THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES REED, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-23-0669
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division
February 7, 2024
2024 IL App (1st) 230669-U
JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court‘s denial of defendant‘s petition for a certificate of innocence because defendant did not prоve that he was innocent of all charges.
¶ 2 Defendant James Reed was charged with four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (
Defendant‘s conviction was later vacated pursuant to People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, which struck down as unconstitutional portions of the AUUW statute that categorically prohibited possession of an operable firearm outside the home. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22. Defendant then filed a petition for a certificate of innocenсe pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 ¶ 4 Defendant was arrested on October 6, 2003, and charged by information with four counts of AUUW. Count I аlleged that defendant knowingly carried an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm outside his home (
¶ 5 On December 3, 2003, defendant pled guilty to count I and was sеntenced to six months in the Cook County Department of Corrections and two years’ probation. The State nol-prossed counts II, III, and IV. As the factual basis for the plea, the State proffered that defendant was involved in a shooting on the 6400 block of South Wood Street in Chicago on October 6, 2003. When defendant was arrested that day, police recovered from his person a loaded semiautomatic handgun. Defendant violated his probation and was resentenced to one year of incarceration.
¶ 6 In 2021, defendant filed pro se petitions pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (
¶ 7 In 2022, defendant filed a pro se petition for a certificate of innocence pursuant to section 2-702 (
¶ 8 The State objected, arguing that defendant failed to establish that he was innocent of all four charges; therefore, he could not fulfill the requirements of subsection 2-702(g)(3) (
¶ 9 Defendant filed a pro se reply to the State‘s objections. He argued that he was relying on the second clаuse of subsection 2-702(g)(3), which allows a petitioner to prove that his acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor at all, rather than the first clause, which requires proof that the petitioner is innocent of the charges in the indictment or information (id.). Defendant cited People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, in support of his claim that “his acts charged in the indictment *** did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State because the charge was based on а statute later held unconstitutional.”
¶ 10 The circuit court denied defendant‘s petition for a certificate of innocence, finding that defendant “ha[d] to be able to demonstrate [his] innocence as to all the offenses charged in the information or indictment” and that he could not establish his innocence of the AUUW counts premised on his lack of a FOID card.
¶ 11 Defendant timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 ¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition because he was not required to prove that he was innocent of all four charged counts of AUUW. Rather, defendant contends that he only had to prove his innocence of the one count for which he was convicted and incarcerated.
¶ 14 This appeal concerns the interpretation of subsection 2-702(g)(3), so de novo review applies.2 See People v. Hilton, 2023 IL App (1st) 220843, ¶ 15. De novo review means that we perform the same analysis as the circuit court. People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 151. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to thе legislature‘s intent. People v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53. The language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature‘s intent. Id. We cannot “depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.” People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). If the statute is unambiguous, we must apply it as written. Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 180696, ¶ 11. “A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.” Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1996). We presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53.
¶ 15 Section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs petitions for certificates of innocence.
¶ 16 Subsection (c) requires the petitioner to present documentation demonstrating that he was convicted of a felony and served all or part of a sentence of imprisonment and that his “conviction was reversed or vacаted, and the indictment or information dismissed,” or that “the statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or information was based” was unconstitutional.
¶ 17 Subsection (g) sets out the elements of a petition:
“(g) In order to obtain a certificate of innocence the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the sentence;
(2)(A) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or information dismissed ***; or (B) the statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or information was based violated the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois;
(3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not сonstitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State; and
(4) the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his or her conviction.”
Id. § 2-702(g)(1)-(4) .
“If the court finds that the petitioner is entitled to a judgment, it shall enter a certificate of innocence finding that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated.”
¶ 18 Subsection (g)(3) requires a petitioner to prove either that (1) he is innocent of the “offenses chаrged in the indictment or information” or (2) “his *** acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor.”
¶ 19 In this case, the information charged four counts of AUUW, two of which were premised solely on defendant‘s possession of a firearm, and two of which were premised on his possession of a firearm without a FOID card. To fulfill subsection (g)(3), defendant had to prove either that
¶ 20 People v. Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, supports this conclusion. In that case, the defendant was charged with six counts of AUUW including possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card. Id. ¶ 2. He pled guilty to one count of AUUW and was sentenced to one year in prison; the State nol-prossed the remaining counts. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. The defendant‘s conviction was later vacated pursuant to Aguilar. Id. ¶ 6. The defendant filed a petition for a certificate of innocence, arguing that he had been convicted and incarcerated under an unconstitutional statute. Id. ¶ 7. However, his petition “contained no allegations to establish [his] innocence as to the other valid offenses charged in the information.” Id. The circuit court denied the petition and this court affirmed. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. We held that subsections (d) and (g)(3) unambiguously require a petitioner
¶ 21 People v. Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, is similar. The defendant was charged with AUUW, armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Id. ¶ 3. He pled guilty to AUUW and was sentenced to eight years in prison; the other charges were dismissed. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant‘s conviction was later vacated pursuant to Aguilar, and he filed a petition for a certificate of innocence. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that the defendant could not establish his innocence of all charged offenses and, therefore, could not meet the requirements of subsection (g)(3). Id. ¶ 6. The court affirmed. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. Citing Warner, the court found that thе “plain meaning of [subsections (d) and (g)(3)] is that petitioners must demonstrate their innocence of all charged offenses, not just the ones for which they were convicted and incarcerated.” Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 22 We see no meaningful difference between Warner, Brown, and this case. All three cases involve defendants who pled guilty to one count of AUUW in exchange for the dismissal of the other counts, AUUW convictions that were later vacated pursuant to Aguilar, and defendants who failed to prove their innocence of all charged offenses. Like the defendants in Warner and Brown, defendant is not entitled to a certificate of innocence because he does not meet the requirements of subsection (g)(3).
¶ 23 Defendant argues that a certificate, if granted, only declares a petitioner innocent of “offenses for which he or she was incarcerated” (
¶ 24 Defendant is not the first to claim that certificate of innocence proceedings concern only charges resulting in conviction and incarceration. This court has already rejected the exact argument that defendant makes regarding subsections (b) and (h). Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984, ¶¶ 22-23. Similarly, in Warner, this court explained that “[i]f the legislature had intended that a petitioner was required to allege and show only that they were innocent of the ‘offenses for which he or she was incarcerated,’ subsections (d) and (g)(3) would contain the same language as found in subsections (b) and (h).” Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 28. “Instead, the legislaturе chose the phrase ‘offenses charged in the *** information,’ demonstrating its clear intent that a
¶ 25 Defendant contends that we should follow People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, and find that charges of which a defendant was not convicted play no role in certificate of innocence proceedings.4 In that case, the defendant was charged with AUUW, bringing a firearm into a penal institution, and bringing cannabis into a penal institution. Id. ¶ 3. Following a bench trial, she was convicted of AUUW but her conviction was later vacated pursuant to Aguilar. Id. ¶¶ 3-6. The defendant filed a petition for a certificate of innocence, which the circuit court denied, explaining that the trial evidence established that she possessed a firearm inside a prison, so she was not innocent of AUUW. Id. ¶ 7. The defendant appealed and the Third District ordered issuance of a certificate of innocence. Id. ¶ 1. The Third Distriсt reasoned that the AUUW statute “that criminalized [the defendant‘s] actions is void ab initio” due to Aguilar, so the “actions for which she was charged, convicted, sentenced and incarcerated were not criminal at the time.” Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 26 We find McClinton unpersuasive. McClinton did not involve a guilty plea or charges that the State nol-prossed as part of that plea. It also did not involve AUUW charges premised on possessing a firearm without a valid FOID card. Defendant has not proved that he is innocent of possessing a firearm without a FOID card and McClinton does not change that conclusion.5
¶ 27 Defendant also argues that Palmer supports his position because it holds that “the proper focus of subsection (g)(3)” is on the allegations “charged and prosecuted in [the] petitioner‘s criminal trial.” Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 72. In that case, the defendant was charged with five counts of first-degree murder arising out of the victim‘s beating death. Id. ¶ 5. Each count alleged a different theory of culpability for murder. Id. At trial, the State presented evidence that the defendant and another man burgled the victim‘s apartment and, the following night, the defendant returned alone and killed the victim. Id. ¶ 7. The defendant was found guilty of first degree murder on the count alleging that he intentionally killed the victim. Id. ¶¶ 5, 28. Years later, his conviction was vacated based on testing that excluded him as a contributor of DNA profiles found under the victim‘s fingernails. Id. ¶¶ 31-34. The defendant filed a petition for a certificate of innocence, which the State opposed, arguing that, while the DNA evidence established that he was not the primary assailant, he could still be guilty of murder as an accessory at the scene during the murder. Id. ¶¶ 37, 43-44. The circuit court denied the petition for a certificate of innocence, finding that
¶ 28 The supreme court reversed. Id. ¶ 80. The court framed the issue as whether subsection (g)(3) required the defendant to prove that he “was innocent of the offense only as it was originally charged or innocent of every conceivable theory of criminal liability for that offense.” Id. ¶ 1. The court held that “because the word ‘offenses’ is modified by the phrase ‘charged in the indictment or information,’ the legislature intended that а petitioner establish his or her innocence of the offense on the factual basis charged in the indictment or information.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 64. The court reasoned that, at trial, the State argued that the defendant alone beat the victim to death and did not advance the theory that he was an “accomplice or unidentified third party” until certificate of innocence proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 65-66. Because the State did not charge or argue the defendant‘s guilt based on a theory of accountability, hе was not required to disprove that theory to obtain a certificate of innocence. Id. ¶ 67. That is, subsection (g)(3) does not “require a petitioner to prove his innocence of a novel theory of guilt that was never charged.” Id. ¶ 68.
¶ 29 Palmer does not mean that a petitioner can fulfill subsection (g)(3) by proving his innocence of the charge for which he was convicted and incarcerated, but not the other charges against him. Rather, Palmer holds that a petitioner does not have to prove his innocence of uncharged theories of culpability. Id. In this case, the State does not claim that defendant must prove his innocence of a theory of culpability for AUUW that it never charged. For example, the State does not contend that defendant must prove that he is innocent of AUUW premised on possessing a firearm while committing a misdemeanor involving the use or threat of violence (
¶ 30 Defendant also relies on Smith‘s discussion that a petitioner does not have “the burden of affirmatively demonstrating his innocence *** on charges that were nol-рrossed by the State” because “the State cannot pursue and thus has no ability to obtain a finding of guilt on” a charge the State abandoned by nol-prossing it. (Emphasis in original.) Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984, ¶ 25. However, Warner rejected that conclusion, explaining that “[s]ection 2-702 does not contain any language or any indication that the petitioner‘s burden of pleading and proving innocence applies only to the charges in the indictment or information on which the State has an ability to obtain a finding of guilty.” Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶¶ 36-37. We agree with Warner. Subsection (g)(3) requires proof of innocence of charges in the indictment or information and says nothing about charges that are later nol-prossed. The State‘s decision to dismiss a charge nolle prosequi does not mean that the offense was never charged, and it certainly does not mean that the State conceded the defendant‘s innocence of that charge. People v. Rodriguez, 2021 IL App (1st) 200173, ¶ 59. Subsection (g)(3) applies to nol-prossed charges.
¶ 31 This case has reached an accurate and fair result. Defendant is not guilty of the AUUW charge for which he was convicted and incarcerated because that charge was unconstitutional under Aguilar. Defendant‘s conviction has been properly vacated. However, that does not mean
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 ¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of defendant‘s petition fоr a certificate of innocence.
¶ 34 Affirmed.