16 Colo. 274 | Colo. | 1891
delivered the opinion of the court.
jESTo illegality or defect in the manner of respondents’ selection for the office in question is asserted, nor is any personal disqualification relied on; therefore, our investigation is necessarily confined to the objections so ably argued, touching the constitutionality of the court itself.
Section 1, article 6, of the constitution declares that: “ The judicial power of the state, as to matters of law and equity, except as* in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and such other courts as ma/y be provided by law” This section clearly recognizes two kinds of courts, viz.: First, those established by and expressly enumerated in the constitution itself; and second, such other courts as the legislature may at its pleasure from time to time create.
It will be observed that the character and jurisdiction of the statutory courts to be. thus created are not specified. The provision contains no command or inhibition touching these subjects. For aught that appears therein the legislative will is omnipotent in the exercise of the power mentioned. When the constitution was first adopted, the clause in question read, “.and such other courts as may be created by law for cities a/nd incorporated towns; ” but by constitutional amendment in 1886, the phrase, “for cities and incorporated towns,” was expunged. This change was evi-. dently made with the deliberate purpose of removing the single limitation upon legislative discretion theretofore existing. There is nothing in the language now employed to
If, therefore, the act before us is unconstitutional, it is because constitutional provisions touching other courts or subjects inhibit, Toy implication, the jurisdiction, in whole or in part, conferred upon the court of appeals. Such is- the position taken by relator and the learned counsel who appear with him on behalf of the people. It is asserted that a part at least of the authority given the court of appeals undermines the constitutional supremacy and jurisdiction of the supreme court, and is therefore as fully prohibited by the constitution as if express inhibiting words were found therein. If this contention be correct, it is either because a constitutional right of the citizen is denied, or because some constitutional provision relating to the supreme court or its jurisdiction is invaded.
There can be no doubt about the supremacy of the supreme court. This court is placed by the constitution the head of the judicial system of the state; from its judgments there is no appeal to any other state tribunal, and its determinations are binding upon the rest of the state judiciary. The legislature cannot interfere with its existence or supremacy; nor can that body alter the ncitv/re of its jurisdiction and duties. And it follows of course that, without change in the fundamental law, the legislature cannot create a court of co-ordinate final jurisdiction. In re Court of Appeals, 9 Colo. 623; In re Court of Appeals, 15 Colo. 578. Every tribunal established by statute, whether clothed with original or appellate powers, must, like the trial courts expressly named in the constitution, be inferior to the supreme court, subject to its “superintending control,” and guided by its decisions upon questions determined in the exercise of its appellate authority.
But the present statute does not undertake to create a tribunal superior to, or co-ordinate with, the supreme court. The court of appeals is given no original jurisdiction whatever, and no independent superintending control over other courts; neither is it authorized to answer executive and legislative questions. Its decisions in all civil actions relating to franchises or freeholds, or where a constitutional question, state or federal, is involved, or where the amount of the judgment in the trial court exceeds $2,500, may be reviewed by the supreme court. Ror are any of its judgments final in causes from the fifty-five county courts, regardless of the subject-matter or amount in controversy, in the sense that a review of such judgments may not be had in this tribunal. And while some ambiguity exists in relation thereto, we are of the opinion that the statute con.'templates a reconsideration by this court of its conclusions criminal causes when-demanded by the convicted party. Every case that, within the purview of the constitution and statute, might under any circumstances come in the first instance to this court for review, may still be brought here for final adjudication.
In this connection it is important to remember that a
With these general observations, we proceed to consider the remaining constitutional provisions to which our attention has been specifically invited.
If, as relator contends, every suitor is entitled to be heard by the supreme court in every case, it follows of course that the judgment of no other court can be final; and therefore the act, in so far as in certain cases it confers final jurisdiction upon the court of appeals, is void. But the citizen has no natural or inalienable right to a hearing// in the supreme court. If the right to such a hearing exists, it must be deduced from some constitutional guaranty. The constitution will, however, be searched in vain for any
The foregoing conclusion is not affected by any constitutional declaration concerning the manner of invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The litigant cannot, as a matter of right, assert that he will come to this tribunal by appeal, for such appeals remain creatures of statute, and, in the absence thereof, do not exist. He cannot claim a vested right to bring his case to this court by writ of error; for while this writ is in most cases a writ of right at the common law, it may by statute, unless the constitution forbids, be limited or abolished altogether. Haines v. The People, 97 Ill. 161; Willoughby v. George, 4 Colo. 22; Stebbins v. Anthony, 5 Colo. 273; Webster, Assignee, v. Gaff, 6 Colo. 475. But, save as to judgments of county courts, the writ of error has received no express constitutional recognition for ordinary appellate purposes. The declaration in section 23, article 6, that writs of error
It is true, as counsel for the people contend, that the writ of error is an original writ; and it may possibly be true, as they also assert, that it is fairly included within the “ other original and remedial writs ” referred to by section 3, article 6, of the constitution, which the supreme court is authorized to issue. But, as we have already held, the jurisdiction conferred by said section 3 is original, in contradistinction to the appellate authority given by the preceding section; the original writs mentioned are not to be used in connection with or in aid of ordinary appellate jurisdiction, but for the purpose of instituting .original causes or proceedings. Wheeler v. N. C. I. Co., 9 Colo. 248.
Neither of the foregoing constitutional provisions, aside from the exception mentioned, fairly inhibits the legislature from saying, within reason, at what particular stage or in what^particular court a specified kind of ordinary litigation shall ©nd. It would seem that when the suitor has had the full, fair and impartial judicial hearing guarantied by section 6 of the Bill of Rights, the constitutional duty of the state is performed, and he ought not to complain.
We answer that, in the first place, since the constitution authorizes the legislature to create “ other courts,” such power necessarily carries with it authority to give the courts created a share in the trial of controversies that would otherwise be disposed of by the tribunals expressly named; moreover, the very words of section 1, above quoted, lodge “ the judicial power of the state ” in the courts that may afterwards be provided by law, as well as in those enumerated by name. Secondly, we reply, that while section 2 clothes the supreme court with appellate jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is not exclusive. True, the intent is clear to make this court essentially a court of review ; the word “ only,” coupled with the other words em- : ployed, plainly indicates a purpose to render its primary ¡ and principal powers appellate; its superintending control over other courts and its limited original jurisdiction, together with its anomalous duty of answering executive and legislative questions, while functions of great importance and value, must be regarded as secondary. It would be idle, however, to argue that the supreme court absorbs all appellate jurisdiction; and it would be scarcely less idle to say that section 2 gives it a monopoly for purposes of review. We are not at liberty to transpose the adverb and make the constitution read: “ The supreme court only shall have appellate jurisdiction; ” while the language as it is written, “ shall have appellate jurisdiction only,” falls far
If the claim of counsel for respondents be correct (a matter we do not determine), that the last clause of section 2, viz., “ under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law,” applies to the appellate jurisdiction of the court, this feature of the provision reinforces the above conclusion. For while the expression relates principally to procedure, the word “ limitations ” is comprehensive enough to include a legislative declaration as to the character or amount of a judgment that can be thus reviewed.
It is hardly necessary to add that the “ superintending control ” given by the constitutional provision now under consideration refers primarily to courts, not to parties or cases.; its purpose is to keep the courts themselves “within bounds,” and to insure the harmonious working of our judicial system; it was not designed to secure the review of judgments in connection with ordinary appellate jurisdiction ; and in so far as the rights of suitors in particular causes may be affected, the effect is incidental purely. To
The foregoing views are not inconsistent with the principle also relied on by relator, that when a constitution confers jurisdiction over a particular subjecPmatter upon one court and not upon another, the jurisdiction thus conferred is exclusive. That principle is simply inapplicable. The provision before us grants general appellate supervision; it specifies no “particular subject-matter.”
Section 28, article 6, of the constitution declares that “ all laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings and practice of all the courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments and decrees of such'courts severally, shall be uniform.” The court of appeals created by this statute cannot be regarded as belonging to the same class or grade with any of the trial courts; while, as we have .seen, it is inferior to the supreme court. There being no other court of a like class or grade, and its powers being exercised uniformly throughout the state, there is no disobedience of the constitutional command relating to judicial uniformity. It may be that, as counsel suppose, the views entertained by the court of appeals in cases within its final supervision will sometimes differ from those promulgated, under like circumstances, by the supreme court. .But it is believed that in such instances the court of appeals will voluntarily yield its judgment to that of the higher tribunal. Something must always be trusted to the disposition of judges to act for the general harmony and good, as wrnll as to their honesty and legal discrimination. Should direct contrariety of opinion arise in the same case, however, as counsel seem to fear, an appropriate remedy will undoubtedly be found to enforce the law as declared by the supreme court, and thus
¥e have now briefly considered all of the constitutional provisions upon which reliance is placed by relator and' his learned co-counsel. "We discover in the legislative act challenged no such inconsistency therewith as would justify us in holding it unconstitutional. Some of its features .will doubtless prove objectionable in actual practice. But it is largely an experiment; experience may demonstrate its entire inutility; that it will suggest improvements is a mat- ¡ ter of course.
Aside from the rule of construction that forbids courts from holding statutes void so long as a reasonable doubt of their validity remains, this or asimilar measure is supported by direct constitutional sanction as well as by p'otent considerations of public and private justice. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights, already mentioned, not only guaranties to the citizen a remedy for every legal injury suffered, but also provides that such remedy shall be enjoyed without delay. It is an open secret that the reviewing branch of our judicial machinery has for years been unable to give this provision full force and effect. Upon the organization of this tribunal, it received a' bequest of more than one hundred causes from the territorial court of last resort. The state’s diversity of industries and its marvelous growth in population and wealth have caused a vast and unanticipated increase in the volume of judicial business; as one of the natural results, nearly three thousand cases have reached this court for review. And when the novel and perplexing character of a large part of this litigation is considered, it
There is no evidence whatever in the act itself, or in the circumstances attending its adoption, of a legislative intent to detract from the dignity or standing of the supreme court. ¥e cannot favor the supposition that the legislature may in the future directly or indirectly undertake to deprive this tribunal of its jurisdiction, appellate or original. When that body attempts, if it ever should, to interfere with the existence or supremacy of the court, or to change the nature of its jurisdiction and duties, or to render it an “ idle and empty pageant,” the court will undoubtedly decline to recognize such usurpation of authority and illegal action; but until that time arives, the discourtesy toward another branch of the government will not be committed, of indulging the presumption that a wilful effort may be made to thus impair the judicial system and lessen its usefulness. The supreme court might, by disregarding rules of construction, declare all acts of a particular general assembly void, and thus nullify its entire work; but it is highly unreasonable to surmise that this tribunal will ever be guilty of such revolutionary conduct. To suppose that either department of government will make the most vicious and illegal use possible of the powers conferred is to suppose a proceeding subversive of the government itself.
The numerous authorities cited by counsel have been carefully examined, but to attempt a critical analysis thereof would unnecessarily prolong this opinion. It is not pretended that our views are in strict harmony with all of the
The demurrer to respondents’ return or answer will be overruled.
JDemwrrer overruled.