People v. Prentiss C.People v. Prentiss C.
Opinion
At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found Prentiss C. committed the following crimes: rape (
The minor raises only one issue on appeal. He contends the court erred by relying on section 667.6 to calculate the maximum period of confinement. (
Discussion
Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “[W]hen any person is convicted of two or more felonies . . . and a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed under Sections 669 and 1170, the aggregate term of imprisonment. . . shall be the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed pursuant to [inter alia] Section 667.6 . . . .” (Italics added.)
Generally, section 1170.1, subdivision (a) imposes one-third of the mid-range for a “subordinate” consecutive term. By contrast, section 667.6 subdivision (c) provides: “In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a
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full, separate, and consecutive term
may
be imposed for each” of several specified sex offenses, including rape, forcible oral copulation and penetration by foreign object. (Italics added.) In addition, section 667.6, subdivision (d)
requires
the court to impose full consecutive sentences for certain sex crimes (including rape, forcible oral copulation and penetration by foreign object) if they involve separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions. (See
People
v.
Pena
(1992)
The juvenile court referee did not specify which subsection he was relying on in calculating full consecutive terms under section 667.6. However, the evidence would support discretionary full consecutive sentences under subdivision (c), as well as mandatory consecutive sentences under subdivision (d) of section 667.6. 2
Appellant contends sentencing under section 667.6 is an “alternative” sentencing scheme to the one provided in section 1170.1, subdivision (a), because the first line of section 667.6, subdivision (c) provides that full consecutive terms may be imposed
[i]n lieu
of the term provided in Section 1170.1, . . .” (Italics added.) (See also
People
v.
Belmontes
(1983)
In interpreting a statute, a court “should seek to effectuate the intent of the law, acting in a reasonable fashion to give the statute a sensible construction in accordance with the purpose of the lawmakers, to promote rather than defeat the policy underlying the legislation.”
(People
v.
Superior Court (Price)
(1984)
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If we apply section 667 to determine the maximum aggregate term for multiple sex offenses, we promote the policy underlying Welfare and Institutions Code
Nevertheless, appellant argues that the reference to section 667.6 in the quoted language is not to subdivisions (c) and (d), which provide for full consecutive sentencing, but to subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 667.6 which provide for enhancements where a defendant has previously been convicted of a sex offense. The short answer to this contention is: if the Legislature wished to limit section 1170.1 in this manner, it could have easily done so by referring to the specific subsections. Instead, the statute states the “aggregate term of imprisonment shall be the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed pursuant to Section . . . 667.6, . . ." (Italics added.) Significantly, section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (d) do not describe the terms imposed under those sections as “subordinate” terms; instead, they impose additional terms which are added to the terms calculated under section 1170.1. 4
In short, the method used by the juvenile court ensured that the minor will not be held “in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult” for the same offenses. (
Consequently, we affirm the judgment.
Merrill, J., and Werdegar, J„ concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 14, 1993, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 22, 1993.
Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Whether the referee relied on subdivision (c) or subdivision (d) is irrelevant to our analysis, since the “maximum period of imprisonment” would be the same under either section.
Of course, the court is not
required
to aggregate multiple periods of confinement; however, once it elects to do so it must act in accordance with subdivision (a) of section 1170.1.
(In re Jesse F.
(1982)
Both subdivisions (c) and (d) provide that the full consecutive sentences imposed “shall be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released from imprisonment. The term shall not be included in any determination pursuant to Section 1170.1.”