Lead Opinion
Defendant pleaded guilty of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(a), and was sentenced to twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to the dismissal of additional counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving the same victim. Defendant appeals as of right. We remand.
Defendant challenges the accuracy of the trial court’s scoring of Offense Variables (ov) 6 and 12. Appellate review of the guidelines calculation is very limited. People v Reddish,
Defendant was correctly assessed ten points under ov 6 for two or more victims. Although the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty involved only his seven-year-old daughter, the record indicates that defendant also acted inappropriately with regard to his four-year-old daughter.
Score all penetrations involving the offender arising out of the same criminal transaction.
* In esc 1st and esc 3rd do not score the one penetration that forms the basis of the conviction offense.
There is an apparent conflict on this Court regarding the scoring of ov 12. In People v Warner,
However, the Warner Court went on to state "even if we were to find that the trial court improperly scored ov 12, defendant’s sentence would still fall within the minimum guidelines range.” Id. at 29. On the basis of this language, another panel of this Court concluded that Warner was not binding precedent with regard to the scoring of ov 12 because any conclusion made in Warner was mere dicta. People v Polus,
Notes
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
Dissenting Opinion
dissented in Polus, finding that the discussion of ov 12 in Warner was not dicta. Judge Griffin believed the decision in Warner was binding precedent pursuant to Administrative Order No. 1990-6.
Although Judge Michael Kelly concurred in Bivens, he concluded that Warner was inapplicable because the Warner Court never directly addressed the issue whether prior incidents of sexual penetration between the defendant and the victim can be appropriately considered when scoring ov 12. Id. at 288. Judge Kelly reasoned that because the Polus Court directly addressed this issue, Polus, rather than Warner, establishes the applicable rule of law. Id.
Although we conclude that this Court’s decisions in Warner and Bivens represent the better-reasoned view, we agree with Judge Kelly’s concurrence in Bivens. Because Polus directly addresses the issue of prior penetrations with respect to the scoring of ov 12, we are bound by Administrative Order No. 1994-4 to follow the Polus decision. Accordingly, we hold that evidence of prior instances of sexual penetration between defendant and the victim were inappropriately considered by the trial court in its scoring of ov 12.
Were we not bound by the Polus decision, we would conclude that the trial court’s scoring was appropriate. That is, as Judge Griffin noted in his dissent in Polus: " '[T]he penetrations were properly scored under ov 12 because the multiple penetrations were from the same overall criminal transaction-—-years of molestation.’ ” Polus, supra, at 206, quoting People v Harris, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided September 17, 1992 (Docket No. 126931). We believe that evidence of prior instances of sexual penetration between the defendant and the victim should be considered in the scoring of ov 12. In this case, we would conclude that the fact that defendant admitted molesting his daughter daily for over two years supported the court’s assessment of fifty points for ov 12. However, we must remand this case in order to afford the trial court
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
We note that another panel of this Court has recently addressed this issue, finding that the decision in Polus is binding under Administrative Order No. 1994-4. People v Hyland,
Concurrence in Part
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s conclusion we are bound by Administrative Order No. 1994-4 to follow the Polus decision. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Warner and Bivens represent the better-reasoned view. It was unnecessary for the Warner panel to specifically address the ov 12 scoring issue because any decision would not affect the sentence rendered by the court. I agree with the analysis and decision of the majority in Polus.
