THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAIME RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-18-2401
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
May 25, 2021
2021 IL App (1st) 182401
SECOND DIVISON
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 After a jury trial, the 17-year-old defendant, Jamie Ruiz, was convicted of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years and mandatory natural life imprisonment. See
¶ 2 On remand, the defendant, who was now 40 years old, was resentenced to 50 years on the murder charge and 30 years on the attempted murder conviction to be served concurrently. Again, by operation of law, these sentences were ordered to run consecutively to the defendant‘s prior 30-year sentence in case No. 94-CR-24440. See
¶ 3 On appeal, the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the newly imposed 50-year sentence. In this respect, he makes three contentions. First, he argues that the 50-year sentence is a de facto life sentence and therefore unconstitutional as applied to him both under the federal and state constitutions (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 ¶ 5 Because the 15-year procedural history of this case is complex and lengthy, we set forth only those facts relevant to the resolution of this appeal.
A. Undisputed Facts
¶ 7 It is undisputed that while still a juvenile, the defendant, who was an active member of the Latin Kings, participated in two separate murders, for which he was charged and convicted. In the first occurrence (case No. 94-CR-24440), the defendant was found guilty by accountability of the 1994 murder of Daniel Martinez and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment on July 12, 1996. In that case, the evidence at trial established that, on August 25, 1994, the then 16-year-old defendant was with other Latin King members in rival Two-Six gang territory looking for enemy gang members when he passed the victim, Martinez, and heard Martinez comment to a friend not to “hang out on the streets looking for trouble, but to make something out of his life.” The defendant approached Martinez and asked him why he had “disrespected his love?” When Martinez indicated he did not want any trouble and tried to walk away, the defendant punched him and called his fellow gang members to join in. The victim tried to run down an alley but was caught by the defendant and his fellow gang members and beaten. At that point, another Latin King member pulled out a handgun and shot the victim in the head and neck. At trial, the defendant was identified as a “Cocina,” or a second-in-command in one of the Latin Kings’ pee wee groups, and the shooter was identified as the “Inca,” or the leader.
¶ 8 While out on bond and awaiting trial in that case, on February 7, 1996, the defendant committed the instant crime (case No. 96-CR-6048). Specifically, the defendant, who was now 17
B. Procedural History
¶ 10 After the defendant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence, for the next decade, he pursued numerous claims on collateral review. Relevant to this appeal, on July 10, 2013, he sought leave to file his third successive postconviction petition asserting that his natural life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller, 567 U.S. 460. After the defendant was granted leave to proceed with his successive petition, that petition was advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings, and the defendant was appointed counsel. The case was then continued for years until the United States Supreme Court denied the State‘s writ of certiorari in People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1026 (2014), which had held that Miller applied retroactively on collateral review. At this point, the State conceded that Miller required that the defendant be granted a new sentencing hearing. Accordingly, on November 30, 2017, by agreement of the parties, the trial court vacated the defendant‘s sentence of natural life
¶ 11 At the time of remand, the defendant was 40 years old and had already been in prison for over 23 years.
C. The Defendant‘s Sentencing Memorandum
¶ 13 Prior to the resentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum asking that the defendant be resentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment on his murder charge. In support, the memorandum attached 43 exhibits, including, inter alia, (1) a June 8, 2018, report from Chicagoland gang expert Professor John Hagedorn opining about the defendant‘s rehabilitative potential and his present maturity; (2) certificates from numerous programs that the defendant had completed while incarcerated; (3) the Illinois Department Of Correction (IDOC)‘s visitor logs from 1999 to the present showing more than 940 visits to the defendant by family and friends; (4) letters from numerous family members and friends demonstrating the violence, instability, and volatility of the defendant‘s childhood, the defendant‘s current efforts at rehabilitation, and the family‘s intention of providing the defendant with housing and stable work once he was released from prison; (5) a Chicago Tribune article from 1990 discussing the gang violence in the defendant‘s neighborhood; and (6) a 1994 police report from the murder of the defendant‘s uncle, Roberto Torres (Roberto), who was savagely beaten to death in an alleyway when the defendant was a teenager. Citing these numerous exhibits, the memorandum argued that all five of the Miller factors counseled in favor of a reduced sentence.
D. Resentencing Hearing
¶ 15 The resentencing hearing was held on September 26, 2018. Prior to any arguments, the trial court asked the parties to clarify the defendant‘s potential “exposure” under the law. The State indicated that under the 1996 law, the defendant was eligible for a sentence between 20 and 60
¶ 16 The parties then proceeded with brief opening arguments. Defense counsel sought the imposition of a 30-year sentence for the defendant‘s murder conviction. The State, on the other hand, argued that the court should use its discretion to sentence the defendant to a term “commensurate with the seriousness of the offense.” In addition, the State asked the court to keep in mind that under the 1996 law, any sentence it imposed was eligible for good-time served day-for-day credit. See
¶ 17 The parties next presented their evidence. In mitigation, the defendant offered his 43
¶ 18 It is undisputed that the defendant is the youngest of four children of Mexican immigrants with three older sisters. The defendant‘s sister, Ruiz, and his cousin, Ibarra, both testified that as a child, the defendant suffered severe medical complications, requiring him to wear a colostomy bag, which he found embarrassing and which impeded his ability to connect with his peers. In addition, both Ruiz and Ibarra averred that the defendant grew up in an unstable environment. According to Ruiz, while their mother was “very kind” and overprotective, their father was an abusive alcoholic, who was often physically violent with their mother. As Ruiz explained, the family went through “a lot of emotional abuse at home,” and the children were all afraid of him. Ibarra similarly testified that “anything would trigger [him] to go physical on my aunt,” and as children “we *** just comforted each other.” In her letter, admitted into evidence, the defendant‘s second sister, Elvira Vergara, similarly described their childhood, noting that while their mother worked multiple jobs to support the family, their father was a violent alcoholic and was either drunk, violent, or absent from the home. As a result, the defendant had no relationship with his father.
¶ 19 The neighborhood of Little Village, where the defendant grew up, was also violent and replete with gangs and drugs. The defendant‘s uncle, Roberto, was killed by gangs in April 1994 when the defendant was only a teenager. Ibarra testified that Roberto was savagely beaten to death in an alley and left to die, but that the family never discussed his death because violence was
¶ 20 The evidence at the hearing further established that the defendant‘s three older sisters moved out of the home in their teens, leaving the defendant unsupervised and unsupported. According to a letter from the defendant‘s childhood acquaintance, Luz Maria Cervantes, as a young teen the defendant was expected to “financially contribute[ ] to the household to make do.” As Ibarra explained, at 16, the family considered the children to be adults and expected them to contribute just as they had done when they were growing up in Mexico. As was common in the neighborhood, the defendant dropped out of school at 15. Ibarra explained that the highest level of education in their family was fifth or sixth grade, and “at 16, we didn‘t think about options, about school or anything of that nature.”
¶ 21 Ruiz and Ibarra next testified that they both had a good relationship with the defendant when he was younger. Ibarra averred that, as a child, the defendant was very calm and respectable, just “a normal kid who wanted to be part of a family.” He often came to Ibarra‘s house and hung out with her and her boyfriend playing video games. Ruiz and Ibarra both stated that it was not until all three of his sisters left home that the defendant began hanging out with “the wrong crowd” and changed. According to Ibarra, when he was in around eighth grade the defendant began to distance himself from the family and to hang out with his own peers. At this point he became very confused, angry, and rebellious. He made friends with a boy from the neighborhood who was in a gang and, eventually, led by this boy, joined the gang himself.
¶ 22 Ibarra and Ruiz both believed that if the defendant had had a positive male role model, he would not have joined the gang or committed either crime. Both believed that the crimes were the result of his immaturity and gang involvement. Letters from family friends, Cervantes, and Elena
¶ 23 Ruiz further explained that after the defendant‘s arrest on the first murder charge in 1994, their mother attempted to help him, but that the defendant was too young to be able to help himself. Ruiz testified that after their mother paid the bond for the defendant‘s release, she also found the defendant a job and encouraged him to “get his life on track.” However, at that point, the defendant‘s then-girlfriend, who idolized his gang lifestyle, became pregnant. Feeling overwhelmed and depressed, the defendant continued to hang out with the “wrong crowd,” which led to his commission of the instant crime.
¶ 24 Ruiz and Ibarra both testified that they have supported the defendant throughout his incarceration and that he has greatly matured since the time he was a teenager. The defendant‘s present girlfriend, Garcia, similarly testified that the defendant has grown and matured since the time of his offenses, reflected upon his past mistakes, and changed his entire way of thinking. According to Garcia, since 2004, when she met him, the defendant has made incredible changes in his life and is respectful, inquisitive, and deeply caring for his family. She also stated that she would not be in a relationship with him if she believed that he was still actively involved in the Latin Kings. The defendant‘s daughter, Perla, who was born while the defendant was in jail, similarly testified that the defendant is a loving and devoted father and grandfather, who has become “one of her best friends.” Perla averred that the defendant encourages her to stay out of trouble and that she knows he is a good person who does not want to return to “where he used to be.”
¶ 25 Numerous family members and friends similarly attested to the defendant‘s involvement and positive influence in their lives since his incarceration. Fellow prisoner Miguel Brito Jr. credited the defendant with his years of continued education, explaining that the defendant had
¶ 26 In addition, the evidence introduced at the hearing established that during his incarceration, the defendant had completed numerous classes and workshops, including, inter alia, “Inside/Out Dad,” “BURST,” “How to Succeed on the Streets,” “ADAPT,” “Crossroads Bible Institute,” and chess classes. Throughout his incarceration, the defendant also consistently attended chapel, practiced his Catholic faith, and regularly corresponded with Father Arturo J. Perez, who stated in his letter that he believed the defendant now recognized the consequences of his actions and had tried to better himself to the benefit of his family.
¶ 27 Finally, the defendant‘s family offered evidence regarding the defendant‘s plans upon release from prison. Both Ibarra and Ruiz testified that the defendant had no intention of returning to Little Village and would instead live with one of them in their homes, either in Burbank or Oswego. Ibarra further testified that she would never invite the defendant into her home if she believed that he was violent, especially since her two younger children still live at home. She further stated that her husband, Jose Ibarra (Jose), who is a foreman in a construction company has offered to provide the defendant a job and to teach him the trade. Jose‘s letter to the court
¶ 28 In addition to the aforementioned evidence, at the sentencing hearing, Chicagoland gang expert, Professor Hagedorn, testified in detail about the defendant‘s rehabilitative potential. He acknowledged that in his June 8, 2018, written report, he had concluded that the defendant does not fall into the category of irretrievably depraved or permanently incorrigible juveniles, which deserve prolonged and continued incarceration. Professor Hagedorn explained that in coming to this conclusion, he considered his three interviews with the defendant, letters provided by the defendant‘s family members, his own research into Chicago gangs, transcripts and police reports from the defendant‘s crimes, and incident reports from the Cook County jail and IDOC.
¶ 29 Professor Hagedorn first testified that the 10th District neighborhood of Little Village, where the defendant grew up, had been Latin King territory since the 1960s and was the dividing line between two other rival gangs, the Two Sixers, and the Satan Disciples. According to Professor Hagedorn, the 1990s, when the defendant was a teenager, were the most violent period in Chicago‘s history of gang wars. Because of the demise of the gang coalitions, in that decade, the Latin Kings were at war with numerous other gangs in the neighborhood, including the Latin Folks, the Two Sixers, the Latin Disciples, and the Satan Disciples. The mentality of the gang was different from previous decades when the gang was more of a social or community organization. This was a time of war and serious violence, and new gang members were expected to be soldiers, defending the Latin King‘s turf and seeking out enemies to fight.
¶ 30 The defendant joined the Latin Kings in 1992 when he was 14 years old and remained an active member until his incarceration in 1996. According to Professor Hagedorn, during that time, the defendant was one of four or five “shorties,” or junior Latin King members, in the local Trumbull Avenue Latin King branch. The professor explained that such pee wee members were
¶ 31 Professor Hagedorn next explained how the defendant became involved with gangs. He stated that, as a young boy, the defendant was initially drawn to sports and did not see the gang in his future. Around the fourth grade, however, he began having trouble in school and got a reputation as a “troublemaker.” From then on, Professor Hagedorn explained, the defendant was “treated as a dunce,” made to “stand in the corner,” and was embarrassed or shamed as a standard disciplinary tactic. This alienated him from school and made him more susceptible to the bad influences rampant in the neighborhood. It would be another five years, however, before the defendant would succumb to peer pressure and join the Latin Kings following in the footsteps of his best friend, Juan Torres.
¶ 32 According to Professor Hagedorn, the defendant joined the Latin Kings because they were the peer group in the neighborhood, and the only way to not join them would have been to move away—an option the defendant did not have. In addition, the defendant was “young and impressionable,” and there were not enough “protective factors” to counter the “pulling factors” for him to escape the gang scene. Specifically, apart from the problems he was already experiencing in school, the defendant had a disruptive family life. The defendant‘s father was an abusive alcoholic, who was often violent with the defendant‘s mother, which made the defendant feel “hopeless and guilty.” Without any real father-son relationship, the defendant naturally looked up to older gang members as role models who appeared to him to be well respected in the
¶ 33 Professor Hagedorn next described the usual maturation process of gang members. He explained that unlike the defendant, some gang members are indoctrinated into the gang by their families, and therefore have a much harder time identifying with anything outside of the gang. According to Professor Hagedorn, however, the defendant, who was never accepted by the gang as a generations-old-member, has always experienced a conflict of identities: the pull of the gang life and the belonging that it offers versus his more conventional identity, i.e., his religion and the humbleness and hard-working ethic of his mother‘s family who grew up in a small Mexican village.
¶ 34 Professor Hagedorn next testified about identity replacement and how that allowed a gang member to leave the gang. He explained that distancing from a gang is a process, which involves taking small steps by participating in activities that are not part of the individual‘s gang identity, which ultimately leads to identity replacement. In Professor Hagedorn‘s opinion, the defendant was the definition of the distancing process as he has spent the last 11 years of his incarceration avoiding gang activities and trying to better himself. Specifically, the defendant has been involved in numerous prison programs, has become an avid reader, and has learned to get along with former enemies, including a black Gangster Disciple he taught to read. In addition, the defendant has counseled younger inmates from different gangs to use their prison time to do something positive. According to Professor Hagedorn, in taking these steps over time, the defendant‘s conventional identity has prevailed over his gang identity, and he now sees himself as a family man who wants to get out of prison to a place where “he has no enemies” and away from the Latin Kings.
¶ 35 Consistent with this identity, according to Professor Hagedorn, the defendant has expressed
¶ 36 Professor Hagedorn acknowledged that upon entering IDOC, the defendant continued to be a member of the Latin Kings but stated that the defendant‘s sole reason for continued membership was survival. As the professor explained in his written report, the prison system at first strengthens gang identity because young Latinos entering a black-dominated and gang-laden inmate culture are fearful and their gang represents protection and solidarity. As the defendant himself told the professor, inmates with no gang affiliation are at risk of being raped, robbed, or assaulted. The first time the defendant went into the prison yard, he saw a prisoner “getting slashed.” Accordingly, the defendant was greatly relieved when he met a fellow inmate from his old Trumbull Avenue Latin King branch upon first arriving at Menard Correctional Center.
¶ 37 Professor Hagedorn opined that the defendant‘s IDOC records support the conclusion that the defendant‘s continued membership in the gang is rooted in survival. Specifically, the professor pointed out that, just as expected, in the first few years of his incarceration the defendant, who would have been only 17 or 18 years old, obtained additional gang tattoos, and received several tickets for insolence and fighting. However, in the next 11 years, spanning from 2000 to 2011, uncharacteristic of what would have been expected of a true Latin King, the defendant was not given a single gang-related ticket and was never found with any drugs, shanks, weapons, or gang literature or propaganda.
¶ 39 Despite his refusal to publicly denounce the Latin Kings, Professor Hagedorn opined that it was very unlikely that, if released, the defendant, who is over 40 years old, would revert to his prior gang activities. As the professor explained, if released, the defendant wants to get back to school, obtain “a decent job,” be a part of his daughter‘s and granddaughter‘s lives, and work with “troubled kids.” In addition, the defendant is adamant that upon release he will not return to Little Village.
¶ 40 Professor Hagedorn further opined that he does not believe the defendant is manipulative, or a hardcore gang member, pretending to be changed to get released and then resume criminality. Instead, the two murders that the defendant committed represent a distant past characterized by the defendant‘s immaturity and impetuosity. In the professor‘s opinion, the defendant has matured and the main barrier to further change is his prison environment, rather than an unalterable violent or evil character. Accordingly, with respect to sentencing, Professor Hagedorn recommended “a concrete and not too distant release date.”
¶ 42 Professor Hagedorn also acknowledged that IDOC‘s records reflect that, in 2014, the defendant received a security threat group ticket, which the Bureau of Prisons uses to refer to gangs. That ticket was based on information from four confidential informants2 claiming that the defendant was on the seven-member advisory and disciplinary body of the Latin Kings, called the Crown Council (Council), “at Menard and somewhere else.” Professor Hagedorn, however, found these allegations to be flimsy and incredible and likely raised by “snitches” to benefit themselves. He explained that from his years of research, which included conversations with numerous contacts within the Latin Kings, some of whom were high ranking members and had served on the Council, the Council is top secret and no general member of the Latin Kings within any of the prisons would know who its members were. The reason for the secrecy is the Council‘s power within each Latin King chapter, which includes organizing elections for “Inca” and “Cacique,” recruiting new members, expelling others, and even removing the “Inca.” Accordingly, unless the confidential informants were also on the Council, which the professor believed was very unlikely,
they would have no way of knowing whether the defendant was one of the seven Council members.
¶ 43 On cross-examination, Professor Hagedorn further acknowledged that according to the Cook County Sherriff‘s records, the defendant was involved in a jail brawl on January 2, 2018. The professor testified, however, that in his opinion this fight was both “stupid” and not gang related. The professor stated that before making this judgment, he watched the video footage of the fight, read the jail reports, and talked to the defendant. The professor explained that the fight involved something of the highest importance to the defendant, namely his access to the telephone and his ability to stay in touch with his daughter and family. Specifically, the defendant had been moved to a new deck and because there were only three telephones on every deck, as a “newbie” he had to negotiate access to the telephone. When he tried to do so, the defendant was told by the large, “aggressive” inmate who controlled the telephone and who had the reputation of preying on Latino inmates, stealing their commissary and bullying them: “[Y]ou ain‘t gonna get on that
“Gang boundaries, even within Cook County Jail, are breaking down, but the elements of survival and need for human contact with family and the outside world remain. Racial tensions are high within the jail with Latinos a distinct and at times vulnerable minority. [The defendant] has been socialized to survive in a prison environment and this brief fight was his statement he would not become a victim and be denied use of the phone. The [Cook County jail] incident report signed by J. Holmes concurs: ‘The reason for the incident was over the telephone.’ ”
¶ 44 After the defense rested, the State presented seven exhibits in aggravation, including (1) certified copies of the defendant‘s two convictions; (2) the trial transcript and appellate court record in case No. 96-CR-6048; (3) the defendant‘s presentence investigation reports prepared for case Nos. 96-CR-6048 and 94-CR-24440; (4) a group of reports from the Cook County Sherriff, including the report describing the defendant‘s 2018 jail altercation over the use of the telephone; (5) a stipulation regarding the undisputed facts in case No. 94-CR-24440; and (6) a victim impact statement provided as part of the original sentencing hearing by the mother of the victim Martinez in case No. 94-CR-24440.
¶ 45 The defendant next gave a lengthy statement in allocution, expressing remorse for the pain he had caused the victim‘s families and his own family and stating that he would bear that shame for the rest of his life. He regretted his sisters having to carry his responsibilities for his daughter
¶ 46 After hearing all the evidence, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 50 years’ imprisonment for murder and 30 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder to run concurrently. Both sentences were again ordered to be served consecutively with the previously imposed 30-year sentence in case No. 94-CR-24440. The court acknowledged that as such the sentences “obviously [were] stacked for aggregate” but stated that it nonetheless believed it had “crafted a sentence here that was fair to all the parties.”
¶ 47 In pronouncing the sentence, the court explicitly stated that the present circumstances did not warrant either a natural life or a de facto life sentence. However, the court found that in accounting for what constitutes a de facto life sentence, it needed to factor in good-time credit. As the court explained:
“The de facto life essentially states that an individual should not [be] given life if they can‘t serve that sentence. However, again on this second case he is also eligible for day for day good time credit. *** I‘m looking at de facto life as to the earliest possibility of release.”
¶ 48 The court also noted that it had never encountered a situation where a defendant committed a murder while on bond for another murder. The court mused whether the defendant‘s crime (the second murder), which it labeled an “execution,” was the “depraved individual” described in Miller.
¶ 50 At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court instructed the defendant to continue in his rehabilitation efforts, stating:
“The fact of the matter is, Mr. Ruiz, that your life doesn‘t end today. And if you‘re really dedicated to what your family believes you‘re dedicated to and what you told me, you have a unique opportunity to touch people in your life. You can go and climb into a hole and disassociate yourself from everyone else. You could be active in the gang. Or you could help some young people that you have contact with. I truly believe that you have learned some things since you were 15 and 16 years old, but I would strongly urge you to continue your rehabilitation and your commitment to others, sir.”
¶ 51 Following the sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider arguing, inter alia, that because the 50-year sentence imposed had to be served consecutively to the 30-year sentence for the 1994 murder, the sentence was a de facto life sentence and therefore
No. 1-18-2401
unconstitutional as applied to him.
¶ 52 The trial court denied the defendant‘s motion. With respect to the defendant‘s de facto life argument, the court stated:
“I think I did address the de facto life issue and how I did not feel it was de facto life because, number one, it applies to the potential release date, what his age would be at the potential release date. And [two,] these are two separate occurrences and not one occurrence. There‘s two separate homicides. One committed after he was on bond for the first murder. So the question is whether or not it would even apply on the—on separate cases. But I don‘t believe that my sentence is, in fact, de facto life based on the fact that he is entitled to day-for-day good time credit if he does qualify for the day for day good time credit. And I believe he will be out of custody when he‘s what 6[5]?”
The defendant now appeals.
¶ 53 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 54 On appeal, the defendant makes three contentions. First, he argues that his 50-year de facto life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him both under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (
¶ 55 Because we find this issue to be dispositive, we begin by addressing the defendant‘s argument regarding the constitutionality of his 50-year de facto life sentence.
¶ 56 In this respect, the defendant contends that since he was resentenced in 2018, (1) the Illinois Supreme Court has unequivocally held that a sentence of more than 40 years imprisonment for a juvenile is a de facto life sentence (see People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41) and (2) our appellate court has repeatedly held that good-time credit is not to be counted when considering whether a sentence amounts to de facto life (see, e.g., People v. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170677, ¶ 20; People v. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, ¶ 19). The defendant therefore contends that because the resentencing court considered good-time credit in determining whether the imposed 50-year term constituted de facto life, that sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him both under the eighth amendment and the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. In addition, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider his youth and its attendant characteristics and never found that he was permanently incorrigible to justify the imposition of such a de facto life sentence. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
¶ 57 We first address the defendant‘s arguments in context of the eighth amendment. The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”
¶ 58 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of mandatory life without
¶ 59 Subsequently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016), the United States Supreme Court determined that Miller should apply retroactively and that state courts must apply Miller in collateral proceedings. Montgomery held that while Miller did not prohibit all life sentences for juvenile, such sentences were reserved for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 208. Montgomery explained that Miller
“recognized that a [trial court] might encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified. But in light of ‘children‘s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,’ Miller made clear that ‘appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.‘” Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).
¶ 60 Relying on the aforementioned principles, our supreme court has since extended Miller to apply to juvenile offenders who were sentenced to life imprisonment, whether natural or de facto (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10), or mandatory or discretionary, and the trial court failed
¶ 61 According to our supreme court‘s present interpretation of Miller, a sentencing court may impose a life sentence on a juvenile offender but only after it has considered the defendant‘s youth and its attendant characteristics and made a finding of “irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, 46; see also Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 24. In making this determination, our supreme court and subsequently our legislature have instructed the sentencing courts to consider the following non-exhaustive list of youthful characteristics: (1) the juvenile defendant‘s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant‘s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant‘s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant‘s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant‘s prospects for rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46; see also
¶ 63 With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of this appeal.
¶ 64 In the present case, at the outset, the State argues that the defendant was not sentenced to a de facto life sentence so as to trigger any Miller-based protections and require the trial court to find him permanently incorrigible before sentencing him to life imprisonment. The State asserts that because the defendant was sentenced under the law as it applied in 1996 when the “truth-in-sentencing” statute had not yet been enacted, he is entitled to day-for-day good-time credit served. See
¶ 65 Since the decision in Buffer, our appellate court has repeatedly held that the availability of statutory good-time sentencing credit “is irrelevant to the determination of whether a [juvenile] defendant has been sentenced to a de facto life sentence,” i.e., a sentence greater than 40 years imprisonment. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170677, ¶ 20; see also Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, 19, appeal filed, No. 125340 (Ill. Oct. 4, 2019); People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (1st) 172390, ¶ 35; People v. Daniel, 2020 IL App (1st) 172267, ¶¶ 23-26; People v. Quezada, 2020 IL App (1st) 170532, ¶ 13; People v. DiCorpo, 2020 IL App (1st) 172082, ¶ 53.
¶ 66 We first addressed this issue in Peacock, in the context of an 80-year sentence imposed on a juvenile offender for murder. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, ¶¶ 1-3. In that case, just as here, in light of the holding in Buffer, the State argued that because the defendant could be released in 40 years or less with good time served, his sentence was not de facto life and the court was not required to find the defendant permanently incorrigible before imposing the 80-year term. Id. ¶ 15. We rejected the State‘s argument, holding that the defendant‘s sentence was indeed de facto life. Id. ¶ 17. As we aptly explained:
“Defendant was not sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment but was instead sentenced to 80 years’ imprisonment with the mere possibility of release after 40 years. Moreover, to serve a sentence of 40 years, he must receive every single day of good conduct credit for
which he could be eligible. Defendant‘s receipt of day-for-day credit is not guaranteed. [Citations.] The IDOC ‘has the right to revoke good-conduct credits for disciplinary infractions, [and] an inmate‘s right to receive the credits is contingent upon his good behavior while in prison.’ [Citations.] The IDOC ‘ultimately has discretion as to whether defendant will be awarded any credit,’ and the trial court has no control over the manner in which a defendant‘s good conduct credit is earned or lost. [Citation.] Accordingly, we conclude that defendant‘s 80-year sentence, for which he may receive day-for-day credit, constitutes a de facto life sentence.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 67 Subsequently, in Thornton, we revisited the issue in the context of a juvenile defendant‘s postconviction challenge to his 70-year murder sentence. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170677, ¶¶ 20-22. Here again, the State argued that because of good-time credit, the defendant was likely to serve only 35 years and therefore his sentence should be treated as a 35-year term rather than an unconstitutional 70-year de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 18. The State also explicitly urged this court to find that Peacock had been wrongly decided. Id. ¶ 21. Rejecting the State‘s argument, we reiterated that day-for-day credit is not guaranteed because it is IDOC rather than the trial court that has the ultimate discretion as to whether any such credit will be awarded. Id. ¶ 22. We therefore held that “the State‘s assurances [of good time credit] are not enough for us to consider the defendant‘s sentence as anything other than a 70-year term.” Id.
¶ 68 Since Thornton, our appellate courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the holding of Peacock. See Figueroa, 2020 IL App (1st) 172390, ¶ 35 (“we adhere to Peacock and Thornton“); Daniel, 2020 IL App (1st) 172267, ¶¶ 23-26 (applying Peacock and Thornton to find that a 70-year sentence was de facto life, even though defendant was eligible for day-for-day good-conduct credit that could “reduce his time served to 35 years“); Quezada, 2020 IL App (1st) 170532, ¶¶ 13, 16
¶ 69 Their rationale has always been the same, namely that we may not consider day-for-day credit in calculating what constitutes de facto life because day-for-day credit is a function of IDOC and not the judiciary. Quezada, 2020 IL App (1st) 170532, ¶ 13. It is axiomatic that “the trial court does not control the manner in which good-conduct credit is earned and lost by a prisoner.” People v. Castano, 392 Ill. App. 3d 956, 960 (2009); see also Quezada, 2020 IL App (1st) 170532, ¶ 16. The Unified Code of Corrections tasks the IDOC, not the trial court, with prescribing the rules and regulations for awarding and revoking sentencing credit.
¶ 70 We agree with the rationale of these decisions and therefore hold that it was improper for the trial court to consider day-for-day credit in determining whether the defendant‘s 50-year sentence constitutes de facto life. Under the clear holding in Buffer, the judicially imposed 50-year discretionary term exceeds 40 years and is therefore a de facto life sentence.
¶ 71 The State nonetheless asserts that even if we find that the imposed 50-year sentence is de facto life, the trial court was well within its discretion to impose such a sentence, where it found that the defendant was permanently incorrigible. For the following reasons, we disagree.
¶ 72 As already noted above, in Illinois “a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life or de facto life imprisonment, but before doing so, the trial court must ‘determine[ ] that the defendant‘s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.‘” Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, 22 (quoting Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46); see also People v. Hill, 2020 IL App (1st) 171739, ¶ 46 (for a ”de facto life sentence, the court must find permanent incorrigibility“).
¶ 73 In the present case, the record reveals that the trial court made no such finding. The State correctly points out that at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it understood that even under Miller it was permitted to sentence the defendant to a discretionary life sentence and then mused over whether the defendant was one such rare juvenile whose crimes warranted a life sentence. Nonetheless, contrary to the State‘s position, the record reveals that the court ultimately
¶ 74 Although the State is correct that, when making a finding of incorrigibility, the sentencing court need not recite “magic words” (see People v. Perez, 2020 IL App (1st) 153629-B, ¶ 56 (Pierce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), almost every finding that the trial court made here rejects the conclusion that the defendant is one of the rare juvenile offenders who deserves a de facto life sentence.
¶ 75 As noted above, prior to making a finding of incorrigibility, the trial court was required to and did consider the defendant‘s youth and its attendant characteristics, including, but not limited to the following factors: (1) the defendant‘s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the defendant‘s family and home environment; (3) the defendant‘s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the defendant‘s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the defendant‘s prospects for rehabilitation. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46; see also
¶ 77 Under this record, and taking into account that “the trial court‘s sentence of de facto life *** is in [clear] conflict with its determination that a life sentence was not warranted,” we conclude that the sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment as applied to the defendant. DiCorpo, 2020 IL App (1st) 172082, ¶ 54; see also People v. Murphy, 2019 IL App (4th) 170646, 48 (holding that the trial court‘s “determination that [the] defendant, a juvenile, had the potential to rehabilitate contravenes any conclusion that defendant was permanently incorrigible or irretrievably depraved and is, therefore, unconstitutionally at odds with a de facto life sentence without parole“). We therefore vacate the defendant‘s sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. See Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, ¶ 25.
¶ 78 Because we find that defendant‘s sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence under Buffer
¶ 79 On remand, however, we instruct the trial court to take into consideration that the new sentence will necessarily be served consecutively with the 30-year sentence imposed in case No. 94-CR-24440. Any aggregate sentence, regardless of whether it is imposed for a single or separate crime, which by operation of law exceeds de facto life as defined by Buffer, is unconstitutional unless it is also made in tandem with a finding that the defendant is beyond rehabilitation. See Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 (“A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant‘s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation.“); see also Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (“[T]he teachings of the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy require sentencing courts to provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining a juvenile‘s ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform’ when, as here, the aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without parole. To do otherwise would be to ignore the reality that lengthy aggregate sentences have the effect of mandating that a juvenile ‘die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more appropriate.’ [Citation.] Such a lengthy sentence “means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the juvenile convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” ’ [Citation.]
¶ 80 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 81 For the aforementioned reasons, we vacate the defendant‘s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing with instructions.
¶ 82 Sentence vacated; cause remanded.
| Cite as: | People v. Ruiz, 2021 IL App (1st) 182401 |
| Decision Under Review: | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 96-CR-6048; the Hon. Charles P. Burns, Judge, presiding. |
| Attorneys for Appellant: | James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Levi S. Harris, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant. |
| Attorneys for Appellee: | Kimberly M. Foxx, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Christine Cook, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. |