THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v WILLIAM ROBINSON, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
August 24, 2011
995 NYS2d 371
Devine, J.
After leaving his sister‘s residence, the victim was approached on the street by two unknown men, one of whom repeatedly slashed the victim in the face with a box cutter. Approximately one month later, the victim observed defendant walking down a street and flagged down a police officer, showed the officer a police incident report detailing the attack and provided a description of the assailant. Shortly thereafter, defendant, who matched
Defendant was indicted on two counts of assault in the first degree and, following a jury trial, convicted of one count. Defendant‘s posttrial motion to set aside the verdict was denied and County Court sentenced defendant, as a second felony offender, to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of post-release supervision. Defendant now appeals.
Initially, defendant argues that the jury‘s verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. A verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence when “there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial” (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; see People v Johnson, 24 AD3d 803, 804 [2005]). The People were required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury[,] . . . cause[d] such injury . . . by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument” (
The victim testified that defendant approached him and asked “what‘s poppin’ Blood” and then, without provocation, slashed his face repeatedly with a box cutter. Conversely, defendant testified that the victim and another individual came up to him and asked how much money he had on him. Defendant further averred that he warned the men to “back up” and pulled a box cutter out of his pocket and, after the victim struck defendant in the head with a metal pipe, defendant swung outward with the box cutter and slashed the victim in the face. The parties did stipulate during trial that the blood residue found on defendant‘s box cutter was that of the victim. Defendant‘s fiancée, Ericka Ferguson, took the stand in an attempt to corroborate defendant‘s version of the incident, however, her credibility was greatly diminished when the People inquired about telephone conversations that she had with defendant while he was detained in jail following his arrest, during which they attempted to fabricate a different justification defense. In particular, after the People had to refresh her recollection several times during cross-examination, Ferguson eventually conceded that she and defendant concocted a false version of the incident in
As far as the victim‘s injuries are concerned, the victim‘s treating physician testified that the lacerations to the victim‘s cheek, nose and eyebrow required 29 external stitches and four internal stitches and left significant permanent scarring, which the jury observed during the victim‘s testimony and properly found constituted “serious and protracted disfigurement” (People v Powell, 101 AD3d 1369, 1370 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 1019 [2013], quoting
Defendant further asserts that County Court erroneously limited the jury‘s consideration of evidence of the victim‘s history of attempted armed robberies for impeachment purposes. Proof of a victim‘s previous crimes is admissible to impeach his or her credibility or—where a defendant was aware of prior, similar violent acts committed by the victim—for the purpose of demonstrating that the defendant‘s acts of self-defense were justified (see Matter of Robert S., 52 NY2d 1046, 1048 [1981];
Moreover, we find unavailing defendant‘s claim that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when County Court ruled that the victim could refuse to answer questions regarding the nature of pending criminal charges against him in light of the victim‘s invocation of his 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. During cross-examination, defense counsel was given great latitude in questioning the victim about his outstanding criminal charges, yet the court properly exercised its discretion when it limited the scope of such questions to those tending to affect the victim‘s credibility (see People v Siegel, 87 NY2d 536, 544 [1995]; People v Hickman, 60 AD3d 865, 866 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 916 [2009]).
Next, as to the argument that the victim‘s identification of defendant and the evidence that resulted from the improper detention and search of defendant should have been suppressed, we find such assertion to be without merit. After spotting his assailant on the street approximately one month after the attack, the victim stopped a nearby police officer to report that defendant had previously attacked him, showed the officer his facial lacerations and the police report detailing the assault and described defendant‘s skin coloring and clothing. Where, as here, a “complainant flags down a police officer and then points to the attacker[ ] on the street,” it cannot be said that the initial identification of the defendant was anything other than spontaneous (People v Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 223 [1995]). As the police officer subsequently observed a man matching the victim‘s description walking in the area where the victim had directed him, sufficient cause existed to warrant the detention and questioning of defendant (see People v Robinson, 101 AD3d 1245, 1245-1246 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1103 [2013]; People
Nor do we determine that County Court erred in denying, following a hearing, defendant‘s
Defendant‘s remaining arguments have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Peters, P.J., Stein, Garry and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.