*1 CONCLUSION foregoing reasons, For the judgment of the circuit court of County Peoria is affirmed.
Affirmed. (The S.B., Illinois, In re a Minor Petitioner-Appellee, of the State of
S.B., Respondent-Appellant). Third District 3 — 09—0095 No.
Opinion filed March 2011. (argued), Appellate Carrie B. Stevens and R. Meinz both State Verlin Office, Ottawa, appellant. Defender’s Lyons, Attorney, (Terry Gary Kevin W State’s of Peoria A. Mertel and F. Office, (argued), Attorneys Appellate Gnidovec both Prosecutor’s of State’s counsel), People. for the judgment delivered CARTER
PRESIDING JUSTICE court, opinion. opinion. judgment in the concurred
Justice McDade dissented, opinion. Justice Schmidt
OPINION alleg S.B., was the respondent, *2 (720 ILCS assault criminal sexual aggravated ing that he committed (720 (West 2004)) 14(b)(i) sexual abuse aggravated and criminal 5/12 — (West 2004)). 16(c)(2)(i) found the The circuit court ILCS 5/12 — discharge hearing, the After a not fit to stand trial. respondent was “not not respondent the the first count and found court dismissed entered an order subsequently The court guilty” on the second count. the appeal, On respondent as a sex offender. requiring the of alia, registration requirements respondent argues, inter that the Act) (730 ILCS (Registration the Sex Offender Act 150/1 (West 2008)) him because he was never seq. et do not adjudicated delinquent. We reverse.
FACTS respondent, the juvenile petition alleged The filed in this case that 5, 1991, an incident that occurred born June was based on 1, alleged that the August June 1 and 2005. Count between (720 ILCS respondent aggravated committed criminal sexual assault 14(b)(i) (West 2004)) in that he committed an act of sexual finger his penetration age by placing under nine victim ag alleged respondent inside her II that the committed vagina. Count 16(c)(2)(i) (West (720 gravated criminal sexual abuse ILCS 5/12 — 2004)) vagina his hand. Eventu in that he touched the victim’s trial and ally, respondent that the was not fit to stand the court found attain fitness within substantially probable that it was not he would year. one 28, 2007, discharge hear August the circuit court conducted
On Procedure of the Code of Criminal ing pursuant to section 104 — 25 of 2008)). (725 hearing, At the close of ILCS 5/104 — 25 com respondent prove insufficient to the court found evidence prove but sufficient to aggravated mitted criminal sexual assault Accordingly, sexual abuse. respondent aggravated committed assault count aggravated criminal sexual the court dismissed the criminal sexual aggravated respondent found the “not not abuse. compel State filed a motion
On December to section register as a sex offender respondent 150/2(A)(1)(d) (West 2008)). After a hearing, the circuit granted court the State’s motion and ordered the respondent as a sex respondent offender. The appealed.
ANALYSIS appeal, On argues that the circuit court erred when it required him register as a sex offender.
contends, alia, inter qualify as sex offenders under the only if they have been adjudicated delinquent, as 2(A)(5). 150/2(A)(5) provided by (West 2008). This argument presents question of statutory construction, which we (2000). review de novo. In Dierkes, 326, re Estate 191 Ill. 2d “The cardinal construction, rule of statutory to which all other subordinate, rules are is to give ascertain and legislature’s effect to the intent.” People Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d The best indica legislature’s tor of the intent plain language is the of the statute itself. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d at giving 497-98. In legislature’s effect to the intent through plain language statute, presume we absurd, did not inconvenient, intend unjust results. son, v. Christopher (2008); Hanna, 207 Ill. (citing 2d at 498 Church Holy Trinity States, v. United 143 U.S. (1892)). 457, 459-60 “Accordingly, courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind it addresses and the *3 legislature’s apparent objective enacting in son, it.” Christopher 231 Ill. 2d at 454.
Initially, we recognize that proceedings under the Juvenile Court (West 2008)) Act of 1987 through 5 — 915 differ 405/5 — 101 from adult criminal proceedings. proceedings While brought under the Juvenile nature, Court Act are not in certain procedures from the system adult criminal apply. can See generally People v. 101(3) Taylor, 157, 166-67 Section of the Juvenile 5 — that, Court Act specifically provides procedures “[i]n all under this Article, minors procedural rights shall have all the of adults in criminal proceedings, specifically unless precluded by laws that enhance the 101(3) (West 2008). protection of such minors.” 705 ILCS With protection mind, this enhanced principle in we now address the merits of the respondent’s argument.
In 2 part, relevant section of the Registration provides: Act
“(A) Article, As used in this any person ‘sexoffender’means who is: *** (1) charged pursuant to Illinois law with a sex offense set (B)
forth in subsection of this Section or the attempt to commit offense, an included sex and:
* * * (d) resulting acquittal finding not an subject is 25(a) of the hearing pursuant conducted Section at a 104— alleged commis- Procedure of 1963 for of Criminal Code offense; or attempted commission such sion or
* * * (5) of commit juvenile delinquent as the result adjudicated a which, by an if committed attempting to commit an act ting or (B), in item adult, any specified of the offenses constitute would (C 5) (C), ***.*** of this Section — Section, the same ‘convicted’ shall have purposes For of this ” (West (A)(5) 150/2(A)(1)(d), ‘adjudicated.’ meaning as 730 ILCS 2008). indicates that plain language of section circumstances under which intended to limit the juveniles only offender. The reference to qualify could sex (A)(5). 2(A)(5) thus offers in section is subsection Section juveniles have been only enhanced for in that who fit section 2’s definition adjudicated delinquent specified offenses 101(3) (West 2008). of “sex offender.” See 705 ILCS 405/5 — 2(A)(5), legislature’s In addition to section intent to treat juveniles differently appears than adults in the entitled, “Application adjudicated juvenile section Act to 3 — delinquents.” part, In relevant 3 — 5 provides:
“(a) involving adjudicated juvenile delinquent all cases (5) paragraph meets the definition of a sex offender as set forth in (A) Act, order of subsection of Section of this the court shall minor to as a sex offender.
(b) adjudicated juvenile delinquent ordered Once an offender, adjudicated juvenile delinquent as a shall be sex 6,3, registration requirements set forth in Sections registration. or her and 10 the term of his 6 — (c) which, adjudicated if delinquent For a minor for an offense adult, felony, than after charged as an would be a no less (a) Section, of this registration ordered to subsection registration. may petition for the termination of the term of minor which, adjudicated charged if For a minor for an offense *4 misdemeanor, adult, no less than after as an would be a (a) Section, pursuant of this registration ordered subsection registration. minor may petition for termination of the term (d) may hearing petition on the for termination upon The court if finds that registration, registration terminate the court registrant poses community by no preponderance risk to the (e).” the evidence upon based the factors set forth in subsection (West2008). 730 ILCS paramount Of importance in this the procedure by section is which juveniles petition can the circuit court to terminate his or her sex of 5(c) (West 2008). registration. fender Registra The tion Act provide does not adults with ability the court to terminate registration. sex offender The import clear of section juveniles 3 — 5 is to afford protection enhanced under the 101(3) (West 2008). Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5 — light protections, of these enhanced argument the State’s qualifies as a sex offender under section not consistent statutory with the scheme in the Act as it juveniles. relates argument ignores The State’s the remedial distinc- tion Registration Act, between adults and contained in the entirety, provides its statutory protection juveniles. enhanced for
The respondent’s status for the purposes juvenile, of this case is a not an adult. importance of this distinction cannot be understated. While the State could sought have transfer of the case to the adult (see 805(3) 2004) system criminal (allowing 705 ILCS 405/5 — discretionary juvenile transfer of certain cases to adult criminal court older)), if the minor is 13 years age it chose not to do so. The juvenile case remained in system and the therefore retained juvenile. may his status as a The State not adult system procedures juvenile to an individual with status under doing Act if provisions so violates intended to offer 101(3) (West juveniles. enhanced 705 ILCS 405/5 — Our support unjust conclusion finds further in the absurd and results that arise if an individual with status is treated as an 2(A)(1)(d). adult reading under the State’s literal of section In this case, nondelinquent juvenile having rights the result is a than fewer actually adjudicated delinquent who was in that the former has no ability the circuit court to have his sex offender 5(c). registration terminated to section 730 ILCS 150/3— 5(c) (West 2008). arise, Similarly, example, a situation could 16-year-old engaged which a in consensual sexual contact a 15-year-old accused of criminal could be sexual abuse ILCS 5/12— 15(b) (West 2008)) trial, juvenile petition, in a found not fit to stand discharge hearing, required found “not not in a as a 2(A)(1)(d), ability peti sex offender under section and left with no result, registration. tion the terminate sex offender This court to case, comport the enhanced well as the result does not *5 101(3) of the Juvenile in contained section principle 5 — 101(3) (West under Accordingly, Act. 705 Court 405/5 — case, that the we hold uniquely presented as the circumstances a sex of register as respondent the to it ordered court erred when fender. the issue obviates statutory interpretation
Our resolution of appeal. on remaining arguments respondent’s need to address the the circuit reasons, judgment of foregoing we reverse For the register as a required respondent County of Peoria that court sex offender.
Reversed. SCHMIDT, dissenting:
JUSTICE unfit court, already respondent found noting The trial that it had respondent that would become probability for trial and that no existed discharge hearing pursuant to section year, proceeded fit within one to a (the Code) of 1963 10 4— 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (West 2008)). hearing, At that the court entered ILCS 5/104 — 25 25(b) (725 ILCS judgment acquittal pursuant to section 104 — (West 2008)) 25(b) respondent on behalf of offense 5/104 — aggravated acquit respondent sexual did not assault but aggravated charge. criminal sexual abuse clearly Section indicates (1) charged pursuant if to Illinois qualifies one as a sex offender he: is (2) (3) law; offense; subject finding resulting to a not with a sex 25(a) of the Code. 730 ILCS acquittal pursuant an to section 104 — 150/2(A)(1)(d) (West 2008). requirements meets all the of a sex of S.B. fender as defined that section. only intended for majority legislature
The concludes that register pursuant Registra juveniles adjudicated delinquent by necessity, legislature means that the interpretation, tion Act. This similarly situated specifically juveniles intended to exclude is, offenders, juveniles charged registering from as sex offense, been found unfit for trial but with a sex who have the State’s support doubt exists to proof beyond whom a reasonable A trial court can juvenile committed the offense. contention that the acquittal” in an under finding resulting not enter “a not presented proves unless the evidence 104 — 25 of Code (West 2008). 25(b) guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 5/104 — 5(c) fact that section heavily upon the majority relies adjudicated have been juveniles some allows registra- of sex offender petition early termination 5(c) (West 2008). tion. 730 ILCS One reasonably ques could tion the wisdom of the scheme chosen by legislature, which allows juveniles adjudicated delinquent to reduce the term for they which providing must while not the same mechanism to juveniles that are unfit for trial finding resulting but not However, acquittal. say points one cannot that this scheme inescapable conclusion that did not intend for such as respondent under the Act. A juvenile adjudicated delinquent has no to a shorter term of registration; simply section 3 — 5 allows him to to reduce the term. reject respondent’s argument discharge also that his hearing was discharge hearing
not an actual under section 104 — 25 of the Code. (West 2008). *6 S.B. asserts that since a 5/104 — 25 proceeding is not criminal in nature and section in 104 — 25 is found Code, he “was not a ‘defendant’ as referred to in section 104— that, 25.” The Juvenile Court Act “In procedures states all under this Article, procedural rights minors shall have all the of adults in criminal proceedings, specifically unless precluded by laws that enhance the protection of jury such minors. Minors shall not have the specifically provided by trial unless this Article.” 705 ILCS 405/5— 101(3) (West 2008). A discharge hearing section 104 — 25 is a (West 2008). procedural right afforded adults. 725 ILCS As 5/104 — 25 such, incorporated it is into the Juvenile Court Act section 101(3) discharge hearing and the in this took in ac place matter cordance with section 104 — 25 of the Code. 2(A)(1)(d)
Respondent argues apply further that section cannot him it only applies “charged pursuant as to those to Illinois law” 150/2(A)(1) (West 2008). committing a sex crime. 730 ILCS He claims “charged” he was never a in crime as he was named a petition complaint, and not a information or indictment under the alia, disagree. alleged, Code. I was petition inter committing aggravated on the basis of the act of aggravated Undoubtedly, sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse. there are and an petition alleging delinquency differences between App. 808, In 243 Ill. 810 information or indictment. See re J.A.J 3d (1993) (“While allegations petition wardship of a need not instrument, charging petition meet the standards of a criminal apprise precise charged must of the offense with sufficient accused defense.”) S.R.H., Ill. 2d 138 specificity prepare (citing his In re 96 (1983)). in
The Juvenile Court Act sets forth the manner which 2008). (West committing are accused of offenses. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 120 “may proceedings Act notes that Section 5 — 120 of the Juvenile Court concerning any minor provisions be instituted under the of this Article *** violate, attempted regardless of where the has violated or occurred, county any municipal act federal or State or law 2008). (West proceed While these ordinance.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — 120 of an indictment or ings may by filing petition initiated instead be information, supreme routinely respondents our court has referred to proceedings having “charged” People in such been with offenses. See (“The (1982) 132, 2d Vazquez, ex rel. Davis v. 92 Ill. Michael, old, charged then with two counts of murder 15½ 26, shooting Gregory January deaths of Vincent and Jackson on (2001) (“On 1981.”); re A.G., 313, Ill. February 2d delinquency 16-year-old the State filed a (720 respondent, charging burglary him with two counts of residential (West 1998)), possession ILCS one count of unlawful (720 (West 570/402(c) 1998)), controlled substance ILCS and one count 1(a)(1)(A)(West 1998)).”); of theft ex rel. Han (1971) (“two Felt, rahan v. delinquency petitions were filed in County the circuit court of Cook in the interest of Donald Vance, minor, age which him charged with the offense of armed robbery rape”). Respondent alleged herein was to have committed these crimes in proscribed by the manner Illinois law which juveniles are “charged” with offenses. See 705 ILCS 405/5 — 520 2(A)(1)(d) I find no support for the assertion that section of the cannot “charged pursuant as he was never Illinois law.”
Respondent falls within the definition of a sex offender as found and, therefore, *7 Registration the registration requirements. disagree Act’s I Because conclusion, majority’s with the respondent’s must address additional arguments.
Equal Protection 2(A)(1)(d) Respondent alleges that an interpretation of section of Registration finding applies principles it violates equal protection. interpretation impermissibly He claims such an creates two classes of offenders: one that can to be removed from the sex 2 registry years, offender after either or 5 and another that must remain registry years. on the the entire 10 This impermissibly claims, equal protection, respondent violates notions of by affording “rights,” though the first class of offenders more even they adjudicated delinquent following hearing have been a full in ac- protections provided cordance with all the in the Court Act Juvenile 524 (West 2008)), seq. ILCS et than the second class of of
fenders, nothing. “found who have been posits respondent’s interpretation
The State that of the statutes rights unequivocally equal protection “would be a violation of the adjudicated juvenile, because, while both situations offenders, respondent’s argument sex them dif- involve treats ferently” interpretation where State’s treats them the same requiring register. group, both to The State continues that while one adjudicated delinquent group, may to reduce its term of be allowed registration, guarantee there is no in the statute that the term bewill ability reduced. The a reduced term after two or five claims, years, equal protection the State is insufficient to create an However, continues, suggested by violation. the State the mandate group register register that need is one another not enough to create such a violation. concerning constitutionality presents
An of a statute issue law, D.W., 214 2d questions of which we review de novo. In re Ill. (2005). confronted a claim constitu
“When statute violates guarantees process equal protection, tional of due a court must right purportedly infringed by first determine the nature of the right [Citations.] statute. Classification affected is critical right scrutiny because the nature of the dictates the level of courts employ determining question passes whether statute right constitutional muster. Unless a fundamental constitutional implicated, applies, the rational basis test and the statute will be upheld long relationship legitimate it bears a rational to a so D.W.,214 state interest.” In re Ill. 2d at 310. right implicated in the instant case involves an individual’s having to be free from as a sex offender Registration
an order entered under section
of the
Act. 730
150/2(A)(1)(d) (West 2008).
supreme court has determined
Our
registration requirements
Act do not
rights
and are therefore
infringe on “fundamental”
such,
J.W.,
In
Ill. 2d 50
As
rational basis test.
re
long as it
registration requirement
upheld
Act’s
will be
so
J.W.,
relationship
legitimate
bears a rational
state interest.
(1991)).
Adams,
(quoting People
Ill. 2d at
v.
Adams,
(1991),
supreme court
I acknowledge respondent, juvenile adjudicated unlike a delinquent, registra would not be able to for termination of his years. 2008); tion five See 730 ILCS 152/121 150/ 5(c) (West 2008). However, dichotomy does not violate his equal protection rights.
“Equal protection requires government to deal with individu ‘similarly als who are situated’ in a similar manner. [Citation.] equal protection triggered ‘lays unequal clause is when the law hand on intrinsically quality those who have committed the same of offense.’ A equal [Citation.] claim that a statute violates the requires clause the determination of whether a funda mental is involved or whether the statute discriminates suspect involved, [Citation.] class. If neither factor is court uses the rational basis test to determine whether the statute irrationally persons similarly differentiates [Cita between situated. test, statutory tion.] Under the rational basis classification only need relationship legitimate goal. bear a rational state equal protection challenge governed by [Citation.] An the rational any may basis standard is limited: ‘if statement of facts be reason ably justify enactment, upheld.’ [Cita conceivedto it must be (2006). Beard, People App. tion.]” v. Ill. 3d suspect they Sex offenders are not a class nor are faced implication of a right. My guess fundamental best is that the failure to include group early these in the can termina- tion of registration requirement simply legislative oversight. Regardless reason, I infirmity. find no constitutional
Equal protection
require
persons
does not
that all
be treated
equally.
Pembrock,
Respondent
Let us look situation. 104— guilty” up adult found “not not can be held for treatment to the had he been maximum time he could have been incarcerated convicted. However, eligible person many offenses would be for convicted good-time credit incarcerated. One who is confined day-for-day while good-time being after found “not not is not entitled (1991). If being 222 Ill. 3d 855 People Rasgaitis, App. credit. See v. equal to the maximum involuntarily period confined for time convicted, opportunity he sentence available had been without concerns, credit, equal protection apply good-time does not violate early termination of being I fail to see how not able to registration equal protection constitute an violation under would facts before us. him alleges discharge hearing denied his
Respondent next
argument
already
has
process. Respondent’s
constitutional
to due
Waid,