*1 CONCLUSION court reverse the reasons, we the above
For order circuit court’s judgment, which reversed C.N., af- rights parental terminating respondents’ court judgment. firm the circuit reversed; judgment court
Appellate court judgment circuit affirmed. (No. 88670 . ILLINOIS, Appel- OF THE OF
THE PEOPLE STATE RICHARDSON, HAROLD lee, Appellant.
Opinion April filed *2 J.,
THOMAS, concurring. specially Pelletier, Ann C. Defender, J. Deputy Michael McCallister, Defender, Office of Appellate Assistant Defender, Chicago, Appellate appellant, State Richardson, Joliet, se. appellant pro and Harold General, Ryan, Attorney Springfield, E. James (William Devine, Attorney, Chicago Richard A. State’s General, Browers, Chicago, L. Attorney Assistant *3 L. Goldfarb, McCurry Kenneth T. and Ann Renee counsel), of for the Benedek, Attorneys, Assistant State’s People. the opinion JUSTICE delivered
CHIEF HARRISON of the court: first
Defendant, Richardson, of Harold was convicted (West 1994)) 1(a)(1) (720 and murder degree 5/9 — (720 ILCS criminal sexual assault aggravated 5/12— (West 1994)) 14(a)(2) circuit a trial in the following bench and to consecutive County, court of Cook sentenced ap- years of On direct prison respectively. terms 34 and sentencing hearing, argu- sought defendant a peal, new considered ing improperly that trial court Rights of the of in violation impact (Act) (725 Crime Victims and Witnesses Act ILCS 120/1 (West seq. 1998)), provision et and of the Act prqhibiting ground its use as a for relief was judg unconstitutional. The court affirmed the (unpublished ment of the circuit court. No. 1—98—1348 23). Supreme order under Court Rule We allowed petition appeal. defendant’s leave for 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
The evidence trial adduced at established that defen- participated dant and several others in the sexual as- beating strangulation sault, and of Nina Glover. At sentencing, presented the State the written victim daughters of statements Glover’stwo her of mother. argues
Defendant before this court that trial court’s consideration three victim statements violates plain language agree. of the Act. We statutory pri “In the construction, exercise of our mary task is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the (2000). legislature.” People Pullen, 192 Ill. legislative The reliable most indicator of intent is the language People Robinson, statute itself. 172 Ill. (1996). language 2d given The of the statute must be ordinary plain meaning, its and where the unambiguous, clear is no we have occasion statutory to resort aids of Pullen, construction. Further,
2d at a 42. statute should be construed so that phrase superfluous meaning no word or or rendered Edgar, less. Inc. v. 138 Ill. 2d Kraft, question law, Because the construction a statute is a Robinson, our is de novo. review 6(a)
Section the Act sets forth the present victim to a victim statement for the court’s consideration at the of defendant 120/6(a) (West convicted of violent crime. 725 ILCS 1998). statutory victim,” The definition of “crime *4 purposes 6(a), representa- single of section includes “a sibling parent, may spouse, a or of child the who tive perpetrated person crime of a killed a result violent as 120/3(a)(3) (West person against ILCS the killed.” 725 1998). unambigu plain clear from the It is therefore that, Nina while Glover’s qualified of the statute ous parent could have two children or either of her 3(a)(3), trial the under the “crime victim” section as accepted comply it with the Act where did not court of three all considered representative” single persons of “a rather than (a)(3) (West 1998); People v. see deceased. 720 ILCS 120/3 App. Ill. Benford,
Having statute, the issue a violation of the found trial court’s before court becomes whether improper state consideration hearing. to a new ments entitles defendant acknowledges Act, Defendant section 9 which “Nothing Act a basis for vacat states: in this shall create ing ground relief in a conviction or 1998). (West case.” Defendant criminal 120/9 it contends that section 9 is unconstitutional because provisions violates two of the Illinois Constitution separation powers in article 1970, the clause set forth (Ill. 1), § right II, II, and the section Const. art. by guaranteed VI, article section to review 6). (Ill. unnecessary § VI, However, it is 1970, art. Const. arguments pro find address because we another these dispositive of this issue. of our constitution vision state (the 8.1, I, Article Illinois Constitution section Amendment), adopted 3, 1992, November an amendment Rights” part, states, “Crime entitled Victim’s “[c]rime law, victims, as shall have defined *** following rights [t]he provided law: as sentencing.” (Emphasis to the court at make statement 8.1(a)(4). added;) § here, Thus, I, art. Const. 3(a)(3) of the Act defines “crime victim” because *5 230 *** single representative person
to mean “a killed,” aof only the Amendment would allow for one victim sentencing. statement to be made to the court at 725 (3) (a) (West 1998). However,like Act, the the 120/3 provides: “Nothing further Amendment in this Section any or in law enacted under this Section shall be creating vacating construed as a for a basis or conviction ground any a in relief criminal Ill. case.” 8.1(d). § prohibited 1970, I, Const. art. Thus, defendant is seeking appellate our constitution from relief on ground that more than one was statement presented sentencing. and considered at his require
The United States Constitution does not grant appeals right states to as to criminal defendants seeking alleged to review trial court errors. Evitls v. Lu cey, 387, 393, 821, 827, 469 U.S. L. Ed. 83 2d 105 Ct. S. (1985). granted 830, Illinois, however, 834 criminal has appeal judgments defendants “final Court,” VI, Circuit in 6, article section of our state constitution. § 1970, Il l. Const. VI, Thus, art. is it upon practicable, harmonize, incumbent this court to if 8.1(d), I, article VI, 6, section and article section which initially appear to be in conflict. See Oak Park Federal Savings Village Park, & Loan Ass’n 2d Oak 54 Ill. 200, 203 parts
All of the constitution be must construed together although and, article one or section is entitled weight any to the section, same as other article or general whole must be construed that the so intent will prevail. People Washburn, ex rel. Wellman 410 Ill. (1951); Herget Kenney, see also National Bank v. (1985). Additionally,
Ill. 2d while one clause will not be to defeat if allowed another reasonable (Oak together construction the two can made be to stand 203), provision specific Park, constitutional prevail general incompat- will over a if the two are section (Walker Elections, 65 Ill. Board v. State ible (1976)). in stated Wellman: Further, this court as is a re our constitution rights incorporated “The bill of upon which very principles of the adoption statement to be our admitted generally is based and our freedom greatest other legislature or any act of the heritage. Where case, tends to constitution, particular ain provision must assume preserved, we upon rights thus infringe that there framers thereof intent of the it was the Wellman, rights.” no curtailment of such should at 328-29. find that we principles, stated
Considering the above as rights 8.1(d), of the bill I, part as article a limitation read as must be specific provision, the more *6 VI, sec by article jurisdiction granted appellate on the 188, Ill. 2d Gebis, 186 In re Estate tion 6. See of sug and the Act the titles of the Amendment As a shield them to serve “as drafters intended gest, their delineated victims,” expressly rights protect criminal by “not used as a sword provisions that their 295 Ill. seeking Benford, relief.” See appellate defendants hold, plain on its at 700. therefore based App. 3d We 8.1(d), I, specifically article section explicit language, that rights spectrum from the of issues removes victims’ may appeal. which a criminal defendant 8.1(d) to re agrees operates that section Defendant in criminal if the basis jurisdiction cases appellate strict enacted under” the Amendment. “any for relief is law 8.1(d). However, § defendant 1970, I, art. Const. 3(a)(3) the Act is not a law that section contends statutory Amendment because the enacted “under” the a crime victim set forth on who constitutes restriction 3(a)(3) that a law being it from precludes section “ ” Amendment, by section required enforce as [s] (d). 8.1(b). I, 8.1(b), disagree. §§ We Ill. Const. art. 8.1(b) Assembly “[t]he states that General While section of this may [Amend law for the enforcement provide a test ment],” not establish does determining pieces legislation trigger protec which 8.1(d). 3(a)(3) Although tions of section section of the Act January was amended effective 1994, to limit the defi single representative” nition of crime victim to “a 3(a)(3) deceased, section is still a law which enforces the 120/3(a)(3) (West 1994). Amendment. See 725 ILCS As 8.1(a) noted, we have section states victims, that crime rights law,” “as defined are entitled to the set forth in provided by the Amendment “as law.” Ill. Const. 8.1(a). §I,
art. Thus, defendant cannot avoid the consti preclusion by claiming tutional relief 3(a)(3), defining section a law “crime victim” as contem plated by 8.1(a), was not enacted to enforce the Amendment.
Finally, important pro we believe it to note that the hibition on relief for violations of the Act or the responsi Amendment does not alleviate the trial court’s bility appropriate sentencing. to exercise discretion at require This court has found that the Act does not consideration at and all victim regard materiality. evidence without for its relevance or (1998) (the See People Hope, 39, 49, Act contemplate, “does not condone, we will not an expansion of victim statements to include evi dence from victims other than the victims of the offense trial”; on such evidence is irrelevant and therefore inadmissable). portion Indeed, the of the Act which provides *7 “[t]he that court shall consider statements mandatory made the victim” is not in nature and nothing weight given does to indicate what should be to victim evidence, nor does it indicate what 120/6(a) (West imposed. sentence should 725 ILCS (1989). 1998); 525, 131 Ill. 2d Felella, v. 539 People This court has further warned that Payne v. Tennes 808, 501 see, 720, U.S. 115 L. Ed. 2d Ill. S. Ct. 2597 (1991), admissibility which established the of victim “ ‘ give sentencing, not “does at evidence argue anything prosecution introduce a free rein to ’ ” People quoting Hope, 48, Ill. 2d at it wants.” “ (1992). that ‘In the event 274, Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d unduly prejudicial that is so introduced that evidence is fundamentally Pro unfair, the Due the trial it renders provides a Amendment of the Fourteenth cess Clause ” quot Mitchell, Ill. 2d at for relief.’ mechanism ing Payne, 735, 111 L. Ed. 2d at S. 501 U.S. at 2608.
Ct. not made case, however,defendant has instant
In the process showing right to due was that his a substantial the introduction of violated sentencing. It well established
statements at his hearing sentencing before the trial is conducted where a presumed jury, the court is rather than a court competent only in evidence relevant consider determining People Ashford, sentence. observed, court the State As the argue of the three victim
herein did not
impact
the content
aggravation
and, al
a factor in
statements as
though
it had read the same
the trial court stated that
sentencing hearing, the
at a codefendant’s
imposing
the statements when
court did not mention
Therefore,
hold that while the
sentence.
we
defendant’s
considering multiple
admitting
trial court erred
nothing
impact statements, defendant has offered
unduly preju
support
finding that the statements
defendant’s
diced the trial court such that
fundamentally
hearing
Ashford,
unfair. See
was rendered
Accordingly foregoing reasons, affirm we and for judgment court.
Affirmed. concurring: specially THOMAS, JUSTICE judg- agree majority Although that the I with *8 disagree ment of the affirmed, court should be I majority’s with the improperly conclusion that the trial court impact
considered three victim
statements in
plain language
Rights
violation of the
of the
of Crime
(Act) (725
seq.
Victims and Witnesses Act
et
120/1
(West 1998)).
majority recognizes,
As the
this court must
language
look to the
of the statute itself to determine
legislative
give
intent, and must
the
of the stat
plain
ordinary meaning.
ute its
Here, it was the State that
the written
daughters
statements of
two
Nina Glover’s
agree
and her mother.
The
limitation on the admission of evidence is that
Williams,
the evidence must be reliable and relevant.
Ill. 2d at
impact
Because the three
victim
issue
aggravation,
in this case
introduced
the State in
were
section 6 of the Act did not limit the trial court’s
consideration
those statements. To hold otherwise
severely
prosecution’s ability
to
limit the
“threatens
present
aggravation”
relevant, reliable evidence in
and
designed
provide
“transforms what was
a benefit to
victims
witnesses into a shield for their offenders.”
(Miller,
Hope,
concurring
part
J.,