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People v. Raibley
788 N.E.2d 1221
Ill. App. Ct.
2003
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*1 ILLINOIS, PAUL T. Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE OF THE PEOPLE OF STATE RAIBLEY,Defendant-Appellant. District No. 4 — 00—0587 Fourth April 2003. Argued Opinion filed November 2002. *2 MYERSCOUGH,P.J., specially concurring part in dissenting part. Daniel D. Yuhas and Robert (argued), N. Markfield Appel- both of State Office, late Defender’s Springfield, of for appellant. (Norbert Tucker, Alan D. Attorney, State’s Goetten, of Havana J. Robert Biderman, J. Dodegge (argued), Thomas R. Attorneys all of State’s Appel- Office, late counsel), Frosecutor’s of Feople. for the JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court: trial, After a bench the trial defendant, court found Paul T. Raib ley, guilty (720 of two counts of child pornography ILCS 5/11— 20.1(a)(l)(vii) (West 1998)) (720 and two counts of burglary residential (West 1998)). ILCS The court sentenced him to 12 years’ 5/19—3 imprisonment count, for each ordering that the terms run concur rently with each other but consecutively to a 10-year term of imprison ment that the United States District Court for Central District of Illinois imposed, for the conduct, same in United Raibley, States v. No. 98 — CR—40058. Defendant appeals on grounds, several but we need consider only one: that the trial court erred in finding defendant had consented to a taking officer’s the incriminating videotape from pickup truck jail to the county it agree there. We with that contention and therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment as well as the conviction on all four counts.

I. BACKGROUND Attorney against filed six counts the State’s On October I County alleged: circuit court. Count defendant in the Mason County[,] com- [defendant] in Mason September “[0]n *** in that defendant pornography] [child of mitted the offense knowingly [videotaped] *** Doe, Jane a child whom defendant knew to be under the age [18] years, while [the] child was another the unclothed buttocks of object of lewd exhibition of ***.” person [sic] I, alleged it that defendant except II to count

Count was identical setting in a involv- depicted [the] Doe “while child was videotaped Jane genitals [the] unclothed of child.” ing the lewd exhibition of the trial, and the trial court prior count III The State dismissed IV¡ sexual predatory of criminal assault acquitted defendant count 1998)). 14.1(a)(1)(West (720 ILCS 5/12 — alleged: Count V com- County, [defendant] in Mason September “[0]n defendant burglary] [residential

mitted the offense dwelling place authority entered knowingly and without Illinois, Havana, intent to Doe, County, with located Mason John felony pornography child ***.” commit therein a count V verbatim. repeated Count VI II, I, and VI. guilty of counts The trial court found V videotape of suppress motion to pretrial Defendant filed a children, by shrugging, given he had not arguing that John Doe’s *3 hearing At the on videotape. and police permission to seize view testified, significant and no motion, only witnesses for State attorney testimony. Neither emerged from their discrepancies factual in their recitation of the incorrect argued that the witnesses were one should facts, disagreed on the inferences although they historical those facts. draw from Aledo, He testified for Illinois. Lindburg

Eric a officer was dispatched he to Wal-Mart p.m., at 4:13 was that on October entering videotaping employees Aledo, reportedly in a man was where a store Wal-Mart, Lindburg spoke with the store. At exiting and small, short, man in a white a red-haired manager, who described plate of the license number. portion remembered a pickup truck. She hurry in a when and left she man had become nervous She said the testified he also Lindburg videotaping employee. an noticed he was videotaped, 17-year-old a the man had employee whom spoke with man, manager had but the noticed the teenager female. The never lot as she parking her from the guy videotaping a “told her there was dangerous man armed or suggested one was walking in.” No was any way. in lot,

Seeing pickup parking Lindburg no in resumed white truck radio, officers to regular patrol. requested his Over the he other truck, keep eye speak an out for the he wanted “to because later, by again; individual.” About an hour he cruised Wal-Mart this parking lot, time the truck was in the but no one was the truck. he the truck Lindburg plate testified ran the license ascertained belonged to defendant. He then into Wal-Mart to ask the went manager talking if she saw the man in the store. While with the out manager, glanced speeding over his shoulder and saw truck that the Lindburg lot. ran to car and radioed parking patrol his west just parking high speed going truck had left the lot at a and was highway. patrol sight on the He truck in his car but lost pursued the speeding park- of it. He did intend to write a citation because a ing illegal. merely lot was not He wanted to talk with defendant hasty departures suspicious because his from the lot were parking Lindburg might stalking teenager. was concerned he have been four-

Lindburg spotted highway truck a mile down the at the way County A deputy intersection center of Aledo. Mercer sheriff, Hast, patrol Sean the truck car 10 stopped angling his Lindburg feet in front of it. Both and Hast had turned on the overhead emergency lights patrol Lindburg “[Defendant] of their cars. testified: window[,] get had his hands out of the him up [Hast] had against [began] “may the vehicle and have pat down.” Hast had his hand on firearm in yet the holster or near it.” Defendant Hast, “[‘][N]o, appeared surprised Lindburg and nervous. told he is ” just not under I speak Lindburg arrest. need to with him.’ then stated, [‘]okay,[’] apologized “[Hast] said and I believe he got [defendant] and in his vehicle and drove off.” arrest, assuring Lindburg After him he not under “asked [defendant] corner[.] if he mind around the speaking [him] with around[,] pull parking [I]f [was] he wanted to his vehicle there a intersection, spot.” Lindburg Lindburg After he and moved out of the might patted again, defendant down but he was uncertain. Defendant “still asked him shaking, Lindburg a little nervous.” why videotaped employee. he had the Wal-Mart Defendant asked if it illegal videotape person parking in a lot. said no but suspicious.” anything it looked “real He “if he had il- asked defendant no, legal [pickup] truck.” When defendant said “asked him if if prosecutor questioned [he] he would mind made sure.” The Lindburg as follows:

“Q. then[,] words[,] ***? [W]hat [were] his on the consent [(the truck)]. just A. He said he didn’t mind if I searched it Q. I he you gesture you testified[.] [D]id note made a there as any gesture you? make as he answered didn’t mind if I did.” shrugged A. I he and said he believe truck, seat, defendant reached under the Lindburg As searched folders, and stuck them in his back pulled out some videocassette him him he “didn’t want to reach under the pocket. Lindburg told again. seat” it. truck, Lindburg marijuana pipe smoking

In found and a for (Miranda defendant, rights read him his Miranda He handcuffed (1966)), Arizona, L. Ed. 2d 86 S. Ct. 1602 then, Hast had returned put patrol By him in the front seat of the car. seat, assisting they in the search. Under the found two and was following: videotapes. Defense counsel asked search, “Q. you conversation At the location *** tapes? [defendant with about the Yes, them], anything illegal pornography [was I him if on A. asked pornography. or child

Q. respond? How did he girlfriend him on there. There tapes A. There were and his may pornography.” be some County Attorney Mercer State’s Baron

Lindburg testified called him, telephone a cellular and asked within earshot Heintz on him he defendant, legally videotapes. if he could view the Heintz told if then could defendant consented. asked defendant —who patrol then in the car with his hands cuffed front of sitting tapes. if took a look at the That is [they] him —“if he minded Lindburg: gave shrug.” Defense counsel asked when he “Q. point? why And were the seized at if he mind if I took a look [defendant] A. Because I asked tape. object. at the He didn’t

Q. say? did he What Nothing, shrugged shoulders.”

A. evidence, Lindburg took defendant to the gathering up After him through sally port and took County jail. Mercer “We entered possession for jailers [and] told them he was under arrest out of Lindburg got Then paraphernalia.” cannabis and A brought jail. county employee helped car and them into the patrol office, dispatcher’s in the up equipment hook some audiovisual jailers booking defendant. next door to the room where the were office, was a booking dispatcher’s room and the there Between the window, Lindburg and others car- through defendant could see which into the office. rying equipment the audiovisual office, videotape, the first dispatcher’s In the viewed pornogra- no footage teenager parking lot but which had phy. Lindburg: Defense counsel asked *5 [(the

“Q. viewing particular tape that any prior [your] At time incriminating footage),] [defendant] did videotape first that had no verbalize, say tape[’?] say the Did he [‘]go ahead and watch anything to indicate consent? [‘]go tapes. [’]”

A. He never ahead and said watch Lindburg further testified: jail. previously already

“A. He had told him We we were them[,] taking videotapes] [the to view however.

* * * Q. You had [‘]we[’] said advised him?

IA. had advised him.” jailer Lindburg videotape, After viewed the first defendant told the jail.” he “in speak wanted with the back of the testified:

“A. I went back there to talk to him.

Q. say? And did he what people viewing tape. A. He said that he didn’t a lot of want If I tape, needed to use his video camcorder to view the he would show me how to do that.

Q. you Did utilize the video camcorder? already A. I told him up only we had had it hooked me and guy up videotape] [would who hooked it view the there because it[,] going looking wasn’t to be a lot people anyway. at Q. say What did he after that? [‘]okay.[’]

HeA. said

Q. you say? And did what got [a] A. We discussion about fact he knew what he was doing wrong help.” and that he needed Lindburg then videotape, viewed second which contained Afterward, child I and II and an pornography counts describe. he investigator defendant, eliciting from him the interviewed admission he incriminating videotape. had made the

In order the trial noted denying suppress, its motion to court old, years college graduate, working “[34] that defendant was as a scientist.” The order further stated: vague “The evidence is as to whether there was an somewhat *** by viewing tapes [defendant

actual verbal consent to the of the car, they It acquiescence. the time were seized from the or mere *** body language, thought is clear that the officer [defendant’s *** that[,] further[,] given consent[ ] [defendant any objection viewing tapes not voice of the time. * * * *** viewing tape containing of child [P]rior evidence an affirmative act indicative of pornography, [defendant took voluntary by offering his video camera for the officers viewing tape, saying to use in he didn’t want others to see it. act, consent, coupled original implied with This even if verbal clearly given, light age, education, consent was of his intel- ligence, setting[,] circumstances, non[ ]coercive and all relevant [c]ourt that he leads conclude consented to the tape.” appeal This followed.

II. ANALYSIS A. Timeliness of the Posttrial Motion (cid:127)1 argues The State that because defendant posttrial filed his mo late, tion he has forfeited the issue of whether he consented to the viewing of the videotape. posttrial issue, His motion discussed but he filed May days the motion on more than 30 after March 2000, when the trial court finding guilty issued its order of child 1(b) (West pornography and burglary. residential See 725 ILCS 5/116— *6 2000); 228, 243, 1275, People Segoviano, v. 189 Ill. 2d 725 N.E.2d 1282 (2000). in

Citing People Gauwitz, 362, our decision v. 80 Ill. 3d App. 400 (1980), argues N.E.2d 92 that because the State never posttrial court, moved to strike the motion in trial the State has waived 27, the 2000, issue of untimeliness. Defendant is correct. On June in hearing motion, the on the posttrial prosecutor argued the never the motion untimely. merely requested He the trial court deny grounds. Gauwitz, the motion on As in substantive we said 80 Ill. 367, 96, 3d at 400 App. “two-way N.E.2d at waiver is a street.” If the State never alerted the trial court to the posttrial untimeliness of the motion but instead attacked the motion, substantive merits of the necessarily State recognized jurisdiction the trial court’s waived Gauwitz, 367, the issue of untimeliness. 80 App. See Ill. 3d at 400 96; People Eddington, 745, 751, N.E.2d at see also v. 129 Ill. 3d App. (1984) 103, (by 473 N.E.2d 108 actively participating, objec without tion, motion, in proceedings posttrial on a late the State revested jurisdiction). trial court with

B. Distinction Between a Search and a Seizure giving findings While deference to a trial court’s of historical facts, fact and reasonable inferences from those we review de novo the and, therefore, reasonableness of a or seizure warrantless search applicability exceptions requirement People to the of a warrant. v. Blair, 373, (2001), denied, 321 Ill. App. appeal 3d 748 N.E.2d 318 195 (2001). 582, parties dispute Ill. 2d 755 N.E.2d 479 The do not case, although they dispute historical facts in this whether defendant videotape. consented

699 people from protect and federal constitutions state Const., I, 6; § art. U.S. 1970 Ill. searches and seizures. unreasonable warrant, police must Const., consent or a amend. IV Absent 377, at Blair, App. 321 Ill. 3d 748 property. to seize probable cause unlawfully seized evidence government at 323. The cannot use N.E.2d Lord, 379, 381, v. Ill. 2d City Chicago at trial. 7 against a defendant (1955). 504, 130 N.E.2d The fourth conceptually are distinct. A search and a seizure “ involving one types expectations, amendment two ‘protects ’ ” Illinois, “searches,” County, v. Cook the other “seizures.” Soldal (1992), 538, 544 506 U.S. 121 L. Ed. 2d 113 S. Ct. 85, 109, 113, L. 2d Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 80 Ed. quoting United States to look for that 94, 1652, To “search” means S. Ct. 58, 62, 245 App. 107 Ill. (People Milligan, is concealed which 551, (1969)), thereby infringing upon expecta someone’s N.E.2d 459, S. (Soldal, 63, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 113 Ct. privacy tion of infringe, “meaningful” in a property To “seize” means to property. People interest way, upon possessory someone’s One can 525-26, 687 N.E.2d Shapiro, 177 Ill. seizing property it and seize without search property search without Soldal, 63-64, 459-60, 113 Ct. at ing it. 506 U.S. at L. Ed. 2d at S. property. A property 544. consent to search is not seize Blair, 321 Ill. 3d at 748 N.E.2d at 323. App. Blair,

In ar App. police 321 Ill. 3d at 748 N.E.2d at disorderly videotaped rested the defendant for conduct that he had custody, police children at the zoo. While defendant was and, according testimony, to their went to the defendant’s residence computer. obtained a consent from father to search the defendant’s 375-77, Blair, 3d at N.E.2d at 322-23. The App. refer turned on the and found “bookmarks” therein with computer Blair, at 322. teenagers. ences to 321 Ill1. Believing pornography, it contained child seized the *7 and, thorough search of it outside computer upon performing a more Blair, home, in 321 Ill. pornography computer. found child 376, “[E]ven Third District held: App. 3d at 748 N.E.2d at 322. The lawful, assuming computer that the search of defendant’s (Blair, consent to seize it” computer could not be absent valid seized 323) (Blair, 378, or cause App. probable 321 Ill. 3d at 748 N.E.2d at 323). 377, videotap The defendant’s App. 321 Ill. 3d at 748 N.E.2d at teenagers ing referencing children at and the “bookmarks” the zoo suspicion person would have aroused in a reasonable but would contained child given probable computer have cause to believe the 377-78, Blair, at 748 N.E.2d at 323. pornography. App. 321 Ill. 3d 700

Thus, in denying suppress the trial court erred the motion to computer Blair, 375, Ill. App. files. 321 3d at 748 N.E.2d at 321. argues

Defendant that a reasonable person, consenting when to a truck, search of a pickup “anticipate [police] would not that the officer carry off play order to them at an off-site loca- argues tion.” He that his consent to search the truck did not encompass police “removing officer’s the videotapes from the viewing truck and them at a remote location.” agree. By carrying We away county jail separate them in a booked, room being interfered, while defendant was in a way, meaningful possessory with defendant’s videotapes. interest They videotapes, by seized the consenting pickup to a search of his truck, defendant had not consented to a property. seizure (such

If police during discover an item a lawful search as a consent), pursuant they may only search seize it if they prob have Warden, able cause to believe it is contraband evidence of a crime. Maryland Penitentiary Hayden, 294, 307, 782, 387 U.S. 18 L. 2d Ed. 792, 1642, (1967); Blair, 377, 87 S. Ct. 1650 App. 321 Ill. 3d at 748 N.E.2d incriminating at 323. The character of the item must be im mediately apparent Blair, at the App. time of the seizure. 321 Ill. 3d 377, 323; 128, 136, 748 N.E.2d at Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 110 123, 2301, L. Ed. 2d 110 Hayden “[I]f S. Ct. 2308 test met, objects is not then lawfully may discovered in the consent search subjected scrutiny, be carried off and to further unless of course LaFave, goes 8.1(c), § the consent far.” 3 so W Search & Seizure (3d ed. If the underlying probable facts a claim of cause are undisputed, probable we review cause de novo. People Sweborg, App. Ill. A N.E.2d person’s posses sion of nonpornographic images of children does not create probable cause to seize person’s property might the belief that it contain Blair, child pornography. 377-78, 323; 748 N.E.2d at (1st Brunette, 2001); United States v. 256 F.3d Cir. United States (D.P.R 2002). Hernandez, 183 F. Supp. lacked probable to seize videotapes. cause Shrug

C. The search, At the site of the defendant sat while handcuffed car, patrol [he] asked him if “he would mind if took a look at tape.” only Defendant’s response shrug. scope by applying We determine the of consent a standard of “ ‘objective’ typical person reasonableness —what would the reasonable exchange suspect?” understood between the officer and the Jimeno, Florida v. L. Ed. 2d 111 S.

701 phrase not his though Lindburg did 1801, 1803-04 Even Ct. them, request as a to seize a look at” the request to “take would have understood position, in defendant’s person, a reasonable jail at the requesting permission view Lindburg as going to therefore, police knew the were and, to seize them. Defendant them to reasonably expected jail and could not have take him to the camcorder, at finish, on his own videotapes, from start view the two the site of the arrest. expression of consent. unambiguous not an shrug

Defendant’s 1188, 1190 194, 197-98, 761 N.E.2d Anthony, In People v. and, defendant on the street (2001), approached the police a officer he had in the area and whether asking doing he was after what a search of him to consent to anything illegal person, requested on his no nervous, gave the defendant Plainly shaking, his hands person. “ ” pat-down, for a merely position’ ‘assumed the verbal consent but on of his head. placing top his hands spreading legs apart at 1190. The officer Anthony, Ill. 2d at 761 N.E.2d 198 consent,” him, and searched gesture construed that as a “nonverbal 198-99, Ac 761 N.E.2d at 1190. Anthony, found cocaine. 198 Ill. 2d at court, failed to that supreme prove the State cording Ill. Anthony, 198 defendant had consented to search. 203-04, 761 N.E.2d 1193. The court supreme explained: may convey by to search nonverbal

“The defendant [citations], authority is acquiescence apparent conduct but ‘mere *** necessarily [citation]. consent’ us draw an inference The State would have consent, acquiesce. equally An valid defendant intended to he ambiguous gesture is that inference from the defendant’s intimidating as the and surrendered to what viewed submitted just an and uniformed officer who presence of armed increasingly accusatory questions.” subtly a of asked series 1192-93, 202-03, quoting Anthony, Ill. 2d at 761 N.E.2d 198 744 Kelly, People v. Ill. ambiguous case, shrug more In present Anthony. shrug A “assuming position” than the defendant’s indifference, uncertainty.” Merriam- “aloofness, express can (10th “In the case Dictionary ed. Collegiate Webster’s from a conduct, easily inferences so arise dueling where nonverbal this intention to surrender gesture, the defendant’s single ambiguous Anthony, unmistakably clear.” right should be valuable constitutional The has the burden N.E.2d at 1193. State Ill. 2d at proving the consent voluntary. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d at N.E.2d at carry 1192. The State cannot proving burden shrugged. See v. Zapp, State 108 Idaho 701 P.2d 1985) (App. (shrugging holding up bag shoulders and were gestures not sufficient bag); Harris, consent to search the State v. (Del. 1993) 642 A.2d Super. 1246-47 (shrugging shoulders was toolbox). not a gesture sufficient of consent to search a shrug could “I have meant don’t It know.” could have *9 expressed contempt. aloofness —or It could have expressed defendant’s acquiescence to authority police after the asked him a series of increas ingly accusatory questions (Why you videotaping young were that you woman? anything illegal Do have in this truck? Is there any child pornography on this videotape?). According court, to supreme our defendant’s consent to the seizure and viewing videotape of the had to be “unmistakably clear” from shrug the or other “nonverbal conduct.” Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d at Significantly, 761 N.E.2d at 1193. the trial court found it was unclear shrug whether the was a manifestation of consent or a mere acquiescence authority: to “The vague evidence is somewhat as to whether there anwas actual verbal consent to the viewing tapes by they [defendant at the time added.) were car, seized from the or acquiescence.” mere (Emphasis Thus, court, the trial fact-finding capacity, its shrug found the not to be an “unmistakably clear” manifestation of consent. if shrug expressed indifference,

Even it still would been ambiguous, it expressed because could have indifference not to the (as proposed videotapes seizure of the request but to the to seize them if say, to “What does it matter if I going consent or not? You’re to take them, and anyway”). view shrugged Defendant had verbally consenting truck, when to the search of his but defendant’s shrug, mute he patrol car, when was handcuffed in the could have had meaning. different The State points protested out that “defendant never upon learn that ing Lindburg interpreted ‘shrug’ his as consent.” In Anthony, we reasoning order, used the same in a Rule 23 which the supreme court “ reversed. said: We ‘Defendant never protested during police [the of objected actions, ficer’s] search or otherwise By to search. these ” gave defendant [the his consent to officer] for search.’ Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d at 761 N.E.2d at quoting People 2000) (June Anthony, 99—0708, No. slip (unpub order at 7-8 4 — lished order Supreme under Court Rule The-supreme court declined to hold that the objection, coupled ambigu lack of an an with gesture, ous an Treating objec was affirmative consent. the lack of an greatly tion as a consent concept debase the of consent. It was seizure; it an search or illegal responsibility protest to until refrain from a search seizure police’s responsibility to clear, gave voluntary consent. defendant To Use Camcorder D. Defendant’s Offer His explicitly offered county jail, clearly In the and defendant trial court inferred on his camcorder. The show voluntarily, argues did the State we should defer so ques is a finding. Because the voluntariness factual unless tion, finding the trial of voluntariness uphold we will court’s Purchase, People 214 Ill. finding manifestly is erroneous. er error” means 573 N.E.2d “Manifest Ruiz, evident, “clearly plain, indisputable.” People ror that is 368, 384-85, 574, 582 finding The belie of voluntariness. trial court’s own words its said, use of camcorder as the trial court defendant offered the If, it videotape],” [the “he to see is clear because didn’t want others unconstrained, Once product his consent not the of his free will. to be a jail, videotape appeared defendant was in it, they going accompli: told were view fait carrying them admits equipment. saw audiovisual State camcorder, purpose, offering that defendant’s the use of his it is people tape.” “limit[ ] number of who saw the We think just a lot of unreasonable to infer that want because defendant people viewing the he wanted to view videotape, *10 In An videotape. obviously “damage-control.” Defendant’s offer 203, 1193, thony, supreme 198 Ill. court said 2d N.E.2d “ to suspect’s police you ‘[d]o a what have that statement to ” case, voluntary not to a search. In defendant’s we do’ was a consent “If might slightly, you alter the follows: have only statement as vestige in a a remaining videotape, way preserves view the do so voluntary not a of my privacy.” of That is statement consent. intelligent The State as and characterizes defendant well-educated and, could therefore, type person police manipulate. not the of biologist an has scientific precisely, aquatic published More he is and determining “In a will was papers. whether defendant’s over-borne totality circum- particular case, a the Court has assessed the *** stances,” “lack education or low including the defendant’s of Bustamante, L. Ed. intelligence.” Schneckloth 862, large, a 2041, Perhaps, and 93 S. Ct. or worldly, suggestion learned is less vulnerable intelligent, person must entertain person. than We simple, coercion illiterate aquatic biology. however, degree of a expectations, unrealistic narrow, Defendant’s education were in a accomplishments special- field, necessarily ized would not an well-equip which him for encounter police. with the had advised right defendant of his to remain silent

(and, therefore, right his to refrain from proposing use camcorder). gave the police Whether the defendant a Miranda a factor warning is to consider deciding when whether the defendant’s Smith, voluntary. People 124 Ill. App. 3d N.E.2d Nevertheless, apparently defendant silence, concluded point, that his at that him would have done no good but, rather, brought greater humiliation, would have because the police had resolved already to view the in fact viewed the first one. assumed,

Even we for argument, if the sake of that the consent gave jail voluntary, defendant the consent would neverthe “ less be ‘inextricably up ineffective because it was with [the bound ” illegal State’s] conduct and segregated [could not] be therefrom.’ People Freeman, App. 121 Ill.

(1984), quoting Kelly, 394 N.E.2d at 744. Because shrug was not a clear communication of consent to seize the seizure of videotapes, them was unreasonable. Defendant’s of fer to use his was inextricably up camcorder bound with the seizure If videotapes. had not seized and viewed (after stating both), the first one an intent them view defendant offered the use camcorder — otherwise.

III. CONCLUSION reasons, For the foregoing judgment we reverse the trial court’s and defendant’s conviction on all four counts.

Reversed.

KNECHT, J., concurs. MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring

PRESIDING JUSTICE part dissenting in part:

I concur that the State forfeited issue untimeliness of the posttrial However, motion. I disagree majority’s holding with the not consent to the search or the *11 I videotapes. disagree also with majority’s apparent ap- the view that always de a pellate courts should review novo the voluntariness of only consent. of a novo consent is reviewed de where Voluntariness

705 Anthony, credibility disputed. is the of witnesses neither the facts nor Ill. Sims, v. 192 1191; People at also 201, Ill. 2d 761 see 198 at N.E.2d (2000), Ornelas v. United 592, 1048, citing 1060 615, 2d 736 N.E.2d 1657, 911, 920, S. Ct. 1663 L. Ed. 2d 116 States, 517 134 U.S. 551, 372, 374 Carlson, 546, Ill. N.E.2d (1996); People 185 2d 708 v. cred finding neither the facts nor the Perhaps, majority’s is on the trial court’s comment ibility disputed of witnesses is based body language, officer by “[i]t [defendant's is clear that further[,] that[,] ] thought given [defendant] had consentí of at any objection viewing tapes to the [defendant did not voice However, I the trial court’s App. time.” Ill. 3d at 697. find that any 338 (1) voluntarily had Lindburg believed that defendant findings—that (2) consented, objection defendant voiced no (3) objection defendant’s lack of constituted consent —were tape, of credibility findings, disturbed absent an abuse which should be discretion. standard,

Regardless, even under the de novo I would affirm trial court. The record indicates that defendant consented years age, college gradu his car. Defendant 34 of a to search of of employed ate as a at the time this incident. When scientist way consented, any arrest or in detained. he was under drawn, have nor had he weapon did not activated made lights. suggests that squad emergency No evidence any threats that his or the tone of voice language used United States way clearly voluntary. The coercive. consent (7th Kozinski, 795, 16 F.3d 810 Cir.

Moreover, Lindburg scope The did not exceed the consent. subjective by is not intentions of scope determined searching of consenting subjective interpretation or the party 146, 1186, People Baltazar, 149, Ill. 691 App. ficer. 3d N.E.2d (1998). Rather, of a measuring scope the standard for Jimeno, 500 “objective is that of reasonableness.” suspect’s consent Ledesma, 302, 1803; Ed. at People U.S. at 114 L. 2d at Ill S. Ct. App. requires Ill. This typical, person consideration of what a reasonable suspect. and the by exchange understood between officer 1803-04; Jimeno, L. 2d at 111 S. Ct. at 114 Ed. of a Baltazer, 149-50, scope 1189. App. 3d at 691 N.E.2d at Jimeno, object. U.S. at generally is its express search defined scope Consequently, 114 L. 111 S. at 1804. Ed. Ct. by evaluating the officer’s may ordinarily of a search be ascertained Ill. Ledesma, express purpose focus or search.

814, words, N.E.2d 815. In 763 at other courts examine what the Ledesma, was the for said reason the search. Ill. App. 814, 763 N.E.2d at 815. case,

In the instant defendant was seen at Wal-Mart a videotaping 17-year-old girl. He to then returned Wal-Mart and overheard Officer

Lindburg investigating defendant’s of videotaping girl. the Defendant high speed fled at a rate of was stopped and another officer. Lind- burg, girl stalking occurring, questioned concerned a of the was then videotaping defendant about the he had any pornography. and whether Clearly, the of search to Lindburg’s focus was determine whether defendant was a stalker and he possessed illegal whether pornography.

Lindburg expressly asked videotaping about defendant’s of the employee. Wal-Mart why asked defendant videotap- ing a employee. Wal-Mart He then asked defendant whether defendant anything illegal vehicle, had in the and defendant that he replied not. if he sure, asked could make and said defendant that Since fine. the focus of a search its scope, defines defendant’s consent extended to videotape. circumstances, expect

Under those a reasonable person would search, part they could be viewed as since could directly contain relating suspicious evidence to defendant’s activities. (2000) 1, 853, See v. People Berry, 314 Ill. App. (reasonable person would exchange have understood which “ ” ahead,’ said, right response request ‘Go to officer’s to phone, look at to mean that turning defendant consented officer on phone pulling number, subject and up only where under discussion ownership phone). Kelk, See People also 797, 800-01, (1992), N.E.2d where this court stated:

“Here, defendant, the police immediately prior officer asked the car,’ request to ‘lookin the if drugs weapons there were sufficiently The of that question vehicle. context informed suspect do, and, of what the officer intended to under those circumstances, reasonably the officer the defen- consider dant’s statement —that he did not care if the officer looked in his car, general including car—to be a to a search of that thereof, Supreme contents as the Court held Jimeno.” videotapes, Girls,” camera, camera, one labeled “Aledo video magazine, undergarments, lingerie pornographic women’s found clearly here were within focus.

Additionally, Lindburg was entitled to continue on his search two grounds. Immediately commencing search, other after the officer time, drug discovered cannabis and At that paraphernalia. his Miranda advised of placed properly under arrest and defendant was resulted in seizure of rights. The continuation of the search if that even lingerie. female Defendant’s contention consensual, anything seized after court finds the search to be suppressed be is finding paraphernalia the cannabis and should merit for two reasons. without area, in an to a search of

Once a defendant consents car, complain that a search of the case, this he cannot thereafter consent, protests or scope clearly area of his unless he exceeded 251, 114 Ed. 2d Jimeno, 500 U.S. at L. withdrew consent. (7th 1804; Stribling,

111 S. 94 F.3d Cir. Ct. United States 23 L. Ed. 2d California, Under Chimel found, (1969), marijuana paraphernalia S. Ct. 2034 once the were clearly authority complete the search incident the officer consent, scope and the the arrest even without the defendant’s *13 extended all the seized items were discovered. search to areas where Belton, Ed. S. Ct. 2860 New York v. 69 L. U.S. (7th (1981); Richardson, Cir. States F.3d United consent, need authority, Given this the officer to seek further nor later detract responses and neither the fact that he did defendant’s authority. from that

Moreover, shrug response to given authority, this Lindburg’s Lindburg’s request to view the further ratified not, arrest, reasonably do Defendant could after his authority to so. tapes roadside—with an arrested expect that would view the them. suspect tapes than take the to the station view —rather Lindburg viewing tape, the second which Finally,' prior clearly defendant consented view- pornography, contained child Rather, ing prior and did not withdraw his consent. tape second voluntary consent took an act indicative of his affirmative tape, saying camera to use to view the offering video act, original with the coupled he did want others it. This see age, education, intelligence, light the later of his shrug, circumstances, setting, all relevant indicate defendant viewing 17-year-old tape. consented to the Were the defendant objection to individual, any way he in indicated an uneducated time, might my conclusion be otherwise. tape (7th 1995); Price, United States United 54 F.3d 342 Cir. States 1997) (10th Gutierrez-Moran, (unpublished disposi- 125 F.3d Cir. tion). reasons,

For I affirm the trial court. these

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Raibley
Court Name: Appellate Court of Illinois
Date Published: Apr 30, 2003
Citation: 788 N.E.2d 1221
Docket Number: 4-00-0587
Court Abbreviation: Ill. App. Ct.
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