THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIE REYNOLDS, Defendant and Appellant.
Crim. No. 20307
First Dist., Div. Three
Feb. 2, 1981.
116 Cal. App. 3d 141
John Raymond, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O‘Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Charles James and Carol M. Slatin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SCOTT, J.—Appellant Willie Reynolds pled guilty to robbery and admitted the use of a gun during commission of this offense. He was committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA). Some months later, he was returned to court and sentenced to prison. He was given credit against his prison sentence for time spent under the control of the Youth Authority. He now contends he should also be entitled to conduct credit against his sentence for time spent with the Youth Authority. We disagree.
Appellant was returned to the court and sentenced pursuant to
Appellant makes no mention of
First, we reiterate that appellant was returned from the Youth Authority and sentenced pursuant to
Moreover, as we will explain, we also reject appellant‘s claim because we have concluded that youthful felons are not entitled to behavior credits while confined at the Youth Authority, and are therefore not entitled to such credits against a subsequent sentence.
In People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223 [157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92], a defendant committed as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) argued in part that had he been sentenced as a criminal rather than committed as an MDSO, he would have been eligible to
The court enumerated reasons for that determination. First, the concept of giving or taking away credits might interfere with therapy. Second, even without conduct credit, acceptable behavior in the hospital is encouraged by the possibility that the disruptive patient can be determined unamenable to treatment, and transferred to prison. Third, part of prison “good time” may be earned by participating in certain programs which may be unavailable in a hospital. Fourth, denial of “good time” credits involves an array of administrative requirements with which hospital personnel may be unable to comply; moreover, an administrative adversary proceeding might not further treatment. Finally, the concept of “good time” credit does not make sense in the context of an indefinite medical commitment period which can be extended if necessary. (Saffell, 25 Cal.3d at p. 234.)
In Sage, the court relied on Saffell and held that a defendant committed as an MDSO, then sentenced to prison, is not entitled to conduct credit against that prison sentence pursuant to
From these legislative and judicial expressions, we conclude that the state has a compelling interest in providing rehabilitative services for those amenable to the care, treatment and training programs available through its Youth Authority facilities.3 We then consider whether that
The primary purpose of prison or jail behavior credits is to encourage conformity to prison regulations, to discourage criminal assaultive acts while in custody, and to encourage participation in rehabilitative activities. (Saffell, 25 Cal.3d at p. 233.) We acknowledge that unlike the hospital to which the MDSO is committed, the Youth Authority has educational, vocational and rehabilitative programs, enrollment in which is not only available but may be compelled. We also acknowledge that unlike hospital personnel, Youth Authority personnel would not find the administrative aspect of the behavioral credit system to be an alien task. However, notwithstanding the above, we conclude that to superimpose the Penal Code‘s behavior credit scheme on the Youth Authority is to provide the youthful felon with what he already has: the opportunity to reduce his time in confinement because of his conduct. The fact that a youthful felon in the Youth Authority is not given Penal Code behavior credits does not mean that he is denied recognition and reward for good behavior. Participation in rehabilitative programs and behavioral conformity is encouraged and rewarded in Youth Authority commitments because of the indeterminate nature of the commitment itself, with release at the discretion of the Youthful Offender Parole Board. That board is to discharge each person as soon as in its opinion there is reasonable probability that he can be given full liberty without danger to the public. (
Accordingly, there is no denial of equal protection in excluding those committed to the Youth Authority from the conduct credit scheme of the Penal Code. Furthermore, as such individuals cannot earn conduct credits at all, they are not entitled to such credits against a subsequent prison sentence. (See Sage, 26 Cal.3d at p. 505.)
In sum, confusion about conduct credit continues. Nonetheless, we conclude that neither
Appellant‘s contention that his plea bargain was breached when he was sentenced to prison is without merit. No promises were made with respect to sentencing when appellant pled guilty, and certainly he was not told that if committed to the Youth Authority and later found unsuitable, he could withdraw his plea.
Appellant‘s contention that his prison sentence in some way placed him in double jeopardy is also without merit. The purpose of the double jeopardy prohibition is directed to the elimination of the burden of multiple prosecutions. (In re Bryan (1976) 16 Cal.3d 782, 787 [129 Cal.Rptr. 293, 548 P.2d 693].) Appellant was prosecuted only once for this offense.
Judgment is affirmed.
White, P. J., concurred.
FEINBERG, J.—I dissent from the decision of this court insofar as it denies behavioral (good time/work time) credits to appellant, assuming he earned them during his incarceration in the Youth Authority facility. It appears to me that equal protection principles demand that appellant be entitled to such credits if he has earned them.