The defendant was indicted for murder. On his arraignment, his counsel made a motion to set aside the indictment upon the ground that one Celis, who was a deputy sheriff and liad arrested the defendant, and was also a witness against him, had acted as interpreter in the examination of witnesses against him before the grand jury, and was present at the exaination of such witnesses by the grand jury. The motion was denied, and the ruling is assigned as error.
1. The presence of the interpreter before the grand jury was necessary, and the law allowed it. (Stats. 1871-72, p. 540.) But it is contended, that one who was the prosecuting witness against the defendant could not legally act as interpreter against him. We know of no reason why a person who is a witness in a case should be disqualified from acting as interpreter at the examination of other witnesses in the case. It must be presumed, that the grand jury or district attorney,, in acting under the statute, summoned a fit and proper person as interpreter. The fact that the person summoned was a witness in the case, or had arrested the defendant, was immaterial. Doubtless there were extrinsic reasons which influenced the grand jury in summoning the particular interpreter. It may have been that he was the only one whose services were available, and that but for him it would have been necessary to postpone the examination of witnesses, to their inconvenience, the public detriment, and the delay of justice. At all events, the selection of an interpreter depends so much upon circumstances, including the
2. The next assignment of error is, that the Court improperly admitted in evidence a confession made by the defendant, and in its charge to the jury gave an instruction in relation to it, which, it is claimed, was erroneous, and refused to give instructions upon the same subject which were requested by the counsel of defendant.
The confession of the defendant was made to the witness Celis, while the latter had the defendant in custody. Celis was deputy sheriff of Los Angeles County, and arrested the defendant without a warrant, in Kern County. On his way from that county to Los Angeles, with the prisoner, he stopped, about four o’clock in the morning, at Mewhall, in Los Angeles County. There the prisoner asked for a drink, and some whisky was brought him. He drank about half a tumblerful, and between that and breakfast lie had two more drinks, each of about the same quantity. After' breakfast, the officer and the defendant went on horseback to San Fernando, where they arrived between eight and nine A. M., and the defendant had two more drinks of whisky. At San Fernando, the officer obtained a horse and buggy, and drove with the defendant to Los Angeles, where they arrived at eleven o’clock A. m. On the way, the defendant, “ feeling pretty lively and talkative,” confessed to the officer that he had killed the deceased. This confession was not influenced by anything said to him by the officer. So far as appears by the record, the officer had not spoken to him at all upon the subject. After the confession had been made, the defendant remarked: “ All I am afraid of is, when we get to Los Angeles, I will be mobbed and hung.” And the officer said to him:
We think it evident that the confession was the spontaneous suggestion of the defendant’s own mind, unmoved and uninfluenced by any inducement, promise, threat, or menace by the officer to obtain it, and there was no abuse of discretion in admitting it as evidence. (People v. Jones,
3. In its charge to the jury, the Court instructed them upon the subject of voluntary confessions, as follows: “A man’s declaration or voluntary confession are always admitted in evidence against him when not made under the influence of threats, intimidations, promises, or inducements; for the law presumes that a man will not say anything untrue against himself or his own interests. But the evidence of the oral admissions of a party ought to be viewed with caution.” This is a correct exposition of the law. But defendant’s counsel requested two additional instructions upon the same subject. One to the effect that the jury were to receive voluntary confessions with great caution and distrust, if they found from the evidence that the defendant was so much under the influence of liquor as to be unconscious of what he was saying, or careless in his expressions, or did not mean to utter the language imputed to him, or did not utter the exact words testified by the officer. The other reiterated the principle of law which had been, substantially, given by the Court; but it set forth in extenso the reasons for the rule excepted from 1st Grcenl. on Ev. § 214. We think the Court did not err in refusing the first, because it was not predicated upon the evidence in the case (People v. Strong,
4. It is next urged, that the Court erred in giving to the jury the following instructions : “ Flight or concealment is relevant testimony for the prosecution, and it comes in with other incidents, the death of deceased being proved, from which guilt may be cumulatively inferred; and if you find from the testimony in this case that the defendant, soon after the time deceased was killed, if killed at all, concealed himself, or fled from the neighborhood where deceased was slain, then that circumstance may be considered by you, with the other testimony in the case, as bearing upon the question of defendant’s guilt.” The principal objection urged against the instruction is the use of the phrase, “ deceased was slain;” because it is said to be an assumption of the corpus delicti. In People v. Williams,
6. Another objection is, that the Court refused to give certain instructions, which were requested by defendant’s counsel, upon the question of reasonable doubt. Counsel admit that “ these instructions are essentially embraced in the charge of the Court, but are abruptly refused, without the assignment of such reason.” When a legal principle has been once announced, there can be no necessity for its repetition, and there can be no error in refusing to give it in a second instruction. . A court is not bound to repeat itself in its charge, at the request of counsel. (People v. Hobson,
7. The last objection urged is, that the district attorney, in the course of the examination of a witness introduced to sustain the character of Celis, whose reputation had been attacked, asked the witness this question: “ From what you know of him, would you believe him under oath ? ” In People v. Methvin,
There is no error in the record which operated to the prejudice of the defendant, and the judgment and order denying the motion for a new trial are affirmed.
McKinstry, J., and Ross, J., concurred.