People v. PostPeople v. Post
Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Jesse Post, was denied pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (
I. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Pretrial Detention Proceedings and First Appeal
¶ 4 On November 7, 2023, defendant was charged by information with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (
¶ 5 On appeal, this court determined the trial court failed to make a record adequate to allow a meaningful review of its decision to deny defendant pretrial release. Therefore, we vacated the order denying defendant‘s pretrial release and remanded with directions for the trial court to promptly set a new detention hearing, at which the State could present evidence and the court could make express findings, based on defendant‘s individual circumstances, as to whether any condition or combination of conditions would allow for his pretrial release. People v. Post, 2024 IL App (4th) 241002-U, ¶ 29.
¶ 7 On remand, the trial court held a new detention hearing. The State presented the following evidence: (1) proffered testimony of Sheriff Jonathon Webb regarding a prior unrelated investigation of abuse allegations involving defendant‘s four-year-old daughter; (2) proffered testimony of Officer Ryan McCabe regarding the abuse allegations involving the three victims in this case (the victims were seven, five, and four years old at the time, and the abuse occurred when defendant was their father‘s roommate); and (3) testimony of Breitanyia L., the mother of the three victims, explaining defendant‘s alleged abuse of her children as well as what several other people had told her about being victimized by defendant. Defendant testified prior to his arrest he was a “stay-at-home father” to his youngest son living in Peoria and he had no contact with his other three children. If released, he stated he would reside in St. David, Illinois, with his mother, would have no reason to go to Peoria, and would abide by any conditions of release including restrictions on his movement and wearing an ankle monitor. The evidence presented was discussed at length by this court in defendant‘s second appeal and need not be repeated here. See People v. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 241527-U.
¶ 8 The trial court denied defendant‘s pretrial release, expressing concerns regarding the victims and the community at large and finding there was no set of circumstances at that time supporting defendant‘s pretrial release. Defendant‘s motion to reconsider pursuant to
¶ 9 Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, the trial court erred in allowing hearsay evidence regarding his danger to the community, considering evidence of a 2017 Child Advocacy Center interview of his child that did not result in any arrest or criminal charges, and
C. Defendant‘s Motion for Release Based on Change in Circumstances
¶ 11 On April 23, 2025, defendant filed a motion for review of his pretrial detention order pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code, arguing for his pretrial release. Defendant stated a change in circumstances had occurred since the order to detain was entered and pointed to the following: (1) he had obtained appropriate housing and would reside with his parents, (2) his parents would provide constant and direct supervision, (3) he would agree to wear an ankle monitor, and (4) he would abide by all terms and conditions the court wished to impose upon him. Defendant contended because of these circumstances “there is no longer a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons or the community” and his continued pretrial detention was no longer necessary.
¶ 12 A hearing was held on May 6, 2025. The court took judicial notice of the evidence presented at the prior detention hearing as well as this court‘s decision affirming the decision (Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 241527-U).
¶ 13 Defendant testified, if he was released, he would reside in St. David, Illinois, at his mother‘s residence and he would agree to being placed on home confinement. Defendant was willing to wear a GPS ankle monitor to confirm he remained at home, and his parents would be able to provide constant supervision of him. He explained, although his father worked, his mother would be home all the time and he would abide by any conditions imposed by the court.
¶ 14 On cross-examination, defendant admitted he last resided with his parents from 2020 to 2022. The trial court then inquired regarding defendant‘s parents. Defendant testified his father was 67 years old and his mother was 64 years old. His father was in good health and was
¶ 15 In arguing there are less restrictive means to protect the community other than continued detention, defense counsel conceded “some of this information may seem to be not very dissimilar” to the information presented at the prior detention hearing. Still, he argued the information presented, notably defendant being “agreeable to house arrest,” “dispels or dissipates some of the concern the Court would have at [defendant‘s] free reign to go wherever he wished to or be wherever he wished to.”
¶ 16 In response, the State stood by its previous arguments as to why there was no condition or combination of conditions to protect the community from defendant in this case. The State pointed out defendant‘s testimony did not establish a change in circumstances, other than defendant‘s assertion that “his mother would watch him 24/7.”
¶ 17 At the close of arguments, the trial court denied defendant‘s motion, finding GPS monitoring would not work in this case, noting the testimony regarding defendant‘s conduct at the prior hearing was “of significant concern” and given defendant‘s mother‘s age and health.
¶ 18 Defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to
¶ 19 This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Defendant relies on his motion for relief filed in the trial court as his argument on appeal in accordance with
¶ 23 Importantly, we caution defendants relying upon a
¶ 24 In his one-paragraph, run-on sentence motion for relief, defendant contends he showed a change in circumstances had occurred establishing there were less restrictive means to protect the victims and the community other than his continued confinement. In support he points to the following to justify his release with conditions: (1) he secured housing in Fulton County with his parents, who would be able to provide 24 hour supervision of him, (2) he would wear an ankle monitor and abide by the conditions of house arrest, (3) he would be able to assist his mother with her health issues, (4) he would have no contact with the alleged victims or their family, and (5) he would abide by any other conditions the court wished to impose of him.
¶ 25 When a defendant has been denied pretrial release under the dangerousness standard, the Code provides, “[a]t each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.”
¶ 26 In People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 28, this court addressed the method by which trial courts must assess the issue of continued detention under section 110-6.1(i-5) and determined a trial court must find a change in circumstances has occurred before altering an existing detention order under this provision. In doing so, we compared the language of the three provisions of the Code governing the process of reviewing pretrial detention or conditions of detention, which is required at every subsequent court appearance. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶¶ 23-29; see
¶ 27 The next question we must address is what standard of review should be applied on appeal. The majority of the district courts have previously held a trial court‘s decision at
¶ 28 After Morgan, one decision has continued the reasoning set forth in Thomas, Casey, Harris, and Walton, concluding that, because proceedings under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code do not require the specific findings required at the initial pretrial detention hearing and, in fact, the section contains no standard of proof or burden of proof, it is “logical that the legislature intended the finding required by [this section] *** to be discretionary in nature.” People v. Mansoori, 2025 IL App (1st) 250481-U, ¶ 32. In contrast, two districts have determined the reasoning in Morgan “applies equally to hearings on continued detention.” People v. Thomas, 2025 IL App (1st) 250251-U, ¶ 23 (applying Morgan and utilizing de novo
¶ 29 We are aligned with the line of cases distinguishing a trial court‘s initial pretrial detention decision from its continued detention decisions, thus distinguishing Morgan, and conclude the appropriate standard of review in this situation is the abuse-of-discretion standard. In Morgan, the court held “there is nothing discretionary about making a finding as to whether the State has met its standard of proof of a particular fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 28. Section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code does not set forth a standard of proof or impose a burden of proof regarding the issue of pretrial detention. Therefore, we find persuasive the proposition that, “if the purpose of a standard of proof is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication,’ [(Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 29)] then the absence of such a standard suggests the legislature intended to leave the decision to the trial court‘s discretion.” Mansoori, 2025 IL App (1st) 250481-U, ¶ 32. In sum, a trial court‘s decision regarding continued detention under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court‘s “decision is arbitrary, fanciful or
¶ 30 In this case, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant‘s continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. Defendant failed to present to the court any new information or demonstrate a change in circumstances to justify changing the court‘s decision to order his pretrial detention. Defendant stated he had secured housing in Fulton County with his parents who would be able to provide 24-hour supervision of him. However, at defendant‘s prior hearing, he also stated he would be able to live under his mother‘s supervision in Fulton County. The only information that could be considered “new” was defendant‘s assertion that his 64-year-old mother, who suffers from health issues requiring regular medical attention, did not work and could provide 24-hour supervision. The court considered defendant‘s mother‘s age and health concerns to be relevant factors to assessing her ability to monitor defendant and noted the testimony presented at the prior hearing regarding defendant‘s conduct remained of “significant concern.” Defendant stated he would wear an ankle monitor and abide by the conditions of house arrest. Defendant volunteering to wear an ankle monitor is not new information, as he stated his willingness to do so at the prior hearing. Although defendant‘s willingness to be under house arrest was not specifically discussed at his prior hearing, the court at that time was told defendant was amenable to wearing an ankle monitor, being prohibited from going to Peoria, and any other restrictions on his movement. The possibility of wearing a GPS monitor in the context of house arrest was a condition available at the time of defendant‘s prior hearing; thus, it is not a change in circumstances. Further, defendant‘s statement that “he would be there to assist with his mother[‘]s health issues” is not new information that would impact the necessity for defendant‘s
¶ 31 After our careful review, we conclude the trial court‘s decision that defendant‘s continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community was based on the specific articulable facts of the case and was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Defendant‘s “new information” was basically that he was willing to be on house arrest with GPS monitoring and under the supervision of his elderly parents. This option and information were available to the trial court at the time of his prior detention hearing and are, therefore, insufficient to show a change in circumstances as is required to warrant a change in his detention status.
¶ 32 Although we have determined the proper standard of review of a continued detention determination is abuse of discretion and the trial court‘s decision was not an abuse of discretion in this case, we further find the result would be the same under the manifest weight of the evidence standard as well. Therefore, we affirm.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
| Decision Under Review: | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fulton County, No. 23-CF-235; the Hon. Thomas B. Ewing, Judge, presiding. |
| Attorneys for Appellant: | James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and James Wozniak, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. |
| Attorneys for Appellee: | Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People. |