People v. RosenwaldPeople v. Rosenwald
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Carter
delivered the opinion of the court:
This was an action brought by appellant in the municipal court of Chicago to recover taxes on thé personal property of appellee for the year 1913, under section 23a of the Revenue act. (Hurd’s Stat. 1913, p. 2065.) The claim filed was for $7826.11. The trial court allowed and entered judgment for $782.61. This appeal followed.
Counsel for appellee have made a motion to strike the bill of exceptions from the record on the ground that it was not presented to the trial judge within sixty days for signing and sealing. This motion was taken with the case and the question has been argued at length in the briefs.
The judgment was entered August 12, 1914. Under section 38 of the Municipal Court act a bill of exceptions “may be tendered to the judge at any time within sixty days after the entry of a final order or judgment, or within such further’ time thereafter as the court, upon application made therefor within such sixty days, may allow.” (Hurd’s Stat.
Counsel on both sides state that section 81 of the Practice act has been adopted by rule 23 of the municipal court, and therefore applies here and should be construed in deciding this question, along with said section 38 of the Municipal Court act. We will so assume for the purposes of, this case.
That part of section 81 of the Practice act which we are asked to construe reads: “A bill of exceptions, certificate of evidence, or report of trial allowed in any cause shall be deemed sufficiently authenticated if signed by the judge of the court in which the cause was tried or by the presiding judge thereof, if more than one judge sat at the trial of the cause, without any seal of the court or judge annexed thereto. And in case the judge before whom the cause has heretofore been, or may hereafter be tried, is, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, unable to hear’ and pass upon a motion for a new trial in a case at law, and allow and sign a bill of exceptions, certificate of evidence or report of trial, then the judge who succeeds such trial judge, or any other judge of the court in which the cause was
Previous to 1907 the general Practice act of this State contained no provisions of this kind. This court, however, had made numerous rulings before the passage of this portion of said section 81 of the Practice act which had more or less bearing on the question here under consideration. In David v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 316, the court held that a bill of exceptions signed by one judge without the consent and against the objections of one of the. parties, containing proceedings which took place wholly before another judge, was irregular and unauthorized. In Alley v. McCabe, 147 Ill. 410, the question was raised after the death of the trial judge whether. any other judge had authority to sign the bill of exceptions, and it was there intimated that even though this might be done, it would only be permitted where the record showed that the appellant had used due diligence to obtain a bill of exceptions, not only after but before the death of the trial judge. Later, in People v. McConnell, 155 Ill. 192, the same case being under consideration, it was held, after a review of the authorities, that after the death of the trial judge, after verdict but before motion for new trial, the succeeding judge had authority, and it was his duty, to decide the motion for new trial. By a long and unbroken line of decisions this court has also held
A reading of the foregoing and other decisions of this court makes it quite apparent that some of the provisions of section 81 of the Practice act heretofore quoted were the established law of this State before these provisions were made a part of said act in 1907. Section 953 of the United States statutes, as amended in 1900, contains substantially the same provisions as to bills of exceptions and stenographic notes as are found in said section 81 of our Practice act heretofore set out. (31 U. S. Stat. at Large, 1899-1900, p. 270.) It is manifest from comparing the provisions of the two statutes that ours was copied from that of the United States, with one or two slight changes that in no way affect the question here under consideration.
While this court has never had occasion, since its enactment, to construe our statute on the questions here under consideration, the Federal courts have passed upon some features of the Federal statute. It has been held that the words “other disability,” in the phrase “by reason of death, sickness or other disability,” should be construed to be a physical or mental disability of like character to death or sickness, by which the trial judge is disabled from the performance of judicial functions, and his absence from the district or circuit, merely, does not authorize the allowance and signing of a bill of exceptions by another judge. (Western Dredging and Improvement Co. v. Heldmaier, 49 C. C. A. 264.) We agree with the reasoning of that decision. Our statute must be construed, on this question, in the same manner. It may be noted in passing that the statute in question does not refer in any way to marking a bill of exceptions as presented, but only to the final signing of the bill. The Federal court, in a later opinion involving the same case, held that the judge who actually tried the case, on the recitation in the bill of exceptions by him that he was
When the bill of exceptions was presented to Judge Hopkins on October 10, 1914, he undoubtedly could have
Counsel for appellant further insist that this motion to strike should not be allowed here, because appellee and her counsel stood by and permitted, without objection, the nunc pro tunc order to be entered. We find nothing in the record indicating that appellee or her counsel consented to the entry of this nunc pro tunc order. If the record so showed, then the holding of this court in Brethold v. Village of Wilmette, 168 Ill. 162, would control, and appellee could not now object. The question of what is in the record may be tried by the record at any time. (Haines v. Danderine Co., supra.) Appellee has not waived, on this record, the right to raise the objection that the bill of exceptions was not signed within the time allowed by law. See Reliable Incubator and Brooder Co. v. Stahl, 42 C. C. A. 522.
The motion to strike the bill of exceptions from the transcript of the record must be allowed.
The assignments of error filed in this court all being based upon the matters in the bill of exceptions and not on anything contained in the common law record, and the bill of exceptions having been stricken, the judgment of the municipal court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.