delivered the opinion of the court:
Thе State appeals the trial court’s order quashing the arrest of defendant, Michael Rosemeier, and suрpressing evidence. The State contends that the court’s finding that a State trooper lacked a reаsonable articulable basis to stop defendant’s car was manifestly erroneous.
Defendant was chargеd with driving with a revoked license. (625 ILCS 5/6 — 303 (West 1992).) He filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, which the court granted.
Defendant was driving west on Route 20 about 3:30 a.m. on March 29, 1992. At the same time, Trooper William Kearney was driving eаst on Route 20 near the intersection of Brown Hills Road. Kearney spotted defendant’s car about a quartеr mile ahead of him. Kearney activated his radar and obtained a reading of 45 miles per hour. He felt this was unusual, because the average speed of cars on Route 20 at that hour of the night was between 55 and 70 miles рer hour.
Kearney turned around at the intersection of Brown Hills Road and followed defendant’s car. He testifiеd that he noticed defendant’s left tires cross the center line twice and "kind of weave back into the drive lane.” Kearney felt that the driver was not paying attention, was tired, or was driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He therefore stopped defendant’s car.
As the officer approached the car, defеndant volunteered that his license was revoked. He explained that the car belonged to his friend, who was in the passenger seat but was too intoxicated to drive. Defendant admitted having had "a couple of beers,” but passed a field sobriety test.
At the point where defendant had been driving, Route 20 has two lanes in each direсtion, separated by a grass median-. It was raining on March 29. There are no streetlights in that area, so it was very dаrk.
Defendant testified that he did not remember his tires crossing the lane marker. On redirect examination, he stated that if his wheels had crossed the line, it was prior to the officer’s beginning to follow him. It could not have been while the officer was following him, because he was "really cautious then.”
The court granted defendant’s motion, finding:
"Given the outset [szc] I think there is merit to the defendаnt’s contention that there wasn’t a reasonable articulable cause or circumstance which would givе cause to give a belief that the defendant had committed, was committing or was about to commit a traffic offense. I have heard no evidence that he committed any traffic offense or was about to cоmmit a traffic offense. Accordingly the arrest in question is quashed and the defendant is ordered discharged.”
The State filed a timely notice of appeal, and now contends that the court erred in granting defendant’s motion. Thе State contends that the court incorrectly believed that the officer had to observe a traffic violation in order to make an investigatory stop. Alternatively, the State argues that the court gave undue weight to defendant’s ambiguous testimony about crossing the center line.
We note that defendant has failed to file an аppellee’s brief. We will, however, consider the appeal under the standard set forth in First Capitol Mortgаge Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976),
A police officer may briefly stop and detain an individual to investigatе the possibility of criminal behavior absent probable cause to arrest. (Terry v. Ohio (1968),
The State correctly contends that an officer need not actually witness a violation in order to effect a traffic stop. (Pеople v. Houlihan (1988),
In the cases the State cites, facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion were essentially undisputed. (See People v. O’Brien (1992),
The trial court has the responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses. (O’Brien,
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
INGLIS, P.J., and GEIGER, J„ concur.