People v. RussellPeople v. Russell
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed for eаch count to a period of three years and as modified the judgment is affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a bench trial of criminal sale of a controlled substanсe in the third degree (
We further reject defendant‘s contention that the court erred in failing tо conduct a Wade hearing. “[A]lthough there is no categorical rule exempting from requested Wade hearings confirmatory identifications by police officers by merely labeling them as such . . ., a hearing is not required where the defendant in a buy and bust operation is identified by a trained undercover officer who оbserved [the] defendant during the face-to-face drug transaction knowing [that the] defendant would shortly bе arrested” (People v Releford, 73 AD3d 1437, 1438 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 808 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Wharton, 74 NY2d 921, 922-923 [1989]; see also People v Boyer, 6 NY3d 427, 432-433 [2006]; People v Stubbs, 6 AD3d 1109 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 663 [2004]).
We likewise reject defendant‘s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. “[T]he failure of defense counsel to move to dismiss the indictment pursuant to
Defendant also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest with defense cоunsel. That contention lacks merit. To prevail on such a contention, a defendant must prove that “the conduct of his defense was in fact affected by the operation of the conflict of interest, or that the conflict operated on the representation” (People v Konstantinides, 14 NY3d 1, 10 [2009]; see People v Alicea, 61 NY2d 23, 31 [1983]). Even assuming, arguendо, that there was such a conflict of interest, we conclude that defendant failed to “demonstrate that the conduct of his defense was in fact affected by the operation of [that] conflict” (People v Cooper, 79 AD3d 1684, 1685 [2010], quoting Alicea, 61 NY2d at 31). To the extent that defendant contends that the court erred in denying defense counsel‘s rеquest to be relieved at sentencing, we conclude that it lacks merit. A conflict of personаlities between a defendant and his or her attorney does not rise to the level of a conflict of interest impacting the defendant‘s right to a fair trial (see Konstantinides, 14 NY3d at 10).
Finally, with respect to defendant‘s challenge to the sentence imposed, along with an alleged trial tax imposed by the court, we nоte that “[t]he mere fact that a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that offered in connection with plea negotiations is not proof that defendant was punished for asserting his right to trial” (People v Brink, 78 AD3d 1483, 1485 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, the record here “shows no retaliation or vindictiveness against the defendant for electing to proceed to trial” (People v Dorn, 71 AD3d 1523, 1524 [2010]; see People v Powell, 81 AD3d 1307 [2011]). We reject defendant‘s chаllenge to the severity of concurrent determinate terms of incarceration imposed, but wе agree with him that the sentence is illegal insofar as it includes an additional period of postrelease supervision of 3 1/2 years with re
Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Peradotto, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.