delivered the opinion of the court:
Dеfendants, Terry A. Reynolds and Kevin Wright, were arrested and charged with theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(a)(1)), burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 19 — 1(a)), and possession of burglary tools (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 19 — 2(a)). The circuit court of Du Page County allowed defendants’ motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence seized at the time of the arrest. The appellatе court affirmed (
The facts are adequately stated in the appellate сourt opinion and will be reviewed here only to the extent necessary to discuss the issues presented. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendants called Michael W. Glugla, formerly a police officer for the Hanover Park police department. Glugla testified that on November 25, 1979, while employed and on duty as a pоlice officer for the Hanover Park police department, he observed a station wagon pulling a trailer with inoperative taillights. Glugla activated the red lights оn top of his marked police cruiser and stopped the vehicle. As Glugla approached the station wagon from the rear he observed several cartons in the trailer with the word “Magnavox” printed on them. The open trailer was covered with a tarpaulin, but the tarpaulin was not tied down at the back of the trailer. The wind was blowing the tarpaulin in such a manner that Glugla was able to see the boxes as he walked past the trailer. Glugla stated that in the light cast by the spotlight on his squad car and his flashlight he was able to see what was written on the boxes. Glugla approached the driver, defendant Reynolds, and advised him that there was something wrong with the taillights on the trailer. Glugla аsked the occupants of the car, defendants Wright and Reynolds, and a third person, Mr. Norman, where they had acquired the equipment in the trailer and their responses differed. No one could produce a bill of lading for the merchandise. The occupants were unable to identify their destination. After Glugla obtained identification from the thrеe occupants of the vehicle, he stepped to the rear of the trailer, out of hearing range of the parties, and through his shoulder-mounted radio ran a check on the occupants, the station wagon, and the trailer. At this time Glugla was again able to view the contents of the trailer. Glugla was advised that there were no warrants on the occupants, that the station wagon was registered to Mr. Norman, and that the trailer was registered to Peckins T.V. store, located in Roselle. Glugla asked his dispatcher to call the Roselle police department to check on the security of the Peckins T.V. store. Glugla was advised that the Roselle police “had gone by the building and felt it was secure.” Glugla then asked defendants to follow him to the police station. He did not tell defendants they were under arrest. Glugla stated that had defendants refused his request to accompany him to the police station, he would not have permitted them to leave because of their inoperative taillights. Dеfendants followed Glugla to the police station while another police vehicle followed directly behind them. Fifteen to twenty minutes after their arrival at the pоlice station Mr. Peckins arrived and stated that the trailer and its contents belonged to his store and that defendants did not have permission to possess them. Peckins consеnted to a search of the trailer, which produced several television sets and burglary tools. Glugla testified that although no citation was issued at the scene of the stоp a traffic citation did eventually issue on the taillight violation. Glugla admitted that at the preliminary hearing he had made no mention of the inoperative taillights and stated that he did not use a flashlight to view the contents of the trailer. Glugla also admitted that when asked at the preliminary hearing whether he had related all of the conversation that occurred between himself and the defendants he had responded in the affirmative.
After hearing and arguments on the motion to suppress, the circuit court found that the arrest and detention of defendants occurred when Glugla directed defendants to accompany him to the police station and that the arrest was pеrformed without reasonable grounds to believe defendants were committing or had committed an offense. The court ordered that all evidence obtained as а result of the arrest be suppressed. The appellate court affirmed.
The People contend that defendant’s compliance with Glugla’s request that they follow him to the police station was voluntary and did not constitute an arrest. They argue that in escorting defendants to the police station Glugla was acting as a safety оfficer; that he was confronted with a station wagon towing a trailer without taillights, on a busy highway late at night under hazardous weather conditions, and that the only reasonable сourse of action open to him was to escort defendants to the police station. The People note that Glugla was unable to escort defendants tо their destination because defendants were unsure of where they were going and contend that leaving the car and trailer on the side of the road would have crеated a risk of harm to the articles in the trailer. The People state, too, that the police car which followed defendants from the scene of the stop to the police station served to protect defendants from the danger resulting from their lack of taillights.
In determining whether an arrest took place the question is nоt simply whether the officer’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, but whether a reasonable, innocent person in the defendant’s situation would havе considered himself arrested or free to go. (See People v. Townes (1982),
Nor can we say that the court’s finding that the arrest was made without probable cause was manifestly erroneous. As this court stated in People v. Lippert (1982),
“Probable causе for arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense. [Citations.] Although a ‘mere suspicion’ that the person arrested has committed thе offense is an insufficient basis for arrest [citations], evidence sufficient to convict is not required [citations].”89 Ill. 2d 171 , 178-79.
The People contend that the information properly obtained as a result of Glugla’s brief, investigatory questioning was sufficient to provide a reasonable person with an articulable suspicion that defendants had committed a criminal offense and that the information relayed concerning the Roselle police department’s check of the Peckins T.V. store did not negate that articulable suspicion. As indicated in Lippert, the probable-cause test is a compromise for accommodating the “often opposing interests” of privаcy and law enforcement, and there is good reason for striking the compromise somewhat on the side of privacy where it is uncertain whether any crime has occurred. (People v. Lippert (1982),
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.