People v. SchallmanPeople v. Schallman
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Duncan
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error, Abraham Schallman, was convicted of receiving stolen property of the value of $150, at the June term, 1915, of the criminal court of Cook county. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled and plaintiff in error was sentenced to the penitentiary.
The evidence in the record tends to show that Charles Hoffman, a young man twenty-four years of age, was employed in the lining department of Marshall Field & Co.’s wholesale store in Chicago as order filler, city buyer and floor salesman. He was not employed in the silk department, which was just across the aisle, opposite the lining department. A large quantity of silk disappeared from the stock of Marshall Field & Co. in that department. Hoffman was suspected of stealing the silk, and in June, 1913, he was followed by a detective about noon of June 19, 1913, from said‘store
Plaintiff in error testified that he knew Hoffman and had met him at Marshall Field & Co.’s wholesale store several times, where he bought cotton and satin linings but never bought any silk there; that he bought from Hoffman from
Hoffman had plead guilty to larceny of silk goods stolen by him from Marshall Field & Co. and was serving his term when this case was tried. The State asked the court to call him as a witness and examine him, as counsel for the State did not want to vouch for him as their witness. The court called and examined him over the objections of the plaintiff in error, and finally the State cross-examined him at length, but he refused to answer any questions as to whether or not Schallman knew anything about the goods being stolen or had any connection with him in stealing them, merely stating that he had been convicted on the charge of larceny, was serving his time and wanted to get out and start life anew and did not want to perjure himself.
As this cause must be reversed for errors assigned we do not desire to discuss the case on the merits.
These two witnesses further testified, in substance, that they told Schallman that Hoffman had been arrested and
The court erred in giving the State’s instruction No. 19, which reads as follows:
“That one who purchases property from the possessor thereof is bound to use the ordinary discretion and caution
This instruction is bad because it is a mere abstract proposition of law and was not specially applied to the case in hand by appropriate words requiring the jury to find the necessary facts upon which it purports to be based. By the last clause thereof the jury might conclude that the court assumed to decide for them as a fact that Schallman had willfully disregarded the suspicious circumstances in evidence in this case and should be convicted. It invades the province of the jury, and, besides, is not a correct statement of the law. An instruction upon the subject of receiving stolen property that informs the jury that actual knowledge by the accused that the goods were stolen is not necessary to constitute the crime is erroneous. While such knowledge may be proved by circumstances, yet actual knowledge or the existence of such facts as would cause the jury to presume knowledge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence, like every other material averment in the indictment. Cohen v. People, 197 Ill. 482; May v. People, 60 id. 119.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the defendant was greatly prejudiced in his trial by reason of the foregoing errors, and the judgment of the criminal court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.