*1
POWELL
PEOPLE v
17, 1993,
February
Lansing.
Docket No. 151214. Submitted
at
Decided
20, 1993,
September
appeal sought.
at 9:15 a.m. Leave to
Powell, Jr., charged
Court,
Adie
in the Genesee Circuit
Judith A.
Fullerton, J.,
conduct,
first-degree
with
criminal sexual
moved
suppression
in limine for the
of evidence obtained in a search
pursuant
of his home
to a warrant and for the admission of
complainant’s
history
persons
evidence of the
sexual
with
other
than himself. He contended that
the affidavit submitted to a
magistrate
support
application
of the
for the search warrant
statutory requirement
naming
violated a
that an affidavit not
person
from whom the affiant obtained information must
allegations
magistrate may
contain affirmative
from which the
spoke
personal
conclude that the unnamed source
with
knowl-
edge of the information and either that the source is credible or
regard
that the information is reliable. With
to evidence of the
complainant’s
history,
alleged
sexual
the defendant
that testi-
mony indicating
complainant
topless
that the
was a
dancer and
company
reputed prostitutes
was seen in the
of
would establish
complainant
prostitute
a was
and had consented to
granted
sexual intercourse with the defendant. The trial court
prosecution appealed by
granted.
both motions. The
leave
Appeals
Court
held:
ruling
1. The trial court abused its discretion in
as admissible
proffered
complainant
topless
evidence that
was a
prostitutes.
dancer and that she was seen with
That evidence is
statute,
rape-shield
750.520j;
barred
MCL
MSA
28.788(10),
prejudicial
probative
and it
is more
than
with
respect to the claim that
the sexual encounter between the
complainant and the defendant was consensual.
suppressing
2. The trial court
erred
the evidence obtained
support
with the search warrant. The affidavit submitted in
application
780.653;
28.1259(3),
the warrant
satisfies MCL
statute,
as amended
that the evidence of the sexual inadmissible, but stated that the warrant affidavit is deficient 28.1259(3) 780.563; under MCL and that the trial court suppressed pursuant correctly evidence seized to the warrant. Kelley, Attorney General, L. Frank J. Thomas Casey, General, Weiss, E. Solicitor Robert Prose- cuting Attorney, Kuebler, Chief, A. and Donald Appellate people. Division, for the
Barney Whitesman, R. for the defendant. Shepherd P.J., Before: Corrigan, and Mc- JJ. Donald, people appeal by P.J. The leave
Corrigan, granting granted an order defendant’s mo- from pursuant suppress to a tion to evidence obtained granting and from an order defen- search warrant motion to admit evidence of the victim’s dant’s prosecu- parties in third this sexual conduct with Opinion by Corrigan, P.J. 750.520b(l) conduct, MCL tion for criminal sexual 28.788(2)(l)(e). (e); MSA We reverse both orders.1 charges underlying The incident occurred on alleged 19, 1991. The victim that she was October visiting neighbor defendant, a whom she had approximately years, four to five at his known for apartment. attempted leave,
When victim prevented doing defendant her from so. After threatening sexually club, her with a he assaulted prosti- victim, her. Defendant contends tute, with consented to have sexual intercourse falsely him and then only accused him of sexual assault pay he failed her. because We address two (1) appeal: issues on whether the court erred ruling pertaining certain admissible persons the victim’s sexual activities with other (2) than defendant and suppressing whether the court erred pursuant evidence obtained to a *3 search warrant that was determined to be invalid.
I. THE EVIDENCE OF VICTIM’S PRIOR CONDUCT ruling The court abused its in discretion admis- regarding certain evidence sible victim’s em- topless ployment as a dancer and that prostitute. people victim was a contend rape- admission of the evidence will violate 28.788(10), 750.520j; statute, shield while MCL MSA argues preclusion defendant of the evidence right will violate his constitutional to confront rape-shield witnesses. The lower court found the applicable, statute but ruled the evidence could be it admitted because was "material to a fact at prej- issue,” defense, defendant’s consent and "the outweigh probative [did] udicial nature not its Shepherd 1Judges i; Judge and concur McDonald Section Shepherd concurs in Sections i and n. The views stated in Section m opinion of the are mine alone. People Powell v Corrigan, P.J. disagree We value.”2 hold inadmissible. Michigan rape-shield statute
Enactment of
Legislature’s
that,
reflected the
the
determination
overwhelming
prosecutions,
majority of
evi-
rape
par-
of a
victim’s sexual conduct with
dence
defendant, as
as the
ties other
victim’s sexual
than the
well
reputation,
is neither an accurate
veracity nor determinative
measure of the victim’s
of the likelihood of consensual sexual relations
People
LaLone,
v
432 Mich
with the defendant.
(On
(1989); People
103;
purpose showing a victim’s bias or mo- filing People LaLone, tive for a false claim. supra; Hackett, 365 NW2d *4 403(a)(3) Although recognize jurists MRE to we some believe be issue, analyzing proper vehicle for this the lower court and the parties and, applied analysis applicable rape-shield statute have to otherwise, majority until Court us we a of our instructs LaLone, do the same. See 437 NW2d will Corrigan, P.J. case, the intro- defendant seeks In the instant party testimony by that on a a third duction date before the assault walking the victim he saw persons been informed were whom he had with prostitutes question a date after the incident and that on dancing topless at a the victim
he viewed testify topless also seeks to club. Defendant local that, approximately incident, months after two waving standing corner to on a he saw the victim passing He in a short skirt. cars while dressed engaging he believed she was what contends prostitution. attempts Defendant to solicit be defense that is material to his claims this evidence in ex- to have intercourse the victim consented change agree appropri- money. an We might re- a such as defendant’s ate case quire defense demonstrating the admission of evidence employment prostitute at the time of victim’s as a alleged This, however, not the case. assault. the The attempts
majority defendant of the evidence not material to his claim that to introduce is prostitute from whom he solicited victim was a question. A date in victim’s em- services on the ployment topless her a dancer does not render as prostitute. The offer of this evidence constitutes attempt place nothing before more than "questionable” jury character. the victim’s sexual rape- type Clearly, that the this is the shield statute was enacted address. remaining
Moreover, evi- we find defendant’s prejudicial proba- considerably more than dence tive. person in the viewed the victim who alleged prostitutes company did testified he prosti- in fact not know whether the women were anything any event, he had never heard tutes. reputation. Likewise, defen- the victim’s bad about self-serving testimony that two months af- dant’s allegedly crime, he the victim ter the witnessed *5 People v Powell Opinion by Corrigan, P.J. soliciting questionable probative was of value with respect him to whether she had solicited two ruling months earlier. The court erred in proffered evidence admissible.3
II. SUPPRESSION OF OF EVIDENCE—SUFFICIENCY
AFFIDAVIT sup- next court We conclude that erred pressing . the the fruits of search of defendant’s apartment. just noon; The crime occurred before procured day. the warrant was the same The explicitly search warrant affidavit did not state the victim herself was the source of the reading However, information. the a common-sense affidavit, whole, taken as a that the establishes allega- named victim was the actual source of the tions underlying A search warrant affidavit. victim, crime mant, in contrast to an underworld infor- presumptively Additionally, reliable. proven reliability victim’s was the self-authenti- cating details of the crime affida- contained 28.1259(3), Accordingly, 780.653; vit. MCL as amended 1988 PA was satisfied. affiant,
The affidavit states that a Flint police sergeant years experience, with ten was investigating a criminal sexual conduct case ear- day apartment. lier that at the defendant’s The complainant by affidavit then identifies the name. complainant It stated that dant’s talking visited the defen- apartment, neighbor years. her of four After drinking gin forty- with him for about complainant minutes, him five asked for her prejudicial Because we find the evidence either irrelevant or more probative, than we need not whether address exclusion was mandated apparent requisite ten-day because of defendant’s failure to meet the However, requirement notice of the statute. we to note failure file may require such a notice the exclusion of evidence otherwise admis Lucas, supra. sible under the statute. Corrigan, P.J. get it, she went declined When defendant
coat.
subse-
it. Defendant
look for
the bedroom
complainant
grabbed
quently
from behind
club.
a carved wooden
her with
threatened
specific
of three
details
furnished
then
affiant
first-degree
conduct, as
sexual
criminal
counts
example,
explicit
the crime—for
details of
as
well
the
*6
cranberry-
presence
on defendant’s
semen
of
also de-
The affiant
the bed.
robe and
colored
physical evidence
items of
the location
scribed
complainant
had
the defendant
and
the
that
permission
sought
to search
The affiant
touched.
drinking glasses,
including
items,
these
cranberry-
gin
stick, the
bottle,
club or
the brown
clothing.
robe,
bed
colored
28.1259(3), an
780.653; MSA
to MCL
Pursuant
supplied
upon
may
information
be based
affidavit
by
If
source is
or unnamed source.
a named
only contain affirmative
named,
allegations
need
the affidavit
magistrate
permit
to conclude
knowledge
personal
of the
the source had
that
facts
alleged.
unnamed,
If the source
the source is
must show that
in the affidavit
credible or
is reliable.
that the information
reading
affidavit,
taken
A common-sense
yields
whole,
the affiant
the conclusion
as a
obtained
crime victim.
directly
the named
from
her information
not an "unidentified
The victim was
police
sense. Neither
informant” in the classical
subject identified crime victims are
nor
officers
applied
requirements
in-
once
to confidential
Aguilar/
milieu under
from the criminal
formers
Spinelli.4 Indeed,
States
Court
the United
veracity
traditionally
of informa-
assumed the
has
Maroney,
by
supplied
Chambers v
tion
the victim.
4
(1964);
Texas,
108;
1509;
Aguilar
12 L Ed 2d
v
378 US
84 S Ct
723
States,
410;
584;
Spinelli
an arrest makes crime, eyewitness to a victim or complaints, as demon- underlying circumstances where omitted; knowledge. strate his firsthand [Citations emphasis added.] Aguilar/Spi- McCreary out that pointed court of informants nelli problems to the only related to arrests based underworld and from the criminal general target’s of the suspicion because on mere pres- Id. at 1268. Neither situation reputation. in this case. ent REMAND OF EVIDENCE—MITCHELL5
III. SUPPRESSION
FOR
REMEDIES
THE
OF EXCLUSIONARY
AND
VALIDITY
STATUTORY VIOLATIONS
I also con-
separately
in
because
part
I write
could have entertained
that
the circuit court
clude
the affiant
proof
offer of
that
prosecutor’s
time the warrant
affida-
under oath at the
testified
rape
victim herself was
presented
vit was
affidavit.
the source of the
Further,
of the amendments
contained
light
precedent
federal
intervening
in 1988 PA
rule,
the continu-
relating
exclusionary
to the
powers doctrine
supervisory
refinement of the
ing
Sherbine, 421
People
nine
since
years
(1984),
decided,6 I
658
was
502;
364 NW2d
of Sherbine’s con-
continuing validity
question
probative
exclusion
clusion
5
Mitchell,
364;
798
NW2d
Leon,
897;
3405;
See, e.g.,
104 S Ct
82 L
States v
468 US
United
Krull,
340;
1160;
(1984);
94 L Ed
480 US
107 S Ct
Ed 2d 677
Illinois v
States,
2529;
(1987);
533;
Murray
487 US
108 S Ct
v United
2d
(1988)
also, e.g.,
(good-faith exception); see
Bank of
L Ed 2d 472
States,
250;
2369;
108 S Ct
10Í L Ed 2d
v United
487 US
Nova Scotia
Mechanik,
938;
(1988);
106 S Ct
89 L
States v
475 US
United
*8
1974;
499;
(1986);
Hastings, 461
103 S Ct
States v
US
Ed 2d 50
United
(Í983) (supervisory power).
The United States has directly not decided whether and under cir- what supplement cumstances oral information can written search warrant affidavit. fed- Numerous courts, however, eral circuit held have require Fourth Amendment does not a written supporting application sworn statement for a government may prove search warrant. The issuing magistrate apart information, had oral *9 516 526 Opinion Corrigan, P.J. affidavit, authorize in the to
from the warrant. United States v search issuance (CA 1974); 5, Hill, 315, 500 F2d 320-321 United Brierley, Gaugler 516, F2d 522- ex rel v 477 States (CA 1973); 1224, 3, Roberts, 441 F2d 523 Frazier v (CA Eyman, 1971); 8, 648, 389 F2d Sherrick v 1226 1968). (CA recording 9, the oral is 652 Nor required by the Fourth Amendment. information magistrate’s duty testimony under The is take testimony preserved oath, whether or not that is Goyett, 699 later review. United States v F2d for 838 1983). (CA generally, LaFave, 6, See, Search 4.3(b); Seizure, § anno: court determi- and nation of Federal probable con- cause for search warrant: testimony was, in of oral which addition sideration affidavit, who 24 before officer issued warrant. 107. ALR Fed supra Hill, 322,
In the Fifth United States v at supplementation Appeals Court of allowed Circuit of the affidavit with oral testimony and declined to exclude relevant evidence: apply situation furnishes no occasion to [T]his to bar the of Hill’s exclusionary rule executing the criminality that was obtained in Phillips properly going to the
warrant. magistrate acted seeking Magistrate warrant. calling infor- properly Sear acted mation to additional Thus, credibility. only demonstrate procedure they error attributable to the followed way a technical one that would deterrent no serve purposes of the rule. Williams, v F2d See also United States 1980). (CA 5, B. REMAND TO ORAL TESTIMONY RECONSTRUCT response People supra, Sherbine, v Powell Corrigan, P.J. Legislature, PA in 1988 amended the search 28.1259(3). statute, 780.653; warrant MCL Legislature repudiated Sherbine’s conclusion expanded statute had codified and (In AguilarZSpinelli Sherbine, test. this construc- tion the statute allowed the Court to deciding Michigan avoid whether followed Illinois Gates, 213; 462 US S Ct 76 L Ed 2d [1983].) statutory The current test now far lenient than more the former wooden and inflexi- *10 Aguilar/Spinelli Legislature certainly ble test. The contemplate did not the situation at hand it when response amended the statute in to Sherbine. Nor Legislature suppression remedy did the choose as a for technical violations of or the statute foreclose testimony actually pre- remands to reconstruct examining magistrate. Tejeda, sented to the See supra at 464. significantly,
Even more
after
de-
Sherbine was
Supreme
cided, the
Court in
Mitchell,
(1987),
Mich
circumstances. a especially appropriate because the search warrant explicitly and affidavit in this case state that magis- affiant was examined under oath before trate. The first of the sentence search warrant part, states, in relevant "On examination on oath writing reading and in of . the affiant. . and after evaluating and . .” the affidavit. .
C. REMEDY EXCLUSIONARY FOR STATUTORY
VIOLATIONS Suppression judge-made evidence, of seized a Mich Corrigan, P.J. designed remedy of the Fourth to deter violations remedy Amendment, for the is warrant harsh a defi- too depicted draftsmanship cient search these facts. Michigan A violation of technical require exclu- should not search warrant statute probative the absence an sion of explicit evidence justifi-
legislative Sherbine’s sole directive. exclusionary remedy statutory for an for cation People Chartrand, 73 is a to violations reference (1977), App 645; in a footnote. Mich 252 NW2d Supreme 511-512, n 18. The Court See did not so Chartrand, much Chartrand. as discuss turn, discuss, at not much less at- does suppression probative tempt justify, why statutory a is warranted for mere viola- tion. Supreme this diffi- Court’s failure to discuss troubling. question
cult The issue of Sherbine Supreme authority suppress Court’s evi- significant statutory dence for violations is complex. may Indeed, lack the Court remedy authority impose exclusionary e.g., Reconsidering statutory See, Beale, violation. power supervisory in criminal cases: Constitutional statutory authority on the limits federal *11 courts, L R Professor Columbia where United Beale examines cases Supreme the States requested apply Court declined reme- statutory Congress dies for not Beale violations because had explicitly authorized those remedies. Professor
explores separation-of-powers problems the legisla- judicial usurpation of unexercised in the powers purely remedies for statu- tive fashion well-developed analysis tory violations. Her raises questions Michigan’s similar about scheme. See Tejeda, supra J., 461-467 also ing). at dissent- (Griffin, exclusionary remedy Moreover, an is cruel and Powell Opinion by Corrigan, P.J. disproportionate Physical in these circumstances. corroborating the commission of a serious suppressed investiga- crime would be so that this tor will theory from be deterred future "misconduct.” The through punishment, that, this the detec- judges tive would learn to inform in the future in writing allegations. about the actual source the of noted, As the Fourth Amendment itself does not command a written submission. Michigan Tucker, 94 Ct 2357; US S (1974), Supreme recog-
L41 2d 182 Ed the Court purposes nized that the ary of deterrent the exclusion- police engaged rule assume that the have in negligent deprived wilful or conduct that has the the right. remedy ignores defendant of The some prospect unjust acquittal theory of on offending police high lesson to officers worth the case, minimis, In this de cost. the the violation is but disproportionate cost punishment is extreme. The nature of is even more extreme if the inves- tigator actually judge informed district about allegations. of source The detective com- plied by applying with the Fourth Amendment apparently good complete a warrant. She in acted faith.
The deterrence rationale has no force whatso- setting. investigator ever this The did not en- gage deterring in misconduct worth in a rational society. police pro- The "error” to the attributable unwilling equate I cedure was technical. am slight imperfection draftsmanship human de- picted here the "midst and of haste a criminal investigation” warranting with misbehavior remedy suppression. advancing drastic from Far purposes exclusionary the deterrent rule, promotes public exclusion this evidence disre- spect legal process. for the recognized good-faith Court has á *12 McDonald, J. obtaining
exception violations in for constitutional Leon, 497 US States a search warrant. United 897, 903, Ed n 82 L 2d 677 1; 104 S Ct statutory power suppress judicial for viola- If Michigan judges Michigan, in then tions does exist recognize exception good-faith surely should statutory the violation at issue. jurisdiction
Reversed; retained. not J., Shepherd, parts only. ii concurred with I and part dissenting (concurring and J. McDonald, part Judge Although part). I i concur with of Corrigan’s opinion, respectfully I dissent from the opinion. of balance the people on in concede the affidavit relied satisfy
issuing the failed search warrant 28.1259(3). requirements 780.653; of MCL MSA Although thorough, specific, the affidavit contained particularized facts, it failed name though appears of information. Even it source from the obvious the information was obtained magistrate informed, and that was so victim the uous. language mandatory unambig- statutory probable finding It cause "shall states upon all the facts related within the be based added) (emphasis and, if the affidavit is affidavit” upon supplied by unnamed information based person, it contain must magistrate
affirmative
may
knowledge
from which the
person
spoke
personal
conclude that
with
and either that
information
informa-
person
unnamed
is credible or
28.1259(3)
780.653(b);
tion
reliable.
[MCL
(b)J
suppression
of the statute results
Violation
pursuant
to the warrant.
the evidence obtained
Powell
*13
Opinion by McDonald,
J.
Sherbine,
