People v. RobinsonPeople v. Robinson
At the suppression hearing, the People presented evidence
In denying defendant‘s suppression motion, the court concluded that the traffic stop was lawful based upon “a founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot” (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). That was error. It is well established that ” ‘police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime’ ” (People v Washburn, 309 AD2d 1270, 1271 [2003], quoting People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 753 [1995], cert denied 516 US 905 [1995]), or “where the police have ‘probable cause to believe that the driver . . . has committed a traffic violation’ ” (id., quoting People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]). Here, the People do not contend that this was a routine check to enforce traffic regulations, and instead rely on defendant‘s commission of a traffic infraction under