Defendant-appellee Rich was convicted by a jury on February 20, 1973 of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, contrary to MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. This conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant-appellant Robinson was jury-convicted on July 3, 1973 of assault with intent to rob being armed, contrary to MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284. This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion. We granted leave to appeal in each case to consider whether
People v Crittle,
In
Crittle,
the defendant was charged and convicted of armed robbery. His defense was that he lacked the requisite specific intent because he was intoxicated and/or because he intended nothing
*402
more than a prank. There were some facts which were arguably supportive of each facet of this defense. The trial court charged the jury: "You would not, however, be justified in acquitting * * * unless you find * * * that he was not conscious of what he was doing or why he was doing it * * * ”.
The question of retroactive application to these cases concerns part V of the
Crittle
opinion,
The capacity standard of Roberts was used in instructing both the Rich and Robinson juries. Neither Rich’s nor Robinson’s counsel objected to these instructions; neither defense counsel nor the trial judges had reason to anticipate this Court’s overruling in Crittle of the longstanding precedent of Roberts v People.
When the issue of retroactivity arises, the case of
Linkletter v Walker,
The latter two
Linkletter
factors, reliance and effect on the administration of justice, are often interdependent. Here, where there was profound reliance on the old rule, the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice could be marked. Instructional law with respect to the effect of voluntary intoxication upon specific intent had in this state long been governed by the rule of
Roberts v People.
As was stated by the Court of Appeals in footnote 6 of
People v
Scott,
"There would appear to be a real question of whether Crittle, to the extent that it appears to repudiate the capacity standard, should be given retrospective application. While Crittle relies upon the statement made by Cooley in People v Walker, supra, it is questionable that Cooley really intended to formulate a rule different from that in Roberts v People, supra. Not only did Cooley, along with Campbell and Graves, sit on both panels, but also Cooley in his opinion in Walker indicates that what he was saying therein was fully explained by Justice Christancy in Roberts. Whatever Cooley may have meant by his language in Walker, it is the rule as stated in Roberts which has been treated as controlling for the last century. Thus while Crittle used Cooley’s language in Walker as the vehicle by which to formulate the presently approved instruction *404 on intoxication, Crittle marked a change in the established law with respect to what the proper instruction was. It would therefore appear that since the trial courts of this state had every reason to rely on the Roberts rule which had been oft repeated as proper, the change in focus evidenced by Crittle should be given only prospective application from the decisional date of Crittle
Although I regard the
Walker
language elevated to law by
Crittle
as preferable to the rule of
Roberts,
I concur in the above sentiments with respect to the question of
Crittle’s
retroactivity. It makes no sense at all to hold trial courts to instructional standards that could not have been anticipated. In
People v Kirk,
The misplaced emphasis of pr e-Crittle law was corrected in that decision by a unanimous Court. However, if trial courts are to be effectively guided by our appellate pronouncements, a rational dependence on our decisions currently in effect must be encouraged.
These juries were properly instructed under the law extant; their verdicts must stand. The Court of Appeals is reversed in Rich and affirmed in Robinson.