People v. Prieskorn

Prieskorn 1985] v PRIESKORN

PEOPLE 24). (Calendar 5, Argued No. 75370. June Docket No. —Decided 11, 1986. February Released December 1985. Court, Otsego pled guilty Circuit Joseph in the E. Prieskorn J., Porter, second-felony one of offender to as a A. William exchange marijuana delivery in for dismissal of counts of three granted credit for remaining sentence The court of the counts. served, prior fifty-eight days that the defendant of incarceration offense, marijuana sentencing for an unrelated of- for the of the on bond on two he was free committed while fense charged being with a marijuana delivery and before marijuana, free delivery while he was also committed third of (M. Beasley Appeals, O’Brien, JJ. and Court of on bond. The dissenting part), part J., concurring affirmed and Kelly, P. conviction, trial court had held that but defendant’s served to which of credit for time the amount miscalculated entitled, to the trial remanded the case defendant was opinion per unpublished recomputation curiam. in an court was entitled the defendant further held The Court marijuana disposition pending credit for incarceration for the charges, the time served credit for but denied sentence 70016). (Docket appeals. No. The violation unrelated joined by Justice opinion Chief Ryan, Justice In an Riley, the Su- Brickley, Boyle, Justices Williams preme Court held: sentencing spent for time the time of receive credit at To offense, prior a defendant conviction of an incarceration of which he is for the offense must have been incarcerated unrelated to or circumstance and not for an offense convicted the conviction. time in crime who have served 1. Persons convicted of a [1, ^[2] Right Right court that Am Jur ALR3d 182. to credit for time regard. ALR3d 408. to credit separate jurisdiction 2d, References Criminal Law state sentence for for Points §§ where state court 548-550. custody prior in Headnotes time served under sentence to trial or sentence. fails to specify in 424 Mich 327 having having prior to been denied or unable to credit the time been furnish are to receive sentencing. provision to avoid intended leaving the matter to the of trial discretion put post and to courts an accused who cannot bond because of indigency equal footing on an who are affluent. with those more However, required permitted sentence credit is neither nor where, case, defendant, as in a this who is released pending disposition charge subsequently a is of and who incar- charges arising of cerated as result out of an or offense original charge, to circumstance unrelated the seeks credit upon sentencing original spent for the for the offense time incarceration for the unrelated offense. enacting Legislature In2. the sentence credit the give sought right any to a criminal defendant the to credit for prior sentencing time served to for the offense of which he is convicted, upon any Legislature not other Had conviction. the given intended that convicted defendants all credit for time sentencing, regardless purpose served to for which served, presentence confinement it was would not have conditioned limited entitlement to credit to time served for the offense of which the defendant is convicted. argument The 3. that denial of credit this case for the spent time incarceration the unrelated imposition will result in of consecutive is sentence merit. without rule is relevant concurrent not in this case. of Commencement the defendant’s sentence for the marijuana delayed was conviction not until after the sentence Rather, imposed for the unrelated offense was concluded. it was served, after well the sentence for the unrelated offense was imposition, and was made to commence on the date of its with given previously marijuana credit for all time served for the offense. 4. The not defendant was incarcerated because he unable was post marijuana Rather, to delivery bond for the offense. he was following having charged free on bond been for that offense when the unrelated offense was committed. To to the attribute Legislature the intent to credit the defendant for served time offense, to relative the unrelated be to to it would attribute misdemeanor, to intent afford the defendant a "free” one for which no Sentence of confinement be or need could be served. joined by Levin, concurring, Cavanagh, Justice Justice agreed that the defendant is not entitled to sentence credit for for the offense committed while he free on beyond spirit It bond. and intendment of the sentence Prieskorn grant felony for time to on a statute credit credit ninety-day not misdemeanor that could incarcerated for a free on bond. been the defendant not been have committed had agree he did with not Justice Levin also stated majority to construe the sentence insofar as it seeks Appeals in applied of it has Court statute as been presented properly Court in before the factual situations not of appropriate seek to a rule It is enunciate this case. majority, applied, "in countless law to be in the words yet myriad yet litigated upon factual scenarios cases not tradition, development develop.” both in the The common-law statutes which law in the construction of of the common developed practices large rules are measure elaborations law, only the case at hand. at common to decide appropriately, on the and cannot The Court is not omniscient apply the facts a rule enunciate basis imagination quite beyond "presenting facts our future cases today.” Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court — — — Credit Unrelated Law Sentence 1. Criminal Sentences Offenses. spent time of for time To receive credit at the offense, of an a defendant to conviction incarceration he is for offense of which must have been incarcerated unrelated to or circumstance convicted and not for an offense (MCL 761.11b; 28.1083[2]). MSA the conviction — — — Sentence Credit 2. Criminal Law Sentences Unrelated — Bail. Offenses required permitted defen- nor where a Sentence credit neither dant, charge pending disposition a who is on bond of released charges subsequently and who is incarcerated as a result arising unrelated to the out an offense or circumstance original original charge, upon sentencing credit seeks spent the unrelated offense for the time in incarceration for (MCL761.11b; 28.1083[2]). MSA Kelley, General, Louis J. J. Frank Attorney Hayes, Caruso, Norman R. General, Pros- Solicitor Malinowski, As- ecuting Attorney, and Leonard General, Attorney people. sistant 424 Mich Court Appellate (by State Defender Sheila N. Robert- son) for the defendant. presented Ryan, J. The issue for consideration is whether defendant is entitled to sentence this case for time incarcerated under sen- tence for an unrelated offense committed while he was free on bond for the offense for which he now seeks sentence credit. We hold that he is not so entitled. April 7, 1982,

Defendant was arrested on charged delivery marijuana. with two counts of alleged The offenses were March 9 and March to have occurred on posted

22, 1982. Defendant April 10, 1982, bond on and was released from custody. again 20, 1982, On arrested, June he was driving this time for posted with a revoked license. He seventy-five again a dollar bond and was July began 20, 1982, released. On defendant serv- ing ninety-day following sentence, conviction, for driving September 9, 1982, violation. On driving incarcerated under sentence for the viola- charged tion, delivery defendant was with a third marijuana delivery of leged offense. This third was al- July 8, 1982, have occurred on when posted previously defendant was free on the bonds marijuana for the first offenses, two and the driv- ing post violation. He did bond for the latest arrest. September pled guilty, 27, 1982,

On defendant as second-felony original offender, to one of the delivery charges exchange for a dismissal of the (The delivery charges. two other of March 8.)1 July 22 22, On November years imprison- was sentenced to serve three to six July delivery "pending Since the disposition” occurred of the delivery charges, subject March tences if convicted defendant was to consecutive sen July of both the March and deliveries. MCL 28.1030(2). 768.7b; MSA v Prieskorn Opinion of the Court granted ment. The court sentence credit for trial fifty-eight days sentencing. served Appeals appeal, held, the Court of an

On unpublished per opinion, curiam that the trial court had miscalculated the amount of sentence credit for time to which the defendant was pursuant § entitled to 11b of the Code of Criminal 28.1083(2).

Procedure, 769.11b; MCL MSA Court of held that defendant was entitled to credit for:

— spent days jail The four between his arrest on original marijuana delivery charges and his release 10, 1982; April on bond on

— verified, eighteen days spent jail If violation, driving Sep- under sentence for the between 9, 1982, charged tember when he was with the third violation, 27, 1982, marijuana delivery September and pleaded guilty pursuant plea bargain, when he to a to a single offense; marijuana delivery

— plea The fifty-six days guilty between his on 27, September 1982, and the 1982. November Judge appellate Kelly’s dissent, Over court fifty-one days declined to award credit July September 20, 1982, 9, 1982, between under for the driving charged violation, before with delivery marijuana the third offense. The court then ordered case remanded to the trial court recomputation for a of sentence credit due the defendant. chronological history foregoing events,

A segments, into divided the relevant is as follows: 424 Mich Opinion op the Court granted appeal upon We leave to the lower pursuant certification, court’s to our Administra- 1984-2, tive Order No. its was in decision People v Prieskorn Opinion of the Court Coyle, conflict with (1981).2 305 NW2d 275

I Michigan’s sentence credit 769.11b; MCL 28.1083(2), provides: MSA any person Whenever is hereafter convicted of any time in any crime within this state and has served jail sentencing being because of denied or unable to furnish bond for the oifenseof imposing convicted,

which he the in trial court specificallygrant against sentence shall sentence for such time sentencing. credit jail prior in statute, Before the enactment of the a criminal right defendant had no to sentence credit for the period he was confined before sentence was im- posed. Judge, See Bowen v Recorder’s Court 384 (1970). 55; Mich 179 NW2d 377 The enactment of Legislature’s the statute reflects the intention to every entitle defendant in a criminal case to the sentence credit leaving in described instead of the matter to the discretion of courts. interpreted many The statute has been different

ways Appeals, depending upon in the Court of permutations presentence factual that result particular confinement in and the factual cases. The sheer number uniqueness of the host of cases Appeals that have been decided the Court of defy categorization, discrete or restatement of sim- ple majority minority and rules._ 2 Coyle, charged breaking In the defendant was arrested and with entering, bond, and and then released on bond. While free on he was charge. arrested on an unrelated He remained in until he was breaking entering Appeals sentenced for the credited served and oifense. The Court Coyle’s breaking entering sentence with the time he following his arrest on the unrelated oifense. 424 Mich op the Court Coyle, accurately observed, however,

It has been interpretations supra, pp the stat- 649-650, that into one of have fallen ute in the Court of approach general categories: the liberal three any presentence ordinarily con- credit for affords reason, for whatever finement served to the crime or unrelated whether which related People imposed, v issue is App Chattaway, 538, 543; 171 NW2d Mich approach (1969); the middle or intermediate question the reason for whether asks presentence an "intimate

confinement bears relationship” to the offense for which substantial seeking sen- was convicted and App People Groeneveld, credit, v tence (1974); strict 424, 427-428; 221 NW2d 254 and the presentence approach limits con- which finan- defendant’s finement that results from the cial offense post unwillingness inability bond for the convicted, he has been Finn, 254 NW2d 585 category Presumably, in- last would include is denied bail under which the accused stances Michigan provisions 1, § Con- the of art 15 of the stitution. necessarily foregoing

The classifications are present inexact, cases factual sce- and some will precisely any the that not fit within narios stated do categories. provides: repeat,

To the statute person any hereafter convicted Whenever any any this state and has served crime within being prior sentencing because of jail time in the denied or unable furnish bond for convicted, imposing which he is the trial court against the specifically grant shall jail time sentence for such sentencing. v Prieskorn Opinion of the Court Appeals The has, Court of times, at various postulated the sentence credit statute was Legislature put intended cannot an accused who post indigency equal bond due to his on an footing counterpart with his affluent more who e.g., People App See, can. Davis, v 87 Mich (1978); People #1, v Andrews (1974);People 719; 218 Pruitt, NW2d 379 App 510, 513; 179 NW2d 22 language particularly expres- being sion, "because of denied or unable to furnish bond for the convicted,” offense of which he is supports interpretation. early

In the Court of decision in Chatta- way, supra, statutory the Court observed that language going should be read as much farther of an merely equalizing position impecu- than nious defendant with that of his more affluent counterpart. Chattaway, In the defendant was ar- rested for two distinct and unrelated crimes. He post was unable to bond for the first crime. No apparently bond was set crime, for the second required because, since the defendant was to be post confined for failure to crime, bond for the first posted if even he had second, bond for the would not be released from until he met bonding requirements for the first. When the de- pleaded guilty fendant first and was sentenced for the given crime, he was credit in that case for all presentence When, confinement served. six weeks following plea, guilty later, his he was sentenced crime, for the second he was denied credit in that previous case for the in confinement on ground given that full credit had been in up first case for all time served to the date of in that and that the time served thereafter was under the sentence first appealed, seeking conviction. When the defendant 424 Mich the Court again in case for the the second credit once already prosecution case, in first credited argued to not entitled the defendant was that "duplicate” was issue before credit. That to be Court: Whether twice credited defendant entitled previously in with the time charges. jail pending disposition of both Chattaway if the statute The Court stated again to to were construed entitle not predisposi- in the case with the be credited second was once tion confinement time for which he already "would in the the result credited first right of the to trial an accused chill exercise person defendant, than more who, like the faces Responding charge.” 542. one untried argument prosecutor’s that the defendant to the jail prior Chattaway sentencing not served time had being "because of for the second crime bond the offense denied or unable furnish crime], but [the which because he had not furnished lated first convicted” second he is unre- bond on the charge, Chattaway Court stated: per- The does not make convicted statute dependent the the right son’s reason reason fact sentence credit set, or, if why bond was denied bond is to furnish why he was unable bond. may the defendant have been able furnish he in this even if he did so case because might not have been released because pending charge in case other the other and still may "holds” or have pending related pled guilty been denied bond after he had been sentenced the other case does of) (it change merely explanation the fact an furnish that the defendant was at first "unable” to bond and later was “denied” bond this case. The Court concluded: entitles a convicted

We hold that statute People v Prieskorn 337 Opinion op the Court person regard to sentence credit without to the why reason was denied or unable to furnish [Chattaway, 18 App bond. Mich 542-543.] There a line developed therefrom of cases es- what pousing has come to called the "liberal” view, that a gain defendant who is unable to his reason, by posting freedom bond for any including reasons related to his financial status reasons to the unrelated case in which he is seek- credit, ing is nevertheless entitled to sentence Chattaway and, in situation, that case in a People Parshay, v all other pending cases as well. People v 104 304 App 411; Mich 593 (1981); NW2d Coyle, supra; People Donkers, v 70 App 692; Mich People Parisi, v (1976); 247 330 NW2d 46 Mich 322; rev’d on other App (1973), 208 70 NW2d grounds People 31; 393 (1974); Mich 222 757 NW2d Potts, v 46 App 538; (1973); Mich 208 NW2d 583 People Cohen, v 706; 192 652 App NW2d eg., People Nieto, (1971). v See, 695; 122 App Mich People Lewis, v (1982); 333 11 42 Mich People Dorsey, v 121; 201 (1972); NW2d 341 104 People v 528; Mich App (1981); 305 NW2d 257 supra, People #1, Haines, Andrews v 726-727; at People v App 240; (1970); NW2d 107 Hall, 95; 19 Mich App (1969); NW2d 473 People Chattaway, supra; People Thomas, v v (1968). Mich App 160 NW2d 382 among Included the foregoing decisions are cases like one before us in which a defendant is arrested and then released on bond one case then, pending disposition charge, subsequently arrested and incarcerated a result as of unrelated charges brought in another case. See supra, Coyle, supra, supra. Potts, Cohen, As indicated certification 424 Mich 327 op the Court grant Appeals is divided whether Court of many required cases. In sentence credit of such granted credit has been cases regard the credited time without whether having anything to do with served for reasons convicted,” the defendant] is [the “offense of which Court of not because has afforded relief language of credit statute com- the mands necessary the sentence following Chattaway, but, “un-

it, avoid chilling right trial,” of exercise [Michigan’s] losing “the benefit of or to avoid concurrent Mich Face, 88 [law].” App 435, 441; 276 NW2d 916 panels de- Court have Other of the of reasoning essentially facts, nied that the same credit question was not occa- the confinement post inability by for the offense the bond sioned convicted,” is but was [the defendant] “of which by the a made after second arrest occasioned posted the "of had bond for People See v [defendant] which the is convicted.” People App supra; Risher, Finn, 78 Mich v have been char- These cases adopting by some as decisions acterized observers application approach of the sen- the “strict” tence credit statute. panels Appeals have

Still of the Court of other adopted ground called the middle what has been approach in confinement which the served sought speaking, strictly not, for time is which post inability as a of an bond result for is convicted for the offense which accused credit, for but is time served seeks “ an intimate and substantial reasons 'bear person relationship to such the crime ” subsequently People Groeneveld, v convicted.’ People supra. Tilliard, Such case was (1980), defen- 17; 296 NW2d 180 where the charged breaking entering an dant was with v Prieskorn of Court unoccupied dwelling incarcerated house and was days forty-eight his arrest the date for for the crime between arraignment. He

and the date days be- for an additional remained arraignment and the date of the date tween sentencing, sentencing. cred- defendant was At days forty-eight ar- served between ited rest and with arraignment, credit for but denied sentencing. arraignment days between at time of released he had not been reason recognizance personal although arraignment, a "hold” had been set, was bond was Michigan Department upon placed by him parole possible violation, since for a Corrections was commit- he was arrested for which the offense parole. Court said The Tilliard he was on ted while that credit should granted to the defen- have been although period 112-day because, dant for the confinement for that to his directly related time was post inability for the offense (he personal granted he was convicted was which bond), inextricably parole [was] violation[] "the which the accused the offense of related” to convicted. interpre- recalling conflicting to resolve the

We undertake statute of the sentence credit tations whether we role is not to determine that our problem presentence prefer to deal with the conservatively, liberally, or in some confinement adopt judicially fashion, to or even a intermediate preferred policy The of fairness in the matter. Legislature policy decision, our the has made language according apply of it function is enlightens language us con- statute as cerning Legislature’s intention.

II only granted leave in case We have 424 Mich op the Court dispute us, resolve raised the facts before attempt conflicting but to to resolve in in views Appeals concerning Court the manner applied which the sentence credit will be statute litigated upon yet myr- in the countless cases not yet develop. equally iad factual scenarios important It is provide guidance that we some for the bench, bar, trial and the other constituencies possible, nearly assure, for whom we write to as as consistently application correct of the statute to presenting quite beyond imagina- cases tion facts our today.

A We believe the sentence credit statute neither requires permits cases, nor sentence credit in such us, as the one before on bond one offense where defendant is released following entry charges arising from pending disposition

and, of those charges, subsequently incarcerated as result charges arising out of an unrelated offense or and then circumstance seeks credit the former period case for that latter of confinement. legislative purpose enacting a statute primarily, language determined, must be from the Ledge of the statute itself. Jones v Grand Public (1957). Schools, 1, 349 Mich 84 NW2d 327 liberally While remedial statutes should be con- strued, a "rule liberal construction will not application override other rules where its would legislature defeat the intention of the or the evi- meaning Sands, dent Statutory of an act.” 3 Sutherland (4th ed), agree § Construction 60.01. We primary purpose that statute is to of the of the sentence credit

"equalize possible as far as the status indigent financially and less well-circum- stanced accused with the status of the accused who can afford to furnish Pruitt, bail.” App 510, 513; 179 NW2d 22 Prieskorn the of Court enacting Legislature sought, statute, the right give credit for to any criminal a to a presentence "for the offense of time served upon any convicted,” and other he not which is Legislature the intended that con- Had conviction. given for all defendants be victed regardless sentencing day, of to time served presentence purpose for the confinement the which not conditioned and served, it would have to credit to time served "for limited entitlement defendant] is [the convicted.” the offense of which may find defendants who them- It multiple offenses, unrelated incarcerated for selves plead guilty to the motivations to some one of the imposi- the to accelerate desire benefit, as much as order tion of sentence sentencing possible, Michigan’s from concurrent given ingredient of a defendant’s But that law. motivation derives peculiar facts from the with facing multiple charges is which the defendant limiting appli- not, think, from we confronted and those credit statute to cir- of the sentence cation by it is its terms. We think cumstances described clear that to Legislature sought, right give to credit for a criminal defendant upon presentence any "the offense time served obedience convicted.” Judicial incidentally, language may, legislation in- motivating coincidentally, have effect deed charged multiple defendant, offenses who is with posted offense and was and who has one released, a second who is incarcerated for but right proceed offense, to trial and waive his get plead guilty in the first in order to case running on that conviction clock disposition awaiting of the offense for which final bond, final of an unre- he is denied resolution However, that motiva- "detainer.” lated "hold” or Mich Opinion of the Court change language tion does of the statute judicial applying and should not be excuse for the statute to to which situations it does not extend.

B upon urging In addition to us the "liberal” reading began Chattaway, of the statute that with argues granting the defendant sentence credit fifty-one days in this case for the confinement driving served under sentence for the offense will sentencing "effectuate” state’s concurrent argument rule. The is that the defendant is denied Michigan the of the benefit concurrent sentence effectively rule and made to serve consecutive sentences for the two convictions involved here given unless he is credit in at the case bar for the fifty-one days driving confinement under the viola- tion. Consecutive is forbidden in this except state, in circumstances not involved in this Carey, In case.3 re 372 Mich The concurrent sentence rule does not affect whether the sentence credit the defendant seeks is granted or denied. The concurrent sentence rule is simply rule, irrelevant to this case. as stated Carey, supra, "in is that the statutory authority, may absence of a sentence not imposed completion be to commence at expiration Applying of another sentence.” the rule Carey to that Court declared that sen- imposed tences for two state convictions serving was federal not sentence could expiration made commence at sentence, federal but must commence on the date imposition of the state sentences. Plainly, application that rule has no here. Com- mencement of the sentence in this case was not MCL 768.7a et seq.; MSA 28.1030(1) et seq. v Prieskobn Opinion op the Court driving delayed violation until after in this The sentence case was concluded. imposed driving violation sen- well after until served, it was made to commence tence was imposition, September 27, 1982, on the date of its given previously for all time with credit that offense.

C enacting the statute sum, believe that In we Legislature question, primarily to intended equalize who, defendants the status inadequate resources, are "un- of their financial for the offense which [they able to furnish bond financially convicted,” are are] and those who posting capable bond, be- or are denied bond charged they with an offense cause are 1963, 1, Const art is no entitlement to bail. there §15.

Ill posted us, the defendant bond In the before case marijuana at and was two for liberty first driving of- he for the when was arrested again on that released on bond fense. He was again July until incarcerated offense and was not began ninety-day 1982, 20, when he serve now seeks for the traffic violation. He sentence credit, days fifty-one case, of the confine- in this driving for the he under sentence ment served grants no to such offense. The statute credit entitlement however, not the defendant did because post inability time serve that his marijuana delivery 1982, 9, bond the March Indeed, offense of which he now stands convicted. on for that offense it was free bond was because he driving position to commit he was Legislature the inten- to the offense. To attribute given tion that the defendant be credit in this case fifty-one days for the served under the traffic offense, sentence committed while he was free Legislature attribute to the an intent to afford a a "free” misde- meanor —one for which no sentence of confinement need be or could be served. Appeals granted note that

We Court eighteen days defendant credit in this case for driving served under violation sentence be- September 19, 1982, tween date charged marijuana delivery offense, with the third September pleaded 1982, the date he guilty charge delivery 9, 1982, to the March —all being time under traffic conviction and, therefore, to the unrelated for which he was convicted this case. Because prosecutor cross-appealed portion the of the has Appeals decision,

Court no we take action respect with to that matter. presentence

beTo entitled to sentence credit for served, a defendant must have been incarcer- ated "for the offense of which he is convicted.” fifty-one days Since the the defendant offense of incarceration for which

seeks credit is unrelated to the us before for which he convicted, has been he is not entitled to sentence credit for that con- finement.

The decision of the Court of is affirmed. Williams, C.J., Brickley, Boyle, Riley, JJ., J. Ryan, concurred with (concurring). question presented, opinion as stated in defendant Court, of the is whether Joseph Eugene Prieskorn "is to entitled spent sentence credit in this case for time incar- cerated under sentence for an unrelated offense committed while he was free on bond for the Prieskorn by Levin, J. he now credit.”1 for which seeks sentence supplied.) (Emphasis opinion reasoning agree with

We not is entitled to it that Prieskorn insofar as states for an offense served credit for time sentence "To attrib- he was free on bond: committed Legislature that the defen- intention ute to fifty-one given for the in this case credit dant be days offense, sentence the traffic under on bond was free while he committed Legislature intent an to the to attribute 'free’ misdemeanor —one a defendant afford or could need be of confinement no sentence beyond spirit intendment It is served.”2 grant on a credit statute the sentence credit of felony for a incarcerated for time ninety-day could that the defendant misdemeanor not free if he had been committed not have bond.

I opinion agree of the Court with the I do not the sentence to construe insofar as it seeks applied the Court of it has been statute as presented not now in factual situations appropriate properly to seek to us. It is not before opin- law, in the words of a rule of enunciate ion of the applied Court, in the countless to "be litigated upon myriad yet scenar- factual cases ios develop.”3 development tradition, yet The common-law law and of the common in the both many statutes, are of which so the construction developed practices at and rules elaborations only hand. the case at law, common decide 1Ante, p 330.

2Ante, pp 343-344.

3Ante, p 340. 346 424 Mich 327 by Opinion appropri- We cannot are omniscient. We ately, case, of on the basis the facts of this enunci- again applicable, ate a rule in the words of the opinion presenting Court, of "to cases facts quite beyond imagination today.”4 our recently

This Court its reaffirmed adherence concerning "the rule that well-settled statements principle of law not essential to determination of the case are obiter dictum and lack the force of an adjudication, McNally Wayne Canvassers, v Co 316 (1947).” (Emphasis sup- 551; Mich plied.) 25 NW2d 613 Co, Roberts v Ins 422 Auto-Owners Mich (1985). 594, 598; 374 sure, To be has after this Court considered may attempt cases, number of it to state the principle emerged in or rule that has the decision opinion not, of those the Court cases. The does explicate however, decisions this Court. There are three decisions of Court this which bear on the correct construction of the sentence credit People Patterson, 83; v 392 Mich (1974), Judge, NW2d 31 Brinson v Genesee Circuit (1978), People 676; Mich 272 NW2d 513 v Gallagher, (1979), 273 NW2d 440 opinion none of which are considered Court.

II justification sweeping The asserted for a state- going beyond necessary ment, what to decide granted ap- is that this Court leave to peal in this case resolve a conflict in the Court Appeals, which certified that its decision in this People case was in conflict with its decision v Coyle, App 636; 305 NW2d 275 is, however, Prieskorn, There no conflict between 4Ante, p 340. Prieskorn Levin, J. time served on a was denied for

where credit while the defen- offense committed sentence for an granting large bail, and the dant was credit, at Coyle, awaiting reported Appeals has, in all trial. The Court of opinions, consistently pending granted in credit all awaiting preceding spent jail trial in for time cases prison sentence without and the first conviction prison regard conviction the first whether (i) for the defen- for offense which an or unable to furnish times denied dant was at all (ii) posted for he bond, for offense which or an later, he arrested effect, when was in revoked bond he was re- for offense committed before another (iii) bond, There is or for another offense. on leased regard to resolved. See in no conflict Coyle, supra. People v reported opinions in which the three

There are Appeals sentence credit. Peo- has denied Court of App ple Groeneveld, 424; 221 254 NW2d v 54 (1974); 580; 254 NW2d Finn, 74 Mich v (1977);People App 431; Risher, 78 Mich 260 585 sentence credit In Groeneveld5 spent jail, for in but time denied, not for time was the defen- in mental institution which a state petition, had, been committed dant on his wife’s awaiting Risher, In Finn and after the trial. on in the case had been released sought, tried, was con- in victed, credit was (in in another another court sentenced Risher) county juvenile in Finn and court committed he was re- before another bond; denied on the sentence on leased imposed the defendant the offense for which arraignment jail awaiting on the defendant was confined While assault, court, acting charge probate his wife’s on a petition of felonious institution, ad him to a state mental to have committed mentally judged ill ordered him so committed. him Mich spent had released bond for the been serving imposed by the sentence other court. Coyle, opinion authorship,

In an known without Court stated that there are three views of the correct construction of the statute: the view, view, liberal This tween the middle and the strict view. analysis ignores the factual differences be- Coyle

cases. cases cited for the Risher, strict view are Finn and where credit was denied for time served on sentence for another exemplified by offense. The middle view Groene- veld where credit was denied for time in a institution, state mental not for time served in a prison. ig "liberal,” "middle,” The labels and "strict” reported nore Appeals all decisions of Court readily except can be reconciled the deci disagreeing question sions on the whether credit should be for time allowed served on a sentence for another offense in the of Finn circumstances and Risher.

Ill provides: The sentence credit statute by nonexistent, Appeals While the conflict certified the Court of is Appeals there is a conflict in the Court of between the in decisions Risher, supra, Cohen, Finn People and the decision in v App 706; (1971), question 192 NW2d 652 on the whether credit should where, be allowed after the defendant has been released on bond in sought, the case in which credit is he is arrested and confined and tried, convicted, then and sentenced for another offense committed before he was released on bond. Finn and analogous Risher are somewhat to the instant case there, here, because as credit serving was denied for time imposed sentence after the defendant was released on bond. Finn and concerned, however, Risher offenses committed before the defendant necessary case, was released bond. It is not in order to this decide where the offense was committed after the defendant was released on bond, to decide properly whether credit denied in Finn where, and Risher sifter defendant was released on bond he was tried, convicted, arrested and confined and then and sentenced for another offense committed before he was released on bond. Prieskorn Levin, J. convicted of any person is hereafter Whenever any has served any within this state crime sentencing being of because prior to jail time in offense for the to furnish bond denied or unable imposing convicted, in the trial court is which he grant against the specifically sentence shall jail prior such time served sentence sentencing. 769.11b; 28.1083(2).] MSA [MCL disagreement administra- has arisen No charged is the defendant statute where tion committing only If he is released one offense. with sentencing, large he at until remains on bail and any to sentenc- time in has "served ing.” to furnish is If or he unable bond is denied only again, is one of- bond, then, there because clearly fense, to credit on sen- is entitled imposed he is the offense "for tence is If bond is set and convicted.”7 reason, and, for bond, whatever released on is and defendant Court were to revoke bond conviction, trial, thereafter confined before beginning confine- would, with his sentence, he jail prior clearly ment, "time have being or unable denied only of which he is for the furnish bond” convicted. disagreement any Court of

Nor is there charged with mul- where the defendant arising tiple offenses, or different out of the same transactions, unable to furnish and is denied or he was ar- for the first offense for which bond perforce rested. such a because he In the offen- furnish all denied or unable to might convicted, is entitled he he ses which People Hall, ^[7] See 19 Mich v People Tilliard, App v Haines, ^[98] 95; Mich 172 NW2d 473 24 Mich App 17; App 296 NW2d 180 240; 180 NW2d (1980); People ^[107] (1970); v 424 327 imposed

to of on for credit sentences all the offenses eventually he is convicted and sentenced.8 It should be noted that whenever a defendant is or denied for trial unable to furnish bond on first arrest multiple awaiting offenses and he confined multiple all

for offenses and thus becomes imposed entitled to credit on all the sentences all the offenses of which he for might be convicted he receives double if credit he sentenced on two pending quintuple cases and credit if he is sen- pending on tenced five The cases. Court allowing construction of the multiple the defendant pending offenses, all credit on is consis- (see IV) general tent with the Part rule that all concurrently. run sentences disagreement Nor has there been where the defendant is convicted and sentenced for an of- fense and thereafter is arrested for another offense serving and is denied bond another sentence.9 he is then Clearly denied bond and awaiting confined is, trial for the offense of which he following arrest, such convicted. controversy has, however,

There been where multiple posts offenses, there are the defendant People Donkers, 692; App (1976), (1977). See v 70 Mich 247 NW2d 330 Finn, in discussed v distinguished Court Finn ground on Donkers Donkers the defendant was arrested while confined another offense,” "unrelated and thus "was unable to furnish bond.” Suppose a breaking is arrested on two "unrelated” entering charges robbery jurisdiction or in one then on two breaking entering robbery "unrelated” or in another jurisdiction, and is confined at all times because he was denied or was Clearly, unable to furnish bond. he is entitled to for all time spent any imposed any in confinement on sentence on of the four pick offenses —there is no basis and choose between offenses in "awarding” the credit —until at least he is on sentenced one of the anything language, offenses. Nor is history, purpose there in the the statute that yet indicates that credit is to be denied cases untried in confinement sifter one of the offenses. People Tilliard, supra. Cf. 7n 351 v Prieskorn by Opinion Levin, J. subsequently here, and is bond, on offense as one thus, another and confined on arrested offense— revoking granted arguably effect, the bond the first offense. subsequently arrested

If, is when the defendant judge offense, the were on another and confined People Potts, Mich order, 46 as in an enter (1973), revoking the bond offense, that he it would be clear on the first set for the first denied bond had then been thereafter offense. representing lawyer a defendant

A cautious might a formal order advised to seek be well revoking his client was released on which subsequently for and confined he is arrested when Upon entry order, it of such an another offense. indisputable would, think, that the defendant I the offense from for had then been denied bond though he even and after the date revocation just liberty offense, the same for that at was once judge for other reason revoked if the had some as the Although formal order revo- no such bond. sought generally the or entered when is cation subsequently on another confined defendant is questionable failure offense, it whether the entry decisive. of such an order should be obtain

IV Patterson, Court, The three decisions of this Gallagher, Brinson, be- should be considered pronouncement any by the Court. fore further Patterson, another In stabbed prison they in the where were confined inmate imprisonment a term of was sentenced serve expiration commencing of the sentence at stabbing. serving A at time of statute may, provides judge discretion, in his impose a consecutive sentence where committed offender is incarcerated penal institution.10 This Court held the defen dant was not credit on the entitled to imposed prison for the offense committed prison arraignment the time between his though conviction that offense even provides literally sentence credit statute person in all where a or to cases "denied unable furnish bond the offense of which he is conv 1 grant icted,”1 credit would defeat the purpose authorizing judge of the statute trial impose a consecutive sentence where offense is prison. committed the defendant is in Brinson, In the defendant absconded while on awaiting pretense charges. bond trial on false He spent Pennsylvania thirty- was arrested in and eight days Pennsylvania jails awaiting in extradi- pursuant held, Patterson, tion. This Court was Brinson ing not entitled to credit on the abscond- spent Michigan in sentence either for time jail Pennsylvania after his extradition from until pretense charges his conviction time served on false following on his conviction the false pretense charges, but that he was entitled to credit thirty-eight spent days Pennsylvania for the jails against for which he had not received credit pretenses the false sentences.12This Court said: The grant statute mandates credit appropriate circumstances is to be read defendants, beneñt People v Havey, 69, 82; (1968), 160 unless the intent aof consecutive statute would frustrated Pennsylvania 12 Brinson received MCL MCL for the time he 769.11b; 768.7a; until his conviction on those MSA MSA 28.1030(1). credit, however, against 28.1083(2). spent after his extradition from charges. the false pretense v Prieskorn Patterson, [Emphasis reading, supra.[13] by such a supplied.] convicted of Gallagher,

In defendant was ap- An receiving concealing property. stolen bond, While on granted. bond was peal on an the Detroit House Correction confined in prison and in a federal conviction unrelated state judge granted credit for income tax violations. conviction, on other state but for time on the federal convic- denied for time served the defendant was enti- tion. This Court held convic- served on the federal tled to credit for time tion.14 and also Gallagher

In both instant said: This Court further Patterson, supra, plaintiff has no to credit claim [on "Under absconding charge] because of his for time confinement pretenses charges. The sen- on the false March tence for 1974 conviction absconding consecutively to the sentences runs grant pretense upon A of credit his convictions. Brinson received false legislative subsequent and intent that the consecu- would defeat the tive sentence be served completion sentence. Patter- after son, supra. Pennsylvania awaiting cannot "Time while served [in extradition] plaintiff holding, it is not time be denied under the Patterson Patterson, obliged 'already his he was to serve under sentence.’ yet conspiracy supra, 90. not convicted of either He had been pretenses. Moreover, obtaining money he has or under false obtain Pennsylvania jail.” yet any not credit for time in a received Brinson, supra at 686-687. 14This Court said: Michigan may imposed is "The rule in a sentence completion of another in the absence of commence at the sentence statutory authority. Carey, In re 126 NW2d 727 case, years imprison- to 5 In that the defendant had been sentenced days ment for a before he was sentenced to serve Federal four years noting prison 3 to 14 a state After that two state on conviction. concurrently, held the defendant should terms run it was would prison: time in Federal receive credit for the served " receiving is in a court after 'A defendant who sentenced State subject and court to the same "undefined sentence in a Federal uncertain in the case of 2 or more State sentences. applies is sentence, begins, contingencies” as he is about when State aptly The for the rule reason Therefore, types hold that where in we both cases. 424 Mich Levin, J. Risher, in Finn and the had defendants been subsequently released on bond and were sentenced to federal in serve time on unrelated state or prison, imposed and the served sentence they large while otherwise would have at been on sought. bond in in the case which credit was only Gallagher, Finn, difference between and Gallagher Risher, case, the in instant is that hence, defendant had been convicted and but appeal serving bond, for the tence, case, sentence, would be the sen- in Finn and Risher and in instant began not, he had when he to serve the yet been convicted and sentenced in the sought. case in which credit was Gallagher While did not involve sentence credit already because there the defendant had in

been convicted sentenced the case sought, principle underly- in which credit was ing Gallagher in decision sill sentences —that Michigan concurrently arguably appli- run —is arguably cable, and should be into taken account reflected the construction of the sentence awaiting credit statute where the is trial as well as when he has been sentenced.15 court, defendant sentenced in commence at the absence subsequently has been sentenced in Federal and is courts, may imposed a State court or sentence not be completion expiration sentence, of Federal in the statutory authority.’ Carey, supra, re In 381. people distinguishable "The Carey contend that because the sen- tencing for the Federal sentencing. offense occurred before the state Here, the defendant was on sentenced the Federal offense after the sentencing. state "We do not find these differences in the order of to be controlling began imprisonment when the actual on the Federal conviction imprisonment before on state conviction. In such a subject contingencies defendant is to the same uncertain about when begin. the state sentence will The defendant is entitled to credit for time 865.1(7), served Federal conviction. Pursuant to GCR grant the defendant’s amended him credit for prison.” (Emphasis original.) Gallagher, Federal supra at 439-440. question The sentence credit more often than not does not arise People v Prieskorn departing Court, from Patterson, In reading statute to of the sentence credit literal deny had been sentence credit where a consecutive adopt imposed, the defendant’s observed delay might in the trial mean that because view any required to not be serve date he would might Similarly, it be on the consecutive sentence. argued should not be denied that a defendant delay trying case in which credit because credit is sought.16 try concurrently prosecutor tends to run and the

because sentences charge upon charge to dismiss a less serious the most serious and given example, suppose the defendant is and For conviction an released on a sentence. offense) (a shoplifting ninety-day appearance and is ticket breaking personal He then is arrested for a bond. shoplifting entering and is confined because he before the committed $2,500 post percent that is set and there is unable to ten overcrowding days hundred later he is sentenced is no to one already hundred trying is run less one hundred that week. One breaking entering. years Since he has to ten on the days, for the one he will receive credit served one hundred delay importance, days. unless there is undue It is of little charge, charge shoplifting or he whether that is dismissed ninety days; because the sentences and sentenced to even convicted year concurrently, no than one will in all events serve more days. consequence to Prieskorn In the instant the sentence pled guilty to or was convicted should be the same whether he following for which he was for a time released on bond pled guilty was unable to furnish bond and which was charge charge marijuana was the a trial of the first —this and to which he later charge charge marijuana third for which he —the —or dismissed when he was Face, charge. marijuana People 88 Mich sentenced on the first See v 435, 441; (1979); App App People Coyle, 104 Mich 276 NW2d 916 v 636, 644-650;305 NW2d 275 (1978), Davis, In pled guilty robbery, pending charges to armed and other given by were dismissed. Credit was the trial court for time served on robbery charge, the armed charges but not for time served on the other credit, awarding which were dismissed. In the Court said: charges posts "A on numerous bond on all defendant arrested who pleads charge subsequently guilty the for a dismissal of the rest receives no to one return punishment the dismissed charges. Consequently, credit to charges. purpose in accordance with the behind inability similarly except a defendant situated for his punishment post also suffer no on the dismissed bond must Since he has charges, only already on these served time counterpart again placed equal footing way he can on an with his 424 Mich 327 by Opinion Levin, J. V Finn, In the Court of said its Donkers, in People decision (1976), granted, where credit was factually distinguishable was there defendant in jail serving a sentence when he charge was arrested on the for which credit was sought: distinguishing features between Donkers

and the defendant was arrested while in a at are In case bar obvious. Donkers the jail as a result of previous conviction for an offense. unrelated [Finn, supra Hence he was furnish unable to bond. at 582.]

Under reasoning, apparently adopted in the opinion Court, obiter dictum of the if charge is denied bond on a and subse in quently, jail, arrested on another time, charge and sentenced to serve in prison before he is convicted and charge sentenced on the arrested, for he was first which would be enti he tled to credit in pretrial both cases for the time and in the first case for the time served on the imposed on the second charge.17 given is to be passed by credit for the time served on all the encom- plea, guilty including those which were dismissed.” person In that construction of the who is released on bond, perhaps time, only for a short who then is arrested on another (the charge revoked), charge being may bond on the first in effect period pretrial denied credit for a substantial time prison post-sentence confinement and in confinement for which he would have received credit if he had not been free for a short time. April months, Prieskorn was released on bond 10 and arrested two later, days 20, driving ten June for on a It revoked license. was five later, charge months November that he was sentenced on agree which he was released on bond. While I that Prieskorn was properly driving denied credit for time served on the on revoked offense, license because that offense was committed after he was bond, agree released on I would not that he should be denied credit in People v Prieskorn post If a defendant who is able to bond on the charge for which he is first arrested is henceforth respect to be denied credit is, another offense for while free on subsequently impecunious bond, arrested, and the post defendant unable to bond on the first arrest receives credit for time served after second charges, impecunious arrest on both fendant, then the de- following arrest, as to the time the second greater receives post credit than the defendant able to following bond who loses his freedom generally second arrest. amount of Since the reflects the seriousness of the offense and the tendency offender, record of the of such a construction of the sentence credit statute would grant high be to more sentence credit to risk offenders than to low risk offenders. opinion

If, declares, as the of the Court purpose primarily of the sentence credit statute is equalize impecuni- to the treatment accorded the might argued defendant, ous then it that credit impecunious should be denied an person those situations where credit is denied a post adoption argu- who able to is of that bond— circle, ment would be to turn a full but that is opinion where the obiter dictum in the of the might Court lead us.

VI agree opinion I with the of the Court that where multiple a defendant finds himself confined on (and, charges indeed, also when he is confined on single charge) credit, he is entitled to under the only terms of the for time for, ninety-day the instant case for time served after arrest sen- on, tence two the revoked license offense because he was free on bond for months, months, days days ten of the seven twelve between sentencing arrest and in the instant case. 424 Levin, J. being denied or of to offense of which he "for the to furnish bond unable is convicted.” agree function is I that our also language "according apply of the to the the statute concerning enlightens language us that statute as the agree Legislature’s that I further intention.”18 legisla- language "[j]udicial of the to the obedience "judicial required, no there is tion” is applying situations to the statute to excuse it not extend.”19 does touching opinion Court, those part add, the obiter dictum bases, as would statutory opinion, qualifications lan- guage not there stated:

(i) "upon any other not for time served conviction”;20

(ii) "arising charge out on a for time served circumstance.”21 unrelated offense or an apply only qualifications apparently These following released on bond a defendant "where arising entry and, from one charges, pending disposition is subse- of those quently charges; as a result of’22 other incarcerated appear qualifications do not

thus these multiple apply offenses where the defendant following first arrest. confined at all times his multiple offenses, and the de- Where there are arrest, a fendant is released on bond on the first subsequent arrest on another offense and the re- sulting the offense for which he confinement for following apparently regarded, was first arrested is (if of and sentence for the other offense conviction precedes conviction of and sentence for the 18Ante, p 339. 19Ante, 341, pp 342.

20Ante, p 341.

21Ante, p 340.

22Ante, p 340. Prieskorn " arrested) first as confine- offense for which he was ment on an "other or circumstances are "related.” conviction,” unless the offenses opinion or does not state when offenses they and when are circumstances are "related” Perhaps that offenses what is meant is "unrelated.” arising related and out of the same transaction are as it that do not are unrelated. Be that those may, nothing language, history, or there is in the justifies purpose apparent the statute that purposes, distinction, between a for sentence credit arising more offenses detained on two or defendant out of the same transaction and a defendant de- arising or more offenses out tained on two separate transactions. language, history, appear, or it in the

Nor does apparent purpose that a jail prior any who has fact "served being unable denied or of which he is con- furnish bond for the offense victed” is to be denied sentence

credit for time awaiting of which he is trial for the offense upon an convic- after sentence "other convicted thereafter at the tion” because he was then and serving upon the "other same time conviction.” a sentence language, apparent history, Nor does the purpose support ob- of the statute somewhat opinion lique suggestion in the the words to furnish bond” should be limited so as "unable "primarily” to do so

to include defendants unable inadequate financial resources.”23 "because their opinion boldly dictum, In still further obiter phrase "denied,” in the "denied defines the term possibly bond,” limit to furnish so as to or unable that term to situations where bond is pur-

denied requirements 1, of Const art suant to the 23 Ante, p 343.

360 424 Mich 327 by Opinion Levin, J. ignores § 15.24This that when the sentence credit excepted by 73, § PA 15 statute was added persons charged only from entitlement to bond proof with murder or treason when evident presumption great. persons or the would Such receive little benefit from a credit statute. § It was not until the amendment of persons entitlement bond was limited for some charged with violent felonies and certain other again, offenses other than murder or treason. Once nothing language, history, appar- there ent into it this purpose reading justifies of the statute which

suggested limitation. serving Suppose defendant, that a a sen- tence for one offense is arrested for another offense and the provides

judge may that the defendant personal recognizance,25 but, released on his be- serving sentence, cause he is still the other Although remains confinement. the defendant "inadequate by was not sources” "unable to furnish bond for the reason of financial re- convicted,” which he is he nevertheless was unable to do so.

Reading literally, the words of the statute defendant is "denied or unable furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted” for whatever period of time he is unable to obtain his freedom thereby serving jail prior and sentencing” avoid "time in regard

without to whether there is explains, more than one reason that plains, why or also ex- justice system detains him. Under 24Id. essentially Tilliard, People supra, This was the situation in n 7 judge personal recognizance

where the Court said that the set "a present breaking entering charge for the but [the defendant] meaning 'unable to furnish bond’ within the of the statute because of Michigan Department possible parole of Corrections detainer” for stemming offense, charged breaking entering violation from the arraign days and where the Court ordered credit for the 112 ment and between sentencing breaking entering on the offense. v Prieskorn language enough it is in jail prior served "time or furnish being because of denied unable to bond for the he is for what- convicted” period ever of time he was so denied his freedom by any component justice system of the that would not him on large allow to be at whatever bond that set. may have been

The to qualifications proposed several be added opinion the of the other convic- by "any Court — tion,” "related” and "unrelated” offense or circum- stances, resources,” financial denied "inadequate 1963, 1, "[pursuant] to Const art 15”—underscore § that opinion by judicial the of the Court would to construction add words the statute there stated. qualifications

The read into the statute in the language” name of obedience the "judicial to support the statute are in either the lan- without guage history apparent purpose or or statute.26 26 opinion of the Court states: (a) approach presentence "and the strict which limits credit to inability confinement that unwillingness convicted, Presumably, from or results the defendant’s financial post bond for the offense for which he has been Finn, People 580; App v 74 Mich 254 585 NW2d category this last would include instances in which the 15 of the provisions accused is denied bail under the of art § Ante, Michigan p Constitution.” 334. inability” There is not a word in Finn about either "financial "unwillingness post distinguished contrary, to following bond.” Finn On

Donkers on the basis: jail "In Donkers the defendant was arrested while as a result previous conviction for an unrelated offense. he was Hence unable present post to furnish bond. In the case defendant did in fact thereafter, ultimately for the offense for which he was convicted and bond, charge while free on went to on an unrelated another Finn, county.” People supra v at 582. Donkers, Under Finn and to to sentence credit would not be limited financially unwilling situations where the defendant is unable or post a confined in for an unrelated offense. pursuant provision, bond or denied bail to the constitutional person regarded would be as to furnish when "unable bond” jail serving previous a sentence as a result of a conviction 327 424 Mich by Levin, J.

VII defer, until receive sum, we In this Court should pre- appeal application in a case for leave to an opinion senting issue, intimation of an (b) has, times, postulated at various "The Court put Legislature by an statute was intended sentence credit accused who cannot footing equal indigency post on an bond due his See, e.g., People counterpart v who can. with his more affluent #1, (1978); Davis, 72; People App v Andrews 87 Mich 273 NW2d Pruitt, (1974); App People v 52 Mich 510, 513; (1970).”Ante, pp 334-335. 179 NW2d decided, only: Pruitt, cited cases to be stated the first of the three legislative credit-granting statute was intent of the "One manifest indigent equalize possible less far the status of the to financially who can afford as as of the accused accused with the status well-circumstanced added.) Pruitt, (Emphasis furnish bail.” supra at 513. only legislative suggests This no means that was purpose. decided, Andrews, similarly cases to be the second of the three stated: post put due purpose, usually, cannot bail "Its is to an accused who counterpart equal indigency who can.” on with his to his (Emphasis an status added.) Andrews, People supra at v 726. quoted merely Davis from Andrews and cited Pruitt. (c) among foregoing like the one "Included decisions are cases then released on bond before us in which a defendant is arrested and then, charge, pending disposition of that is subse- in one case and quently as a result of unrelated arrested incarcerated Cohen, Potts, Coyle, supra, supra, brought in See another case. Ante, p supra.” 337. "foregoing in of the cases like” this one None decisions are because denied, here, none of those decisions was credit served on in was at as it was offense, sentence, and in none of those decisions was sought, while the defendant the case in which credit is committed large on bail. (d) panels Appeals on "Other of the Court of have denied credit facts, essentially reasoning question the same in that the confinement by post inability was not occasioned which for the offense 'of bond convicted,’ by but occasioned a second was [the defendant] posted 'of arrest made after the defendant had for the offense Finn, People supra; which the v convicted.’ See [defendant] Risher, have NW2d 121 These cases by adopting been characterized some observers as decisions the 'strict’ Ante, approach application p of the sentence credit 338. statute.” opinion, As elsewhere noted in are the this the facts Finn and Risher "essentially not other the same facts” as in the those cases dealt with "foregoing of the in Finn decisions” Court of and Risher alone credit denied for a sentence. time served on People v Prieskorn correct construction the sentence statute sought where credit is for time served another free offense where the defendant was on bond when arrested for the offense and the other other offense was committed before he was released on bond, and consideration of whether the Finn/ principle, reconciled, Risher construction can Gallagher; with if it this Court’s decision adopted, can, and the Finn/Risher construction is whether means that credit should also be denied for time served on another sentence in a case where the all defendant was at times denied although or unable furnish bond the statute in requires terms credit in such a case. only J. I concur in the first two

Cavanagh, paragraphs preceding part opin- I, but intimate no reasoning analysis ion on the other opinion of the Court.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Prieskorn

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 11, 1986

Citation: 381 N.W.2d 646

Docket Number: 75370, (Calendar No. 24)

Court Abbreviation: Mich.