (Terry the it U.S. 19 by’ authorizing circumstances 1868]), L.Ed.2d and that the will not be conducted 88 S.Ct. (Woods, supra, an or manner 21 Cal.4th arbitrary, harassing capricious, Samson, 752-754; Reyes, Cal.4th at see supra, supra, pp. 856). at p.
The Court of focus on defendant’s of his ignorance Appeal’s passen ger’s status when him to the car is We have parole admitting misplaced. never be that a or house would suggested probation unlawful knew or unless a defendant his or her cohabitant was a probationer a rule good No reason create such for vehicle searches. appears Because the of the rule is to exclusionary deter unlawful primary purpose conduct, the the police the is whether knew of question operative officer Sanders, (See status before search. passenger’s parole conducting Robles, 332-335; 799-800; 31 Cal.4th at Cal.4th see also id. is knowledge-first to deter appropriate requirement [“a future and misconduct to effectuate the police Fourth Amendment’s guarantee and against seizures”].) unreasonable searches search, of the statute that
Turning scope our state specifies only “is to search or seizure . . . officer or other by officer at of the peace time or without a any day night, with search warrant Code, or with or (Pen. (b)(3).) without cause.” subd. While § search, statute for the it provides authority does not to define its purport Rаther, in given case. limits of a search flow from the nexus between the the area and or items searched. How we define circumstances, nexus and depends totality takes into account item, such factors as the of that area nature how close and accessible stake, area or item is to the interests at parolee, government’s interest in conducting search. noted, As {Samson, state’s interest substantial. supervising parolees “ U.S. at Parolees ‘are likely more commit future ” {ibid.) criminal offenses’ “grave safety concerns attend pose 854).14
recidivism” of their conditional release Additionally, because {id. into “incentive society, have even to conceal their parolees greater criminal activities and evidence than quickly dispose incriminating The truncated does expression Deputy record here not reflect an Mihai of concern safety her once her arrived and were do backup occupants officer removed from the car. We note, however, the Supreme stops “especially fraught Court’s observation that with traffic danger (Michigan Long officers.” *14 924 supra, (Knights, criminal . . . .”
ordinary [discussing p. Samson, accord, supra, at “incentive-to- probationers]; [the Warrantless, force” conceal concern” with “even greater applies parolees].) {Reyes, are a effective searches vital of supervision suspicionless part 752; Samson, supra, supra, in 854), 19 Cal.4th at and mandated p. p. Code, (Pen. as of California a condition release every parolee’s § 2511,- (b)(3); (b)4). Regs., subd. Cal. Code tit. subd. § balance, noted, has On the other side of the a driver a reduced (South Dakota to an v. with automobile. privacy regard expectation Lewis, Cardwell v. 368; Opperman, supra, U.S. at p. when
590.) A is further diminished he allows driver’s expectation privacy car, (Cf. to ride thus measure of to them. others in his some ceding privacy Jacobsen, Maryland, supra, United States v. Smith 466 U.S. Sanders, 743-744; Cal.4th at The Court in a bubble and legal of Appeal placed passenger in concluded defendant retained a reasonable expectation car the front seat where “every of his part except passenger interior In so it the car’s and sitting.” holding, artificially segmented improp- limited the of a search erly strictly parolee’s person permissible scope a such circumscribed authority and seat he or she No occupies. supports approach. that a front seat has passenger
To the
the law does not
contrary,
presume
to do
compartment
with items located elsewhere
nothing
Pringle
Maryland
car. In
Moreover, not reflect modem Court view does rigid of Appeal’s conventions, whether assessing a framework for which provide social *15 (Oliver (1984) of is reasonable. United States U.S. expectation v. 170, 214, 1735]; (1978) 178 & fn. 8 L.Ed.2d 104 S.Ct. Rakas v. Illinois [80 128, 143, 387, 421]; fn. 12 L.Ed.2d cf. v. Georgia [58 208, Randolph 547 U.S. L.Ed.2d 126 S.Ct. The vehicle here was a noncommercial car. automo- five-passenger Typically, bile do not act as if were confined in divided occupants they separate coats and other on their compartments, elbows possessions pilеd laps, at their A clamped sides. front seat even if a casual passenger, driver, of will feel free acquaintance likely to stow items in personal feet, backseat, available at his or her in the door or in the until space pocket, are needed or the ends. Even they journey if the driver’s personal preferences otherwise, it is not reasonable to will expect always passengers adhere to them. The driver is not ain his necessarily position supervise moment, nor he passengers every in a to control their position every observed, move once are in the car. As the they court an Houghton occupant of an automobile hide may contraband without the other knowl- occupants’ reasons, or edge 305.) U.S. at permission. (Houghton, supra, 526 For these p. a permissible of search is “not defined intent of subjective Palmer, (Hudson those asserting rights.” 468 U.S. at fn. supra, p. Rather, 7.) a reasonable officer take all of the circumstances into account when contraband, conducting search of an automobile for property, or associated with weapons the parolee.15 addition, a standard automobile five-passenger generally affords access to
ready areas in both the front and the (See back seats. New York v. Belton 453 U.S. (Belton), Gant, limited holding in on another in part ground supra, 344-348.) This fact is particularly significant given Court’s Supreme observation that have a parolees heightened incentive to conceal or quickly (Samson, 854-855; dispose evidence. incriminating U.S. at accord, Knights, 120.) 534 U.S. at A more than an parolee, ordinary be passenger, may to conceal contraband expected or other weapons places postulates Justice Liu that a etiquette may different apply picks up driver who a rider carpool casual transport volunteers to a group parent chaperones elementary on an (Conc. Liu, J., course, post, school field trip. opn. 938-939.) & dis. Of those circumstancеs are not at play here. This officer encountered a driver with abscesses on his arms use, suggesting drug and a parole. Testimony hearing the suppression established that defendant and the had approximately years known each other for three Accordingly, the time of the search. we have no occasion to consider what modem social govern, conventions would example, stranger driver’s decision to allow a into his or her private (See gaining vehicle for the benefit of carpool access to a lane. conc. & opn. dis. Liu, J., Further, post, while it is true that privy precise this officer was not relationship parties, between the the Fourth permits “rel[y] Amendment the officer to on what usual and place[s] no burden on the possibility atypical [is] to eliminate the [officer] arrangements, in the absence of regular reason to doubt place.” scheme was in (Georgia Randolph, supra, 547 U.S. at well own are severely than on his aware that his person, privacy rights Under the Court could limited. of Appeal’s approach, a valid of the car and by sitting frustrate front seat simply his in the back. discarding Imposing artificially such placing belongings balancing narrow rule frustrates “When legitimate goals parole. interests, our determinations of ‘reasonableness’ under the Fourth competing must take the officer. facing Amendment account of realities” practical [the] (Houghton, factors, these we the Court
Balancing holding. reject Appeal’s *16 that a on a status Instead we hold vehicle search based passenger’s parole the and the or extend seat he she may beyond parolee’s person occupies. limits, the is Such a search is without however. of search areas the officer confined to those of the where compartment have stowed or belongings could reasonably expects personal parolee limits, the items when these activity.16 discarded aware of Within has need not articulate facts that the indicating officer specific or in a in the actually placed property contraband location particular passen before that area. Such facts are not ger searching required compartment “without because the search clause authorizes a search explicitly Code, Reyes, 3067, (Pen. (b)(3); see Cal.4th cause.” subd. 19 § 753-754.)17 pp. rule, we that the officer’s of the backseat this conclude search
Applying was an older model defendant’s car was reasonable. Defendant driving that car used for or Buick. There was no evidence the Oldsmobile barrier found in a (as or that had be might commercial it purpose type commonly the front from the backseat. Nor would taxicab) dividing seats movement conventions to the officer held social suggest passenger’s Randolph, supra, (Cf. Georgia to the seat he was restricted occupied. 111-112.) a standard Considering layout five-passenger 547 U.S. pp. car, the officer to that this parolee reasonable for objectively expect it was glove compartments car like the do not involve a search of closed The facts here console, trunk, box, of such express opinion we no on whether search center or and solely The reasonableness passenger’s areas could be based on a status. closed-off circumstances, including the necessarily take into account all attendant such a search must passenger’s legitimate compartments, in those closed expectation driver’s them, whether or otherwise secured. proximity they were locked Reyes, in the absence of be reasonable even we affirmed In (Reyes, long arbitrary, harassing. particularized capricious, so is not or suspicion “ there, 753-754.) ‘although quantum “some As we noted Cal.4th seizure[,] ... usually to a constitutional suspicion prerequisite is individualized ’ ” 751, of such imposes requirement suspicion.” no irreducible Fourth Amendment 720, 325, 342, Jersey (1985) v. T. L. O. fn. L.Ed.2d New quoting U.S. 8 [83 Samson, Randy In accord, Cal.4th re G. 733]; see 28 P.3d 565 [110 backseat,
could have behind stowed his tossed items personal property him, or rеached back to them in accessible areas encountering place upon circumstances, under these status of the front police. Accordingly, seat a warrantless search of the backseat area where the passenger justified bag shoes were located.18 chips
Defendant would state the rule more
He
that a
restrictively.
contends
search of an automobile
on a
based
status is limited to the
passenger’s parole
immediately
areas
accessible to the
Defendant
seems to invoke a
limiting
to a search incident to an arrest.
principle
Such
search is
applicable
“
”
control,’
limited to the area within the arrestee’s
‘immediate
“the
meaning
area from within which he
might gain
destructible
possession
weapon
(Chimel
evidence.”
395 U.S.
California
(Chimel).)
But test rather than defendant’s position. arrest, a search of an automobile incident to upholding Court in Supreme Belton, supra, observed that “the narrow relatively compass of an automobile” in fact passenger compartment even if “generally, *17 within ‘the area into inevitably, which an arrestee reach in might order to ” Chimel, 460, a (Id. at grab or evidentiary supra, weapon p. quoting ite[m].’ U.S. at p. Accordingly, court a rule that adopted bright-line “when a has made a policeman lawful custodial arrest of the of an occupant automobile, arrest, he a may, as incident of that contemporaneous search the (Belton, 460, of that supra, passenger automobile.” at compartment fns. p. omitted.) arrest,
This search was not incident
and we do not
adopt
bright-line
Nonetheless,
rule here.
Belton’s
is instructive. The
and
analysis
narrow
nature of the
relatively nonprivate
and law
enforce-
compartment,
need
ment’s
for a workable rule to monitor
our
of
justify
parolees,
rejection
rule that would
the officer to assess in each
require
case
parolee’s
immediate
distance and limit the search to that area.19
grasping
Allowing
here,
adopt
In additiоn to the rule we
an officer is authorized to search a vehicle and its
concerns,
occupants
legitimate
based on
safety
guidelines
and articulated officer
under the
set
(See,
323,
previous
e.g.,
forth in
v. Johnson
cases.
555 U.S.
331-332
Arizona
694,
[permissible patdown
occupants
of
based on reasonable
Class,
New York v.
suspicion
they may
dangerous];
that
be
armed and
Justice urges (Conc. & dis. condition.” exceed the parole terms that scope Liu, J., that a would hold post, colleague properly Our opn. and ‘any “the is limited to parolee’s person conducted parole ” (Ibid., Cal. Code tit. Regs., control.’ quoting under property parolee’s] [the 15, 2511, “available (b)4.)20 authority interprets He contends that the subd. § mere access but to mean not sensibly physical ‘control’ more and naturally (Conc. searched.” over authority property rather ownership, possession, or. Liu, J., post, & dis. opn. draw from the Liu seeks to with the limits Justice
We disagree respectfully noted, that every parolee statute provides As our authority. relevant Code, (Pen. searches. § and to warrantless suspicionless conducted to define the limits of (b)(3).) properly It does not subd. purport the officer’s search is Nor is it correct to say search. given parolee upon the literal notification wording tied to strictly Liu, J., Cal. Code post, citing Regs., (Conc. release. & dis. opn. your must be notified (b)4 “[y]ou subd. tit. [parolee § to warrantless control” are subject under your residence clause based held for a search].) probation While we have so accord, Walter 674-675, 682; (Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th consent 2395]), *18 United States (1980) 447 Scalia, underlie safety and evidence destruction J.).) officer Because concerns about opn. of to a vehicle search incident court concluded that requirement, warrant the exception this to the 335, 338.) pp. at implicated. not these concerns are justified cannot be when an arrest of an automobile passenger compartment the search Accordingly, it held reaching distance of the (1) and within “the arrestee is unsecured arrest when incident to (id. 343) to or there is reason p. the at at the time of search” compartment might found in the was made be for which the arrest evidence of the offense believe that that, 343-344, under these two (id. Gant 351). reading of confirms A close at pp. vehicle circumstances, an automobile search of Belton’s holding respect permissible with to (People v. Nottoli Cal.App.4th arrest remains intact. incident reach at parolee’s area within the to limit a is no similar reason There ante, (see pp. at explained previously the moment the search. For the reasons by activity parolee detecting criminal 923-924), interest in compelling has a an officer safely the car and secured. removed from has been regardless of whether property of items of on a detail below the limits in further We discuss (Post, 930-931.) pp. at located in an automobile. from a of advance theory here does not derive we have our rule explained, Rather, we assess the reasonable- consent either the driver. circumstances, with on the totality ness of this search based condition, status, a car in presence passenger’s parole applicable 848; Knights, (Samson, U.S. at supra, salient circumstances. being p. all Sanders, Finally, Cal.4th at to six of “control” amounts Liu cites for his authority interpretation Justice Liu, J., 940-941), post, (cone. pp. Court of decisions & dis. opn. Appeal residences, automobiles, and predate five of which involve searches of and the United States Supreme most recent from this court pronouncements 916-917).21 (see searches Court validity a search of Justice Liu’s “control” test when applied proves problematic He “Officer Mihai had lawful the interior of an automobile. posits to search the and the area authority immediately adjacent parolee’s person circumstances, Absent unusual a further search of the passenger Mihai would have Officer make reasonable compartment required determination of what areas or in the car were under parolee’s property Liu, J., (Cone. 945.) It that a post, control.” & dis. would seem opn. act of contraband behind him into the backseat would tossing passenger’s so, amount to an of “control” that area. If would our colleague exercise over the officer to witness such conduct? To so would demand an require require cause, articulation of at odds with the search requirement expressly condition.
Justice Liu
that his
with the
urges
holdings
is consistent
approach
Vermouth,
Maryland v.
Pringle, supra,
or discarded contraband in the areas of the That open passenger compartment. asserts, can always is not to as Justice Liu that an officer search the say, open (Conc. areas of the of a standard car. passenger compartment five-passenger Liu, J., Rather, post, 938.) & dis. an officer may search opn. those areas where he or she in of all the reasonably light expects, circumstances, have could that the items or discarded placed personal Thus, contraband. an search of automobile based on parole passenger’s otherwise, status does have reasonable limits. To the extent he parole argues articulation, Liu Justice criticizes a rule of his own not the rule we adopt here.22 Reasonable The Search Shoes Was
B. Chips Bag Officer’s We now turn to the officer’s search of the and the bag pair chips (See 1.) & fn. Because there is shoes located backseat. p. no in the record that the contraband found inside these items was testimony view, United States (See we treat the officer’s conduct a search. plain Ross 2157] [“the Fourth Amendment owner of container every provides protection view”].) conceals its contents from plain that, like the automobile
The United States Court has Supreme rеcognized itself, the automobile is to a reduced inside property transported noted, (Houghton, supra, 526 U.S. at As expectation privacy. clause authorizes warrantless and California’s suspicionless Code, Reyes, supra, (Pen. (b)(3); see Cal.4th searches. subd. § account, “the 753-754.) relatively these factors into with Taking along (Belton, an narrow automobile” compass passenger compartment 460), that an a search of a conducting we hold officer may vehicle’s based on a status passenger compartment passenger’s if the officer believes reasonably search items of personal property exert control over them.23 owns the items or has the ability otherwise, hold, may always “the categorically or that an officer We do not areas, headrests, backseat, pockets door the area the backseat the backseat foot behind car, . . . .” and the floor areas under both front seats the front or back on both sides of Liu, J., post, (Conc. today, taken to its Nor does the rule we announce opn. & dis. conclusion, glove necessarily “closed-off areas” like the box logical authorize search of (Ibid.) why exempt. areas would be questions Justice Liu such center console. evolves, incrementally and on a way that that the common law simple answer is is that, totality the circumstances case-by-case applying basis. A more nuanced answer expect be unreasonable in another show that it would approach, the facts case parolee had access to those areas. high court. The belief’ in the same manner as concept We use the of “reasonable available to the judged against objective standard: would the facts “must ‘be determination [requisite] caution in the belief’ ’....” . . “warrant a man of reasonable officer at the moment. *20 was bag the shoes and chips that the officer’s search of
Defendant argues location, items in their nature and very because virtue of “by [these] unlawful clearly belonged . . either feminine” obviously the back seat . were backseat, in the front. rather than the male parolee woman passenger Baker, but his He relies for this supra, Cal.App.4th point lacks merit. argument Baker, The male driver told an a car for officer stopped speeding. Baker, at her feet. A had a purse
officer he was on passenger, parole. held the The Court of Appeal search of the revealed purse methamphetamine. as an that “a has been recognized search unreasonable. It observed purse (Baker, for items” inherently private repository personal “[h]ere, to overcome the 1159) nothing at and that there is Cal.App.4th p. to the sole female belonged occupant obvious that the presumption purse (id. 1160). at the vehicle who to a search” p. parole-condition feet and the officer recounted no sat the female purse passenger’s (Id. conduct, movements, such furtive the driver towards the by purse. that, . . . 1156-1157.) The Court of concluded “on these facts Appeal driver, there could be no reasonable that the to the belonged suspicion purse that the driver exercised control or or that the purse possession purse, contained to the driver. belonging anything [Citation.]” first it from Turning bag, distinguishable chips plainly at issue in Baker. A woman’s is not an bag “inherently private purse chips (Baker, 1159), items” repository Cal.App.4th personal no it as identify belonging any has distinct characteristics would Unlike a which is not shared two particular person. purse, generally a car more is not so people, chips bag carefully guarded. Occupants like a Once the bag during journey. bag’s share food commonly chips consumed, trash, or, instances, contents are it mere in some becomes for trash. of the car would be free to commandeer Any receptacle occupant items, the others. to discard or conceal without bag objection by empty chips Further, claimed while not neither of the car occupant dispositive, nonparolеe at the time of the search. bag Considering exclusive control over chips circumstances, for the officer to believe these it was reasonable objectively reach back and conceal contraband inside the that the was able to bag.24 chips accord, (Illinois 2793]; Rodriguez 188 [111
Sanders, 31 Cal.4th at above, that the analysis impose requirement we do not further Consistent with our actually indicating facts exercised control over specific officer articulate (See & fn. item of in this manner. *21 The shoes a closer The record does not reveal the shoes’ present question. owner or whether the style (See shoes was gender specific. 914.) It is the burden to facts a warrantless People’s present justifying (Vale Louisiana, Johnson, v. supra,
search. 38 Cal.4th 723, 726; Williams, conclude, 20 Cal.4th at We however, case, that under the circumstances of this record is ambiguous not fatal to the People’s position.
The shoes were located in the backseat. of actual it Regardless ownership, reasonable for the officer to believe that the was objectively able to reach back to hide contraband inside the shoes. In this respect, open shoe differs from a which is to be more markedly purse, likely closely monitored its owner or otherwise secured. further evidence of the shoes would
Additionally, any regarding style have undercut defendant’s Had such evidence shown that the position. were a it shoes man’s would have style, strengthened People’s position were searched as the of the male In this they properly property shoes’ location in backseat was accessible to the regard, equally defendant driver and male his both seated in the front. Without an passenger, here, claim of which was asserted of men’s express ownership, pair shoes is not to have likely distinct characteristics it as identifying property driver, of the male rather than the male passenger. had further evidence shown that the shoes were a woman’s
Conversely, size, conclude, or diminutive in it would be reasonable to as defendant style child) belonged (or has female her small argued, they seated in the back. But that fact would undermined a claim necessarily have that the officer’s search on the driver’s reasonable infringed expectation As the court has to claim Fourth Amendment high privacy. explained, personally defendant must demonstrate that he has an protection, expectation (Minnesota Carter searched. 525 U.S. “ 469].)25 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. ‘Fourth Amendment rights which, like not be rights, may some other constitutional personal rights ” Illinois, (Rakas 133-134, U.S. at asserted.’ vicariously Alderman v. United States quoting stands, As it General has not Attorney argued the search of the
defendant lacked a Fourth Amendment right challenge record inured to defendant’s benefit. ambiguous shoes. We conclude above, conclude, identified that the officer’s We further based on the factors search of the shoes was reasonable. and the female relationship There was no evidence of a familial between defendant their ownership him to claim an interest or her child that would allow possessions. located and shoes bag could search the chips
Because the officer status and car based on the defendant’s passenger’s the backseat of mo condition, defendant’s denied the trial court properly applicable evidence. tion suppress
III. DISPOSITION *22 the Court of is reversed. The judgment Appeal J., J., Baxter, J., Chin, concurred. and C. Cantil-Sakauye, I concur in the judgment and WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting. Concurring decision, dissent from but I respectfully the Court of reversing Appeal’s George that defendant Douglas I would find reasons set forth by majority. whether for the question has failed to preserve appeal Schmitz was valid. search warrantless search is whether a sheriff’s
At issue in this case deputy unreasonable to be free of car violated his constitutional right defendant’s States Constitution. to the United searches under the Fourth Amendment area is that ‘searches conducted basic mle in this most constitutional “[T]he or magistrate, by judge outside the withоut judicial prior approval process, ato few se unreasonable Amendment—subject only are under the Fourth per The well-delineated exceptions established and exceptions.’ specifically drawn,’ those who showing by and there must be ‘a ‘jealously carefully made that course of the situation exigencies seek . . . that exemption show the need those seeking exemption ‘The burden is on imperative.’ ” 443, 454—455 v. New (1971) (Coolidge Hampshire for it.’ [29 under the 2022], The rule is the same omitted.) fns. se searches are per “It is axiomatic . . . that warrantless state Constitution: a few and federal Constitutions with unreasonable under the California the burden of and that the have circumscribed carefully exceptions, People one of those without a warrant comes within proving v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d (People Cal.Rptr. exceptions.” 1278].) P.2d is well to a warrantless raising challenge The procedure evidence, must set they move to established: defendants suppress “[W]hen motion, but they satisfy bases for the legal forth the factual instance, showing facie in the first by making prima at least obligation, then has burden acted without a warrant. prosecution the police seizure, which, after search or for the warrantless some justification proving in that justification.” out any inadequacies defendants can respond by pointing (Pe 119, 136 v. Williams 20 Cal.4th ople P.2d
In his motion to defendant both his detention and the suppress, challenged motion, warrantless search of his car. In ensuing the district opposition asserted the detention was lawful. The trial attorney court ruled in favor of the district While the district attorney. mentioned in attorney’s opposition condition, the front seat passing defendant did not re- passenger’s parole and the record discloses neither spond, any argument by concern- parties ing or the significance permissible scope passenger’s parole condition, nor the trial court.1 any ruling Although burden point search, is on the district attorney justify warrantless here the district so, did to the satisfaction of the trial court. If attоrney defendant thought otherwise, the burden then on him to assert his and make a objection Gordon, record it for (see review adequate preserve appellate People 1250), 50 Cal.3d at even while the bear the ultimate burden People Williams, (see the search justifying 127). 20 Cal.4th at “Defendants who do not give sufficient notice of prosecution [the] its for a inadequacies justification challenged cannot raise the [of search] issue on of issues review *23 appeal. must be limited to those scope upon ‘[T]he raised is an elemental during argument.... This matter of fairness in giving each of the an to the facts and parties opportunity adequately litigate inferences to the relating adverse contentions.’ party’s [Citation.]”
Because defendant failed in the trial court to the of challenge applicability the search condition or the passenger’s parole permissible scope search, warrantless he must be held to have forfeited the For this issue. alone, reason I concur in the decision to reverse the majority’s judgment the Court of which the trial the reversed court’s denial of Appeal, suppression motion. forfeiture,
Defendant’s which became after we had only evident apparent review, granted would have weighed heavily against grant regardless any for a decision the Fourth Amendment. “As a party’s preference interpreting matter, we decline to address constitutional prudential routinely questions when it is to reach them.” Alcoholic unnecessary (Department Beverage 1, 17, Control v.Alcoholic Control Bd. 40 Cal.4th fn. Beverage Appeals 21, 2008, hearing began May suppression The and was not recorded or transcribed. A day’s proceedings Deputy settled statement of that indicates Mihai testified she “conducted passenger’s parole search of the car based on the status.” The settled statement does not reflect counsel, legal arguments, any, by parties the if made so there is no record of whether the by scope permitted passenger’s parole discussed the of the search the search condition. “To preserve point appeal, provide adequate such a for review on a defendant must of course (People v. Gordon record.” Cal.3d P.2d Cal.Rptr. 23, 2008; hearing and a reporter present transcript continued on June this time a was evidence, taking prepared. Following parties the the issue the addressed their and, so, arguments Deputy if to the court was whether defendant had been detained whether the'scope permitted had to detain. Neither side mentioned of the search Mihai sufficient cause by passenger’s parole the search condition. the 462],)2 P.3d This case illustrates prudential the wisdom, issue in failure raise the
rule’s as defendant’s to court, (see the search the effort to justify trial to People’s response Williams, of a factual the 136), 20 Cal.4th development prevented need to obviated revisit permissible record have might perceived reaches out searches. Unfortunately, majority warrantless issue, “the Amendment decide the categorically Fourth proclaiming those search of areas of Constitution permits [warrantless] the officer reasonably expects a third where compartment party’s car] [of when items belongings could have stowed discarded personal ante, majority’s aware of Given the police activity.” (Maj. opn., issue, I do offense to our rule choice no further speak prudential reasoning with Justice Liu that noting my majority’s agreement unpersuasive.
Kennard, J., concurred. observes, LIU, J., As JusticeWerdegar Concurring Dissenting. “defendant the trial challenge failed in court applicability condition or the of the warrant- parole search passenger’s permissible scope J., . . As a (Cone. less search . & dis. opn. Werdegar, .” result, the limited. record in this case is We know that the officer very conducted a the car front seat search of based on the passenger’s asked, learned, But what believed in status. we do not know the оfficer search, the course of the even bear on whether though critically such facts under officer believed areas and items searched were reasonably *24 control. deems such facts irrelevant parolee’s Today’s opinion effectively and, the search a novel Fourth doing, adopts lawfulness of in so Amendment rule that be broader than resolve the may necessary legality in this counsels actually what case. Because restraint judicial happened (see it is to do so constitutional when against deciding questions unnecessary Clara v. Transportation Authority Santa Local Guardino (1995) 11 County 220, 207, 225]), Cal.4th P.2d I with Justice agree Cal.Rptr.2d [45 course reverse the Court of based Werdegar here is to prudent Appeal However, on defendant’s forfeiture in the trial court. because apparent rule, has announce I write far-reaching court reached out to a constitutional further to on the merits. today’s decision is explain why unpersuasive
The court holds that a officer who discovers police passenger seat of “those front a car is on areas parole may passenger 2 “Principles gratuitously not reach out decide judicial restraint counsel that we issues be questions impression. jurisprudence of first dictates that such constitutional Sound (People only actually raising issue.” decided in the context of cases controversies 850, 373, (conc. Bennett opn. P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d 17 Cal.4th 947] Reyes J.); P.2d Werdegar, see Cal.4th (conc. J.) [same].) Werdegar, & opn. dis. where the compartment officer that the reasonably expects could have parolee stowed personal or discarded belongings items when aware of activ- police ante, ity.” (Maj. 926.) opn., court describes a search pursuant to this standard as “confined” and “not without limits.” But the logic officer, of today’s holding to authorize a appears police simply upon that the front learning seat is passenger on to search all parole, open areas the a compаrtment standard car. five-passenger These areas backseat, headrests, include the the area behind the backseat the backseat foot areas, car, door in any the front or back pockets on both sides of the and the floor areas under both front seats—for these are all where an officer places may reasonably “the could expect have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of (Id. at police activity.”
This is broad. commuter holding unduly After today, who picks up rider in a casual to work and carpool way stopped speeding may be to a search of all areas in the open car’s passenger if compartment officer learns that the rider is on The same for a driver parole. goes who volunteers to drive a on group parent chaperones elementary school field And the same for a trip. goes who person agrees pick up friend of a friend on the to the way movies. I am not sure what societal baseline the court deems relevant when it legally suggests these arrangements “ ” “ ” ante, are or not ‘usual.’ ‘atypical’ (Maj. fn. opn., any event, it seems an unduly of the Fourth cramped reading Amendment to say sure way driver in these situations can everyday protect warrantless, himself or herself from the possibility suspicionless ask, of all areas of the open is to before compartment rider letting into the car: “By way, Yet that is you parole?” now the apparently rule California.
Further, the court holds that if an officer encounters personal property the course of the car’s searching passenger compartment, also property be searched “if may the officer believes that the reasonably owns those items or has the to exert control over them.” ability (Maj. opn., 913.) This too is exceedingly broad. To that an officer say he she to be under the reasonably believes control is to parolee’s adhere faithfully (See search condition. Cаl. Code tit. Regs., *25 2511, (b)4 subd. release shall be notified that [parolee upon § and “[y]ou your residence and under control be any property your searched without a may .”].) warrant at time . . . any To that an officer search say may any property that he or she believes to be the reasonably within to exert parolee’s “ability control” is to authorize the officer to search found in virtually any property the passenger compartment. hold,
I would not the as Court of seemed to that a lawful Appeal imply, search never the front seat when a parole may go beyond passenger hold, I as But would is a nor the in seat
officer knows passenger the beyond go search may always that a lawful today, parole the court does dictates, hold, the Instead, I as would precedent front seat. on the front depends seat beyond of a search reasonableness ” “ (Samson v. in each case. of the circumstances’ ‘totality California (Samson).) 843, 250, 2193] 547 U.S. 848 [165 the court by the broad rule with Accordingly, disagree adopted I respectfully Amendment’s protections. of the Fourth derogation I. “have diminished severely well that California parolees
It is established (Samson, alone.” virtue of their status by expectations privacy law, California statutory As notes: “Under today’s opinion to or by on ‘is seizure inmate for release every eligible parole of the or with any a . or other officer at time day night, . . officer peace Code, 3067, (Pen. warrant or with or without cause.’ or without § release, (b)(3).) your is notified that ‘[y]ou subd. Upon under be without control searched any your may residence of Corrections by agent warrant time any any Department [and 15, (Cal. Regs., officer.’ Code tit. or law enforcement Rehabilitation] (b)4; see Cal. tit. Regs., [requiring subd. also Code § § conditions of parole prior staff department notify prisoner release].)” search condition furthers (Maj. opn., “ ‘ ’ interest” because “overwhelming state’s supervising parolees ” well as ... are more to commit future criminal offenses’ likely ‘parolees in reducing thereby promoting reintegra the state’s “interests recidivism and (Samson, among tion and ... positive citizenship parolees.” have diminished Although “substantially pri parolees expectation^] {Samson, 855), been our cases have careful vacy” warrantless, search where scope delimit proper suspicionless parole In the interests of third context parties. such search implicates privacy search, have expectation of a residential we said “the condition is a condition is the same whether the search cohabitants v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th (People probation parole.” who involving persons P.3d The cases Cal.Rptr.3d ante, (see with a who is living maj. opn., probation person their 917-918) make that “common or shared areas of residence clear be of an search condition.” searched officers aware may applicable 3 P.3d Robles 23 Cal.4th (People time, (Robles).) same we that “a search pursuant At the have “emphasized” clause clause not exceed particular probation *26 relied Nor such search upon. may a be undertaken in a harassing [Citation.] Moreover, or unreasonable manner. may officers generally only [Citations.] search those of the residence portions they reasonably believe the proba (People Woods tioner has or control complete joint over. [Citation.]” Robles, 21 Cal.4th 1019]; 981 P.2d see at “retain p. [nonprobationers valid in privacy residential expectations control, areas to their exclusive access or so long there is no basis officers believe the reasonably has over those probationer authority areas”].)
The in the search case the present interests of a driver implicates notes, whose car carried a who on the passenger As court the parole. legality warrantless search is based on consent. parole (Maj. opn., ante, Cahfornia, In the p. condition is parole specified by rеgulation. It that a provides extend to the parole may person parolee’s and to under control.” Code tit. “any parolee’s] (Cal. property Regs., [the §2511, here, (b)4.) subd. the search at issue upholding today’s the a opinion defines valid search in terms that exceed the scope scope the search condition. Instead focusing on what is under the property control, first, search, the parolee’s court the expands a officer “areas of the authorizing any passenger compart- ment where the officer stowed reasonably could have expects and, personal belongings discarded items when aware of police activity” second, the officer to search by authorizing items of “personal property located in those areas if the officer that . reasonably believes the . . ante, has the exert control over them.” The ability (Maj. opn., an officer upshot is that is to search all areas of the car’s permitted open areas, and passenger compartment virtually any located those front seat is simply upon ascertaining passenger says holding court its reflects held social conventions” “commonly 926) in a car where front (maj. opn., concerning places “[a] driver, seat even likely if casual of the will passenger, acquaintance feel free to stow items . . . .” I {Id. many personal suspect citizens who drive or ride in cars will be to learn law-abiding surprised areas under “control” of a front seat extend to invariably passenger have anywhere passenger belongings “could stowed discarded personal backseat, 913), items when aware {id. police activity” including areas, headrests, the area door behind backseat backseat foot car, front under or back both sides floor areas pockets both front seats. For causal for commuters carpool example, etiquette floor call for riders in the front seat to may place belongings at their but unless anywhere feet оr their not in the backseat or else laps, asked Five to lunch in five- coworkers permission given. driving must their next they possessions car understand keep *27 a friend at But a who picks up the vehicle. driver them not elsewhere in the backseat will suitcase on place that the passenger the airport may expect it is suggest, question- the the these examples or in trunk of automobile. As authority—what or other the court does without empirical able to posit—as held,” “usual,” or “commonly in automobile are social conventions 926, 925, 15, 927.) id. (See fn. “typical.” situation, the of issue vary Because social conventions depending under items located there “property whether car’s backseat or [the 2511, 15, be (b)4) must (Cal. tit. subd. control” Code Regs., parolee’s] § in case. That is the each decided on the basis of the of circumstances totality court stated Ohio v. in As high of settled law. the straightforward application 347, Robinette “We L.Ed.2d 117 S.Ct. 417]: is the the Fourth Amendment reasonable- long have held that ‘touchstone of Reasonableness, turn, in in is measured terms objective ness.’ [Citation.] test we have the of the circumstances. this examining totality applying [f] rules, instead the consistently eschewed bright-line emphasizing fact-specific Samson, (Accord, of nature the reasonableness inquiry.” our Amendment we general approach’ Fourth ‘examin[e] [“ ‘[U]nder a search is reasonable totality the of the circumstances’ determine whether United Knights States Amendment.”]; the Fourth meaning within the (2001) 534 conclude 118 [151 587] [“we the search of was reasonable under our Fourth Knights general .”]; Amendment the the circumstances’ . . ‘examining totality approach v. Robinson 727, 224 47 Cal.4th indicates, the the ultimate P.3d ‘As the text of Fourth Amendment 55] [“ search is “reasonable- constitutionality measure the of a governmental ’ . . . is . terms objective ness.” ‘Reasonableness . . measured [f] [Citation.] .”].) . . . circumstances’ by examining totality Although to examine the circum- today’s opinion purports totality ante, does at a 921-922), it is that the court so (maj. stances clear opn., this The court notеs wholesale level rather than on facts of case. particular that Officer Mihai arms were covered with “observed [defendant’s] abscesses, drug (Maj. opn., she associated with use.” which see id. this fn. But the does not how fact explain court lawful search where the front seat passenger, relevant defendant, at the “[testimony also notes court had that defendant and known hearing established suppression (Id. three at the time of the search.” each other for approximately years this fn. But indicates that fact was known nothing record Indeed, us at the time of the search. the record before contains Officer Mihai car Mihai reasonably no facts what areas or Officer indicating property under the control. believed be parolee’s record,
Given the deficiencies in the the court Officer Mihai’s upholds search of the backseat found there on basis of general considerations rather facts than to this Those specific case. considerations *28 include standard, the “general[]” characteristics and a layout of noncommer ante, cial, (maj. 926-927), car at five-passenger opn., the pp. “[t]ypi in behavior a standard car to occupants five-passenger according cal[]” (id. “modem 924—925), social conventions” at a statement of “the pp. general (id. state’s interest in 923), at and supervising parolees” general statement of driver’s “reduced with to an expectation regard (id. automobile” he especially “when allows others to ride in his car” 924.). Because this is the the what court understands “totality mean, circumstances” there is no real significance to the in limiting phrases the court’s statement of its the holding: “Considering layout of a standard car, it five-passenger reasonable for the officer to that objectively expect this parolee could backseat, have stowed his in tossed personal property him, items behind or reached back to them in accessible place upon areas circumstances, under these encountering police. Accordingly, the parolee front status of the seat justified warrantless search of the backseat (Id. 926-927, area where the and shoes chips bag were located.” italics added.) How does it matter that case involved “this present parolee” “under these when circumstances” authorizes a search of the today’s opinion to any same breadth with in the front respect parolee riding seat any standard car? five-passenger
Moreover, the court authorizes a search not under just “property (Cal. control” Code tit. parolee’s] (b)4), subd. but of Regs., [the § within the exert property “ability to control” parolee’s (maj. opn., 913, 930). This is a subtle but that difference important significantly true, search. It be expands permissible scope as a matter of sheer that a has the to exert control” over physicality, parolee “ability any unlocked container within the But it is an odd passenger compartment. definition of “control” to item of in which say property might discard or conceal contraband is under the potentially parol- property ee’s “control.” from case constmed Apart single glancingly property under a control of a house “to which parolee’s encompass portions [the LaJocies (People (1981) had access” parolee] Cal.App.3d 955 [174 100]), I am of no authority—and aware the court cites none—-that Cal.Rptr. and today’s unusual of “control” as that supports expansive interpretation term is used search condition.
The available “control” more authority interprets naturally sensibly mean not but authority mere access rather physical ownership, possession, Baker People v. over the searched. For in example, 858], male of a car driver Cal.App.4th stopped defendant, Baker, was on The female was the front seat speeding parole. at her discovering and her was on the floor feet. purse Upon passenger, car. out of the ordered the occupants was on the officer parole, driver asserting her and without ownership did without taking “Baker so purse drugs found The officer searched the vehicle (Id. the purse.” the ground held the search unlawful on The Court of Appeal Baker’s purse. belonged anyone that “there was no reasonable basis to believe purse this The court reached other than the sole female passenger.” and even did claim purse conclusion even Baker though ownership stowed drove car could have contraband though easily who the purse. 109], the v. Veronica Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. *29 a a during
court contraband found in search similarly suppressed purse course, not, do of a male The court “We explained: residence. parolee’s a clearly that a or container is suggest garment designed because simply it be under the other than the never searched may parolee’s person parolee, the object consent. circumstances indicate that The prerelease particular is, fact, or, least, by one of the own effects jointly parolee’s possessed case, however, him In was nothing and another. this there to overcome simply hers, (Id. the his.” cf. the obvious that was not purse presumption (1990) 224 People Boyd v. Cal.Rptr. 749-751 Cal.App.3d [274 100] “ ” (Boyd) search of a where ‘articulable facts’ handbag supported [upholding the owned controlled a rational inference that was or handbag by parolee].) 624], the People Montoya Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. [170 court found in search jeans during parole suppressed drugs pair of two residence. The circumstances indicated that the to one jeans belonged the search female one of whom was on The court held guests, parole. to the unlawful on the that officer failed determine “who owned ground had no reason to believe before them” when “he more jeans searching [the 562.) A rather than jeans] belonged appellant.” parolee] [the [to] of an cases focus on the reаsonableness similarly number search probation (See, item officer’s belief as to who owned area or searched. possessed (1981) 123 e.g., People Tidalgo Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 463] “it officers substantial evidence that was unreasonable for (Tidalgo) [finding was or owned by respond- believe residence occupied [searched] ent”]; Cal.Rptr. v.Alders Cal.App.3d no “a female because “there was search of coat” [invalidating distinctly shared female jointly by reason to suppose defendant] [the coat] [the male probationer]”.) [the be con- above that conditions should literally
The cases indicate “search order to of both strued in protect rights probationers/parolees who with individual to the associate nonprobationers/nonparolees (Tidalgo, supra, particular condition.” Cal.App.3d cases also demonstrate whether an officer believed an item of reasonably is under a within property parolee’s “control” meaning determined condition must be by case case based on indicia of mere ownership, authority, possession, physical By access. focusing inquiry way, this cases due to the give regard fact that does not belong belongs someone else. To likely equate control,” “control” “ability with to exert as the court does today, eviscerates limit areas of a applied open car’s passenger compartment, notwithstanding interests of third parties. conclusion,
Because this rule cannot be followed correct when to its logical the court footnote to leave undecided whether a search drops purports box, console, “closed-off such as “the areas” center or trunk” glove can “be based aon status.” solely passenger’s parole (Maj. opn., fn. But such why (at now) should closed-off areas be least for exempt all, from the rule announced the court After it today? seems entirely that a seat plausible front seeks to hide passenger who contraband from an console, would officer it in the box or approaching put center both of glove which are areas within to exert parolee’s “ability control” and areas where *30 the “could have stowed items belongings discarded when personal see, v. Chavers aware of e.g., People activity.” (1983) 33 police p. 462, 169, Cal.3d 466 P.2d in Cal.Rptr. glove 658 found [189 96] [firearm 720,123 v. Walker compartment]; People (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [78 v. in glove compartment]; People Prochnau (1967) firearms found 439] [two 22, 251 in Cal.App.2d glove firearms found Cal.Rptr. [59 265] [two v. Allen (1967) of car driven 254 compartment by parolee]; Cal.App.2d 597, 602 found [drugs glove Cal.Rptr. compartment].) [62
The court to declines follow its own to this conclusion reasoning obvious on the that such a search must ground necessarily reasonableness “[t]he circumstances, take into account all attendant driver’s including closed legitimate in those expectation privacy compartments, passen- them, to and whether were locked secured.” ger’s or otherwise proximity they ante, 926, fn. shouldn’t (Maj. exactly right. why That is But opn., reasonableness the backseat other car’s searching parts likewise turn on contextual There is no passenger such factors? compartment , reason to evaluate the reasonableness of searches of closed compartments an that differs from the used to searches of
through analysis evaluate analysis other same “we of a car. The parts analysis totality applies: ‘examin[e] determine a search within the circumstances’ to whether is reasonable (Samson, supra, of the Fourth Amendment.” 547 U.S. meaning with privacy *31 cites no the term in the authority construing “control” mere (Cal. (b)4) condition Code tit. subd. to mean the Regs., § contrast, to exert control.” there is “ability By suggesting ample precedent (ibid.) that under most read to control” parolee’s] sensibly “property [the mean over the to have authority, which parolee appears possession, latter from the of a reasonable officer. This ownership police perspective case, the to the circumstances of each is what reading, distinguishes applied of a an unlawful on someone else’s search from intrusion proper scope privacy.
II.
Pringle
Maryland
The
cites
In a a officer car for and obtained police stopped the speeding driver’s consent to search the car. The officer found a roll of cash amounting $763 the and glove five of cocaine compartment behind plastic baggies the backseat armrest. The officer asked the three of the car about occupants the and the When of the ownership drugs money. none car’s occupants claimed the arrested all officer three. who was the ownership, Pringle, front seat officer passenger, argued that the lacked cause to arrest him. In probable arrest, the the court noted upholding that the cocaine behind the backseat high armrest was “accessible to all supra, three men.” (Pringle, 372.) But the court further observed that high the cash was “in rolled-up {ibid.), the glove directly in front of compartment Pringle” “[u]pon the three men failed to offer information with questioning, any respect {ibid.), of the cocaine ownership money” and quantity “[t]he and cash in the car indicated the drugs drug likelihood dealing, enterprise which a dealer would be admit an innocent unlikely to person with the evidence 373). to furnish him” potential against Based on {id. facts, cocaine, and these not the mere court found acсessibility high it “an reasonable inference . . . that or all three of the entirely occupants of, over, knowledge had and exercised dominion and the cocaine.” control {Id. at p. Vermouth, a vehicle at 3:30 a.m. for police stopped having rear
defective the two male light. During stop, police questioned of the car and obtained consent the car and trunk. The occupants turned other a five-inch knife out up, among things, sticking pocket machine, and between instrument club tape-playing billy resting panel door, a small driver’s and wire and knife against pair paring strippers (Vermouth, 750-751.) the backseat area. from 20 Cal.App.3d trunk, stereo, “an Inside found electronic unit or part police at one end wrench and at lug small a tool which had a tire speaker, fresh, other The section had marks on it.” prying edge. long prying scrape arrested both men for unlawful burglary *32 the club. driver had claimed of the billy Although ownership possession club the Court of the had the held billy during police stop, Appeal the the cause to also arrest for club passenger billy probable possession “there because the facts to an inference that was an alliance gave rise (Id. driver], or offensive.” either defensive and the between passenger [the of the the possession arresting passenger The reasonableness from the men as inferred the two the “alliance” between club turned on billy club to circumstances, of the accessibility billy the mere not on of the totality the passenger. that the reasonable- and Vermouth thus follow the settled principle
Pringle be determined Amendment must under the Fourth ness of conduct police the same As follow approach. the of each case. We should based on facts a lawful demonstrate, the conduct of ordinary officer in cases those areas or items property to determine what ways automobile has many stop decided each case to be control. a car are within a Requiring passenger’s оn law enforcement. not an undue burden on its own facts would place case, to search the authority Mihai had lawful In the Officer present Absent the area immediately adjacent parolee. parolee’s person circumstances, would a further search of the compartment unusual determination of what areas Mihai to make a reasonable have Officer required could Officer Mihai in the car were under the control. or property parolee’s driver, a few parolee, have done this by asking simple questions bag belong any “does that the other For example, chips passengers. to search. had then it would have been If the said you?” yes, likelihood, since scenario with some bag—a If no one had claimed chips Mihai could have lawfully contained contraband—then Officer bag chips that the search had a faith belief good searched it because she would have contraband, she would invade discovering would no one’s privacy. Upon Pringle, supra, (see car arresting have been justified occupants additional contra- 372) the rest of the car for and searching claimed the bag, other than the had chips band. Even if with the had been shared Officer Mihai could have asked whether chips the officer need “not be bound reply As to such any question, (Boyd, supra, of its falsity.” in the face of evidence overwhelming account could have taken into The officer Cal.App.3d the individuals the demeanor of the car’s among occupants, relationship areas or indicators of what other verbal or observable questioned, control. in the car were under the parolee’s sum, Mihai could have developed there are that Officer many ways control and thus under the parolee’s belief that the bag reasonable chips what the court suggests (maj. search. Contrary within the Mihai to have Officer 929), would my require approach opn., area. into the backseat contraband tossing the front seat passenger witnessed or item belief that the area officer have a reasonable It that an requires *33 owned, controlled, searched is or And the possessed by reason- ableness of an officer’s belief will on the of the circumstances depend totality in each case. a novel rule instead of the adopting categorical case-by-case approach
dictated the court by motivated “law enforcement’s precedent, appears ante, need for a workable rule to monitor at parolees.” (Maj. opn., p.
But the court artificial limits on its own places theory. For the court example, noncommercial, car, limits its to a standard ruling five-passenger apparently leaving open permissible scope involving sport utility vans, vehicles or even in those no than in though vehicles less car, driver is not in a five-passenger necessarily position supervise “[t]he moment, his nor is he in a their passengers every to control position every move once are they in the car” and “an of an automobile hide occupant contraband without the other knowledge occupants’ permission.” Moreover, noted, the court declines to its p. ruling “closed apply (id. 16), fn. even such compartments” though compartments where a stow or evidence places may readily discard or contraband. Further, if there is any logic court’s for closed exception compart- console, ments like the box or center it would seem glove also exempt closed containers found in the car. But whether a container is or closed open case, can itself be In the the limited record states problematic. present that two were found in “a It syringes bag backseat of car. chips” is not clear whether this should be treated as an or closed bag chips open container. record does not reveal whether was wide bag open, flattened or at the or otherwise sealed. If “it was partially open, clipped top, for the objectively reasonable officer believe that the was able to ante, reach back and conceal contraband inside the bag” chips (maj. opn., 931), then "what about shoebox whose cover is off? Or a partially whose is backpack zipper partially open?
The stock is to are not say these concerns response presented we can (Maj. facts of this case and that decide such issues when arise. they course, fn. fn. there wrong Of opn., nothing with that insofar as under the dictates that reasonableness response precedent Amendment Fourth But if that is requires case-by-case analysis. response, then it is all the more the court cordons off some why arbitrarily inexplicable cases, others, but from the usual apparently fact-specific inquiry. it the virtue of today’s bringing cannot be said that has
Finally, opinion there today, to situations where there was none. Before certainty previously would, citizens who for number was no uncertainty many law-abiding reasons, even a ride occasionally regularly give of innocuous or virtuous *34 held to, with, “commonly Under or mere stranger acquaintance. or ride had no reason 926), those citizens conventions” (maj. social opn., have “control” over would invariably to think that a front seat reason to think had no They areas of a car’s passenger compartment. open in it be located would or items passenger compartment the front seat warrantless search because simply to a suspicionless, turned out to be a when we we keep After we must all be more today, wary company car, legitimate privacy. or ride in a lest we surrender our expectations drive built on cases involving guilty Fourth Amendment doctrine is Although ‘reasonable test presup- it to remember that “the person’ people, important 429, 438 (Florida an innocent Bostick poses person.” might citizens “[m]any law-abiding Just to result in their homes to if so were doing choose not open probationers 799), (Robles, action” Cаl.4th validation of arbitrary police air, decline to help so too citizens many law-abiding might spare need, so may be a Samaritan because good doing or to otherwise person result in a invasion of their privacy. suspicionless above,
For the
I
the court in
join
reversing
judgment
reasons
of Fourth
Court of
with the erosion
disagree
but
Appeal
respectfully
Amendment
worked by today’s opinion.
protections
The
notes
“a driver has a reduced expectation
court
ante,
true,
924.) That is
but
(Maj.
an automobile.”
regard
opn.,
to
(literally)
how
highlight
unprecedented
search cases serve
automobile
an
search of
inventory
not a
an
involving
is. This is
case
today’s opinion
485,
(Arizona
v. Gant
L.Ed.2d
(2009)
vehicle
impounded
[173
South Dakota v. Opperman
L.Ed.2d
1710];
(1976) 428 U.S.
129 S.Ct.
[49
v.
(New
York Belton
1000,
(1981)
to arrest
3092]),
S.Ct.
a search incident
for
2860]), a
search