THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN R. SCHAEFER, Defendant-Appellant.—THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN R. SCHAEFER, Defendant-Appellant.
Second District Nos. 2-08-0218, 2-08-0219 cons.
Second District
February 23, 2010
926 N.E.2d 923 | 338 Ill. Dec. 850 | 398 Ill. App. 3d 963
SCHOSTOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Thomas A. Lilien and Josette Skelnik, both of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the opinion of the court:
After a joint trial on misdemeanor and felony charges, a jury convicted defendant, John R. Schaefer, of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (
Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) a new trial is warranted because the trial court failed to question the jury venire in accordance with
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jury Selection
The facts are undisputed. On January 14, 2008, the trial court addressed all prospective jurors and informed them that, in criminal cases, the State bears the burden to prove a defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonаble doubt. The court asked all prospective jurors whether anyone had “any problem” with the concepts that defendant was presumed innocent and that they could find him guilty only if, after hearing all of the evidence and instructions of law at the end of trial, they determined that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury was selected in a series of three panels; four jurors were selected from each panel. The trial court asked no questions of any prospective jurors in those panels. The assistant State‘s Attorney asked all рrospective jurors whether they: (1) understood that the State bore the burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) believed that the State could meet its burden even if it presented only
Upon its return, the trial court informed the jury:
“As I have previously instructed you, the defendant in this or any criminal case is presumed innocent of the charges against him. Before a defendant in this case or in any American case can be convicted the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime or crimes that he is charged with. The defendant is not required to offer any evidence at all on his own behalf. You may not infer anything negative or hold it against him if the defendant elects not to testify. He has a right to testify on his own behаlf. He also has a right to not testify on his own behalf.”
The court explained the trial process to the jury and noted that the defense could present evidence if it wished, but was under no obligation to do so.
B. Trial
Thereafter, the trial commenced. The evidence relevant to the issues on appeal established that, on July 31, 2005, Kane County emergency volunteer Charles Nadr was blocking off roads in Sugar Grove, due to a chemical spill on Route 47. Police cars, ambulances, emergency management vehicles, and fire trucks, all with flashing lights, were prеsent. Nadr was blocking off the eastbound ramp on Route 30 heading onto Route 47. Route 30 passes over Route 47; Route 30 is a four-lane highway (two in each direction) divided by a 10-foot grassy median. At around 6:30 p.m., Nadr saw a car traveling west on Route 30 in an eastbound lane. Approximately one-quarter of a mile away, a semi-truck and several cars were approaching in the eastbound lanes. Nadr ran onto Route 30 and flagged down the car that was traveling in the wrong direction and tried to get the car “down the ramp to get him off the highway.” The car slowed down and pulled in front of the guard rail along the exit ramp, lightly tapping the guard rail with its front bumper as it stopped. The car‘s driver put the car in reverse and started backing up; Nadr hit the hood of the car and told the driver to stop and put the car in park. Police officers arrived shortly thereafter. Nadr observed a brief struggle between the officers and the car‘s driver, defendant.
One of the officers, Kevin Smith, testified that he observed defendant‘s car parked across the entrance to the ramp. He observed Sergeant John Gennaro speak with defendant through the driver‘s
According to Smith, after defendant was placed inside the squad car, Gennaro discovered one open and three unopened beer cans in defendant‘s vehicle. The open beer can had some beer left in it. At the police station, defendant refused a breath test. Smith testified that, based upon his experience as an officer trained in DUI detection and based upon his interactions with defendant, he believed that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and unfit tо operate a vehicle.
Defendant did not testify or present any other evidence on his behalf. In closing, his counsel suggested that the chemical spill and resulting emergency vehicles, lights, and traffic confused defendant into making a wrong turn such that he wound up driving the wrong direction on the road.
The jury found defendant guilty of all four charges. Defendant appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jury Selection
Defendant argues first that he was denied a fair and impartial jury because the trial court failed to properly question the jury venire in accordance with
We may consider a forfeited error under the plain-еrror rule when “the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury‘s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence” or when “the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. First, we must determine whether there was error.
“The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant‘s failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant‘s failure to testify when the defendant objects.
The court‘s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.” (Emphases added.)
Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007).
Supreme court rules are not aspirational or mere suggestions but, rather, they have the force of law and it is presumed that they will be obeyed and enforced as written. People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 189 (2009). The word “shall” in a statute or rulе generally reflects a ” ‘clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation.’ ” People v. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d 465, 470 (2009), quoting People v. O‘Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001). Accordingly, the plain language of
Here, the State concedes that the trial court erred when it did not technically comply with
We disagree with defendant that reversal under the first prong of the plain-error analysis is appropriate because the evidence was close such that the error, not the evidence, might have been the basis for the jury‘s verdict. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. Defendant notes that Gennaro did not testify, there were no breath test results to consider, and Smith did not testify to any slurred sрeech, bloodshot eyes, or other indicia of defendant‘s alleged intoxication. However, the evidence reflected that defendant drove the wrong direction on a highway; bumped a guardrail when stopping; possessed open alcohol in his vehicle; smelled of alcohol; struggled to maintain his balance when escorted to the squad car; and was uncooperative with the arresting officer. Moreover, although defendant asserts that the jury‘s questions reflected concerns about the quality of the State‘s evidence,1 thе fact that the jury might have wondered about the absence of certain evidence from the State‘s case does not reflect that the evidence was closely balanced. Thus, the first prong of the plain-error analysis is not implicated.
Next, we consider under the second prong of the plain-error analysis whether the error was so serious that defendant was denied a substantial right and, thus, a fair trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. For the following reasons, we conclude that it was and that the cause must be remanded for a new trial.
Prior to May 1, 2007,
Notably, in Blair, a panel of this court recently considered the issue. In that case, the trial court failed tо properly question the jury in accordance with
In considering whether the error was so serious as to deny the defendant a substantial right and a fair trial, we recognized that our supreme court has stated that not еvery violation of its rules mandates reversal (Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 193, 197). Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 477. Nevertheless, we noted that voir dire promotes the right to an impartial jury by allowing the court and the parties to assess information about prospective jurors’ beliefs and opinions so that any with minds closed by bias and prejudice may be removed. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 477-78. We further noted that
“Wе are of the opinion that essential to the qualification of jurors in a criminal case is that they know that a defendant is presumed innocent, that he is not required to offer any evidence in his own behalf, that he must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be held against him. If a juror has a prejudice against any of these basic guarantees, an instruction given at the end of the trial will have little curative effect. *** We agree with the appellate court that ‘[e]ach of these questions goеs to the heart of a particular bias or
prejudice which would deprive defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury’ [citation], and although they need not have been asked in precisely the form submitted, the subject matter of the questions should have been covered in the course of interrogation on voir dire.” (Emphasis added.) Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477.
Accordingly, we concluded that the error “denied defendant a substantial right, undermined the fairness of his trial, and impacted the integrity of the judicial process.” Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 477.
Blair finds support in several recent decisions. For example, in People v. Blanton, 396 Ill. App. 3d 230 (2009), the court granted the State‘s petition for rehearing in light of the Glasper decision. The court held that Glasper did not alter its prior conclusion that the trial court‘s failure to question each venireperson as to whether he or she understood and accepted the fourth principle (particularly significant given that the defendant did not testify at trial) was reversible under the plain-error rule because the error was “so substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.” Blanton, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 236. The court noted that Glasper specifically stated that it was not holding that a violation of
Analysis under either prong of the plain-error doctrine requires consideration of the fаcts and circumstances of the particular case. See People v. Magallanes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 72, 93 (2009). Thus, although other decisions have relied on Glasper to find that an alleged
The facts of this case are more egregious than those considered in the aforementioned cases. Indeed, they are more egregious than those
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Because we are remanding for a new trial, we must consider defendant‘s argument as to whether the evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 535 (1997). Defendant agrees that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict on three charges, but he argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of improper lane usage. He notes that the indictment charged that he “knowingly drove a vehicle upon a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes and [he] failed to drive the vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and moved from such lane before ascertaining that such movement could be made with safety.” See
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidencе supporting his or her conviction, the inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). It is the function of the trier of fact to weigh and resolve conflicts in the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338 (2000). A criminal conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence, as long as it satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offense. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2000). We will not overturn a defendant‘s conviction as based on insufficient evidence “unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt exists as to the defendant‘s guilt.” Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 338.2
The State argues that the evidence was sufficient because section 11-709 is within article VII of chapter 11 of the Vehicle Code, entitled “Driving on Right Side of Roadway—Overtaking and Passing, Etc.”
We reject the State‘s argument that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that defendant violated both requirements because “wherever [he] crossed” from “the right-hand lanes onto the wrong side of a highway divided by a 10 foot grassy median” into oncoming traffic, he did so by not staying as nearly as practicable within his right-hand lane and without determining that the move could be safely made. There was no evidence establishing where or how defendant wound up driving the wrong direсtion, whether he was swerving outside of his lane when doing so, or whether he ever changed lanes. The evidence showed only that he drove in the wrong direction and that he pulled over onto the ramp when directed to do so. There was simply no evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not drive as nearly as practicable within the lane or that he changed lanes without determining that the move could be done safely. Thus, we reverse defendant‘s improper-lane-usage conviction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s convictions and sentence are reversed. We remand the cause for a new trial on the DUI, transportation of open alcohol, and obstruction charges.
Reversed and remanded.
O‘MALLEY, J., concurs.
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
For the same reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Blair, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 486-88, I believe that where a defendant does not object to the trial court‘s failure to strictly comply with
I concur, however, with the majority‘s determination that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of improper lane usage.