OPINION OF THE COURT
Defendant was charged with attempted murder in connection with a shooting. Seeking to show that someone else com *353 mitted the crime, he moved to introduce evidence that, two months after the shooting, a person present at the shooting had used the same gun in an unrelated crime. On the appeal before us, we consider the appropriate standard for the admission of evidence of this type.
In November 1996, police responded to a report of a shooting at a deli in Brooklyn. Upon arriving, they found Michael Cleland lying on the floor, bleeding from several gunshot wounds. Police recovered shell casings and fragments of bullets. Several days later, Cleland gave the police his account of the crime, naming defendant as the shooter. He knew defendant from the neighborhood, and there was bad blood between them. Cleland told of making a purchase at the deli, after which he came facе-to-face with defendant and several of defendant’s friends. A dispute ensued. -As Cleland turned to leave the store, he heard gunshots and felt a pain in his back. He spun around and allegedly saw defendant holding a gun as defendant’s friends fled. Acсording to Cleland, defendant fired at him two more times and missed. As Cleland lay on the floor, defendant allegedly fired another two or three rounds, hitting Cleland in both legs, and ran off.
Upon learning that he was wanted by the police, defendant turned himself in. Police placed him under arrest. Waiving his Miranda rights, defendant gave a statement disputing Cleland’s account. He told police that he and Cleland were arguing inside the deli and that Cleland knocked him down with a large candle. While on the floоr, he heard gunshots and ran out of the deli, not noticing who had fired the gun or that Cleland had been wounded.
At trial, the principal issue was who shot Cleland. From the outset, the defense acknowledged that defendant was at the scene but denied his involvement in the shooting. Before calling their ballistics expert, the People turned over to the defense a report linking the bullets (recovered from the floor of the deli) to a gun used by a man named Maurice Booker over two months later in an unrelated assault. The prosecutor moved to preclude the defense from using the report. In opposition, defendant asserted that Maurice Booker was “Moe” who had been at the deli at the time of the shooting. The ballistics report, defendant argued, supported his contention that someone else — Booker—was the shooter. The court conditionally granted the People’s motion to preclude, but assured the defense that it would allow the report into evidence if the defense could show that Booker was present at the shooting.
*354 Attempting to do so, defendant cross-examined the People’s two main witnesses, Cleland and the assigned dеtective. Cleland acknowledged that someone named “Moe” was at the deli. According to Cleland, Moe was standing in the doorway at the time of the shooting. Furthermore, the detective revealed that his investigation turned up аn individual named Maurice Booker, who was also known as “Moe.” It had become obvious that Booker and Moe were one and the same. Indeed, the prosecutor was in no position to claim otherwise, having argued that “if thе defense opens the door as to Moe Booker present and Moe being at the scene, then the People are allowed to have this detective testify that he received a phone call linking up [defendant] and Moe as being involved in another shooting robbery in Staten Island.” Defendant then sought to introduce the ballistics report into evidence. The trial court refused, stating that “there [was] not evidence-in-chief before this jury placing Mr. Booker inside [the deli] or even outside [the deli] at a time that’s relevant.”
The jury convicted the defendant of attempted murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defense had “failed to show a clear link between the third party and the crime in question.” (
The “clear link” standard employed by the Appellate Division appears to have been gleaned from this Court’s decision in
Greenfield v People
(
“[w]hile evidence tending to show that another party might have committed the crime charged would be admissible, befоre such testimony can be received there must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances as tend clearly to point out some one besides the [defendant] as the guilty party. Remote аcts, disconnected and outside of the crime itself, cannot be separately proved for such a purpose” (Greenfield v People, supra, at 89 [emphasis added]).
The
Greenfield
Court, however, said nothing to suggest that it was fashioning a new or specialized test for evidence of third-
*355
party сulpability. Indeed, the phrase “clear link” was not used in New York until
People v Aulet
(
Following
Aulet,
the Appellate Divisions have regularly employed the “clear link” standard to review trial court determinations that excluded evidence of third-party culpability
(see, e.g., People v Snow,
This appeal presents us with the opportunity to determine whether the “clear link” phraseology best articulatеs the standard that should govern the admissibility of evidence of third-party culpability. For reasons that follow, we hold that the test is better described in terms of conventional evidentiary principles.
As a general rule, evidence is relevant if it tends to prove the existence or non-existence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly at issue in the case. Relevant evidence, however, is not necessarily admissible. A court may, in its discretion, exclude relеvant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the prospect of trial delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, confusing the issues or misleading the jury
(see, People v Davis,
In third-party culрability cases, the Appellate Divisions employ the “clear link” standard, rather than couching their review in terms of weighing probative value against countervailing risks. Courts in other jurisdictions use similar phrases, such as “direct connection”
(Smithart v State,
To the extent that the “clear link” standard implies no more than an abbreviation for the conventional balancing test, it presents no problem. A review of clear link cases reveals that the courts would very likely have made the same ruling regardless оf the nomenclature. “Clear link” and similar coinages, however, may be easily misread as suggesting that evidence of third-party culpability occupies a special or exotic category of proof.
The better approach, we hold, is to review the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence under the general balancing analysis that governs the admissibility of all evidence. In this setting, we note that the countervailing risks of delay, prejudice and confusion are particularly acute. If those concerns
*357
were not weighed against the probative value of evidence, the fact-finding process would break down under a mass of speculation and conjecture. Courts thus have been careful to exclude evidence of third-party culpability that has slight probative value and strong potential for undue prejudice, delay and confusion
(see, Greenfield v People, supra,
Here, the ballistics report is relevant evidence insofar as it links a third person — Moe Booker — to the gun used to shoot Cleland. When coupled with proof that Moe Booker was at the scene of the shooting, its probative value plainly outweighs the dangers of delay, prejudice and confusion. The trial court, however, improperly prеcluded the evidence. This constituted error as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Graffeo concur.
Order reversed, etc.