THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS V. RYBURN, Defendant-Appellant.
Fourth District No. 4-04-0836
Fourth District
February 7, 2008
Still, it is clear that the law in Illinois is that one may not resist an arrest no matter how unfounded it might be. Without reference to the legitimacy of the basis of the arrest (or lack thereof), it is my belief that, given the allegations of the charging instrument, the State‘s evidence of guilt relative to those allegations was insufficient to sustain defendant‘s conviction for resisting arrest. For these reasons, I believe her conviction should be reversed and vacated.
Opinion filed February 7, 2008.
COOK, J., dissenting.
William A. Yoder, State‘s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In July 2004, defendant, Thomas V. Ryburn, filed a petition under
On September 26, 2007, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal but directed this court to vacate our judgment and to reconsider in light of People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). People v. Ryburn, 225 Ill. 2d 666, 873 N.E.2d 932 (2007) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal). In accordance with the supreme court‘s directions, we vacate our prior judgment and reconsider it in light of Vincent to determine whether a different result is warranted. After doing so, we again affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 1998, the State charged defendаnt with four counts each of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (
At defendant‘s October 1999 guilty-plea hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had agreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (
The State provided the following factual basis for defendant‘s
The trial court accepted the State‘s factual basis. The court also fully admonished defendant, outlined the terms of the plea agreеment, and determined that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. The court then accepted defendant‘s guilty pleas.
In November 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison on each count of aggravated criminal sexual assault, with those sentences to be served consecutively (
In December 1999, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging that he did not enter them knowingly and voluntarily. Following a February 2000 hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that (1)
This court affirmed defendant‘s convictions and 60-year aggregate sentence, vacated the $25 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act fine, and remanded for the trial court, not the circuit clerk, to impose that fine. People v. Ryburn, No. 4-00-0117 (June 22, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Ryburn I). In January 2002, the trial court entered an order imposing a $25 fine under the
In June 2002, defendant pro se filed a petition for relief under the
Also in March 2003, defendant filed a “Petition for a New Trial,” in which he alleged that he should not have to serve 85% of his 60-year aggregate prison sentence because the sentence was based on “tainted/perjuried [sic]” testimony in an unrelated case. Later that month, the trial court dismissed the petition, upon determining that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.
In April 2003, defendant filed a motion entitled “Petition to Chief Administrative Judge for Rehearing En Banc with Substitution of Judge and Conduct Review of Judges.” Later that same month, thе trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous, upon finding, inter alia, that defendant had been “engaging in a pattern of filing frivolous pleadings without factual or legal merit[,] all with the apparent end of obtaining relief from his convictions and sentences in [McLean County case No. 98-CF-1062].”
In July 2004, defendant filed the section 2-1401 petition at issue (
In August 2004, the trial court sua sponte dismissed defendant‘s section 2-1401 petition, upon finding that it was frivolous and without merit. Defendant appealed, and as earlier stated, this court affirmed. Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d 870, 841 N.E.2d 1013.
In that opinion, we rejected defendant‘s argument that his guilty pleas were void based оn the trial court‘s imposition of $125 in fines, deeming that argument “ridiculous.” Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 875, 841 N.E.2d at 1017. Citing People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 806 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (2004), we also concluded that the trial court possessed the authority sua sponte to dismiss defendant‘s section 2-1401 petition if it finds that the petition is frivolous and without merit.
This court also noted that defendant‘s claim on appeal that his guilty pleas were void not only had no merit, but also that he failed to raise it in the section 2-1401 petitiоn that was before us on appeal. Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 877, 841 N.E.2d at 1018.
In response to defendant‘s contention that he was not a “vexatious or frivolous litigator,” this court wrote the following:
“In addition, defendant‘s assertion that he is not a vexatious litigant who inappropriately burdens the court system with nonmeritorious litigation is belied by (1) the sheer number of pleadings he has filed since his October 1999 guilty pleas in this case and (2) the trial court‘s explicit finding in its April 2003 order that defendant had been ‘engaging in a pattern of filing frivolous pleadings without factual or legal merit[,] all with the apparent end of obtaining relief from his convictions and sentences in [McLean County case No. 98-CF-1062].’ Defendant continued his practice of filing frivolous pleadings when he filed his July 2004 section 2-1401 petition now before us. Indeed, this defendant could be the ‘poster boy’ for why trial courts should have the inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss section 2-1401 petitions that are frivolous and without merit. Denying trial courts this authority would require them to squander scarce judicial resources. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court appropriately exercised its authority by sua sponte dismissing defendant‘s petition.” Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 877, 841 N.E.2d at 1018-19.
As earlier stated, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant‘s pеtition for leave to appeal in Ryburn III but directed this court to vacate our judgment and to reconsider in light of People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). That reconsideration follows.
II. THE SUPREME COURT‘S DECISION IN VINCENT
The Third District Appellate Court recently had occasion to analyze the decision of the supreme court in Vincent. In People v. Malloy, 374 Ill. App. 3d 820, 821-22, 872 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (2007), the
“In the recent case of People v. Vincent, our supreme court stated that a trial court‘s dismissal of a petition for relief from judgment on its own motion may properly be characterized as either a grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State or a dismissal of the petition with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12[, 871 N.E.2d 17, 25-29] (2007). Such a dismissal is subject to de novo review on appeal. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at [14, 871 N.E.2d at 26]. Thus, we will apply a de novo standard of review to the dismissal in the present case. See Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at [15-19, 871 N.E.2d at 25-29].
Turning to the merits of defendant‘s argument, defendant first asserts that the trial court may not dismiss a petition for relief from judgment, on its own motion, without first providing defendant with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Our supreme court addressed that exact issue in Vincent and ruled to the contrary. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13-14[, 871 N.E.2d at 25-27]. The trial court‘s authority to take such action comes from the Illinois pleading requirements and from well-settled principles of civil practice and procedure. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13-14[, 871 N.E.2d at 26]. *** Our supreme court has noted that the jurisdiction of the lower courts to restrain the maintenance of vexatiоus or harassing litigation is well established. People ex rel. Lake County Bar Ass‘n v. Circuit Court, 31 Ill. 2d 170, 173-74, 201 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1964). In reaffirming the trial court‘s authority to dismiss suit under civil practice principles, our supreme court in Vincent pointed out that adequate safeguards exist to protect a litigant from an erroneous dismissal. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13[, 871 N.E.2d at 25]. A litigant may file a motion for rehearing or an appeal or both. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13[, 871 N.E.2d at 25-26].
Based upon the supreme court‘s ruling in Vincent, the law is now settled in Illinois that the trial court may dismiss a petition for relief from judgment оn its own motion without first providing the defendant with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 13-14[, 871 N.E.2d at 25-27].”
We agree with the Third District‘s analysis and further adhere to the views we expressed in Ryburn III, except, of course, to the extent that those views conflict with Vincent. Specifically, we acknowledge, as our dissenting colleague points out, that the supreme court disagreed with our statement that trial cоurts possess the authority to summarily dismiss section 2-1401 petitions that are frivolous and without merit, noting that “summary dismissals” are not recognized under the Code of Civil Procedure. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 11, 871 N.E.2d at 24.
This acknowledgment, however, does not change our ultimate conclusion. Consistent with the standard set forth by the supreme court for reviewing a trial court‘s sua sponte dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court is correct because the allegations of defendant‘s petition wholly fail to state a cause of action. As a court of review, we review judgments, not the reasons therefor. See People v. DeBerry, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058, 868 N.E.2d 382, 383 (2007) (where this court held that “we will affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the record even if the trial court did not mention its reasons or reasoned incorrectly“). Accordingly, evеn though (as the supreme court held in Vincent) the reasons underlying the trial court‘s judgment in this case were flawed, we can—and will—affirm if the record otherwise shows that judgment to be soundly based. That rule clearly applies here.
The primary focus of the dissent appears to be its disagreement with the decision of the supreme court that the trial court should possess the authority to sua sponte dismiss a section 2-1401 petition. Nonetheless, Vincent resolves that issue, and our job on this appeal is to apply supreme court doctrine as set forth in Vincent.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.
JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand.
Is there any difference between summary dismissal of a petition as “frivolous or patently without merit” under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and dismissal for failure to state a cause of action under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure? In civil cases, will we now routinely see cases summarily dismissed as frivolous and without merit? I suggest that section 2-615 dismissals are much more limited than “summary dismissals,” and that the supreme court in Vincent did not simply engage in semantics, allowing “summary dismissals” just under another name.
In Vincent, the supreme court rejected the argument that special rules should be applied in ruling on section 2-1401 petitions in criminal cases. “This court hаs consistently held that proceedings under section 2-1401 are subject to the usual rules of civil practice.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8, 871 N.E.2d at 23. In particular, the court
Under civil practice rules, a section 2-1401 petition may be challenged by a motion to dismiss for its failure to state a cause of action. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8, 871 N.E.2d at 23. Judgment on the pleadings may also be appropriate. See
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is sometimes used instead of the proper motion in order to attempt to give the determination the finality that a judgment implies.” 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 27.2, at 495 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial). “The difficulty is that there appear to be cases where the use of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, instead of a motion to strike and dismiss, has resulted in the loss of the plaintiff‘s right to seek leave to amend after the complaint was held to be defective.” 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 27.2, at 496 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial).
Vincent held that a section 2-1401 petition may be dismissed sua sponte, in both civil and criminal cases, and that adequate procedural safeguards exist to prevent erroneous sua sponte terminations. A section 2-1401 petitioner whоse petition has been disposed of by the
Motions to dismiss with prejudice under section 2-615 are granted cautiously. In civil cases, a pleading need only assert a legally recognized cause of action and plead facts that bring the particular case within that cause of action. A motiоn to dismiss is granted on the pleadings, not on the underlying facts. The question presented by a section 2-615 motion is whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 348, 798 N.E.2d 724, 733 (2003) (facts alleged were sufficient to raise a duty). No complaint is bad in substance which reаsonably informs the defendant of the nature of the claim that he or she is called upon to meet. Chandler, 207 Ill. 2d at 348, 798 N.E.2d at 733. “[A] motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could ever be proved that would entitle the plaintiff [s] to recover.” Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 89 Ill. 2d 273, 280, 433 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1982).
The trial court here entered a three-page written order, finding that defendant‘s claims were totally lacking in merit. Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 877, 841 N.E.2d at 1018. The triаl court, however, did not determine that the allegations of the section 2-1401 petition were insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a claim. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 10, 871 N.E.2d at 24. Instead, the trial court applied the summary dismissal approach of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, finding that the petition was “frivolous and without merit.” Ryburn III, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 874, 841 N.E.2d at 1016;
Whatever we do in this case can be done in any civil case. It is important that we carefully follow the rules of civil procedure. We should not allow special rules, developed to address a problem in the criminal law system, to affect the handling of civil cases.