On Fеbruary 1, 1985, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled nolo сontendere to one count of manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, and one count of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592. His appeal from the manslaughter conviction has already been affirmed by another panel of this Court. People v Rivera, unpublished opinion pеr curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided July 18, 1986 (Docket No. 82113). Now, defеndant appeals his conviction on the larceny charge. We affirm.
In exchange for defendant’s plea, numerous charges including armed rоbbery, first-degree murder and a supplemental information were subsequently dismissed. Defendant’s sole argument here is that he was denied his constitutional right to а speedy trial. Defendant raised an identical issue in the previous appeal from his manslaughter conviction. In that instance this Court rejectеd defendant’s claim on the basis that defendant’s nolo contendere рlea waived all nonjurisdictional defects. The Court concluded that thе claimed denial of the right to a speedy trial was a nonjurisdictional dеfect and defendant’s argument was waived by his plea.
There has been a split on this Court over whether a right to raise on appeal a claim of a denial of the right to a speedy trial survives a
*672
guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere. For authority for the proposition that a speedy trial claim is waived by a plea, see
People v Parshay,
The most recent case to decide this issue sided with those cases that hаve held that a speedy trial issue survives a guilty plea. See
People v Sickles,
The operant language taken from People v New is as follows:
Today, we hold that a defendant, after pleading guilty, may raise on аppeal only those defenses and rights which would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant. Such rights and defenses "reach beyond the factual determination of defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial . . . .” [People v White,411 Mich 366 , 398;308 NW2d 128 (1981)] (Moody, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) In such cases, thе state has no legitimate interest in securing a conviction. On the other hand, where the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove defendant’s factual guilt, it is subsumеd by defendant’s guilty plea. [Id. at 491.]
From this language, Sickles concludes that, despite the fact that People v New did not involve a speedy trial defense, the rationale in People v New *673 leads to the result that a plea of nolo сontendere will not waive a speedy trial issue, because "[s]peedy trial issues do not relate to the state’s capacity to prove a defendant’s factual guilt but instead go more to the state’s right to ultimately bring а defendant to trial.” People v Sickles, supra at 351-351.
We are unable to agree that
People v New
has resolved this issue. The decision in
People v New
can only be characterized as more restriсtive upon a defendant’s rights subsequent to the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
People v New
expressly rejected the more expansive language of
People v Alvin Johnson,
If panels of this Court could conclude that a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere operated as a waiver of a due process сlaim based on a denial of the right to a speedy trial despite the hоlding in People v Alvin Johnson, such reasoning must still survive the holding in People v New in light of its broader application of waiver in guilty plea cases.
Consequently, we conclude, consistent with
Pеople v Parshay, supra, People v Williams, supra, United States v Freed,
688 F2d 24 (CA 6, 1982), and
United States v Lee,
500 F2d 586 (CA 8, 1974), cert den
Affirmed.