People v. PrindlePeople v. Prindle
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a resentence imposed by Supreme Court upon remittal from the Court of Appeals, which modified the judgment by reducing his conviction of murder in the second degree (
Defendant initially contends that New York‘s persistent felony offender statute is unconstitutional in light of the rule in Apprendi v New Jersey (530 US 466 [2000]). We reject that contention. It is well settled that the persistent felony offender statute is constitutional (see People v Battles, 16 NY3d 54, 59 [2010], cert denied 565 US —, 132 S Ct 123 [2011]; People v Quinones, 12 NY3d 116, 122-131 [2009], cert denied 558 US 821 [2009]). Contrary to defendant‘s further contention, his resentencing does not violate the rule in Alleyne v United States (570 US —, 133 S Ct 2151 [2013]), inasmuch as the factors that made him eligible for enhanced sentencing were prior convictions that were based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus those factors were not “based on [the court‘s] finding by a preponderance of the evidence” (Alleyne, 570 US at —, 133 S Ct at 2163).
Contrary to defendant‘s further contention, “[i]t is settled law that the sentencing of a defendant as a persistent felony offender . . . does not implicate the protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions” (People v Pelkey, 294 AD2d 669, 670 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 771 [2002]; see People v Sailor, 65 NY2d 224, 226-227 [1985], cert denied 474 US 982 [1985]; see also Monge v California, 524 US 721, 728-729 [1998]).
Finally, we reject defendant‘s contentions that he was improperly adjudicated a persistent felon, and that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe. We conclude that defendant‘s “history and character . . . and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the public interest” (