134 Misc. 2d 555 | New York County Courts | 1986
OPINION OF THE COURT
The defendant has moved for an order granting him a
The defendant, age 18 at the time of the alleged criminal incident and an eligible youthful offender (CPL 720.10 [2]), has been indicted for the crime of assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00), a class A misdemeanor. He contends that, under these circumstances, he is, or should be, entitled to mandatory youthful offender treatment pursuant to CPL 720.20 (1) (b). He asserts that he should thus be granted a single Judge, nonpublic trial apart from his "adult” codefendants. (CPL 340.40 [7]; 720.15 [2].) The defendant further argues that he is named only in count No. 2 of the indictment, charged with causing "physical injury” to the complainant. (Penal Law § 10.00 [9].) Count No. 1 of the indictment charges Damon Hewlette with causing serious physical injury to the complainant in the course of a postparty melee. (Penal Law §§ 120.05 [assault, second degree], 10.00 [10].) The defendant contends that the presentation to a jury of the bizarre circumstances bearing on count No. 1 will irrevocably prejudice, by "transference of guilt”, its assessment of his "minimal involvement, if any” in the fracas and, "in effect, deny him a fair trial”. "Charge premises upon disparate levels of and varying allegations of culpability, foreshadow confusion of evidence and prejudice to the Defendant”. Therefore, pursuant to the discretionary provisions of CPL 200.40 (1), the defendant requests he be granted a separate trial.
The Special District Attorney responds by asserting first that the defendant is not a person entitled to mandatory youth offender status because he is before a superior court under indictment, albeit charged only with a misdemeanor. (CPL 720.20 [1] [b].) He further asserts that the People have three interlocking confessions and that contrary to the defendant’s contention, "the facts surrounding defendants’ assault upon Mr. Leahy [the complainant] and their conduct in aiding and abetting each other in the commission of such assault, including their respective roles in fending off those seeking to assist Mr. Leahy, require that this matter be tried in one trial, before one jury * * * A 'joint trial’ would not, as alleged by Mr. Z * * * result in prejudice to him. Indeed, a severance would rather, make the presentation of this action to a jury disjointed and make confusion more likely.”
The defendant’s first ground for seeking a trial severance raises a very troublesome issue. It essentially calls into ques
CPL 720.20 provides:
"1. Upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court must order a presentence investigation of the defendant. After receipt of a written report of the investigation and at the time of pronouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender. Such determination shall be in accordance with the following criteria:
"(a) If in the opinion of the court the interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than four years, the court may, in its discretion, find the eligible youth is a youthful offender; and
"(b) Where the conviction is had in a local criminal court and the eligible youth had not prior to commencement of trial or entry of a plea of guilty been convicted of a crime or found a youthful offender, the court must find he is a youthful offender.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute makes youthful offender treatment mandatory where a youth (CPL 720.10 [1]), who has never before been convicted of a crime (Penal Law § 10.00 [6]) or been the subject of a youthful offender adjudication (CPL 720.10 [3]), is convicted of an offense in a local criminal court (CPL 10.10 [3]). (Compare, CPL 720.10 [2], [3], with 720.20 [1] [b].) For all other eligible youths, a youthful offender finding is discretionary. (CPL 720.20 [1] [a].) The defendant here apparently meets all of the criteria set forth in CPL 720.20 (1) (b) for mandatory youthful offender treatment, save one. Though charged only with a misdemeanor, his case is presently pending in a superior court rather than before a local criminal court, only because the prosecution is proceeding by way of indictment rather than by information. (CPL 1.20 [3], [4], [24].) The defendant sees this as a denial of his constitutionally guaranteed right to equal protection of the law. (US Const 14th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 11.)
An equal protection challenge to New York’s youthful offender statutes is not new. Most notable for present purposes, the statutes were able to withstand a constitutional attack from an otherwise eligible youth, charged by indictment with
There is no constitutional right to youthful offender treatment. Such treatment is entirely "a gratuitous creature of the Legislature subject to such conditions as the Legislature may impose without violating constitutional guarantees. ” (People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 584, supra; emphasis supplied; see also, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 2, Constitution, Constitutional Interpretation § 41.) Therefore, the legislative classification contained in CPL 720.20 (1) is "cloaked with a presumption of validity which may be overcome only 'if no grounds can be conceived to justify [it]’ ”. (People v Drayton, supra, at 584, citing McDonald v Board of Election, 394 US 802, 809; see also, United States v Bland, 472 F2d 1329, 1333-1334, cert denied 412 US 909.) Furthermore, since the challenged classification does not involve either "suspect classifications” or "fundamental rights” (Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1; Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533), the application of a "rational basis test”, not one of strict scrutiny, is appropriate. (People v Drayton, supra, at 584-585, and cases cited therein; see also, Drayton v People, 423 F Supp 786, 787-788, revd 556 F2d 644, 645, supra; People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457, 460.
Applying their version of the "rational basis” test, the Court of Appeals found the distinction drawn by CPL 720.20 (1) not to be arbitrary. The court held that the classification in the statute was based upon the gravity of the crime charged and that "there is a rational basis for distinguishing between a youth accused of a felony and one charged with a misdemeanor.” (People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 585, supra; emphasis supplied.) The court continued: "There is no invidious discrimination involved in a legislative decision that those individuals who, on preliminary investigation, are believed to have committed felonies should not automatically be endowed with the benefit of youthful offender status and that in these cases youthful offender status should be conferred only in the court’s discretion upon due consideration of the youth’s background and prior history of involvement with the law.” (People v Drayton, supra, at 585.) The court further found it was rational for the Legislature to have decided, in the interest of judicial economy, that it would not be necessary to require "a time-consuming investigation for the purpose of determining youthful offender eligibility in misdemeanor cases where the criminal act charged is not as serious as in the case of felonies.” (People v Drayton, supra, at 585-586; emphasis supplied.) In affirming the holding of this State’s highest court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals added some definition to the decision. Their decision centered strongly on the sentenc
It is generally agreed that the purpose of the youthful offender statutes is "to spare young adults who have violated the criminal laws from the stigma and adverse consequences that necessarily flow from a criminal conviction.” (People ex rel. Colvin v Board of Parole, 75 Misc 2d 432, 435, affd 45 AD2d 50; see also, People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 584, supra; Drayton v People, 423 F Supp 786, 792, supra.) It is clear that the courts which found constitutional the statutory classification of youths who must receive this benefit did so on the basis of the rationality of a distinction grounded on the gravity of the crime originally charged in an accusatory instrument which could serve as the basis for a prosecution of that charge.
The only distinction between this defendant and those accused misdemeanants for whom youthful offender treatment is mandatory is the forum in which the charge is pending. There is no basis, rational or otherwise, for treating this defendant differently from them. The statutory classifications were found to be constitutional not because of inherent differences between superior and local criminal courts, but because of the preliminary finding of potentially serious criminal conduct which brings a particular case to one forum rather than the other. Obviously, prosecutorial discretion can play a major role in which it will be. (See, Drayton v People, 556 F2d 644, 647, n 1, supra; People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 586, supra, citing, inter alia, United States v Bland, 472 F2d 1329, cert denied 412 US 909, supra.) But, prosecutorial discretion, broad and virtually unencumbered though it may be (see, for example, United States v Verra, 203 F Supp 87), cannot of itself provide a rational basis for a statutory classification. Prosecutorial discretion can determine in which forum a charge is brought, or the gravity of a charge, or whether a prosecution proceeds at all. (See, United States v Bland, supra, at 1335-1337; Cox v United States, 473 F2d 334, 335-336.) Prosecutorial
The application of the rational basis test requires initially that the basis for the statutory classification and the purported government objective be determined. The classification must then be compared to the objective to determine whether
This court is well aware that a strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to a statute duly enacted by the Legislature (People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333, 337), and that, to declare a law unconstitutional, the invalidity must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. (Matter of Van Berkel v Power, 16 NY2d 37, 40.) Guided by these principles, this court has always deemed it the better practice for nisi prius courts to hold a statute unconstitutional only in the most clear-cut and convincing case. (See generally, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 2, Constitution, Constitutional Interpretation §§ 43, 46, 47.) Mindful of this, and based upon the foregoing, it appears to this court that, as applied to this defendant, CPL 720.20 (1) is unconstitutional. This defendant is clearly entitled to mandatory youthful offender status.
The unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to the defendant does not, however, affect the validity of the underlying accusatory instrument. (Cf, CPL 210.20 [1] [a], [n]; 210.25.) Rather, it affects the range of punishment imposable should
That portion of the defendant’s motion seeking a trial severance is granted.
. In People v Whidden (51 NY2d 457, 460), Judge Wachtler for the majority set forth as the rational basis test "whether the varied treatment of separate classifications of citizens 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective’ (McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425)”.
. In his dissent in People v Whidden (51 NY2d 457, 463), Judge Meyer stated the test to be that the statutory classification must bear a rational relationship to a permissible governmental objective. (See generally, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 2, Constitution, Constitutional Interpretation §§ 22-23.)
. It should be noted that the court considered Drayton’s guilty plea to have been of great significance. Their guilty plea/waiver analysis preceded their consideration of the constitutional merits of CPL 720.20.
. There is no indication that either the State or the Federal Court of Appeals deemed the allegations of a felony complaint (CPL 1.20 [8]) or the findings of a local criminal court Judge in holding a defendant for the action of a Grand Jury (CPL 180.70 [1]) to be the functional or substantive equivalent of a Grand Jury inquiry. It should also be noted that a superior court may acquire trial jurisdiction of a crime (i.e., a felony or misdemeanor) through the medium of a superior court information (CPL 1.20 [3-