Thе facts of this ease are more specifically set out in the opinion of the court of appeal, second district, division two, Thompson, J., which is appended as a part of our opinion. We will, therefore, not repeat them in our introductory observations.
The petition for hearing by this court laid much stress upon two points passed upon by said district court. The first is that the defendant stands convicted upon-three counts of the indictment- which, in fact, are but repetitions of one and the same offense. We think this contention is without merit. It is true that the identical person is alleged to have been defrauded by the accused by employing the same false representations in each count, but this does not reduce the three separate acts to one act. In each count of the indictment the property obtained by appellant was obtained at a different time and was different in character and value from the property alleged to have been acquired by the false reprеsentations set out in the other counts of the indictment. The theory of appellant is that a single crime has been split into several parts and each part of the whole has been made the basis of a criminal action. This contention is not maintainable. Where the proof in a given case is sufficient to show the existence of a fraudulent intent or purpose on the part of an accused to obtain property from another by false or fraudulent representations, the making of the first false representations which moved or induced the person to whom they were made to part with his property does not immune the defrauding person from punishment for subsequently obtaining from said person other property which was parted with under the influence of the fraudulent representations which were still operating upon the mind of the defrauded person at the time he passed his property into the hands of said designing person.
No person will be permitted to profit by his fraudulent acts or conduct, and if one designedly creates in the mind of another a false belief in the existence of a material fact he will be held to a strict accountability for its effect upon the mind of the person designed to be influenced thereby, and the burden is upon the person creating such false belief to show that it has been removed, else it *414 will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have influenced the actions of the person imposed upon in his dealings with the person who is responsible for sаid false belief. It is a statutory rule that in every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent. (Pen. Code, sec. 20.) The intent to obtain property by false or fraudulent means is shown by the plan devised by the person contemplating the offense, but the crime is not complete until such person obtains possession of the property of the other as a result of fraudulent representations. In other words, the crime-is accomplished when an accused receives into his possession property which he had planned to fraudulently gain. So in the instant case, while a general intent to defraud may have been formed in the mind of the accused at the time of or before he completed the first offense, the other crimes charged were completed as separate and distinct offenses on the days that he unlawfully took possession of the property described in the several counts of the indictment. If appellant’s theory be correct and the valuе of the property first acquired had been under $200 the appellant could have been put to his trial for a misdemeanor only, and other subsequent offenses woidd have been merged into the misdemeanor prosecution. This anomalous result would of itself cause us to pause in considering appellant’s theory if that was all that could be said in rebuttal. Clearly the several counts set out different and distinct crimes. The cases cited by appellant reannounce a well-recognized rule, which is not applicable in the instant case. It is the act of getting possession of or of obtaining property by false and fraudulent representations which the law punishes as a crime.
.
People
v.
Cummings,
The crime of obtaining possession of real property is punishable “in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained.” It is very clear that the punishment prescribed for the crime of gaining possession of real property by false representations is to be measured by its convertible money value. This is the naturаl meaning of the statute and is such an interpretation as the average citizen would place upon it. The crime is punishable as if the property was capable of asportation according to its value reduced to money or a chattel. There is no doubt that it was competent for the legislature to depart from the common law by including real property in the list of property that shall be subject to the provisions of section 532 of the Penal Code. The offense of false pretenses has always been construed as largely analogous to and closely bordering upon that of larceny. (People v. Cummings, supra.) The legislature has provided the same punishment for gaining the possession of real property by fraudulent means as is provided by law for obtaining personal property by like means. The degree of punishment in each case depends upon the value of the property fraudulently obtained. The punishment is as definitely prescribed as it is for larceny. There is no difficulty in the way of applying the penal provisions of the statute which fixes the penalty for larceny in its two degrees to the crime described by the indictment in the instant case by giving heed to section 4 of the Penal Code, which provides:
“The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to this code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.”
*416
People
v.
Cummings, supra,
cannot, in our view, longer be regarded as authority for the holding which is repeated in
People
v.
Folcey,
We have given consideration to appellant’s contentions, many of which are extremely technical, and after so doing feel convinced that the evidence is sufficient in substance to sustain the verdict' of the jury. An attempt, marked by considerable industry, is made by aрpellant to show that the alleged representations charged to appellant did not relate to a past or existing fact, and were nothing more than the expression of opinions as to future events, or the expression of hope, or the making of promises, or the expression of opinion on the part of appellant, and, therefore, were not actionable at criminal law. The scheme conceived by the appellant, as set out in the exhibits, was quite elaborate in its initiatory stage, and contained language which undoubtedly related to the existence of present facts and conditions,’ as well as to future probabilities and possibilities. A representation that a corporation, whether completely formed or in its formative process, has purchased land and is to be conducted or operated according to specific or definite plans and in accordance with a fixed disclosed program, and is to be officered by persons well knоwn for their business probity and integrity, if false, may furnish the basis for the kind of action here prosecuted against the appellant, the essence of which is gaining possession of property by false representations.
The opinion of the district court of appeal, adopted as a part of our opinion, follows:
“The appellant was charged with the offense of obtaining money and property by false pretenses. The indict *417 ment was in four counts, upon all of which the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Judgment wаs pronounced upon the verdict, the sentence was suspended upon the third and fourth counts and after denial of appellant’s motion for a new trial he instituted this appeal from the judgment and order denying his motion.
“The first count charged the obtaining on August 1, 192'4, of 200 shares of capital stock of the Moreland Truck Company and 20 shares of the capital stock of the First Federal Securities Company, taken together, of the total value of $4,000, from Elmer E. Owen. The second and third counts charged the obtaining оn August 2 and 5, 1924, from Henrietta McGaw, $1,250 and $4,000, respectively, and the fourth count of obtaining on August 15, 1924, from the same person, a deed to real property of the value of $11,000. In each instance the money or property was advanced in payment of subscriptions for what was termed preorganization stock of a proposed corporation to be known and styled the Long Beach Dock and Terminal Company, which company was not incorporated upon any of the dates of the subscriptions or subsequently.
“The misrepresentations were the same in each instance and were as follows: 1. That defendant was taking preorganization subscriptions for the purchase of capital stock of the Long Beach Dock and Terminal Company; 2. That the company had bought and practically paid- for 140 acres of harbor land, upon which to erect docks and warehouses; 3. That a bond issue of $6,000,000 had been ‘arranged for’ to cover the cost of construction; 4. That General George W. Goethals had been secured to act as chairman of the board of directors and as supervisor of construction; 5. That thé promoters had secured the consent of Senator Short-ridge, Congressman Lineberger and C. H. Windham, city manager of Long Beach, to act as officers and directors of the company; 6. That the subscriptions were worth the amount charged therefor.
“At the opening of the trial defendant objected to the introduction of evidence on the ground that the facts stated did not cоnstitute a public offense; that matters were stated which constituted a justification and that there was not a compliance with sections 950, 951 and 952 of the Penal Code. He now urges the same objections as insuffi *418 ciencies of the indictment. His position may be stated as follows: That the indictment shows that the defendant was in fact taking preorganization subscriptions; that there is no allegation that the subscriptions were not of the value charged therefor and that as to all other representations they relаte to future acts, i. e., the organization in the future of a company to take over the land and to be officered by the individuals named. This thought runs all the way through appellant’s brief and is the foundation upon which rests most of his argument. Such is not the effect of the allegations. They are very similar to the facts in the case of People v. Ballard,75 Cal. App. 29 [241 Pac. 596 ]. Prom a bare recital of the allegations one would judge that all that remained to constitute the Long Beach Dock and Terminal Company a corporate entity was to cоmply with legal formalities; that to all intents and purposes the personnel of its directors had been determined; that its promoters were sufficiently financed to have purchased for it most valuable real property holdings and had arranged very extensive financing. All of these things were representations of past acts and present conditions and not outbursts of the prophet looking with optimistic eye into the distant future. They are all alleged to be false, and we can hardly imagine what might be added to bring it more squarely within the condemnation of the statute. The allegation of falsity not only covers the representation that it was preorganization stock, but also that it was not worth the price charged.
“Outside of these objections, however, we do not find a serious question concerning the fourth count of the indictment. While appellant pays scant attention to the third and fourth counts by reason of the fact that sentence was suspended, there is sufficient in his brief that we have concluded that we must examinе and pass upon them. As has been stated, the indictment shows the obtaining of a deed to real property of the value of $11,000. Counsel says that this count is fatally defective on the authority of
People
v.
Folcey,
*419
346 [
“The next assertion of appellant is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. We have carefully examined the voluminous transcript and fail to see how the jury could have arrived at any other verdict. Concededly Senator Shortridge, Congressman Lineberger and Mr. Windham had never consented to become officers and had never сonsented to the use of their names. The representations were freely made that ‘they,’ which ‘they’ must mean the organizers or promoters of the proposed company, had purchased from the Union Pacific and practically paid for 140 acres of harbor land—and it was positively established that they had not purchased from the Union Pacific 140 acres or any other land. If the defendant or anyone associated with him had purchased 140 acres of land from any other source not cоvered by his representation, it was his duty to present such evidence after proof of the falsity of the representation.
(Shemwell
v.
People,
“Nor can it be seriously argued that the subscribers received what they paid for. As has been indicated, every representation of fact, every suggestion, the entire scheme, was based upon the immediate organization of the corporation, which was nеver done. The subscribers got nothing except a subscription agreement which likewise was so artfully drawn as to leave out a time limit for incorporation, apparently because the actual incorporation was represented to be almost a closed incident. . . .
“ Attack is next launched upon the testimony specially directed toward count one, and it is claimed to be insufficient to show the obtaining from Mrs. McGaw of $1,250 in cash. The testimony shows that she had invested $1,500 with Harry C. Weist Company, with whom the defendant was at the time of investment associated. She executed an assignment of her claim for the return of the money to the defendant. Then when the check was made out to her—Mr. Farrell, an associate of the defendant, brought the cheek to her; she indorsed it; delivered it to Mr. Farrell, who in turn says he delivered it to the defendant. On August 18 the defendant wrote to Mrs. McGaw, saying that he had received confirmation of her subscription of August 1, which is the subscription in question. Under these circumstances we think the jury were fully justified in believing that thе defendant had cashed the check. In the case of
People
v.
Whalen,
“ Counsel argues that there is no causal connection between the false pretenses and the obtaining by defendant of the money and property of complaining witnesses. What has been said heretofore with respect to the immediate organization of the proposed corporation is applicable at this juncture. Furthermore, we think that the case of
People
v.
White,
“ The last argument advanced by appellant, that the subscription agreement, having recited that the moneys were paid to the defendant as trustee, that there is a fatal variance between the proof and the allegation that the defendant obtained the money and property is fully answered by the cases of
People
v.
Bryant,
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
Richards, J., Shenk, J., Waste, C. J., Curtis, J., Langdon, J., and Preston, J., concurred.