People v. RowePeople v. Rowe
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Maher
The defendant appeals as of right from a jury conviction for the crime of resisting arrest, contrary to
On April 12, 1977, the 58th District Court, a district of the first class consisting of the County of Ottawa (
Two Holland police officers went to defendant’s residence in Holland Township, outside of the City of Holland, to execute the warrant. Defendant’s resistance to that arrest led to this conviction.
Defendant contends on appeal that the officers had no authority to arrest him outside of the city and that he was entitled to a jury instruction to that effect. In addition, defendant contends that he is entitled to be discharged because the officers, acting without authority, had only the arrest power of a private citizen and no statutory grounds for a citizen’s arrest existed.
In arguing that the officers had no authority to arrest him outside of the territorial limits of the city, defendant relies on the common-law rule. See 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest, § 18, p 709; 6A CJS, Arrest, § 53b, p 125; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 59, p 92. However, the common-law rule has been abrogated by statute in Michigan.
Arrest warrants may be executed in any part of the state.
“The office of justice of the peace is a part of the
The magistrate’s authority to issue warrants is equivalent to the authority of a circuit judge and extends county-wide.
“If it appears from such examination that any criminal offense not cognizable by a justice of the peace has been committed, the magistrate shall issue a warrant directed to the sheriff, chief of police, constable or any peace officer of the county, reciting the substance of the accusation and commanding him forthwith to take the person accused of having committed the offense and bring him before the appropriate court to be dealt with according to law, and in the same warrant may require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named therein.” (Emphasis added.)
Similarly,
In the present case the warrant was directed in accordance with those statutes to “any sheriff, deputy sheriff, court officer, state police officer, or police officer”. As a consequence the Holland police officers, to whom the arrest warrant was directed, had statutory authority to execute the
“If any person against whom a warrant shall be issued for an alleged offense committed within any county, shall, either before or after the issuing of such warrant, escape from or be out of the county, the sheriff or other officer to whom such warrant may be directed‘, may pursue and apprehend the party charged, in any county of this state, and for that purpose may command aid and may exercise the same authority as in his county.” (Emphasis added.)
Specific provision has been made for state-wide execution of arrest warrants by police officers of the City of Detroit (
In addition, pursuant to the statutory scheme, both the arresting officer and the prisoner are guaranteed safe passage across the state and both are privileged from arrest on civil process while they return to the jurisdiction of the court issuing the warrant.
Pursuant to the statutes cited, when a warrant is directed to a law enforcement officer, the warrant itself provides the authority needed to exe
“Two things are necessary to justify an arrest on a warrant; fírst, a warrant good on its face, and, second an authority in the person who undertakes to act under it.
“If a warrant is upon its face void, then no officer can justify under it; although, as a general rule, no officer is bound to look behind a regular warrant, coming from a proper jurisdiction. It is laid down without dissent, that no person is bound to submit * * * to an arrest made by an unauthorized person under a good warrant * * *. In Rex v Weir, 1 B. & C., 288, Bayley, J. says, ‘It is of great consequence that magistrates should be careful to direct their warrants in such a manner that the parties to be affected by them may know that the persons bearing the warrants are authorized to execute them.’ ” (Partial emphasis added.)
Accord,
Wheaton v Beecher,
49 Mich 348, 351; 13 NW 769 (1882);
Ortman v Greenman, 4
Mich 290, 292 (1856). Even more than authority to execute it, a warrant is a command to the officer to execute the warrant promptly under pain of fine or criminal prosecution.
People v Durfee,
62 Mich 487, 491; 29 NW 109 (1886),
Dunn v Gilman,
34 Mich 256, 257 (1876),
In this case, the circuit court justified the arrest outside of the city on the basis of
“When any person has committed or is suspected of having committed any crime or misdemeanor within a city, or has escaped from any city prison, the police officers of the city shall have the same right to pursue, arrest and detain such person without the city limits as the sheriff of the county.”
In executing an arrest warrant directed to him, the officer functions, in a sense, as a court officer for service of process and acts in a ministerial capacity.
Dunn v Gilman,
34 Mich 256 (1876),
Ortman v Greenman, 4
Mich 290 (1856). See also, 70 Am Jur 2d, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, § 21, p 146. In executing the warrant, the officer acts ministerially
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in the sense that he is not required to make a determination of probable cause; that determination has already been made for him by the magistrate, performing a judicial function.
Birmingham v 48th District Judge,
76 Mich App 33; 255 NW2d 760 (1977). By contrast, a peace officer acting in the traditional role of law enforcement officer acts in a discretionary capacity in numerous matters, including the decision to arrest without a warrant. Under the common law, a peace officer’s authority to act in that traditional role was generally limited to the territorial limits of the officer’s jurisdiction. One exception to that rule even at common law was the exception for
In summary, we hold that a law enforcement officer to whom a warrant is addressed may execute the warrant anywhere in the county where it is issued and, if the accused is out of the county, the law enforcement officer may execute it in any part of the state. In executing the warrant, the officer acts, as it were, as an officer of the court in the state’s single court of justice and the officer is not bound to the territorial limits of the govern
We therefore conclude that the defendant’s allegations of error in the jury instructions are without merit.
Affirmed.
Notes
Made applicable to all criminal proceedings by
See footnote 1.
Of course, the arresting officer does exercise some discretion as, for example, in deciding how much force to use in executing the warrant; but, the decision to arrest and the existence of probable cause have been determined by a judicial officer and are not questions within the officer’s discretion. In contrast, when an officer, acting in the traditional role, decides to arrest without a warrant, the officer exercises discretion in determining whether probable cause exists for an arrest and whether to arrest then or defer arrest until a more appropriate time.
There are
statutory
exceptions to the common-law rule that a peace officer cannot exercise traditional law enforcement powers outside of the officer’s territorial jurisdiction. Under
Assuming,
arguendo,
that an officer serving an arrest warrant outside his jurisdiction is limited to the arresting authority of a private person, we would still uphold the validity of the arrest. Under