People v. Riggs

only defect, equity per- contained technical

mits County's the reformation of the treasur- The PEOPLE of the State of er's deed based on undisputed evidence Colorado, Petitioner presented to the trial regarding v. validity underlying tax sale.

Randy RIGGS, Respondent. Dean 3. Relation Back No. 02SC543. only remaining question is Supreme Colorado, whether the Court reformed deed relates back to original En deed. We hold that it Banc. does. Generally, reformation of an instrument re March original lates back to the date of execution of the instrument. 76 C.J.S. Reformation Rehearing April Denied 2004.* Instruments exception An made where such injure reformation would purchasers

"bona fide without notice and standing

those in similar relations." Id. Be County's

cause the deed properly was re

corded, providing constructive any notice to claiming

one property, interest in the

Timroth cannot take shelter under this ex

ception. The mere fact that the deed was

not reformed until after the institution of against

Timroth's action County is of no See, consequence. e.g., Foley Worthing

ton, (1949) 202 Okla.

(noting deed, that a corrected tax issued to

replace deed, a defective related back to the

original though deed even the corrected deed

was not issued until litigation after the com

menced); McCullough Young, 198 Okla. (1946)(same). 175P.2d

III. Conclusion County

We hold that the properly stated a

claim for reformation of its treasurer's deed

pursuant to Rule 105. We further hold that County was entitled to reformation of deed, and the deed as reformed relates

back to the date of issuance of original

deed. We therefore reverse the court of

appeals opinion and remand the case to the

court of for reinstatement

district court granting summary order judg- quieting

ment and County. title in the

* Justice MARTINEZ and grant Justice BENDER would the Petition. General, T. Salazar, Attorney John

Ken General, Attorney Criminal Bryan, Assistant Denver, Division, Section, Appellate Justice Colorado, Attorney for Petitioner. Defender, Public Kaplan, State David S. Walta, Defend- Deputy Public G. State Mark Colorado, Respon- Denver, Attorney for er, dent. Opinion delivered

Justice COATS the Court. the court of sought review of People Riggs, judgment People

appeals' tempo concerning the (Colo.App.2002), insanity acquittee from rary removal of re hospital. The court the state rejecting the district court's order versed the permit the recommendation staff's Randy Riggs from temporary removal of and rehabilitation. for treatment confinement any express articulation In the absence statute, the court in the removal standards court should the district appeals held that potential of weighed the rehabilitative danger to potential against community, giving due consideration professionals, care the health the recommen approved it should have proved unless the district dation that remov the evidence preponderance of Because unwarranted. al was imposing this burden appeals erred proof on what is a matter of discretion for aspects residual of his personality antisocial the district we disorder, reverse. they did not believe that he would pose danger to himself or others.3 L. Apart testimony physi- In April respondent, Randy D. cians, consisted of cross-exami- Riggs strangled a woman and had sexual by nation attorney; the production of district body. intercourse with her dead The follow- letters from family; victim's op- and an ing day he returned again to her home and portunity Riggs for to address the court and had corpse. relations with her Riggs, then a report offer on family his therapy, a GED years old, sixteen charged was with first- and various certificates of completion, and degree jury murder. In a him found letters recommendation. The district guilty by insanity, reason of and he was court took the matter under advisement. committed to the Colorado Mental Health (CMHIP), Institute Pueblo where lengthy he has In a order, written the district remained ever since. request denied the for temporary re- moval. recounting After leading events through From 1990 gave CMHIP to the plea defendant's guilty by of not rea- notice on six different occasions that it in insanity son of and his subsequent automatic tended to authorize removal of commitment, as well as history of his Riggs for treatment and rehabilitation. On behavior and evaluations confined from while occasion, request each for approval that time until hearing, the district court the district court was either denied or with found that the risk was great far too to drawn CMHIP. In June CMHIP permit Riggs to away be hospital from the again gave notice of its intent to authorize unsupervised. The district court discounted temporary physical removal of Riggs from predictions and hospital assurances hospital for treatment and rehabilitative staff, in part because of long-time their asso- sought activities. It permission Riggs for to clation with Riggs and because of what it premises leave the supervised in a group and considered to be their desire to recognize the later, Riggs' when thought doctors it was success of programs their treatment for him. appropriate order, and without further court emphasize Instead it chose to agree- unsupervised for goal leave.1 The ultimate ment that he should not be left alone with of the treatment discharge was the Riggs any women, young despite great his desire to from CMHIP. so; do diagnosis, his including sexual disor- The district objection, filed an der with features; antisocial and narcissistic permitted statute, and the court heard the inability the doctors' to know for sure if objection 2 At hearing, Riggs two of he was able to fool them. treating physicians sup testified and offered porting documentation for their medical Riggs appealed the district court's refusal professional judgments that Riggs give had to approval, its and with one member of point reached his treatment at which his panel dissenting, the court of continuing progress hinged on his transition majority reversed. A of the court construed into off-grounds supervised They treatment. the statutory provisions for temporary re testified that Riggs while likely would retain moval impose, to implicitly,a any on burden treating 1. physicians One of the for CMHIP testi- 3. The chief presumably, officer of CMHIP was supervised off-grounds however, fied that privileges allow Riggs long- unable to determine that no grounds to leave participate to er "suffered from a mental disease or defect (was) recreational and treatment likely activities under dangerous to cause him be to supervision subject staff and are to himself, others, or to the community suspension. immediate Unsuper- future," revocation or reasonably foreseeable a determination off-grounds privileges vised granted be after obliged report that he would have been years supervised off-grounds six months to five statutorily precipitating: on activity. Riggs' discharge. §See 16-8-116. 16-8-118(1)(b), (2002). 2. 16-8118, C.R.S. 4. 6 C.R.S. incapacity, of mental of a state continuation tempo authorization objecting public, until danger to the corresponding by preponderance prove, rary removal sanity has been restored. unwar it is shown evidence, removal was such sanity provi failing to reflect According In addition Id. at ranted. Riggs' con time of burden, court's at the applicable the district sions

recognition of this eligible failing duct, insanity acquittee becomes held deficient also order was longer has a pub only when he whether for release determination proper reflect achieving him to be likely to cause while ensured mental condition safety could be lic others, and to or to or dangerous to himself purpose therapeutic tem fu reasonably foreseeable potential community, in the weigh the rehabilitative 16-8-120(1). poten against ture. activities porary community on based danger to the tial presumptive of this Largely because giving public, with contact defendant's incapacity mental a state of of continuation of the to the consideration due a burden imposing public, danger to in the exer made professionals health care eligibili prove their insanity acquittees to on The judgment. professional of their cise justified upheld as to ty court release has been the district for ordered appeals court of Chavez, cireumstances. under certain to relevant only evidence on remand consider statutory Currently, at 1050. 629 P.2d these considerations. prove his acquittee to requires the scheme court petitioned this The district of sanity by preponderance a restoration a writ of certiorari. evidence, of his insani evidence once 16-8-115(2). In contrast ty introduced. is IL committed, a civilly person who has been to a acquitted of a is who A defendant criminally adjudicated insane defendant asserting the defense successfully by crime case, conduct, in this by his as demonstrated custody to the committed insanity must be danger corresponding likely illness and until Human Services Department safety of others. threatening to the more § 16-8- for release. eligible he is found Chavez, more strin 1054. The 629 P.2d at (2002). safety public is 105(4), 6 C.R.S. applicable to of release gent standards inter governmental clearly identified reflect criminally defendant committed commitment automatic this supporting est with public associated increased risk People v. Cha acquittees. insanity criminal and, case of as in the the release decision (Colo.1981). 1040, vez, 1052 629 P.2d commitment, release stan those automatic protecting legitimate interest state has reasonably to the state's related are dards previously who from those public Id.; safety. e.g., United public interest but have conduct criminal engaged in overt (D.C.Cir.1976), Ecker, 178 543 F.2d States by responsibility of criminal been relieved 788, 1063, denied, 50 97 S.Ct. 429 U.S. cert. Id.; People v. insanity. see legal reason of (1977); Logan, 196 Colo. L.Ed.2d 779 (1979); 870 588 P.2d Logan, 196 Colo. Howell, (1979); 196 Colo. 588 P.2d 870 P.2d 27 Howell, 586 196 Colo. People v. Alto, (1978); 589 P.2d P.2d 27 State 586 (1978). Lewis, (Alaska 1979); A.2d 403 In re 402 insanity defense (Del.1979). The assertion implicit in the judicial determination and the by finding, whether after Even accused en adjudication-that insanity acquittee has been jury, or a result in criminal conduct gaged (under appropriate sanity restored state questionable a or mental disease standard) must be therefore statutory legally insane defen legal sanity-place released, assembly accounts general posing an persons special class of in a dant safety public interest they state's continued safety were danger public imminent the dis committing court by granting to the detention. immediately released to be adju the released insanity on Chavez, impose conditions An at 1058. cretion 16-8-115(8)(a). The deci acquittee. See presumptive in a therefore results dication impose conditions, sion whether to terms and without court's approval. § 16-8- precisely 118(1)(a),(b),(c). which terms and conditions to From provisions, these impose, solely court of found an intent on is for the court. People v. part Giles, 240, 247, 192 Colo. 413 legislature, despite expressed its con- any specific Without showing or bur cern for safety, to authorize removal of proof, den of statutory grants scheme acquittee into the community, without impose discretion to such terms and supervision condi when the doctors prescribe, so original unless the tions as the court determines are in the best prosecuting officer can prove by preponderance acquittee interests of the community. and the of the evidence 16-8-115@8)(a). although And those condi the risk of dangerousness continued is great punitive nature, too tions cannot be be offset the medical benefits like crimi probationary nal conditions that are unrelat plan. the treatment ed to the individual seeking see Procedurally, juxtaposition this Court, Campbell v. Dist. 195 Colo. 577 burden, which expressly imposed by the (1978), clearly P.2d 1096 proper to re general assembly insanity on acquittees quire an insanity acquittee accept out justify proving "release" their res- supervision. care or See Scheidt v. toration sanity, (by flows reasoning) Meredith, (D.Colo.1970). F.Supp. A from the statute's allowance of authorization defendant who has conditionally been re by the institution, chief officer of the in the remains, statute, leased by super under the any objection, absence of and from the stat- Department vision of the Services, of Human requirement ute's that there be a subject to revocation and recommitment until "upon objections," the in the event there are the court orders his unconditional release. any. Rather merely than eliminating the 16-8-115(8)(b). § need for a formal court ruling where no yet There is another circumstance which party interested proposes to challenge the statutory the permits scheme an insanity ac- hospital's anyway, recommendation the quittee to leave the institution which he scheme is by understood ap- the court of has been Despite yet confined. having peals as transforming objecting party the release, established eligibility his an in- movant, into petitioner, the or whom it sanity acquittee may tempo- nevertheless be imposes then the traditional going burden of rarily removed from confinement for treat- forward with sufficient justify evidence to ment § and rehabilitation. 16-8-118. In view, his motion request. or In by per- sharp statutory contrast provisions for mitting to act without formal release, 16-8-115(2), see and for revocation approval court nobody objects, when of 16-8-115.5(8), conditional see legislature objection intends to convert which specify legal expressly standards and hospital's recommendation into the proof, allocate burdens re- motion at Eliminating issue. the need for provision merely moval requires an authori- judicial approval objec- unless there is some by zation the chief officer of the institution tion, however, does not alter the fact that that objection either draws no or has the acquittee, or aequit- the doctor on the 16-8-118(1)(c). approval of the court. behalf, tee's is still the seeking to change confinement, quo status Whenever physicians his propose to is by mandated continuing presumption acquittee treat an facility outside the dangerousness, his nor is anything there confined, which he has been the statute re suggest any by legislature awareness quires notice, written mail, certified to the that eliminating proceeding, a needless court and the attorney, district at least 80 might shifting be a burden to the state to days may before removal be authorized. Al justify continued confinement. though the permits statute such treatment without approval formal court objec when no Similarly, suggestion unsupervised raised, tion upon objection is kind the "removal" from confinement is a treatment heard, matter must be decision, doctors, authorization for better left to and does not acquittee's may granted not be involve the danger public same risk of

114 407, Sanderson, 111 Mont. v. McCarten "release," practical realities. ignores as (1941)). generally 1108, It is 1112 109 P.2d acquittee's res following an "release" While of a distinct requiring approval of held imposition sanity permits toration another, evi the act of to validate con officer designed to insure conditions terms and officer that such legislative intent dences mental acquittee's restored tinuation of officially with the discretion be vested extent of health, leaves the "removal" Con disapprove that act. Oahke or any, entirely to sanction if supervision, acquittee's Janklow, 308 N.W.2d servancy v. pro Subdistrict greater And while personnel. medical (S.D.1981) 559, (citing v. 561 revoke a "conditional required to be cess Gustafson 191, Dist. 319 Tp. High School acquittee than to return Wethersfield release" (1943)). App. 49 N.E.2d 313 Ill. rehabilitation," or for treatment "removal imports act very 'approval' act of is not needed unsupervised time great deal discretion, judgment, the use of passing already admit type of crimes to commit a deduction therefrom the determination matter how sum acquittee. No by this ted the statute. by the context of unless limited return process mary or abbreviated Co., 67 Okla. v. Cherokee Oil Gas confinement, on the Melton harm inflicted P. weeks, unsupervised during those public undone. While cannot be days, or hours sense, judicial dis In its abstract unsupervised com benefits psychological any settled implies the absence cretion community may a medi be mingling with the controversy that controls the legal standard decision, not. protection cal Stores, Inc., Safeway Buckmiller v. at hand. F.Supp.2d Hinckley, 292 States See United (Colo.1986). Judicial (D.D.C.2003) (citing States United means that therefore discretion Ecker, proposition for the F.2d at 190 way one to decide the issue not bound treatment, dangerousness that unlike another, be power to choose but has the courts). for the question action and is more courses of tween two or creation of legislature's over the light In in all cases to choose one not bound 1199, protect Milton, designed Id.; to statutory People scheme 732 P.2d v. other. Aldisert, by requiring (Colo.1987), automatic commit- safety R. public see also 1207 conditioning (2d ed.1996). by insanity acquittees; 704, Be ment Process 706 Judicial answer, ability overcome the to un single correct release cause there is no in- facts, of their mental continuation presumptive any the outcome given set der subjecting them even then of either capacity; by the failure predetermined never conditions, it is sim- court-imposed persuasion, release a burden of party to shoulder requirement into the ply to read is limited unrealistic of the court's decision and review any objected-to re- "approval," for court the court abused inquiry to an into whether recommendation, legislative intent that it did. making moval the choice its discretion in granted be unless approval must not be disturbed Discretionary that such decisions will manifestly arbi the state can demonstrate was the court's action unless token, Milton, By unreasonable, the same 732 would be unwarranted. or unfair. trary, however, suggest the P.2d at statute does the neither on ac- any particular burden

imposition of provisions temporary removal While justification for removal. quittees prove upon which particular factors may specify not based, the approval should be court's conditioningremov Quite contrary, by commit statutory of automatic entire scheme rehabilitation, there at least whenever al for no doubt release leaves propri ment and conditional its complete agreement about is not dealing overriding concern court, that the court's the statu ety, "approval" on insanity aequittees must the release of the deci with language strongly implies that tory safety. Permitting the re public be one of a matter of court discretion. sion is insanity acquittee from confine an moval of knowledge and "approval" implies term itself supervision, before he proper knowledge. ment without of discretion after the exercise ed.1990) (cit statutory prerequisites (6th satisfy the able to Dictionary Law 102 Black's Ecker, apply." United States v. arguably poses greater 543 F.2d an even 178, public safety 192 (U.S.App.D.C.1977)(quoting Judge threat than release without adequate prevent terms and conditions to Harris, 642, Bazelon from Bolton v. 395 F.2d relapse. Although insanity acquittee an (D.C.Cir.1968), quoting in turn treatment, right a limited see Kort v. Cameron, 657, Lake 364 F.2d Carlson, (Colo.1986), 728 P.2d 143 he has no (D.C.Cir.1966)(en banc)); People see also right to treatment outside the institution Court, Dist. 192 Colo. placed, which he has been except with the (1976) (The proceeding nature of the into an approval of the court. Because the court is inquiry into the mental condition of a defen granted not authority itself impose dant who has been plea committed under a treatment, conditions on such it must there guilty by not insanity, reason of is not an ad satisfy any proposal fore itself that for re versary proceeding in the usual sense moval for treatment and rehabilitation will be case which is controlled the rules of civil safety consistent with the of both the procedure.). Especially approval where for a acquittee, granting before approv its hospital-initiated plan issue, treatment is at al. proceedings have "truly been held to be in precise While Colorado's formula for "re vestigatory," with "the district the hos insanity acquittee moval" of an appears to be pital, patient, government and the shar unique, jurisdictions several other simi with obligation explore elucidate and all provisions lar furlough or removal to less Ecker, the relevant facts." See 543 F.2d at restrictive confinement have arrived at simi 193; Johnson, see also State v. 512 N.E.2d at lar discretionary conclusions about the role of (rather than proof, parties burden of See, Morris, e.g., the courts. State v. 2 Neb. duty relevant, competent (1994)(where App. 518 N.W.2d court). evidence to aid the And while it insanity acquittee greater seeks freedom illogical not be hospital, for the propo institutionalized, while neither State nor ac- nent of the plan, go treatment forward quittee proof, has burden of and court's dis with evidence supporting its recommenda cretionary decision will not be disturbed in tion, concerning matters the order of evi discretion); absence of abuse of State v. extremely dence are discretionary and do not Johnson, 32 Ohio St.3d 512 N.E.2d imply any particular proof. burden of (1987) (since 655-56 acquittee being is not Ecker, 543 F.2d at 193-94. discharged from commitment and statute otherwise, does specifically require scheme, statutory Under Colorado's only proof bears burden of as to transfer of the institution charged custody with of an acquittee to less setting, restrictive a matter acquittee may authorize his removal for instead committed to sound discretion of treatment or rehabilitation. Because such court);5 Cross, People Ill.App.3d cf. removal can only be authorized with the (1997) 225 Ill.Dec. 684 N.E.2d 135 agreement attorney of the district and the (where pass privileges recommendation of defendant, of record for the or with acquittee's constituted modification of treat court, approval institution, the plan ment rather than transfer to non-secure attorney, district acquittee, and the court setting, discharge, or conditional necessarily decision, are all concerned in the proof actually burden acquittee). rested on which involves both the interests of the ac- " quittee and the community. interests of the long It has '[plro- been noted that In ceedings the absence involving express more the care and treatment state- mentally general assembly ill ment strictly adversary limiting are not proceedings'... "approval" of Thus technical rules it must as to be consid- who has the bringing burden of ered, relevant implies, word a matter of discre- tion, evidence the attention of the court do in parties, not which respectively, ). Mahaffey, App.3d 5. But see State v. 140 Ohio after Johnson (2000) (noting change 747 N.E.2d 872 in statute explore manded consistent proceedings and for further to elucidate obligation an "share opinion. Id. with facts." all the relevant and Justice dissents MARTINEZ Justice TIL. joins in the dissent. BENDER suggests arbitrari- record Nothing in the dissenting: MARTINEZ Justice way in either the or unreasonableness ness to ad- in this case granted certiorari We man- or the conducted were proceedings following issue: dress the its discre- court exercised in which ner by agree- appeals erred forward went defendant Whether tion. The and permitted objecting party, were ment, parties concluding that and all guilty refused not The court found defendant positions. not a criminal specifically burden plan insanity, has the approval its reason give insanity permitted have it could whether because determine in a proof of the institu- release eligible confines acquittee to leave defendant sole discre- treatment at the supervision, the state from tion without any show- and without activities. physicians of his rehabilitation tion any further sanity or ing of restoration resolves majority opinion neither The district court by the court. approval any guid- provides nor presented, question unsupervised approve expressly declined involved courts parties and ance to the because confinement temporary removal of hearings on especially it found risk rehabil- for treatment from an institution the defen- women, review of on its based majority's I find that Because itation. as his behavior as well acts criminal dant's functional, the statute is interpretation of while in confinement. legislature I do not believe and because result, respectfully I dissent. such a intended its discretion not abuse court did going for- the burden I would find involved the uncertainties emphasizing fall on proof properly burden of and the ward acquittee's future be- insanity predicting the only because such objecting party, not of his misconduct the seriousness havior and statutory struc- comports with outcome sharing confi- than past, rather in the with ture, consistent it is but also because dangerous- lack of in his of his doctors dence place- regarding the previous our institution officer The chief ness. Therefore, agree I because ment of burden. any determination to make clearly failed affirm and appeals, I would the court of with be- hospitalization required Riggs longer no proceedings. further remand for abnor- from an longer suffered cause he likely make a brief outline my that was with begin condition I discussion mal mental dispute in around which of the statute a determination such dangerous, him because 16-8-118, a dis- necessarily precipitated centered: section this case is would Similarly, hearing. 16-8-116. charge (2008), temporary re- governs C.R.S. that the in the record from an institution patient of a there is no indication moval plan modify treatment This section the hospital offered to and rehabilitation. treatment The court chief officer authority court's concerns. to the grants alleviate the deny the commit- patient has been merely its discretion in which exercised institute an removal of for the it allowed plan because patient temporary removal allow ted to admitted activities. acquittee, who rehabilitation insanity and unrestored for treatment erimes, 16-8-118(1)(a). that requires with- The statute committing the most serious committing notify the any kind. both supervision of chief officer out attorney that he will the district court and for treatment temporary removal authorize IV. re- unless he activities rehabilitation the dis- either objection from written is ceives judgment of Thus, Id. ab- patient. attorney or the re- trict reversed, matter is and the therefore patient objection by either the or the decisions are best left the hands of those sent Gilliland, providing People treatment. attorney, for removal district authorization Carlson, discretion of the chief officer. 769 P.2d proceeds at the 477, (Colo.1989); Kort v. (Colo.1986). Only Id. when the district or the 7 objects temporary removal patient practical perspective, From a when there involved; committing court become does objection, authority is make this required to hold a point at that the court is decision must shift because the chief officer objections." § hearing "upon 16-8- hospital hearing, weigh of a cannot hold a 118(1)(c). Removal is then conditioned on the evidence, Thus, arguments. and hear approval following hearing. eourt's Id. authority likely to make this decision shifts depends As resolution of this case on the legislature longer not because the trusted statute, decision, I proper interpretation of this reiter- the chief officer to make this but statutory interpretation ate the rules of because a court is better suited to hear and arguments opposing this court has laid out innumerable cases consider sides. statute, construing before. When we seek Nonetheless, objection once an is made interpret give it so that we effect to the scheduled, the first issue to Lackner, legislature's Lagae intent. arise is who must shoulder the burden of (Colo.2000). presume We going explicit- forward. The statute does not just legislature that the intended a and rea- ly only state who has this burden. It states Thus, sonable result. Id. we should consider hearing "upon that the court must hold a legislature's purpose intent and the be- 16-8-118(1)(c). objections." § As the hear- adopting hind the statute rather than a "lit- ing "wpon objections," object- is and the interpretation eralist that leads to an absurd party ing presumably has information reveal- result." Id. why the chief officer's decision to allow 16-8-118(1) flawed, authority temporary Section vests in the removal the burden of tempo- going naturally chief officer of the to allow fall forward should to the rary objecting party removal of a for treatment and that evidence. Originally, gave Similarly, objecting party rehabilitation. the statute is also better power committing proof. to the situated assume the burden of request written of the executive director of majority opinion states that the court department of institutions. 39- Ch. approve has discretion to removal decisions 8-118, 1972 Colo. Sess. Laws 282. How- imposition and that the of a is incon- burden ever, Assembly the General amended that majority sistent with that discretion. The section in 1973 and transferred to chief parties decision is not useful power officer of the institution the to author- hearings. In ev- courts involved removal temporary patients, ize his made, ery objection case where an objection. absent see. 89-8- Ch. hearing. majori- court must hold a Under the 118, 1978 Colo. Sess. Laws determine, ty opinion, the court will have to officer, case, By authority granting party go to the chief in each will forward. matter, Assembly clearly presumed practical likely court will General that As appropriately weigh the chief officer can objector impose on the burden go objector possesses various factors that into a evidence which demon- decision removal, including pa why allow chief officer's decision was strates progress impose inappropriate. tient's continued his treatment The court cannot Thus, institution, public safety. and the risk to in all of burden on the which is not a Similarly, the cases where the chief officer's decision is to the action. does challenged, legislature impose not burden on the has left the make sense to regarding temporary party supporting decision in the chief officer's recom- removal mendation, parties if in sole hands of the chief officer of the institu fact one of the does 16-8-118(1). recommendation, support tion. au because that This allocation of thority previous party merely reiterate the reasons be- is also consistent with our will Only by in decision. decisions which we stated that treatment hind the chief officer's objector will the monitoring. on the placing the burden liberty Id. the conditions facility obey must raised in Personnel at the treatment the issues able to address court be face full conditions or "the the court ordered by the statute: objection required Clearly, objections." Id. "upon contempt powers of the court." hearing held must be burden, majority statutory gives By refusing impose a scheme at merely dodges regarding raised and arrives the de- power the issue to make decisions impractical and lead that and confinement. a result fendant's treatment hearings. at scheduled confusion ques Consequently, when faced with the Furthermore, going the burden both required the state was tion of whether proof generally and the burden forward convincing that present clear and evidence test for moving party. "The rest on the dangerous in review remained defendant affirmative, party has the determining which of confine hearings regarding conditions establishing a the burden of and therefore ment, Appeals held the Nebraska Court of case, inquiry of an as to found in the result had discretion. State Mor that the court successful if no evi- party would be vis, Neb.App. 518 N.W.2d 668-69 being of given, at all were the burden denee (1994). that the statute did The court stated party." on the adverse American course specify proof regarding con a burden 34, 39, Naylor, 101 Colo. Ins. Co. "clearly imposes of confinement but ditions (1987). test, the burden Under to determine what on the court the burden object clearly upon must fall in this case fa of movement outside the locked freedom if that did not evi party; safety cility with the is consistent objection, support of its the chief dence Thus, court held public." Id. at 669. prevail should because that officer's decision nor the defendant had that neither the State objection had no been decision would stand proof to demonstrate whether burden made. warrant, change in of movement is a freedom majority safety Rather, agree regarding I with the at 671. ed. Id. important in cases of is an concern both conditions of confinement were vested Nonetheless, I and release. do not discretion of the trial consistent with Assembly intended agree that the General authority legislature's grant complete committing court to have Therefore, for the although courts. Id. Nebraska merely as to removal decisions discretion holding majority adopted the same as the objection party. upon unsupported of a proffers today, court did so the Nebraska dramatically statutory under different Although majority cites to other states scheme than Colorado's. support, my in other review statutes particularly helpful. Dictated states was not provides example of An Ohio case another mandates, statutory by very other different temporary removal deci a situation where varying decisions state courts have made to the trial court's discretion. sions were left change in a of con- about where the burden Johnson, 109, 512 See State v. 32 Ohio St.3d Al- hearing placed. should be finement however, Again, N.E.2d 652 the stat though may appear to lend other state cases utory place at the time of scheme was majority's opinion, upon support for the clos- granted significant the courts that decision examination, they only that er illustrate Johnson, authority. At the time of Ohio interpret courts are bound to statutes consis- regarding changes in confinement statute legislative tent with intent. required in all cases and conditions approve all legislature, example, required the trial court The Nebraska authority changes great in its courts to make confinement. Ohio Rev.Code vested (West 1995). Therefore, patient's Ann. 2945.40 rather involved decisions about a 29-3702(2) appropriately court in Johnson left discretion treatment. See Neb.Rev.Stat. (West 2004). scheme, in the trial court. The statute was later Under the Nebraska however, legislature clear finding dangerousness, superceded, pro- orders the defendant to treatment ly properly fall on felt that the burden should show, by prosecutor to clear and convine- gram. Additionally, the court dictates Id. disregards legislative evidence, on these concerns why patient a should be permit treatment outside of the intent 1996 Ohio greater freedoms. See allowed § 258; though patient Ann. 2945.401 a still Rev.Code institution even Laws Ohio (West 2004); Mahaffey, 140 Ohio "an mental condition" State suffer from abnormal (2000). ineligible 747 N.E.2d for release. The App.3d and thus be Thus, original statute allowed although serutiny by the court in cases of heightened discretion, leg release, removal, court's compared room for the trial makes as the burden should later decided that purposes islature sense when one considers be- patient is prosecutor. the two sections. When properly fall on hind institution, being from an the court released with statutory scheme is consistent Our adequately that is must insure about the rela previous pronouncements our reintegrate able to so- rehabilitated and into tionship institutions and the courts. between removal, ciety. Temporary on the other a treatment mecha Temporary removal is hand, authorized when treatment within is the court's business to nism. Just as longer institution is no the confines of the patient's doc disputes, it is for the resolve Thus, patient. according to helping the doc- officer, tors, to decide report to the chief who institution, treating temporary tors at patient. for a the best course of treatment removal allows treatment outside the institu- Kort, Gilliland, 483; 769 P.2d at step as a toward rehabilitation and the tion Although implicates at 149. removal way, In goal ultimate of release. com- as release that some of the same concerns patients go do not from institutional mitted participates activities outside a defendant any without measures confinement release for treat hospital, temporary removal they reintegrate that can into the to insure step far drastic than ment activities is a less outside world. altogether. the institution release from incorrectly umps remov majority Furthermore, exaggerated focus on However, provisions into one. al and release safety ignores practical public realities temporary statutory framework for re patient's present confinement and both the proce in stark contrast moval stands First, program. temporary removal or uncondition required for conditional dures privileges granting removal 16-8-115, § confinement. al release from step Riggs present great of a would not In a case of C.R.S. present confinementas patient's from the If always hearing. hold a Id. must hospital majority implies. The doctors at the introduced, insanity is the statute evidence of already unsuper- Riggs that had testified the defendant bears specifically states on-grounds privileges for more than vised by preponderance of proving, the burden years. Riggs has never of the last six four evidence, sanity. 16-8- restoration of escape though grounds attempted to even 115(2)(a). sanity for restoration of The test major separates street are not locked and dangerousness determination for release is a Consequently, campus. parts two defendant has no requires which "the grounds hospital off the temporary removal which would be abnormal mental condition large step pa- from the present does not dangerous him either to likely to cause to be Second, tempo- tient's situation. community in or to the himself or to others rary program is a controlled reasonably future." 16-8- foreseeable patients into program to reintroduce gradual (2003).1 120(1), jury or a 6 C.R.S. society. from the testified Doctors whether requested, when then determines granted, temporary removal is that when eligible for release. 16-8- the defendant begins supervised with recreational program 115(8)(a). patient contin- activities. The and treatment undergo treatment at safety ues to live and Although exist for issues of he is committed. Unsu- exaggerated focus institution program, an the removal July case was depending The offense in this before outlines different tests 1. The statute applies This test on the date of the offense. committed in 1981. 2, 1965, but on or after June crimes committed generally temporary removal does pervised responsibly patient Colorado, has

not occur until PEOPLE of State of period for a supervised Plaintiff-Appellee, removal exercised Furthermore, years. to five both six months unsupervised privi- removal supervised and ROBBINS, Richard D. Defendant- subject suspension or revocation. leges are Appellant. Thus, program pro- step patients Riggs like vides the next No. 01CA0927. already ability demonstrated their who Appeals, Colorado Court of privileges. responsibly on-grounds handle Div. V. supervision It to maintain allows providing treatment while still the next April 2003. step patients progress rehabili- Rehearing July Denied tation. April Certiorari Granted 2004.* Assembly has differentiated

The General clearly release and removal and has between

given in which the the institution more discretion removal deci-

committed Thus, Assembly

sions. General officer, in the chief

trusted extension doctors, appropriate

the institution's to make in removal in which cases there are objections respect to removal. We must Assembly

that trust. The General has stated committing court

that the should hold a hear- objection,

ing only when there is an Therefore, objection. appears to me Assembly

that the General intended for the

objecting party to shoulder the burden to why

demonstrate the chief officer's decision

was incorrect.

Accordingly, I I respectfully dissent.

would affirm the decision of the court of

appeals. say

I am authorized to that Justice joins in

BENDER this dissent.

* participate. Justice HOBBS does not

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Riggs

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Mar 8, 2004

Citation: 87 P.3d 109

Docket Number: 02SC543

Court Abbreviation: Colo.